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At the heart of this dissertation is a detailed analysis of the Sasun violence of 1893-1894.   
I used a variety of sources:  consular reports (British, American, French, Russian, 
Italian); missionary material from the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign 
Missions (ABCFM); and Ottoman archival documents.  My dissertation examines how 
different accounts of the violence were disseminated and censored in the years following 
the violence of 1894.   
 
My central argument is that State centralization and the efforts of the Ottoman State to 
maintain a monopoly of legitimate violence1 and legitimate narrative must be understood 
in order to explain both the violence in Sasun and the larger breakdown of communal 
relations between the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
To summarize by way of chapter headings and short descriptions:  I first examine two 
sharply divergent explanations for what happened in the mountains of Sasun in August 
and September of 1894.  The first narrative, maintained by scholars within Ottoman 
Studies, presents the violence in Sasun as the first major rebellion of Armenian 
nationalists against the State.  The second narrative, held by many scholars in Armenian 
                                                        
1 Max Weber defined the state as, “that human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a particular territory.”  Quoted in Peter Breiner, Max Weber & 
Democratic Politics (Cornell University, 1996), p. 127.  Charles Tilly has built on this definition.   
Studies, has presented the violence as the first major episode of Ottoman State mass 
violence against its Armenian populace.  This difference in interpreting the violence of 
Sasun as either a massacre or a rebellion can be traced back to 1894.  Although these 
narratives are based on very different primary documents and assumptions, they both 
analyze the events in Sasun in terms of a broader story of Armenian Nationalism and 
State opposition to that Nationalism.  The scholars of Ottoman Studies who have delved 
into the question of what happened in Sasun in 1894 have relied primarily on one 
account, a report by Zeki Paşa, the commander of the Ottoman forces in the area. 
Scholars within Armenian Studies have used a more diverse set of sources to tell the 
story (memoirs, foreign consul accounts, and contemporary newspapers).  The goal of 
this dissertation is to trace all of the available narratives of Sasun to their origins and to 
evaluate all of the evidence together.  I conclude the first chapter with a different 
approach that places more weight on the longue durée history of the Ottoman State’s 
efforts to centralize its authority by gaining a monopoly of both legitimate force and 
legitimate narrative.  
 
In the second chapter I examine how three technologies (modern firearms, steamboats 
and telegraphs) were used to centralize Ottoman authority in the East.  Through these 
technologies, the Ottoman State was able to first conquer and then, over the course of 
decades, entrench State rule in areas that had hitherto been autonomous.  This 
centralization had some unintended effects as the new technologies dramatically changed 
local relations in Muş and Sasun.  The spread of high-powered firearms from Europe, the 
availability of steam travel on the Black Sea and telegraphs dramatically changed local 
relations in Muş and Sasun.  From the point of view of the inhabitants of Muş and Sasun, 
this period of centralization or reordering (Tanzimat) represented nothing less than a 
violent conquest by the State.  As the local Emirs that traditionally ruled in plain of Muş 
were toppled, a new system of Warlord-Bureaucrats (assigned by the Ottoman Central 
Authority) grew in its place.  For many, this new system simply meant that, increasingly, 
local resources were sent off to build palaces in Istanbul.  One of the unintended 
consequences of these transformations was the creation of new forms of political identity 
as Armenian peasants from many areas began in Istanbul to identify their homeland as a 
geographically bounded place known as ‘Armenia.’ 
 
In the third chapter, I situate the beginning of the ‘Armenian issue’ as a struggle near 
Muş between Armenian peasants and their warlord Musa Bey.  When peasants from Muş 
staged a protest against Musa Bey in Istanbul, the local struggle soon gained international 
attention.  To undercut the charges of corruption, Abdülhamid II ordered Musa Bey to 
Istanbul to stand trial.  When Musa Bey was acquitted in a highly irregular three-day 
trial, a group of young students at the Istanbul Medical School joined together with 
students from abroad to form the first branch of the Hunchak (Bell), a radical movement 
for Armenian political liberation.  Back in Muş, the struggle between peasants and 
Warlord-Bureaucrats such as Musa Bey was a major factor in the creation of the Fedayi 
movement, a collection of Armenian self-defense groups who espoused Armenian 
political liberation.  The combination of international attention, the formation of the 
Hunchak in Istanbul and the advent of the Fedayi in the Eastern provinces terrified the 
Ottoman State.  Convinced that history was repeating itself, in the manner of the 
Bulgarian rebellion of 1876, the Ottoman State sanctioned greater repression of any 
dissent or sign of political organization within the Armenian communities of the East.  
Certain officials within the Ottoman Government benefited financially from this more 
authoritarian governance, and used the paranoia of the Ottoman center to enrich 
themselves.  The result of all of this are the massacres in the Sasun mountains where 
Ottoman soldiers systematically murdered one to two thousand Armenian villagers, and 
burned their villages, over the course of three weeks in August to September of 1894.  
 
In the fourth chapter, I examine how the violence of Sasun was interpreted differently, for 
example, by the investigations of missionaries and consuls, and by the censorship regime 
of Abdülhamid II.  The main goal here is to show that the Ottoman State relied almost 
exclusively on a single legitimist report written by Zeki Paşa.2  Zeki Paşa’s report became 
the measure of ‘truth’ within the Ottoman State.  To retain a monopoly of legitimate 
narrative, the Ottoman State utilized various forms of censorship – from banning 
newspapers from abroad, to forbidding any independent discussion of Sasun in the 
Ottoman Press, and from preventing peasants from the area from travelling, and 
eventually banning all journalists from abroad.  At the same time, news of the massacres 
spread through word of mouth, and rumors of the Sasun violence increased tensions 
throughout the Ottoman Empire.  When news of the violence finally reached London 
through missionary networks in mid-November, it ignited a much larger debate about the 
British Government’s support (now understood by many as complicity) for the autocracy 
of Sultan Abdülhamid II.  
                                                        
2 For my use of legitimist here see, Rifa’at Abou el-Haj’s review of Stanford and Ezel Shaw’s History of 
the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey in American Historical Review 197.   
 
In the fifth chapter, I show how, within a year of the violence, two broad stories had 
coalesced.  According to some, it was in Sasun where the Ottoman State first committed 
an organized massacre against its Armenian populace.  According to other accounts, it 
was in Sasun where Armenian radicals first organized a full-fledged rebellion against the 
Ottoman State.  Although these two stories were often interpreted in a myriad of different 
ways in Istanbul, London and Boston, the main ideas have been maintained until today in 
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All scholarship is communal.  Just behind the mask of single authorship lies a whole 
range of conversations ... with the living and the dead.  
 
If this is generally the case, it is more the case here.  At the end of a long stint in graduate 
school, having shifted my scholarly interests from Timbuktu to Anatolia (and a few 
places in between), I struggled to weave a thousand threads into a single story.  Those 
threads were pulled from archives in several countries and in many languages.  They told 
a compelling story which was complex ... unyielding to a single villian or hero.  
 
In the summer of 2014, my mother suggested that I orally relate the central findings of 
my research .  My father agreed to act an interlocutor.  Over the course of several weeks, 
we recorded the stories of the murder of Professor Hagopian, the kidnapping of Gülizar, 
the patterns linking State censorship and centralization, and the unequal distribution of 
weapons in the plains of Muş.  We discussed the difficulties of assuming that the 
identities of mountain people accorded with those in the lowlands.  We discussed the 
protests at Kum Kapı and the life and death of Rev. George Perkins Knapp.  A semester 
at Cornell gave me the time to type a 274-page single-spaced transcript of conversations, 
and the space to transmute that transcript to the requirements of a PhD dissertation.    
 
The long dialog with my father was rooted in many earlier conversations, with people 
and with texts.   Both at UC Santa Cruz and at Columbia, I have been fortunate to have 
 
 iv 
brilliant teachers.  At UC Santa Cruz, Edmund Burke III, Dilip Basu, and Jonathan 
Beecher set a very high bar for honesty, creativity and intellectual stamina that I hope one 
day to live up to.  During my long years at Columbia University, I am grateful to my 
teachers Melissa Bilal, Frederick Cooper, Ryan Gingeras, Victoria de Grazia, Hans-
Lukas Kieser, Gulnar Kendirbai, Mahmood Mamdani, Armen Marsoobian, Mark 
Mazower, Caterina Pizzigoni and Nader Sohrabi. 
 
Many years of institutional support from Columbia University as well as a Foreign 
Language and Area Studies Program (FLAS-Turkey) provided me with the resources to 
learn languages and search archives in Turkey, England, and France, as well as many 
archives in the United States. 
  
I am also indebted to my friends and colleagues.  Westenley Alcenat, Elif Alp, Maya 
Alyassini, Ahmad Amara, José Tomás Atria, Nazar Bağcı, Idan Barir, Hannah Barker, 
Juan Blanco, Melissa Bilal, Rishad Choudhury, Jonathan Cleveland, Jared Conrad-
Bradshaw, Darren Byler, Giuliana Charmedes, Dzovinar Derderian, Chris Edling, Abdi 
Latif Ega, Gregory Ferguson-Cradler, Aimee Genell, Mike Golan, Ryan Hagen, Mostafa 
Hefni, Tolga Kobaş, Uluğ Kuzuoğlu, Elinor Morack, Nathan Stroupe, Zozan Pehlivan, 
Helen Pfeifer, Saskia Schaefer, Nathan Stroupe, Sergey Trostyanskiy, Zeynep 
Türkyılmaz, Yektan Türkyılmaz and Veli Yasin each contributed to this dissertation in 
countless conversations about Ottoman history, nationalism, genocide and conversion.  
I’d especially like to thank Tony Shin, Matthew Ghazarian, and Kamal Soleimani for 
taking the time to read long drafts of my dissertation.  I alone, of course, am responsible 




This dissertation, in many respects, would never have been completed with the steadfast 
support, encouragement, discussion and careful thought of my wonderful advisors 
(“hocas”), Richard Bulliet and Karen Barkey.  
 
I am very grateful for the years of support from my family.  This dissertation is lovingly 
dedicated to my parents, Laraine Cook and Dwight Miller.  My parents, retired public 
school educators with seventy years of combined teaching behind them, reared their 
children to believe that education was a means to change the world.   I am indebted, of 
course, to my oldest comrades, my brother Colin and my twin sister Yvonne.  This 










































Perhaps it was serendipity that led me to a copy of V.H. Hagopian’s Ottoman-Turkish 
conversation-grammar; a practical method of learning the Ottoman-Turkish Language 
(1907), while roaming the dustier regions of Butler library at Columbia University seven 
years ago.  His text carefully lays out the fundamentals of Ottoman Turkish for the tyro.  
As I delved into the grammatical particularities and unfamiliar structures of the dead 
language, my curiosity was piqued: Who was V.H. Hagopian?  All I could gather from 
his text was that he was affiliated with an Anatolia College – a college that I had never 
heard of.  My ignorance stemmed partly from the fact that the college no longer exists, at 
least not in Turkey.1   
 
Further research yielded a memoir by George E. White, an American missionary who 
taught at the school for over three decades between 1890 and 1921.2  It is here that I first 
learned what became of V.H. Hagopian:   
On the morning of August 10th [1915], as I was holding 
morning prayers with such students as remained for a 
summer session because they could not get to their homes, 
the white face of Dr. Marden appeared at the door and he 
whispered, “They’ve come”.  …  
                                                        
1 The school was originally established by American missionaries in Bebek, Istanbul, as part of the 
theological seminary that would later become Robert College/Bogaziçi Üniversitesi.  In 1886 it was moved 
to Merzifon, a town in the Black Sea region of Turkey and renamed Anatolia College or the American 
College of Mersovan.  Following the Turkish War of Independence (Kurtuluş Savaşı), 1919-1923, the 
college was relocated to Salonica, Greece, where part of it was renamed the American College of 
Thessaloniki.  The prestigious high school affiliated with the College still bears the name Anatolia College.  
 
2 See George E. White, Adventuring with Anatolia College (Grinnell: Herald-Register Publishing 





Officials forced an entrance at our gates and on different 
patrols, drew up sixty-one ox-carts in a ring in the open 
campus, and demanded the surrender of all Armenians.  For 
two hours we parleyed, but the armed guards increased to 
about thirty men, and a search was made by the breaking 
down of doors, and the forcing of entrance everywhere.  
Finally, our Armenian friends, feeling that further 
opposition was worse than useless, voluntarily appeared 
and gave themselves up.  An oxcart was assigned to each 
family.  …  Soon after noon the procession, with seventy-
two persons from the College and the Hospital moved 
away.  
 
As Prof. Hagopian and myself drew aside and kissed each 
other goodbye, he said to me: “Dr. White, I want you to 
understand and remember that I am going on my own 
choice.  I have friends among the officials and influential 
Turks.  They promised me a traveling permit for 
Constantinople.  I could have gone there and have been 
safe.  But I did not want to separate from my own people.  I 
wanted to share in whatever experiences were in store for 
them.  So I go now, because I would not try to escape.”  I 
have no doubt that was fully true.  Twenty-five years we 
had worked shoulder to shoulder.  He was a true and able 
man.  “Except a corn [kernel] of wheat fall into the ground 
and die” … 
 
Not one of the 72 persons deported from our loved College 
campus ever came back.3  
 
White writes nothing further about his friend and colleague in his memoir, published in 
1940.  Over two decades earlier, in a pair of articles, White had written more:4  
According to the testimony of the wives of the professors, 
seen near Sivas, they were all kept together until they 
passed Zieh, then they were separated.  The men, bound 
with ropes, were driven in one direction, the women and 
young children in another.  According to the testimony of 
                                                        
3 White, pg. X.  
 
4 See “The Calvary of a Nation.” Atlantic Monthly (November 1916) and “Armenians Killed with Axes by 




the gendarmes, all the men were killed.  No word has been 
received from them to this day.  Their number included 
Professor V.H. Hagopian, a scholar trained in the 
University of Constantinople, author of several books and 
legal adviser to the college.5 
 
A century after the Aghed or Catastrophe of the Armenians, one is still struck by one 
stark and painful fact: Professor Hagopian – a cosmopolitan Armenian scholar of 
Ottoman Turkish, a representative of the multiplicity of the earlier Empire – was 
murdered by representatives of his own State in Marsovan in 1915.  This dissertation 
began as an attempt to understand why V.H. Hagopian was murdered. 
 
Trying to understand why Professor V.H. Hagopian was murdered led to an enduring 
interest in a broader question:  for what reason did the communal symbiosis, or at least 
the equilibrium of different communities living together, unravel and break apart during 
the long 19th century?  What happened between the Ottoman conquest in the region in the 
first half of the 19th century, until 1915, when between 600,000 and 900,000 people were 
murdered, including V.H. Hagopian? Searching for an explanation to this question led to 
my recognition that there was a continual exercise of state violence directed at the people 
in the mountains.  Thinking about the mountains, in turn, led me to Sasun.   
 
In the summer of 1894, Ottoman troops systematically murdered more than a thousand 
men, women and children in the mountains of Sasun.  Who murdered these people?  And 
how are we to understand the place of Sasun in the larger story of mass violence at the 
end of the Ottoman Empire?  
                                                        











“A man sets out to draw the world. As the years go by, he peoples a 
space with images of provinces, kingdoms, mountains, bays, ships, 
islands, fishes, rooms, instruments, stars, horses, and individuals. A 
short time before he dies, he discovers that the patient labyrinth of lines 
traces the lineaments of his own face.”  
                         - Jorge Borges, The Aleph and other stories1 
 
 
Terms are the units by which one constructs one’s propositions.  The 
terms one uses determine the categories by which one orders a field – 
or at least all those categories that are not the immediate focus of one’s 
inquiry.  The categories one presupposes, then, necessarily delimit the 
questions one can ask – at least all the constants implied in the 
questions, apart (again) from the special point of focus.  The questions 
asked, in turn, determine what answers will ultimately be reached when 
the questions, as posed, are pursued.  




Man makes his own history, but he does not make it out of the whole 
cloth; he does not make it out of conditions chosen by himself, but out 







                                                        
1 Jorge Luis Borges, Aleph and other stories (Penguin, 2000), p. xiii.  
 
2 Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: The Classical Age of Islam (University of Chicago Press, 
1974), pp. 45-46.  
 







In the late summer of 1894, several battalions4 of Ottoman soldiers were ordered into the 
mountains of Sasun, south of the fertile plains of Muş.  The commander of the troops, 
Colonel Ismail, gave orders for battalions to be assembled into a square.  Just that 
morning, Colonel Ismail had been given direct orders from Abdülhamid II himself to 
destroy the Armenian bandits (‘eşkıya’) who were operating in these remote mountains.  
The orders from the Sultan read:  
All of the bandits should be immediately violently 
obliterated in such a way that they are left with an 
extraordinary terror and this degree of discord would be 
prevented from repeating again.5 
 
Süleyman, one of the soldiers, recounted the moment:  
Colonel Ismail Bey held up a paper and said, ‘This is the 
Firman of the Padishah.’ Then he hung the document 
around his neck, on his breast and the secretary read it 
aloud to the troops.  The Firman said that the Armenians 
were in rebellion against the Sultan’s authority, and that 
they were to be punished with blood.  They were to be 
made an example to others.  Colonel Ismail Bey then 
addressed the troops.  He said that the villages of the rebels 
were to be destroyed by fire; that the rebels themselves 
were to be put to the sword; that the soldiers were to do as 
they would with them, so that they destroyed everything 
                                                        
4 The number of troops that were involved in the violence, as with all things about the Sasun massacre, a 
topic of real disagreement.  According to Herbert Chermside, the military attaché for the British Embassy, 
the Ihtiat, or reserve troops, were called out and “I believe eight battalions, two batteries, and some calvary 
to be correct.” (FO 424/178, Colonel Chermside to Sir P. Currie, December 6, 1894, p. 323).   
 
5 “...hemen eşkıyayı külliyyen ve kendilerine bir dehşeti fevkalâde îras edecek ve bu misillû mefasidein bir 
daha tekerrürüne kat’ıyyen mani’ olacak suretde şedîden kahr ve tedmîr etmeniz”], Osmanlı Arşivi Yıldız 




that had life.  This was the order of the Sultan.  Then the 
soldiers cheered three times and were dismissed.”6 
 
After this order was given, the soldiers advanced on the villages of the Shadakh valley in 
the Sasun Mountains.  A number of Armenian villages in the region were regarded as 
rebellious and one to two thousand men, women and children were murdered.7  
Hammond S. Shipley, a British consular officer who spent six months researching the 
violence at Sasun as part of a Commission of Inquiry concluded, based on the evidence 
he observed, that the villagers of Shadakh: 
“were massacred without distinction of age or sex, and 
indeed, for a period of three weeks, viz., from the 12th 
August to the 4th September, it is not too much to say that 
the Armenians were absolutely hunted like wild beasts, 
being killed wherever they were found, and if the slaughter 
was not greater it was, I believe, solely owing to the 
vastness of the mountain ranges of that district which 
enabled people to scatter and so facilitated their escape.”8 
 
The Ottoman State received a different story.  According to the official report of Mehmet 
Zeki Paşa, the powerful Commander of the Fourth Army at Erzingan, the troops 
successfully quelled a rebellion in the mountains and captured the “evil doer 
                                                        
6 Frank Scudamore, “The Armenian Atrocities,” Daily News  (London, England), Friday, March 29, 1895. 
See Süleyman’s deposition to the British consul at Erzurum, FO 424/182, “State of Turkish ex-Sergeant 
Suleiman,” p. 3.  
 
7 The number of dead is highly contested and the real numbers will probably never be known.  I follow here 
the estimate of Raymond Kévorkian, “The Armenian Population of Sassoun and the Demographic 
Consequences of the 1894 Massacres,” Armenian Review no. 47 (2001), pp. 49-50.  Garo Sasuni gives a 
similar estimate (around 1700 dead in both the fighting and the massacres) see, Patmutiun Taroni 
Ashkharhi [History of the Taron Region] (Beirut, 1957), p. 580 and cited in Antranik Chalabian, 
Revolutionary Figures (1994), p. 88.  According to both British Foreign Office and ABCFM sources, 
Tahsin Paşa, the Vali of Bitlis had a list of putatively disaffected villages slated for destruction.  See FO 
424/192, “Report by Vice-Consul Crow on a Journey through Sasun and Guendj,” p. 50 and FO 424/182, p. 
79.   
 
8 This was written by the British consular officer H.S. Shipley, one of the three delegates at the six-month 
long Commission of Inquiry, FO 424/184, “Memorandum on the Joint Report of the Consular Delegates to 
the Sasun Commission of Inquiry,” October 16, 1896.  The Joint Report can also be found in 




Hampartsoum.”9 There is no mention in this report of any violence against the civilian 
population.  Instead, Zeki Paşa emphasizes that after the quelling of the rebellion, “I have 
myself witnessed the fact that food and clothing and all kinds of help on humanitarian 
and Islamic principles have been provided.”10 
 
The narratives of Zeki Paşa, on the one hand, and H.S. Shipley, on the other, have 
remained for twelve decades the dominant historical explanations for the Sasun Violence.   
According to Zeki Paşa, the story of the Sasun Violence was one of sedition, and how 
Armenian radicals incited the local Christian population of Sasun to commit violence 
against the Ottoman State. 11   Many scholars working in the field of Ottoman Studies 
today continue to embrace the ‘sedition’ story.12  This academic subfield and the 
                                                        
9 “…icrâ-yı mefsedet eden Hamparsun [sic]….”, from “Muş’da Dördüncü Ordu-yu Hümâyûn Müşiri Zeki 
Paşa’dan mevrûd 4 Eylül sene 310 (1310) tarihli şifreli telgrafın halli sureti,” OAYT, vol. 1, pp. 288-289.   
 
10 …insâniyet ve İslâmiyetin icab ettirdiği vechile askeriyyeden iltahak ve iltica eden nisvâna ve sıbyâna ve 
aceze suret-i mükememelede irahe ve i’âse edilmiş…” from “Muş’da Dördüncü Ordu-yu Hümâyûn Müşiri 
Zeki Paşa’dan mevrûd 4 Eylül sene 310 (1310) tarihli şifreli telgrafın halli sureti,” OAYT, vol. 1, pp. 298-
299.   
 
11  Esat Uras, Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi  (Belge Yayınları, 1976, reprint, originally published 
in 1950); Kamuran Gürün, The Armenian File: The Myth of Innocence Exposed  (London: Widenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1985), Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi. VIII. Cilt. Birinci Meşrutiyet ve İstibdat Devirleri 
(1876-1907), TTK Yayınları: Ankara, 1995);  Nejat Göyünç, Osmanlı idaresinde Ermeniler  [Armenians 
under Ottoman Administration] (Gültepe Yayınları, 1983); Bilal Şimşir, Ermeni Meselesi, 1774-2005 
 [The Armenian Problem, 1774-2005] (Bilgi Yayınları, 2005); Justin McCarthy, Turks and Armenians: A 
Manual on the Armenian Question  (Committee on Education, Assembly of Turkish American 
Associations, 1989); Jeremy Salt, Imperialism, Evangelism and the Ottoman Armenians: 1878-1896  
(Frank Cass, 1993) and Stanford and Ezel Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. 
II (Cambridge, 1977) 
 
12 According to Selçuk Aksın Somel, the Sasun Revolt was the “climax” of a series of “terror and 
counterterror” episodes that occurred between 1890 and 1893.  Somel wrote that the Hunchaks “provoked 
local Armenians of Sasun to revolt and exterminate the local Muslim populations.” From A to Z of the 
Ottoman Empire (Scarecrow Press, 2003), p. 22.  For other recent work published in this vein see: Edward 
Erickson, Ottomans and Armenians: A Study in Counterinsurgency  (New York, 2013); Haluk Selvi, Bir 
Ermeni Komitecinin Itirafları  [An Armenian Guerrilla’s Confessions] (Timaş Yayınları: Istanbul, 2009); 
Salahi Ramadan Sonyel, Gizli belgelerde Osmanlı Devleti’nin son dönemi ve Türkiye’yi bölme  [The 




narratives it has constructed and propagated are based on documentation produced by the 
Ottoman State.  It reflects the narratives developed from many dispatches sent by 
Ottoman bureaucrats of the Eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire, as well as by 
officers of the Ottoman military.13  
 
According to H.S. Shipley, the violence in the Sasun mountains was not about seditious 
outsiders, or the “the suppression of a pseudo-revolt” but “the extermination, pure and 
simple” of two districts in the Sasun mountains.14  This account has been emphasized in 
the broader field of Armenian Studies and is part and parcel of a larger story of Ottoman 
State oppression.  The ‘oppression’ story has been conveyed and maintained as a central 
explanatory narrative in the smaller field of Armenian Studies. This story is based on 
memoirs and oral histories produced by the Armenian Apostolic communities, and are 
supported by British, French, and Russian reports from consuls based in the Ottoman 
East.  While both narratives acknowledge that violence occurred, the blame is placed on 
different parties.  The Empire’s narrative of sedition focuses on the culpability of the 
Armenian radicals in the violence that ensued; the narrative of oppression focuses on the 
culpability of the Ottoman State.  
 
                                                        
13  These historical materials are based on earlier works, particularly the foundational work of Esat Uras.   
A former member of the Committee of Union and Progress, Esat Uras published his influential Tarihte 
Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi  [Armenians in History and the Armenian Question] in Istanbul in 1950. 
Uras’ text is based on an eclectic mix of Armenian language material, consular reports, newspapers and 
Ottoman archival documentation. It is probably the single most influential text within this narrative. For 
analysis and critique see, a detailed review article by Christopher Walker, The Journal of Royal Asiatic 
Society of Great Britain and Ireland , no. 122 (1990), pp. 165-170. According to Fuat Dündar, Esat Uras 
had earlier served as a CUP researcher assigned the task of studying the Armenian population of the 
Ottoman Empire. See Dündar, Crime of Numbers: The Role of Statistics in the Armenian Question (1878-
1918) (Transaction Press, 2010), p. 47. 
 




According to the bureaucrat and historian Esat Uras, the doyen of the “sedition thesis”, 
the so-called Sasun Rebellion (‘Sason Isyanı’) was instigated by Armenian nationalist 
revolutionaries (komiteciler) with the “sole aim of attracting the attention of foreign 
countries, and was reported abroad by the Patriarchate and the revolutionary committees 
in the bloodiest and most sensational matter.”15  Vahakn Dadrian, a leading scholar in the 
vein of the ‘oppression thesis,’ on the other hand, has insisted that the ‘Sasun Massacres’ 
were ordered by the Sultan Abdülhamid II, “whose peremptory orders unleashed the fury 
and ferocity of the massacring killer bands.”16  After careful research, I conclude that 
while there was a small presence of outside radicals from Istanbul in the mountains, there 
is no indication this represented a rebellion against the State.  Moreover, while there were 
certainly orders to destroy ‘the bandits’ (eşkıya), it is important to bring into the picture 
the corruption of the local government officials and the willingness of Colonel Ismail to 
interpret the orders in the most violent way possible. 
 
There have been various attempts over the years to escape this binary by bringing 
together Ottoman archival documentation with European consul reports and the accounts 
of the locals themselves.  Instead of focusing only on the culpability of outsiders, scholars 
such as Jelle Verheij have emphasized instead the numerous local actors involved.17  My 
                                                        
15 “Aslında sırf yabancı müdalalesinin çekilmesi amacıyla yapılmış olan bu isyan hareketi, Ermeni 
komiteleri ve patrikhanesi vasıtasıyla her tarafa pek kanlı ve heyecanlı bir şekilde duyuruldu.” OAYT, vol. 1, 
p. xxx.  The English translation can be found in, Esat Uras, The Armenians in History and the Armenian 
Question (Istanbul: Documentary Publications, 1988), p. 728.  
 
16 Vahakn Dadrian, “1894 Sassoun Massacre: A Juncture in the Escalation of the Turko-Armenian Conflict,” 
in Armenian Review, vol. 47 (2001), p. 17.  
 
17 Jelle Verheij, “‘Les Frères de Terre det d’eau,’: Sur le Rôle des Kurdes dans les Massacres Arméniens de 
1894 – 1896,” Islam des Kurdes, Les Annales de l’Autre Islam, no. 5, INALCO-ERISM, Paris, 1998, pp. 
238-246; idem, “Die Armenischen Massaker von 1894-1896: Anatomie und Hintergründe einer Krise,” in 
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dissertation continues Verheij’s work.  I will begin with broad descriptions of the two 




The Narrative of Sedition 
 
The narrative of sedition usually begins with a description of the Armenian community as 
the “milleti sadika” (the loyal nation).18  Relations between the Armenians and the 
Muslim population, it is asserted, were peaceful. There are several indicators of tranquil 
relations between Armenians and the Ottoman Government. First, it is pointed out that 
large numbers of Armenians were able to enrich themselves and were accorded 
increasing rights under the progressive Ottoman administration. The Armenian 
community, along with other Christian communities, benefitted disproportionately from 
European trade, at least in comparison with their Muslim neighbors.19  Another indication 
of the close relations between the Ottomans and the Armenians can be found in the fact 
that Turkish was the native language spoken by large swaths of Armenians.20 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Hans-Lukas Kieser (ed.), Die armenische Frage und die Schweiz (1896-1923) / La question arménienne et 
la Suisse (1896-1923) (Zürich, Chronos, 1999), pp. 81-84; idem, “Diyarbekir and the Armenian Crisis of 
1895,” in Joost Jongerden and Jelle Verheij (eds.) Social Relations in Ottoman Diyarbekir, 1870-1915 
(Brill, 2012), p. 94, fn. 27.   
 
18  This phrase appeared to be first used to place the Armenian millet (nation) in contradistinction to 
‘unloyal communities’ in the Balkans. For descriptions of the golden era, where the Armenians were as 
Shaw puts it, “integrated fully into traditional Ottoman Society,” see Shaws 1977, p. 200; Kemal H. Karpat, 
The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Ottoman 
Empire  (Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 209-210. 
 
19  Justin and Carolyn McCarthy 1989, p. 13. 
 




Scholars of the ‘sedition’ thesis point out that as the 19th century progressed, the Ottoman 
State increasingly promulgated policies that gave the Armenian and other non-Muslim 
people (gayr-ı Müslüman) the right to retain their religion and communal distinction and 
guaranteed them equal treatment under the law. If there was insecurity of life and 
property in the Eastern provinces, far from the locus of Ottoman authority, this was not 
due to the policies of the State, but to the tribal nature of the Kurdish population.21 In 
other words, the problem of the East could be boiled down to a lack of central control 
over these regions. Moreover, this narrative maintains that all of the settled populations in 
the East suffered, regardless of their religion, from this very lack of central oversight.22  
The roots of the violence in the East lay not in State action but rather in the development 
                                                                                                                                                                     
yarısında dış tahrikler yoğunlaşmaya başladı”) Armenians were loyal subjects of the Ottoman Empire, 
Nejat Göyünç underlines the fact that many Armenians spoke Turkish as their first language and shared a 
common culture. This is a reformulation of an older framing that emphasized the non-Muslim nature of 
Armenians into a type of Turkish nationalism based on linguistic identity. (1983, p. 56). Göyünç is adamant 
here and elsewhere that the violence between the Christian and Muslim populations in the East was based 
on Armenian massacres of the Muslim population, and the Armenian populace, “at times paid the price for 
the cruelties they perpetrated.” Quote from idem,  “Turkish Armenian cultural relations, in T. Ataöv, (ed.) 
The Armenians in the late Ottoman Period  (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2001), p. 42. 
 
21 According to Edward Erickson in his recent study Ottomans and Armenians: A Study of 
Counterinsurgency (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), Events coalesced in August 1894, in the Bitlis province, 
when well-organized Armenian Komitacıs rose in rebellion in the town of Sason [sic!].  …it fell to Fourth 
Army commander Zeki Pasha to suppress the insurrection and, for this task, his army had only the 8th 
Infantry Division available in the area… This led Zeki Pasha to mobilize his [Kurdish] tribal cavalry 
regiments and send them to assist in the suppression.  Unfortunately, the undisciplined and poorly led 
irregulars quickly gained notoriety for excessive heavy-handed tactics that included the massacre, 
mutilation, rape and pillaging of the Armenian population.” Erickson is far from alone in his placing the 
burden of the blame on the Kurdish Hamidiye.  With very few exceptions, most scholars of the Ottoman 
Empire follow suit on this point.  See, for instance Bruce Masters, “Armenian Apostolic Church,” in Gábor 
Ágoston and Bruce Masters (eds.), Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire, p. 53; Erik Jan Zürcher, Turkey: 
A Modern History (Revised Edition), p. 83; In addition to identifying the Hamidiye as the culprit, Davide 
Rodogno underscores the “long-lasting Kurdo-Armenian hostility,” in Against Massacre, p. 191.  
Interestingly enough, this is a point of agreement for many scholars in Armenian Studies as well, see Suny 
1993; p. 105.  
 






The ‘sedition’ narrative purports that until the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878, 
tranquility reigned between the Ottoman State and its Armenian populace. The roots of 
this bloody war lay in the Balkans, and it is necessary to understand what took place there 
in the 1870s in order to make sense of what was to take place in Anatolia some twenty 
years later.  Radical nationalists in the Balkans had incited the local Christian population 
to murder their Muslim neighbors.24 The ensuing sectarian violence resulted in massacres 
of both the Christian and Muslim populations of the Balkans.25  However, the European 
press only reported violence against the Christians.26  Moreover, most of this reporting 
did not accurately reflect the events that took place but instead typified the violence in the 
stark and dramatized terms of the “Terrible Turk” and the “Suffering Bulgarian.”27  
Ottoman scholars claim that this reporting was based on the Orientalist imaginations of 
the journalists and the aspirations of radical Balkan nationalists, “ignoring the fact that 
Muslims also had been slaughtered and that the Ottoman troops were acting to restore 
order.”28  This violence coincided with the development of a yellow press in Great 
Britain and the rise to political power of the Liberal Party under William Ewart Gladstone, 
                                                        
23  Justin and Carolyn McCarthy 1989, p. 5. 
 
24 McCarthy, Turan and Taşkıran 2014, p. 20.  
 
25 According to the Shaws, “Some of the Muslim settlers, remembering the persecution that had driven 
them from their homes in Christian lands, began to take vengeance from their non-Muslim neighbors in a 
manner hitherto unknown in the Ottoman Empire.” (1977, vol. II, p. 117-118).   
 
26 McCarthy, Turan and Taşkıran 2014, p. 20.  
 
27  See Karpat 2001, p. 142. 
28  Shaws 1977, vol. II, p. 162, see also, Justin and Carolyn McCarthy 1989, p. 39; McCarthy, Turan and 




who utilized the massacres that befell Christians in the Balkans as a tool to criticize their 
Conservative Party opponents.29 Gladstone’s pamphlet served to arouse antagonism 
against the Ottoman Empire, and the subsequent shift in public opinion aided efforts to 
shift British policies regarding the Ottoman Empire.30  As a result, when Russia declared 
war on the Ottoman Empire in 1877 the British government was forced to stay on the 
sidelines.31 
 
 The war was devastating. In the European domains of the Ottoman Empire, hundreds of 
thousands of Muslims were forced out of their Balkan homelands as the Russian military 
condoned a systematic policy of removal of the Muslim Other.32  Paramilitary bands 
organized by Balkan-based nationalists, armed and aided by the Russian state murdered 
thousands of Muslims.33 Meanwhile, at the other end of the Empire in the Eastern 
Anatolian provinces, a similar pattern was emerging. When the Russian military seized 
territory, the result was mass violence against the Muslim inhabitants of cities, such as 
Kars. As a result, large numbers of Muslims were forced to leave their homes, which lay 
in the newly acquired Russian territories. During the war, some Armenians in the 
                                                        
29 Justin McCarthy, The Turk in America: Creation of an Enduring Prejudice (University of Utah Press, 
2010), pp. 93-94.  
 
30  Hanioğlu 2008; Shaws 1977, vol. II, p. 162; Justin McCarthy 2010, p. 94.  
 
31 Justin and Carolyn McCarthy 1989, p. 39; Justin McCarthy 2010, p. 94. 
 
32 For example, see Ahmet Halaçoğlu, Balkan Harbi sırasında Rumeli’den Türk Göçleri (1912-1913) 
(Ankara, 1995); Nedim İpek, Rumeli’den Anadolu’ya Türk Göçleri (Ankara, 1994); Abdullah Saydam, 
Kırım ve Kafkas Göçleri (Ankara, 1997) and Alexandre Toumarkine, Les migrations des populations 
musulmanes balkaniques en Anatolie (1876-1913) (Istanbul, 1995).  
 




Ottoman Empire had supported the invading Russian armies.34 It is usually pointed out 
that General Mikhail Loris-Melikov, the general in charge of the Russian invasion of 
Eastern Anatolia, was of Armenian descent.  The Ottoman State was given extra reason 
for mistrust by Armenian Patriarch Nerses’ attempts to gain Armenian autonomy in the 
East, through negotiations at San Stefano and Berlin. It was at this latter meeting that the 
Armenian Question was born, particularly with the inclusion of Article 61. According to 
article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin:  
The Sublime Porte engages to carry out without further 
delay the ameliorations and reforms which are called for by 
local needs in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to 
guarantee their security against the Circassians and the 
Kurds. It will give information periodically of the measures 
taken for this purpose to the Powers, who will watch over 
the execution of them.35 
 
With the Treaty of Berlin, as ‘sedition’ scholars Stanford and Ezel Shaw put it, “The 
Armenians thus became pawns in the struggles for power in Europe.”36  Ottoman scholars 
of the ‘sedition’ vein also argue that local relations between Armenians and their Muslim 
neighbors were further frayed by the advent of Armenian Nationalism. This Armenian 
Nationalism was supported, inculcated and disseminated through the machinations of the 
Great Powers, particularly Great Britain and Russia.37 
 
                                                        
34 Mesut Uyar and Edward Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk 
(Greenwood, 2009), p. 194. 
 
35  A full translation of the Berlin Treaty can be found in July 20th, 1878 publication of the The Tablet,  
published in London. 
 
36  Shaws, 1977 vol. II, p. 202  
 




As the Armenian nationalists failed to gain an autonomous Armenia, they became 
increasingly violent. Here the narrative turns its attention, almost inevitably, to two 
political parties: the Hunçhak38 and the Dashnaksutsyun.39 Agents from these political 
parties travelled around the Ottoman Empire, inciting the Armenian population to 
undermine the authority of the Ottoman State. According to the Shaws, “Their programs 
involved the creation of action bands to enter Ottoman territory, attack government 
officials, and Armenians alike and incite massacres.”40  The radical Armenian nationalists 
desired such massacres as they, “would bring about foreign intervention and help the 
nationalists secure an independent, socialist Armenian republic, presumably in the six 
Anatolian provinces from which all Muslims would be driven out or simply killed.”41 
 
Since the late 1970s, historians of the ‘sedition’ thesis have described the violence in 
terms of Terrorism and Counterterrorism.42  While the terrorist activities conducted by 
the radical nationalists are described as illegitimate, counterterrorism activities are 
condoned as necessary for the maintenance of State order.  The terrorist activities of the 
Armenian radicals reached a crescendo in the early 1890s. It has become a convention for 
the historians of the ‘sedition’ narrative to present the efforts to establish an autonomous 
                                                        
38 Shaws, 1977, vol. II, p. 203; McCarthy 2010, p. 106; McCarthy, Turan and Taşkıran 2014, pp. 18-20; 
Uras 1988, pp. 682-694.  
 
39 Uras 1988, pp. 694-711.  
 
40  See Shaws 1977, p. 203, McCarthys, 1989, pp. 39-40. 
 
41  Shaws 1977, vol. II, p. 203. The word ‘presumably’ is key to understanding the assumptions underlying 
the ‘seditious’ thesis. The Shaws do not cite any documentation to support their claim here. 
 
42  Shaws 1977, vol. II, p. 203.  The Shaws write that, “Terrorism and counterterrorism went on for three 
years (1890-1893), with the government acting sternly, albeit sometimes harshly, to keep order.” For other 
examples see also, Shaws 1977, vol. II, p. 315. Gürün 1985, chapter 4, “The Armenian Question”; 




or independent Armenia with European intervention as a series of four increasingly 
radical events incited by nationalists.  The first of these events was a protest at the Kum 
Kapı Armenian Cathedral in Istanbul on July 27, 1890.43  The second event was the 
outbreak of rebellion in the summer of 1894 in the Eastern Taurus Mountain region of 
Sasun.44  The third event was the protest on 30 September 1895 near the seat of the 
Ottoman Government in Istanbul, the Sublime Porte (Bâbı Âli Nümayişi).45  The fourth, 
and most radical was the rebellion in the Western Taurus Mountain region of Zeytun in 
October 1895.46  These four events are all, according to the ‘sedition’ narrative, good 
examples of the political interlacing between radical Armenian Nationalism and Great 
Power Politics. 
 
                                                        
43  Musa Şaşmaz stresses that the Kumkapı protest of July 27, 1890 was “the first time since the Conquest 
of Istanbul by Fatih (Mehmet II) that a non-Muslim element contested Ottoman authority.”  From, 
“Kumkapı Ermeni Olayı (1890),” Tarih Incelemeleri Dergisi  19/1 (Temmuz 2004), p. 101. (Kumkapı 
Ermeni olayı Istanbul’un Fatih tarafından fethinden sonra ilk defa bir gayrı Müslim unsurun Osmanlı 
aleyhinde bir olaya sebebiyet vermesi.”) It is interesting that Şaşmaz adopts without citation the opinion 
articulated by the British Ambassador of the day, William White, who pronounced nearly the same 
sentiment.  See also, Uras 1988, pp. 716-719 and Selvi 2009, pp. 28-33.  
 
44 Uras 1988, pp. 726-733; Shaws 1977, vol. II,  p. 203.  Many Ottomanists follow Shaws lead, in particular 
his student Justin McCarthy who until recently paraphrased the dogma of his former teacher.  According to 
Justin and Carolyn McCarthy, “In 1894, large bands of Armenian rebels in the district of Sasun attacked 
Ottoman officials, especially tax collectors, as the first step in insurrection.  When the Ottoman Army was 
sent to defeat the rebellion the rebels fled before it, slaughtering the inhabitants of every Muslim village in 
their path.  In turn, the army, primarily Kurdish Hamidiye units massacred Armenians in the rebellious 
spaces.” (1989, p. 41).  This exact rendition is repeated by McCarthy in 2010.  McCarthy writes that 
“Kurdish cavalry units (known as Hamidiye Tribal Cavalry) were sent from Erzincan.  They defeated the 
Armenians, who fled, slaughtering Muslim villagers and destroying the villages in their past.” (p. 107) 
Justin McCarthy (along with his co-writers, Ömer Turan and Cemalettin Taşkıran), revise this theory using 
the official sources of the Ottoman State. Given the errors that McCarthy made on this point, it is 
interesting how the authors decry any who make such an ignorant mistake that Hamidiye were present. 
(2014, pp. 39-40 and p. 281).  I will discuss the work of McCarthy, Turan and Taşkıran 2014 in detail in 
Appendix 4: Sources.  
 
45 Uras 1988, pp. 733-74 
 
46  Uras 1988, pp. 743-755; Göyünç 1983, p. 64; Justin and Carolyn McCarthy, 1989, p. 41; McCarthy 




According to the ‘sedition’ narrative, between1890 and 1895 Hunchak agents organized 
communities throughout Anatolia to support rebellion against the State.47  As the Shaws 
describe it, the Hunchaks, “organized a major coup at Sasun, southwest of Muş, the 
strongest area of Armenian population, where there were many marauding tribesmen who 
had caused trouble to the cultivators in the past.”48  Similarly, the Ottoman historian, 
Kemal Karpat has maintained that:  
A series of developments not only dashed Ottoman hopes 
of a reconciliation with England but also raised the specter 
that the events of the years 1876-1878 were about to repeat 
themselves. Armenian unrest in eastern Anatolia was on the 
rise, as the Hunchak (Bell) Student organization, 
established in 1886 in Geneva, and the Dashnak association, 
founded in 1890 in Tiflis, Russia, engaged in a variety of 
nationalist activities, including acts of violence. This 
provoked counterterrorist actions that were given negative 
coverage in the European press. The harsh quelling of the 
Armenian uprising in Sassoon and the court acquittal of 
Musa Bey, portrayed as a persecutor of the Armenians, 
created outrage in Europe.49 
 
When the local governor tried to collect taxes, Huncak agents incited the mountaineers to 
confront the tax collectors with armed resistance. It was only after this that the Ottoman 
army was brought in to preserve order, as the radicals fled into the mountains. But the 
radicals did more than simply contest the state. They attacked neighboring Muslim 
villages, with the intention to arouse Muslim feelings of revenge.50  The main ambition of 
                                                        
47 McCarthy 2010, p. 106.  
 
48  Shaws 1977, II, p. 203. 
 
49  Karpat 2001, p. 218. 
 
50  Karal 1962, p. 137; Uras 1976, pp. 4725; Somel 2003 p. 22; M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, A Brief History of the 
Late Ottoman Empire  (Princeton University Press, 2008), p 131; McCarthys 1989, p. 41; Gürün 1985, 




the radicals, according to proponents of the sedition thesis, was to cause massacres 
against the Armenian population so that Foreign Powers would interfere, as they had in 
the Balkans.51 According to the Shaws the result was a “counter-massacre,” carried out 
by the “regular troops and Hamidiye regiments [who] ravaged Sasun after having seen 
the tragedies left in the nearby Muslim villages, where the entire population had been 
wiped out.”52  The Shaws continue that the “counter-massacre had been undertaken 
entirely on the initiative of the Ottoman troops and local commanders and without any 
order to this effect from the central government.”53  While most accounts based on this 
basic sedition narrative do not even mention any Christian casualties, the Shaw’s counter-
massacre thesis has been influential.54 In any case, when news of this violence reached 
Europe, just as was the case before the war of 1877-1878, only the most exaggerated 
accounts were disseminated to the British periodical reading public.55 According to the 
tale of sedition, most of these accounts were fabrications of the Armenian radicals and 
                                                        
51 One of the earliest articulations of  later be called a ‘provocation’ thesis (a term cointed by the sociologist 
Robert Melson), was a letter written by the former ABCFM missionary Cyrus Hamlin. This letter was used 
by the Ottoman State first, and now by many Ottoman historians as evidence of this intention. See Uras 
1988, pp. 708-710.  This is repeated again and again in the echo-chamber literature on this issue.  See, 
William Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism (???), p. 19; Justin and Carolyn McCarthy 1989, p. 40; Salt 
1993, p. 63; Lewy 2005, pp. 17-18.  It is also employed heavily by the Turkish Republic, see, Armenian 
Terrorism, Its supporters, the Narcotic Connection, the Distortion of History (Ankara University, 1984), p. 
269.  
 




54 Justin McCarthy, Jeremy Salt, and Guenter Lewy all reproduce this language.  
 
55 The strongest statement to this effect is in McCarthy, Turan and Taşkıran 2014, p. 2. They argue, that “all 
of the reports of the Sasun troubles, whether from journalism, missionaries or diplomats can be 
characterized as imaginary after close comparison with actual testimony recorded during the investigation. 




their supporters.56 Such accounts of violence aroused the sympathies of the reading 
public in Great Britain and forced Lord Kimberley, then British Foreign Minister, to 
pressure the Ottoman Government to send a Commission to investigate the violence. 
 
The Ottoman Government agreed to investigate the violence and dispatched a 
Commission composed of trusted Ottoman officials.  They were accompanied by 
delegates from the French, Russian and British consular services. Over the course of six 
months, from the end of January to the middle of July in 1895, the Commission held over 
a hundred sittings and interviewed over 190 witnesses. The Consular delegates composed 
a sixty-page report based on hundreds of pages of eyewitness testimony. Historians of the 
sedition narrative stress that while the sixty-page report was biased in favor of the 
Armenians, it nevertheless supports their central claim of Armenian culpability by 
placing the blame for the violence on the Armenian radicals.57 
 
The Armenian activists were very effective propagandists, sedition scholars argue.58 The 
outrage over the depiction of the massacres in Europe was used as a tool to increase 
                                                        
56 According to McCarthy, Turan and Taşkıran 2014, “Hunchak and Hunchak partisans were 
unquestionably responsible for much of the Armenian testimony against the Turks and Kurds presented to 
the Sasun Commission and for reports from European reporters.” (2014, p. 42).  
 
57 Uras 1988, p. 729.  
  
58 Uras 1988, p. 687.  Uras quotes from the “The Political Programme of the Hunchak Committee.”  This 
same passage is cited endlessly.  See, Gürün 1985, Chapter 4.  
 
Scholars of the sedition thesis also tend to quote a passage from Louise Nalbandian [The Armenian 
Revolutionary Movement (UC Press, 1963), p. 100] where she refers to the proganda efforts of the Hunchak.  
See Mehmet Saray, The Principles of Turkish Administration and their Impact on the Lives of Non-Muslim 
Peoples: The Armenians as a Case Study (Atatürk Research Center, 2003), p. 22; Yusuf Halaçoğlu, The 
story of 1915: What happened to the Ottoman Armenians? (Turkish Historical Society, 2008), p. 10; Justin 
McCarthy 2010, p. 106; Şahin Söylemezoğlu, Die andere Seite der Madaille: Hintergründe der Tragödie 
von 1915 in Kleinasien (Önel, 2005), p. 53.   
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pressure on the Ottoman Empire, forcing the adoption of additional reforms in the 
Eastern Provinces. The Ottoman authorities acted in good faith and reforms that would 
have benefitted all the inhabitants of the East were promised.  Before the long-awaited 
reforms could be implemented, however, the Hunchak activists in Istanbul organized 
another uprising, this time in the city itself.  On 30 September 1895 a large number of 
nationalists organized a march to present a petition about these reforms to the Sublime 
Porte.59  When the police intercepted the nationalists, the nationalists opened fire on the 
police. According to sedition scholars, there is evidence to suggest this was a conspiracy 
organized by the Armenian nationalist activists against the State.  The narrative continues 
to point out that a similar pattern of aggressive activism occurred throughout the Ottoman 
Empire, where in practically every case, Armenian nationalists incited local Christian 
populations to attack their Muslim neighbors. While the Ottoman State, in dire financial 
straits, did what it could to protect the populace, they were unable to regain full control 
until the army could be called up in the spring of 1896.60  But by then the damage was 
done. The Armenian revolutionaries had already succeeded in their efforts to distance 





                                                        
59 Uras 1988, pp. 733-742; McCarthy 2010, p. 108.  
 
60 Shaws 1977, vol. II, pp. 203-4. 
 
61 Stephen Duguid, “The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia,” Middle East Studies vol. 
9 (1973), p. 148. Duguid notes, “Abdulhamid’s reputation as the ‘red sultan,’ and other uncomplimentary 
synonyms began in earnest in the late summer of 1894 with the Sason incident. This incident began the 
series of disturbances, or as most authors call them, massacres, in eastern Anatolia which last until 1896, 




The Narrative of ‘Oppression’ 
 
On the other hand, the narrative of ‘oppression’62 locates culpability for the violence 
firmly with the central authorities of the Ottoman State. The narrative usually begins with 
depiction of the second-class status to which Armenians, along with other non-Muslims 
(gayr-ı Müslim), were consigned in the Ottoman Empire.63  According to historians 
working within the narrative of ‘oppression,’ this second-class status was marked by 
distinctions in clothing and differential treatment compared to their Muslim neighbors.  
The Ottoman State assigned the non-Muslim populace special taxes (known as cizye or 
later, the bedel-i askeriyye), prohibited the bearing of arms, and differentiated between 
the relative worth of legal testimony, at least compared to their Muslim neighbors.64  
According to Richard Hovanissian, “Despite their second-class status, most Armenians 
lived in relative peace so long as the Ottoman Empire was strong and expanding.”65 
 
                                                        
62  The two most influential historians within the narrative of oppression are Richard Hovannisian and 
Vahakn Dadrian.  Other variations of the oppression thesis include Raymond Kévorkian, Christopher 
Walker, Ronald Grigor Suny, and Robert Melson.  It should be stressed that these writers, while united in 
certain presumptions, have many substantial disagreements, particularly about the Armenian Genocide.  
For instance, see Ronald Grigor Suny’s review of Dadrian’s History of the Armenian Revolution in Slavic 
Review vol. 55, no. 3 (Fall 1996), pp. 676-677.  See also the debate between Suny and Dadrian in, 
Armenian Forum, vol. 1, no. 2 (Summer 1998). However, on the issue of Sasun, the two are fairly close in 
agreement.  
 
63 Richard Hovannisian, “The Historical Dimensions of the Armenian Question, 1878-1923,” 
in idem (ed.), The Armenian Genocide in Perspective  (Transaction Publishers, 1986), p. 20. 
 
64  Vahakn Dadrian, Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of Turko-Armenian Conflict  (Transaction 
Publishers, 1999), pp. 15-17; idem, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the 
Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucausus (Berghahn Books, [Reprint] 2003), pp. 3-6.   
 




It was during the Ottoman era that large numbers of Armenians settled in the western 
reaches of Anatolia, and played a major role in facilitating long distance trade. However, 
the bulk of the Armenian population continued to live in their historic homeland of 
Eastern Anatolia, where they were “tenant farmers or sharecroppers under the dominant 
Muslim feudal-military elite.”66 
 
The Armenian peasantries in the East, and especially those of the plains of Muş, were 
beset with raids by Kurdish nomads, and by the corruption of local Ottoman authorities 
who failed to protect their livelihoods and lives.  As the story goes, their plight was 
ignored by the Ottoman State.  
 
It is sometimes acknowledged in the narrative of ‘oppression’ that there was political 
movement toward “Ottomanism,” the welding together of all people of the Empire under 
a common legal framework.  In 1869, for instance, the Law of Ottoman Citizenship was 
passed, granting equal citizenship to all. This move toward ‘Ottomanism’ was carried out 
by the administrations of the mid-19th century sultans Abdülmecid and Abdülaziz. It 
enabled large numbers of Armenians, especially from core areas, to become bureaucrats 
within the Ottoman State.  For many Armenians in the western reaches of the Ottoman 
State this was a time of material and political advancement. In 1876, Midhat Paşa 
famously pushed the first Ottoman constitution through conservative resistance. Here it is 
often noted that Krikor Odian, one of the progenitors of the earlier Armenian Constitution 
of the 1860s, was also one of the key progenitors of the Ottoman Constitution of 1876.  
                                                        




However, all of this would be lost in the Ottoman-Russian War that followed. 
 
‘Oppression’ scholars maintain that the Armenian community of Istanbul loyally 
supported the war efforts. Yet, from the point of view of the Armenian peasantries of the 
East, the war was a complete catastrophe. Russian and Ottoman armies waged scorched 
earth campaigns across their opponent’s farmlands and villages.  In addition to this 
violence, Ottoman officials and Kurdish tribal leaders used the war as a pretext to enrich 
themselves. After the war, Patriarch Nerses, successor and ally of Khrimian, reached out 
to Russian military officials at San Stefano, just outside of Istanbul. Nerses requested that 
the Armenian population of the Ottoman East be protected. In the Treaty of San Stefano, 
signed in the early spring of 1878, Article 16 states: 
As the withdrawal by the Russian troops of the territory 
which they occupy in Armenia, and which is to be restored 
to Turkey, might give rise to conflicts and complications 
detrimental to the maintenance of good relations between 
the two countries, the Sublime Porte engages to carry into 
effect, without further delay, the improvements and reforms 
demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited 
by Armenians, and to guarantee their security from Kurds 
and Circassians.67 
 
The treaty of San Stefano, however, was not considered satisfactory to the broader 
consortium of the Great Powers, consisting of Great Britain, France, Prussia, Italy, 
Austria-Hungary and Russia.  Before long it was clear that the treaty would have to be 
altered significantly. 
 
                                                        
67  For the Treaty of Stefano, see Holland, The European Concert in the Eastern Question, pp.335-48.  For 




To promote reform and autonomy in the Ottoman East, Nerses sent envoys from Istanbul 
to Europe.  These envoys were the former Patriarch Khrimian and Minas Cheraz, a 
brilliant scholar and teacher from Istanbul. Khrimian and Cheraz travelled about Europe, 
preaching the need to protect the lives and livelihoods of the Armenian peasantries of the 
East. The result of their effort was Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, hammered out by 
representatives of the Great Powers in Berlin during the summer of 1878. 
 
The late 1870s were deemed a turning point for the Armenian communities of the 
Ottoman Empire for yet another reason. In 1876, Abdülhamid II came to the throne. His 
policies were different from his predecessors, who had endeavored to weld the diverse 
communities of the Ottoman Empire into one whole. Abdülhamid II employed the 
politics of Islamism in his application of the hoary tactic of divide et impera. As his reign 
progressed the Armenian population was increasingly looked on with suspicion and 
Armenian bureaucrats were systematically removed from their positions in the 
administration. The beginnings of Armenian nationalist groups must be seen within this 
framework, ‘oppression’ scholars maintain. Some of these nationalist groups were 
already established in the Ottoman Empire, like the Armenakan in Van in the 1880s. 
Others like the Hunchak, founded in Geneva in 1887 and the Dashnaktsutyun (Dashnak) 
in Tiflis in 1890, were composed of students primarily hailing from the Armenian 
population of the Russian Empire.  By the early 1890s the situation had grown 
increasingly tense, both in Istanbul and the provinces. The situation in Anatolia before 
the massacres in many ways resembled the situation faced by the Slavic peasantries of the 
Balkans. As Dadrian notes, “The indigenous Armenian peasantry had long endured the 
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kind of oppression which, in the case of the Slavs in the Balkans, had triggered their 
uprising, namely a host of inequities imposed upon them, but chiefly a system of double  
taxations.”68 
 
The mountaineers of Sasun had in fact been subject to such double taxation.69  The 
Kurdish tribal chiefs imposed one set of taxes and representatives from the Ottoman State 
imposed the other. The Hunchak agents Mihran Damadian and Hampartsoum Boyadjian 
helped to organize resistance to this and other unjust practices.70 The Ottoman authorities 
first tried to crush this resistance with the use of Kurdish tribes. According to Suny: 
A series of massacres began with clashes in Sassun. In the 
summer of 1893 Kurdish tribes entered the kaza of Sassun 
and attacked the Armenian village of Talori. The Turkish 
mutessarif of Genç arrived with his troops and arrested 
several Armenians, but no Kurds. The soldiers then plunder 
the Armenians, and the mutessarif told the authorities at 
Bitlis that the Armenians were in revolt. The villagers 
retreated into the mountains for several months, returning 
only the next spring. They refused to pay taxes because of 
the state’s failure to protect them from the Kurds. This led 
to a second visit by the army, along with Hamidiye 
troops.71 
 
According to most studies within the ‘oppression thesis,’ at the root of the violence are 
                                                        
68  Dadrian, 2003, p. 114. 
 
69 The phrase “double taxation” is the single most cited explanation of the Sasun violence by scholars of the 
oppression thesis.  The larger issue of State centralization, or the particular actors and local history is 
usually overlooked.  For instance see, Ronald Grigor Suny, “The Sassoun Massacre: A Hundred Year 
Perspective,” Armenian Review, vol. 47 (Spring/Summer 2001), p. 2.   
 
70 Suny 2001, p. 2.  
 
71  Suny 1993; p. 105; Suny repeats this exact understanding of what took place at Sasun, almost word for 
ford in his latest book, “They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else,”: A History of the Armenian 
Genocide (Princeton University Press, 2015), pp. 109-110.  In both, Suny is mistaken in attributing the 
massacres to Zeki Paşa (“the officer who oversaw the Talori killings.”)  Although McCarthy, Turan and 




the tensions between the settled population and the nomads.72  According to the tale of 
oppression, one of “the undisputed facts is the direct complicity of Sultan Abdul Hamid, 
whose peremptory order unleashed the fury and ferocity of the massacring killer 
bands.”73  The Ottoman military sent large segments of the Fourth Army into the 
mountains of Sasun. The Ottoman soldiers proceeded to kill several thousand men, 
women and children.74  This was, in the words of Vahakn Dadrian, the doyen of the 
oppression story, “the first instance of organized mass murder of the Armenians in 
modern Ottoman history that was carried out in peacetime and had no connection with 
any foreign war.”75 
 
After violence was done, the local authorities and the Ottoman State sought to cover up 
what had been done.76  Yet, the ambassadors of France, Great Britain and Russia showed 
a rare unity when they demanded that the Sasun violence be investigated and the local 
bureaucratic instigators punished.  In the winter of 1894-1895 Abdülhamid sent to Muş a 
Commission of Investigation composed of ‘trusted’ members of his household and 
                                                        
72 For instance, according to Robert Hewsen, “In the summer of 1893, nomadic Kurds, a plague to the 
settled population of whatever race, were allowed to come in from the plains of Diyarbekir, something 
forbidden for several years.” From Armenia: A Historical Atlas (University of Chicago Press, 2000, p. 231.  
Hewsen follows the account given by Suny very closely describing the attack on the Kaymakam of Kulp as 
the precipient factor in the violence of the summer of 1894.  
 
73   Dadrian, 2001, p. 32 
 
74 Estimates of the number of dead vary.  See FN 11.  Grigor Suny presents a larger number noting that 
“5,500 to 6,000 people were killed outright in the massacres of 1894, but others perished in subsequent 
massacres.” (2001, p. 2) Christopher Walker, basing his work closely on British Consul documentation, 
gives lower estimates of between 900 and 3,000. (1990, p. 142).     
 
75  Vahakn Dadrian 2003, p. 117.  See also, Hilmar Kaiser, Imperialism, Racism, and Development 
Theories: The Construction of a Dominant Paradigm on Ottoman Armenains (Gomidas, 1997), p. 6.  
Kaiser, who like Suny has strongly criticized Dadrian, affirms that “The Sasun massacre was the first 
organized mass slaughter of an Ottoman Armenian community in the 1890s.”  
 




accompanied by three delegates from France, Great Britain and Russia.  According to the 
story of oppression, the findings of the European delegates were unambiguous: the 
Ottoman soldiers had committed indiscriminate massacre of the populations of the people 
of the mountains of Sasun. 
 
On May 11 1894, some eight months after the violence, the ambassadors of France, 
Russia and Great Britain presented their recommendations to Sultan Abdülhamid II. 
Abdülhamid II was pressured to accept the reforms in a weakened form. The Hunchak 
party in Istanbul organized a planned demonstration at the end of September. As with 
past demonstrations, the large crowd would walk from Kum Kapı to the seat of the 
Ottoman bureaucracy, the Bab-ı Ali. They carried with them a petition letter concerning 
the trials and tribulation faced by the provincial peasantries.77 
 
Around 4,000 Armenians, mostly from the provinces, gathered at the Patriarchal 
cathedral at Kum Kapı on the morning of September 30, 1895.78  However, the protest 
was halted by the police. The insulting language used by the police infuriated the crowd 
and a brawl broke out between the police and the crowd. Shots were fired and a massacre 
began, this time in the middle of Istanbul. There is evidence to suggest that this was a 
conspiracy organized by the State against its own population.79 A similar pattern of 
aggressive activism occurred throughout the Ottoman Empire, where in practically every 
                                                        
77  Walker 1990, p. 155. 
 
78 Vahakn Dadrian 2003, p. 119  
 
79 Vahakn Dadrian 2003, p. 120.  Dadrian notes, “It was clear that the authorities, instead of preventing the 
demonstration, aboutt which they and the representatives of the Powers were informed beforehand by the 




case, the Ottoman State incited the local Muslim population to attack their Christian 
neighbors.80  During the months of October and November 1895, a contagion of violence 
swept across Anatolia and tens of thousands of Armenian Ottomans were murdered in 




The Shared Assumptions of the Two Narratives 
Les deux courants ont publié quantité d'ouvrages qui ne satisfont pas 
aux critères scientifiques, et qui tentent surtout de prouver leur point de 
vue.  Les partisans d'une approche critique louvoient dans un champ de 
mines d'accusations et d'allégations et courent le risque de devenir les 
victimes des axiomes des deux courants.    
                          - Jelle Verheij, "Les Frèrer de Terre et d'eau"
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On the one hand, for scholars who write within Armenian Studies, ‘Sasun’ is where the 
Ottoman State began to kill large numbers of unarmed Armenians.  Some scholars draw a 
straight line between what happened in August of 1894 and the Genocide of 1915.83  On 
the other hand, for most scholars within Ottoman Studies, the violence in 1894 signaled 
the moment when Armenians began to rebel against the State.  For some of these scholars, 
                                                        
80 Dadrian argues that the massacres had “been predesigned by the Palace.” (2003, p. 152) 
 
81  For summaries of the massacres in Trabzon, Akhisar, Erzincan, Bitlis, Gümüşhane, Bayburt, Urfa, 
Erzurum, Diyarbakir, Arapgir, Malatya, Harput, Sivas, Amasya, Aintab (Gaziantep), Merzifon, Gürün, and 
Kayseri, see Walker 1990, pp. 156-161 and Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide, pp. 153-163.  
Estimates of the number of dead vary substantially. Razmik Panossian estimates that the massacres “took 
the lives of at least 90-100,000 Armenians in a number of provinces and cities.” (2006, p. 162) 
 
82 "Les Frèrer de Terre et d'eau" : Sur Le Rôle des Kurdes dans les Massacres Arméniens de 1894-
1896,"  Islam des Kurdes, Les Annales de l'Autre Islam, no. 5 (Inalco-Erism Paris, 1998), p. 227.  
 
83 Vahakn Dadrian describes the violence of the 1890s as the “rudiments of Genocide.” See Chapter 8 in 




Foreign Powers incited these rebellions.  These arguments are to a large extent 
represented in the sources that historians from both of these fields employ.  
 
Historians have long been aware of the problem of reproducing the vantage points of the 
sources that they read.  However, within both Ottoman and Armenian Studies there is 
often an uncritical reproduction of the vantage points and organizing frameworks of the 
sources that are being employed.   Upon closer examination of the source material used 
by two different fields, Ottoman Studies and Armenian Studies, it is striking that in both 
cases the most important sources are either in Armenian for the Armenologist or in 
Ottoman for the Ottomanist. These are the gold standards upon which all other sources 
might be measured.  And while other sources -- notably the published Blue Books84-- 
might be employed, they are frequently used within a framework that privileges the truth-
value of one set of sources over all others.    
 
Scholars working within Ottoman Studies tend to situate the historical camera in Istanbul.   
They also tend to think that the sources in the Ottoman archives are the sources that are 
closest to truth.85  In fact, many of the Ottomanists who have studied the history of late 
                                                        
84 I will discuss the Parliamentary Papers, of “Blue Books” in detail in the Appendix IV.  Suffice to say, the 
Blue Books often redacted key pieces of information, such as sources of where reports came from.  
Publication of the Blue Books were a perennial struggle within the Parliament, with some Parliamentarians 
urging their publications and many within the Foreign Office resisting to maintain their control of 
information.  As one bureaucrat in the Foreign Office later put it, “As regards to the Armenian Blue Book, 
we have to publish these things at certain time; there are several members of Parliament who take a very 
keen interest in Armenian affairs, prompted, no doubt, by some of the Armenian societies in London.  We 
do no mind how much you bowdlerize the Blue Book as long as we are able to publish something; with us it 
is really the quantity and not the quality that are wanted for the House of Commons.” Quoted in Zara 
Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 196.  
Italics added.  
 
85 This presumption is explicit in Justin McCarthy, Turan and Taşkıran 2014.  However, this belief that the 
Ottoman archives hold the ‘truth’ about violence in the Ottoman Empire can be found across Ottoman 
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Ottoman violence have been either former diplomats or State officials.86  Conversely, 
scholars within Armenian Studies tend to look at accounts produced outside of the State 
as better representations of truth.  Behind each one of the sources is a claim, a larger 
claim about where truth lies.   
 
The general tendency in Ottoman Studies is discuss the history of Armenians (and Kurds 
for that matter) only when the Empire begins to fall apart. At that point, a number of 
Studies depict how Armenian exiles, sometimes working with Foreign Powers, incited 
the local Armenian population to rebel against the Ottoman State.  According to this 
perspective, the Ottoman State attempted to deal with the challenge posed by these 
radical nationalists by imprisoning them and cracking down on seditious activity.  
According to this view, the Ottoman State was constantly hindered by meddling Foreign 
Powers which sought to divide et impera Ottoman territory.87 
 
For scholars of the ‘sedition’ thesis, the focus of study is on the halls of diplomatic power 
in Europe and their relationship with tiny groups of radical Armenians who published in 
newspapers abroad. In many ways, this preoccupation with seditious Armenians mirrors 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Studies.  Donald Quataert, in his review of Donald Bloxham’s The Great Game of Genocide, notes, 
“Ottomanists (like me) have long surrendered academic study of this vital topic [State-violence against 
Armenians] to those unable or unwilling to use the Ottoman archives and other Ottoman-language sources, 
failing to take their rightful responsibility to perform the proper research.  Oddly, Ottomanists fall into a 
camp of either silence or denial – both of which are forms of complicity.  Those who have the linguistic 
and paleographic tools to unlock the truth must not leave the matter for others to debate and resolve.” See 
Journal of Interdisciplinary History (Autumn 2006), p. 258. Italics added.    
 
86 It should come as little surprise that the tale that is generally told is one obsessed with the relationship 
between the Great Powers and revolutionary radicals belonging to the Hunchak and Dashnaktsutyun parties. 
 
87 Salahi R. Sonyel, The Ottoman Armenians: Victims of Great Power Diplomacy (London: K. Rustem & 




the anxieties of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry.88  Just as the Ottoman State seemed 
convinced that the outlay of reporting was the work of seditious elements, a trinity of 
historians (McCarthy, Turan, and Taşkiran) boldly stated that, “Hunchak partisans were 
unquestionably responsible for much of the Armenian testimony against the Turks and 
Kurds presented to the Sasun Commission and for reports from European reporters.”89 
 
The narrative that McCarthy, Turan and Taşkıran tell of the Sasun violence diverges from 
the story of massacre found in all other documents (Consul reports, Missionary 
documents, Armenian-language memoirs, the investigations of journalists and travel 
accounts).  Why are the Ottoman documents so radically different from everything else?  
There seem to be two different possibilities.  One possibility is that all the other sources 
are false based on some sort of conspiracy.  Until relatively recently, that’s generally 
what scholars working within Ottoman Studies have indicated. McCarthy, Turan and 
Taşkıran argue that the simplest explanation for why all other sources diverge is that the 
Armenian Revolutionaries were feeding the missionaries, consuls and journalists 
misinformation.90  However, such an immense effort would surely indicate an awe 
inspiring well-organized operation.  It would have to coordinate a complex web of 
misinformation across six independent missionary stations in different cities around 
                                                        
88 These anxieties are apparent in the work of the Shaws and Justin McCarthy.  
 
89 McCarthy et. al. 2014, p. 42.  To support this claim, the authors contend that because many of the 
witnesses at the commission had connected Erko, Tavo, and Sako (three of the leading witnesses who 
stressed that indiscriminate killings had occurred) were alleged have been close collaborators with Murad 
(Hamparsun Boyadjian) and also ‘thieves, murderers and rebels.  McCarthy, Turan and Taşkıran argue 
based on this evidence that the accounts of Erko, Sako and Tavo were thus ‘tainted.’  This in perfectly in 
line with what the strategy employed by the Ottoman Commissioners who divided the Armenian 
population into ‘suspects’ and ‘witnesses.’  The suspects include all the Armenians from the villages 
Shenik, Semal and Güliegüzan.  
 




Sasun.   The problem is that the Hunchak revolutionary society had, by all accounts only 
a very small number of adherents at this time in the mountains.  There is no way they 
could have coordinated some a massive misinformation or propagandistic campaign.  
 
This leads to another question.  Perhaps, the misinformation campaign was not outside of 
the Ottoman State but within it? More to the point, as this dissertation will show, the 
Ottoman State relied heavily on a single report composed by Zeki Paşa that was endless 
used as the baseline for all legitimate narratives.91  The narrowness in historical 
understanding is not simply an artifact of the paucity of documentation in the Ottoman 
Archives on the violence in Sasun. It is a reflection of certain ideological frameworks that 
have been adopted by the Turkish Republic, and reproduced in textbooks. Just as the 
Ottoman State attempted to carefully control the image of the Ottoman State, institutions 
such as the Türk Tarih Kurumu continue to carefully guard the legitimization of history.92 
 
Some combination of outside forces is usually identified as the progenitor of violence.  In 
Eastern Anatolia, outside forces were usually perceived to incite the local Christian 
population to harm the local Muslim population.  However, this focus on people who 
were outsiders to the Muş and Sasun region begs the question of how these outsiders 
were able to incite the locals in the first place.  What were they inciting people about?  
                                                        
91 I will address this overreliance on a single account in Chapter Four: Interpretations.   
 
92 This sort of institution is not unusual in centralized structures. Analogies might be found in centralized 
education systems in Japan, China, and France. In all these cases, history must be understood as part of the 
mythologies that legitimize the very existence of the modern Nation-State.  One of the meta-themes of this 




And this question leads quickly to another question that is not addressed in the literature.  
What was the local history of the region?  
 
While there is very little local history within East Ottoman Studies,93 there is a lot of 
local history within Armenian Studies.  In fact, Armenian history, to a large extent, is 
based on hundreds of memoirs and oral interviews, stitched together into a general 
narrative.  It is a history not from the perspective of the State, but from the perspective of 
many who were dispossessed of their right to go home. Most of the memoir writers were 
born toward the end of the 19th century, and often wrote their memories after mass 
violence.   Armenian Studies tends to reflect a ‘survivor’ view of the Ottoman State.  The 
vision that is produced in the memoir-framework is one that crystallizes the memories 
into eternal ‘facts,’ particularly about the relationship that the Armenian peasantries bore 
to their Kurdish neighbors.   When Kurds are discussed, in Armenian Studies, they are 
described in an instrumental fashion as the tool of oppression wielded by the always-
tyrannical Ottoman State.  
 
Many of the survivors of the 1915 Genocide were children or young adults at the time of 
the violence.94  It is to be expected that their view of the world influenced by the trauma 
of the violence.  However, an examination of the memoirs told by an earlier generation 
presents a different story.  Here there is far more complexity in terms of identity, and the 
                                                        
93 Within the frame of Ottoman Studies there are few local histories of the Eastern parts of the Ottoman 
Empire, and none that I am aware of that discuss the 19th century history of the plain of Muş and the 
mountains of Sasun.   
 
94 For instance, most of the one hundred accounts, that were collected in Donald Earl Miller and Lorna 
Touryan Miller, Survivors: An Oral History of the Armenian Genocide (UC Press, 1993), were related by 




line between Kurd and Armenian was more malleable and to some extent even porous.95  
According to this earlier vantage point, ‘turning Kurd’ simply meant becoming Muslim.  
And, due to the history of conversion, there are many Armenians who are related to many 
Kurds.  From this perspective, the whole history of Armenians and Kurds quickly begins 
to resemble the story of a family.  And, Armenian Studies (and Kurdish Studies for that 
matter) is only focused on one part of that family.  
 
Some writers within Armenian Studies make a deterministic and teleological link 
between the violence that occurred in the mountains in Sasun and the Armenian 
Genocide.96  However, while acknowledging that Sasun quickly became a Janus-faced 
symbol for oppression and sedition that played a role in subsequent violence, we must be 
cautious to draw necessary links.  In fact, the patterns of exclusion that Armenians were 
subjected to in the Ottoman period did not mean that the violence of Sasun was bound to 
happen. History is not destiny.   
 
                                                        
95 See Arménouhie Kévonian, Les Noces Noires de Gulizar (Edition Parenthèses, 2005), and James G. 
Mandalian, Armenian Freedom Fighters: the Memoirs of Rouben der Minasian (Hairenik, 1963).  Rouben 
der Minassian discusses the complex world of “half-Kurdified villages” and crypto-Armenians.  Der 
Minassian profiles one Captain of the Police (Baş Komiser) by the name of Mehmed Effendi who, 
“Although outwardly a turncoat, inwardly he was still a chrisitan.  This was also true of his wife and 
children.  They had to attend Mosque, were forbidden to set foot in an Armenian church, and the Armenian 
priest never blessed their home.  When outside, they swore at the Armenians, and their christian religion, 
but in the privacy of their home, they had a secret chapel in a corner where they gathered at night and 
worshipped Christ.  In the daytime they were not permitted to speak Armenian, at nights, they spoke the 
mother tongue.” (1963, p. 183) 
  
96 Vahakn Dadrian noted that, “Nevertheless, it appears that the masacres were not without a subsidiary 
purpose, namely, as a probative effect which retrospectively may be characterized as a rehearsal for the 




Both Armenian Studies and Ottoman Studies tend to adhere to ethnic terms that are both 
essentialist and anachronistic.97  A good marker of essentialist categorization is the 
definite article often employed before ethnic terms (e.g. “The” Turks, “the” Armenians, 
“the” Kurds).  Scholars in both fields generally hold the distinctions between Armenians 
and Kurds in mutually exclusive terms.98  These ethnic categories in Ottoman and 
Armenian Studies frequently are treated as if they possessed unchanging essentialized 
characteristics that bounce off each other when they encounter each other, as if they were 
billiard balls.  Moreover, these ethnic terms are anachronistic because the ethnonyms 
commonly employed today simply did not exist in the 19th century plains of Muş and 
mountains of Sasun, in the ways that are now understood.99  
 
Ethnic terms had very different ramifications in different geographic spaces.  Terms such 
as “Turk,” “Kurd” and “Armenian” also had a complex welter of different markers across 
space and time.  For instance, one must discuss the various Armenian populations – 
Catholic, Protestant and Apostolic, rather than grouping them all together, which is too 
often the case in Armenian and Ottoman Studies.  Obviously, class and geography also 
                                                        
97 The clearest indicator of this is the lack of indepth discussion of conversion.   
 
98 In the work of everyone from Grigor Suny to Stanford Shaw ‘Kurd’ and ‘Armenian’ are depicted as 
essentialist categories with stable content across space and time.   
 
99 An example of this complexity can be found in a closer examination of religious sites in Muş and Sasun.  
One of the most prominent monasteries in the Ottoman Empire was Surb Garabed in the plain of Muş.  
Surb Garabed was built on top of a pre-Christian temple dedicated to Vahagn and Astghik (two of the most 
important deities in the Armenian Zorastrian pantheon).  According to T.M. Lint, “The particular character 
of veneration for Surb Karabet includes his perceived power to grant wishes particularly of the humble, the 
poor and sick.  He restores their hope, love and faith.  Not only Christian Armenians visited the site, also 
Muslim Kurds and Turks did.”  Mirza Bey, the father of Musa Bey, was said by Gulizar to “parlait 
l’arménien et honorait avec ardeur les saints arméniens.” This apparently is a long standing trend as the 
17th century traveler, Simeon of Poland reported that “throughout the plain and province of Mush, the 




played a role in complex nuances of difference within the Ottoman Armenian 
communities.  During the course of the first part of the 19th century, it is important to 
continually distinguish between the welfare and livelihood of those in the center and 
those in the provinces.100 
 
In the late 19th century, we can locate at least three different constellations of what the 
term ‘Turk’ means.  For instance, in the West, in the Balkans, Turk meant Muslim.  One 
‘turned Turk’ by converting to Islam.101  In the central areas of the Ottoman Empire, in 
the highlands of the Anatolian plateau, the term Turk had a definite negative 
connotation.102  It was a term used by city dwellers to refer to the benighted folks of the 
countryside.  In the East the term ‘Turk’ often referred to someone who was linked to the 
                                                        
100 By using essentialist categorizations, such as ‘the’ Armenian, Kurd or Turk, all the important differences 
in geography – to say nothing about class – between different communities within the Ottoman Empire are 
collapsed.  One of the few scholars who has stressed the importance of spatial difference is Stephan 
Astourian, who stresses throughout his work that the vast majority of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 
(and in the Russian Empire, for that matter) were peasants tied to the land at the end of the Ottoman Empire. 
Astourian’s brilliant dissertation, “Testing World-System Theory,” (Unpublished Dissertation, UCLA 
1996) examines how the agrarian roots of the Armenian Question have been effaced from Ottoman 
historiography which have overwhelmingly focused on “two Armenian types: the international trader or 
banker and the revolutionary.” (1996, p. 1) 
 
101 Mark Mazower, The Balkans: A Short History (Modern Library, 2002) p. 48 
 
102 See Selim Deringil “From Ottoman to Turk: Self-Image and Social Engineering in Turkey,” in Dru 
Gladney (ed.) Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia (Stanford 
University Press, 1998).  This was observed by the ABCFM missionary-explorers Rev. E. Smith and 
H.G.O. Dwight, “The Türkmáns are generally called Türk, but the body of Osmanlies, who repel that name 
from themselves, and appropriate the more honorable one of Müsulmán.” (1833, p. 152)  It was also 
commented upon by Abdolonyme Ubinici, “They however reject the denomination of Turks, which they 
consider insulting, and style themselves Osmanlis, from Osman, the name of the founder of the Empire; 
they only employ the [term] Turk, which in their language signifies boor or barbarian, to designate the 




State.  It was sometimes a synonym for Rum, or ‘Roman.’103  At the same time, ‘Muslim’ 
was a term that referred mostly to the sedentary population.104   
 
In the East, the term ‘Kurd,’ like the terms ‘Turk’ and ‘Arab’ elsewhere, often referred to 
a nomadic person and was often employed as a term of opprobrium.105  However, it had 
other connotations as well that varied over time and physical area.  One might identify 
three constellations of meanings.  The first signifier was religious and was employed by 
Armenian Apostolic Christians to describe Muslims. To turn Kurd, like to ‘turn Turk’ in 
the Balkans, meant to convert to Islam.106   The second signifier was about mobility and it 
was employed by city dwellers to describe the nomadic pastoralists in the countryside.  
The third was a broad geographic term that referred to the inhabitants of Kurdistan, the 
                                                        
103 See Garo Sasuni, Kürt Ulusal Hareketleri ve 15. YY’dan Günümüze Ermeni Kürt İlişkileri (Med 
Yayınları, 1992), p. 103.  
 
104 According to Verheij, “Selon les critères de l’époque, les trois groupes les plus importants étaient les 
Arméniens, les citadins musulmans et les Kurdes.” (1998, p. 229)  Verheij adds, a page later, “Au dix-
neuvième siècle le nom "kurde" était réservé aux membres de tribus kurdes, ce qui nous amène directement 
à l'identité des musulmans habitant les villes, qui parlaient le turc et souvent aussi le kurde.” (ibid, p. 230)  
A similar sentiment was evinced by HFB Lynch, who noted that in Van, although the population speaks 
both Turkish and Kurdish, “The more peaceable among them, who are accustomed to settle pursuits, 
disown the name Kurds, and affect that of the Osmanlı, or Turks of the ruling race.” (1901, vol. II, p. 84)   
 
105 The travel-archeologist and British Ambassador Layard also affirms this, noting during his travels that, 
“Although all the Mohammedan inhabitants of this part of Kurdistan are Kurds, those alone are so called 
who live in tents; those who reside in villages are known simply as “Mussulman.” (1853, p. 17)  Finally, as 
the Ottoman cavalry officer Frederick Millingen observed, “If a stranger were to ask one of the native 
Mussulmans of Erzeroum whether he is a Koord by nationality, the individual will undoubtedly consider 
the question an insult, as he claims to belong to what he supposes to be a higher caste.  If the ignorant 
native, however, were asked to substantiate his claim, he would be unable to do so, for the language which 
he speaks to his family is Koordish, as are his features, his manners, and his habits.  … the Mussulmans of 
Van labour under the same illusion and indignantly disown their Koordish nationality.” (1870, p. 149)  
 
106 In her memoir, Gulizar often discusses conversion as the difference between being Armenian and being 
Kurdish. While held captive by Musa Bey, she recalls, “Je pleurai sans cesse.  Je ne pouvais me faire à 
l'idée de renier ma foi, de devenir kurde.” [I cried constantly. I could not get used to the idea of renouncing 




sort of usage that the Emirs of Kurdistan employed in their self-description.107  The 
common understanding of who is a Kurd today revolves around language.108  This may 
also have been a marker of difference, but it was certainly not a final one in the 19th 
century.  In many respects it is important to emphasize that the religious practices of the 
people of both Muş and Sasun was similar in many respects to other mountain regions of 
the Ottoman Empire.109 
 
In the same fashion that Armenian Studies and Ottoman Studies maintained essentialist 
notions of ethnic categories of peoplehood, both fields are reliant on essentialist 
depictions of ‘the’ Ottoman State.  Until relatively recently, many scholars in both 
Ottoman and Armenian Studies tended to depict the end of the Ottoman Empire as a 
period of decline of the power of the Ottoman State, vis à vis European States.  One 
presumption shared by both Armenian and Ottoman Studies is that the vast majority of 
                                                        
107 Sharaf Khan Bidlisi, trans. Mehrdad Izady, The Sharafnama, or, the History of the Kurdish Nation 
(Mazda, 2005).   
 
108 The categories that we now employ for Armenian and Kurdish do not map well onto the population of 
Sasun in the 19th century.  Today, ‘Armenian’ is usually used to describe someone who has some familial 
relationship to the historical Apostolic Armenian Christian Church.  Recently, there has been a renewed 
scholarly interest in ‘Islamized’ Armenians – like the Hemşinli of the southeastern Black Sea.  The term 
‘Kurdish,’ on the other hand, is usually used to describe someone who has a familial relationship to 
speakers of Kurdish, regardless of their ancestral religious background.  In other words, regardless whether 
someone practices Islam, Judaism, or identifies as an Êzidî (Yazidi), they are generally seen as Kurds.  
During the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, there were populations that spoke Kurdish and practiced 
Armenian Apostolic Christianity.  For the sake of this dissertation, according to the parlance of today, I 
have described this population as Kurdish-Armenians.   
 
109 What the John Van Antwep Fine said of the Bogomils, and H.T.  Norris said of the people in the 
Balkans more broadly, could just as well be said for most inhabitants in the mountainous areas of the 
Ottoman Empire: “The religion of Balkan (and other) peasants is practice-oriented and deals primarily with 
this world.  It has little or no doctrine and its emphasis is chiefly or even entirely upon practices that aim at 
worldly goals: at the health and the welfare of family, crops and animals.” (Quoted in H.T. Norris, Islam in 
the Balkans), p. 264. For examples of local practices among village Armenian Apostolics see, Manug 




Armenians lived in relative peace while the State was strong and expanding.110  Here the 
notion is that the persecution stemmed from the weakness of the State -- not the strength.  
However, from the point of view of the inhabitants of Sasun and Muş, the Ottoman State 




The Patchwork of the Ottoman State 
 
Imagine tracing the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers back up into the mountains to the north 
and the giant plateau beyond them.  Here, the sources of the Tigris and Euphrates are 
composed of a vast array of little rivers and streams.  One of those little rivers is called 
the Murat.  For centuries, the local Armenians of Muş called it the Honey River.111  For 
12 miles the Murat snakes through Muş, a fertile volcanic plain that is 40 miles by 12 
miles, some 4,500 feet up in the air.  At the beginning of the 19th century, this plain 
possessed one of the largest concentrations of Apostolic Armenians anywhere in the 
world.  The villagers in the middle of the valley were almost all Christian (and Muslims 
who spoke Armenian), while the hills and mountains were occupied by a welter of 
different localized religions and languages.112 
                                                        
110 Scholars in the ‘oppression’ vein such as Hovannisian (1986, p. 20) shares this notion with many 
scholars from the ‘sedition’ school.  See M. Hakan Yavuz’s discussion of the ‘failed state’ in “Contours of 
Scholarship on Armenian-Turkish Relations,” in Middle East Critique, vol. 20, no. 3 (Fall 2011), p. 245.  
 
111 See Kévonian 2005 for a description of the ‘Meghraked’ [Arm. Honey River].  
 
112 Travellers in the mountainous regions across the Ottoman Empire often found that the local practices 
confounded the religious categories of the lowlands.  One community that often elicited comment from 




Sasun is the mountainous region south of the plain of Muş, a section of the great Taurus 
Mountains that divide Anatolia from Mesopotamia.  There is a river that cuts through the 
Taurus Mountains.  In the middle of the ravine created by that river is the city of Bitlis, a 
day and a half journey by foot to the southeast of the plain of Muş.  There has long been 
interplay between the mountains and the plains, which were linked by long standing 
trading relations and the rhythms of seasonal migrations of nomads from the plains into 
the mountains.   
 
During the 18th century, the Ottoman State extracted tribute from many regions but 
allowed them to effectively rule themselves.  Over the course of seven centuries and 
across a huge swath of space in the Ottoman dominions there were hundreds of different 
strategies on how to incorporate difference, or more specifically how to bring Christians 
into politics.  For instance, in the 16th century, many of the political and military elite 
were born Christian, enslaved and converted to Islam through the devşirme system.  
However, these elite, known as kul or ‘bondmen,’ retained a complicated position vis-à-
vis the Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire.  They often looked at Christians as 
brethren because in many cases they were.  In many cases, the former Christian servitors 
of the Empire continued to patronize their villages and families.  There is a famous 
                                                                                                                                                                     
unruly set of Kurds called the Baliki.  They swear by a church, and never a mosque, or the Deity, or any of 
the prophets.” (John George Taylor, “Travels in Kurdistan, with Notices of the Sources of the Eastern and 
Western Tigris, and Ancient Ruins in Their Neighborhood,” The Journal of the Royal Geographic Society 
of London, vol. 35 (1865), p. 28).  Lynch also commented on the this community.  He observed, “Strange 
indeed are the anomalies which are presented in these little-known districts of Turkish Kurdistan.  On the 
southern fringe of Sasun live a tribe called the Baliki, or Beleke, speaking a mixed language of Arabic, 
Kurdish and Armenian.  Their religion cannnot be classed either as Christian or Mohammedan nor even as 
that professed by the Kizilbashes.  When they make [an] oath it is in the name of a church or monastery.  




example of a Grand Vizier ruling the Muslims, and a Christian Patriarch who was his 
brother.  This system of inclusion changed dramatically in the 19th century.  One 
example was the centralization of the military.  The military became increasingly 
regimented, and throughout this period, the purview of only Muslims who were born 
Muslims. 
 
At the beginning of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was composed of a patchwork 
of different polities.113  However, as the Second Chapter will show in greater detail, the 
Ottoman State first began to rule directly on the plain of Muş and then the mountains of 
Muş.  From the perspective of the ruling center, this process might well be called 
Centralization.  From the perspective of the people of Muş and Sasun this resembled 
nothing short of a Conquest.  This was not an immediate event, but rather a process that 
began with the removal of Şerif Bey in the 1849 and continued until the end of the 19th 
century.114  Neither Armenian Studies nor Ottoman Studies has explored how 
relationships in this region changed with the advent of Centralization.   With the conquest 
of the East, the Ottoman State began to divide the populace into simplified categories: 
Müslim and gayr-ı Müslim.115  The Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul, an institution 
                                                        
113 According to Helmuth von Moltke, “ “So ist die osmanische Monarchie heute in der That ein Aggregat 
von Königreichen, Fürstenthümern und Republiken geworden, die nichts zusammen hält, als lange 
Gewohnheit und die Gemeinschaft des Koran, und wenn man unter einem Despoten einen Herrscher 
versteht, dessen Wille alleiniges Gesetz, so ist der Sultan von Konstantinopel weit davon entfernt, ein 
Despot zu sein,” Briefe über Zustände und Begebenheiten in der Türkei aus den Jahren 1835 bis 1839 
(Berlin, 1876), p. 45.  [Thus, the Ottoman Empire has become an aggregate of kingdoms, principalities and 
republics, in fact, nothing holds it together aside from long habit and the unity of the Qur’an, and if you 
understand a ruler as a despot, whose will is the sole law, then the Sultan of Constantinople is far from 
being a despot.”] 
 
114 See Sasuni 1992, p. 135.  I will discuss this Conquest in more detail in Chapter Two.  
 
115 This conquest might be compared to the French attempts to control the Kabyle mountains or the Russian 
conquest of the Caucausus.  This comparison was observed by an Ottoman officer who noted to the British 
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embedded at the heart of Ottoman governance, played a key role in this categorization 
process.116 
 
In the plain of Muş and the areas around the Van litoral, where the local Armenian 
Church had long been a power to be reckoned with, the categories of difference were 
relatively clear and were similarly structured along Muslim and Non-Muslim (gayr-ı 
Müslim) lines.117  When the Ottoman State first conquered this region between 1830 and 
1849, the State employed this line of difference between Apostolic Armenian peasantries 
and their Muslim neighbors to practice a policy of divide et impera, going so far as to 
conscript and arm Armenian peasantries of the lowlands against their erstwhile rulers.118  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
traveller Henry Algernon George Percy, “It took the Russians nearly a hundred years to make anything of 
the Circassians, and they are not up to very much even now.  Much has been done … during the last fifty 
years to destroy the power of the Kurds, and the invariable practice of taking advantage of their mutual 
discords gradually to reduce the tribes to submission will, in the course of time, bring about a more settled 
state of affairs throughout the interior.” (Highlands of Asiatic Turkey, 1901, p. 132).  Just as both the 
French and Russians utilized religious and linguistic differences to entrench their rule, the Ottomans 
maintained a strict distinction between Muslims (who had the burden of conscription) and non-Muslims 
(who had the burden of cizye or bedel-i askeriye taxes).  
 
116 See the reports of Natanyan translated into Turkish by Arsen Yarman, in Palu, Harput 1878: Adalet 
Arayışı (vol. I) and Raporlar (vol. II) (Dersim, 2010). The effort represented in these reports was to 
ennumerate and study the various population of Armenians in the East.  The power of the Patriarch in 
Istanbul at first expanded alongside that of other centralizing instutions.  
 
117 See the description of the “Alau-ddin” Emirate of Muş in James Brant, “Notes of a Journey through a 
Part of Kurdistan in the Summer of 1838,” Journal of the Royal Geographic Society, vol. 10 (1840), p. 348, 
350, and 408; Horatio Southgate, Narrative of a Tour through Armenia, Kurdistan, Persia and 
Mesopotamia (New York, 1840), pp. 210-11. See Appendix II: Description of Muş and Sasun for more 
details of the political economy and social structure of the region.  
 
118 Rubina Peroomian, “The Heritage of Van Provincial Literature,” in Richard Hovanissian (ed.) Armenian 
Van / Vaspurakan (Mazdan, 2000), pp. 134-135.  In her description of Mkrtich Khrimian, Peroomian notes, 
“To quell the Kurdish uprising led by Bakrkhan Beg in 1847, the Sublime Porte used the Armenians 
against the Kurdish tribesmen.  The Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople was coerced into authorizing 
the formation of Armenian military units to participate in the campaign against the rebels.  This action was 





Firearms, Steamboats, and Telegraphs 
 
My dissertation will argue that the historical roots of the Sasun violence of the 1890s can 
be usefully traced back over six decades to the early-19th century.  Furthermore, this 
dissertation will contribute critical historical context for the political formations and 
sectarian violence that broke out in Ottoman Taron in the 1880s and 1890s.  More 
specifically, I will suggest that the prevailing focus on what Fernand Braudel called the 
courte durée, “the short time measured on individuals, everyday life, our illusions, our 
understandings and awareness,”119 has obscured the important role played by 
demographic, economic and political conjunctures.  In the second chapter, I will organize 
these broad conjunctures into a history of three technologies: firearms, steamboats and 
telegraphs over the course of more than six decades (1826-1889).  
 
After the destruction of the Janissaries in 1826, the Ottoman State began to centralize its 
authority using a French-drilled conscripted army.  This centralization involved 
enormous violence, especially for those on the periphery of the Ottoman State.  For the 
local inhabitants in the Eastern reaches of the Ottoman Empire, the process of 
centralization inaugurated under Mahmud II at first resembled a conquest.   The Ottoman 
State’s effort to centralize their rule was part and parcel of a larger trend of State 
centralizations that occurred across Eurasia.  To a certain extent, this transformation was 
                                                        
119 Quoted in Jan Bloomaert, “The debate is open” in Language Ideological Debates (Walter de Gruyter, 




rooted in technological asymmetries between the center and the peripheries.  These 
asymmetries allowed for the rapid conquest of vast space by the center.  
 
In a similar manner to the English conquering their Celtic fringe, the French subduing the 
Algerian highlands, and the Russians colonizing the Caucasus, the Ottomans pursued a 
centralizing policy that led to the introduction of military garrisons, prisons and other 
state institutions in the mountainous Eastern provinces of the Empire. The firearms of the 
industrial age and the military drill allowed the Ottoman State to begin the conquest of 
regions far removed from the large cities and trading routes that it had traditionally 
controlled.   
 
In the 1830s-1850s, the Ottoman State conquered the lowlands through a process of 
military victories and divide-et-impera tactics.  The House of Alaeddin was the last of the 
local rulers in the plains to be finally removed in 1849.  At the same time that the 
Ottoman Empire was conquering its hinterlands with rifle-wielding forces, the Russians 
were conquering the Caucasus. Each successive war between the Ottoman State and the 
Russian State brought massive coercive migration and help to create a political line 
between the Muslim and Christian populations. 
 
As Karen Barkey has argued in Bandits and Bureaucrats, centralization occurs in cycles.  
An earlier dramatic case of Ottoman State centralization/conquest occurred in the 16th 
century.120  There are certain parallels and certain divergences in the centralization of the 
                                                        




19th century.  In both the 16th century and the 19th century, the State was enabled to 
conquer its tribute-bearing hinterlands by having access to certain technologies of force 
(ex: cannons in the 16th century and repeating rifles in the 19th).  The diffusion of certain 
technologies of force (e.g. flint rifles) in the 17th century was one of the contributing 
factors in the decentralization of the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century and the creation 
of a patchwork of polities linked together by tribute and tradition.  
 
The 19th century conquest and centralization was different from earlier cycles in one 
glaring respect: for the first time, asymmetries of force allowed the mountainous regions 
to be ruled from the plains.  This rule was by no means absolute.  Governments across 
Eurasia established locally conscripted forces to control their mountainous spaces.  In 
Great Britain, Highland clans of Scotland were recruited to centralize authority in the 
Celtic Fringe.121   In the Ottoman Empire, the Hamidiye were formed from Kurdish 
Tribes with a similar end.122 To control the mountains, the Ottomans also structured their 
military garrisons along the frontiers of the State-control: at the edges of the mountains.   
 
Another parallel to the 16th century of critical importance for this dissertation involves 
how the State instituted throughout its centralized regime certain legible categories of 
difference that enabled it to rule over vast space.123 This process led to the creation of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
121 This process took place in the 18th century century in Great Britain.  The power of the Highland Clans 
was nearly broken after the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745.  
 
122 Janet Klein, The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone (Stanford University 
Press, 2011) 
 
123 James C. Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed 
(Yale University Press, 1998). 
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certain categories of people that were deemed dangerous to the order of the State and in 
times of perceived threat or conquest treated with extreme violence (e.g. Alevi in the 16th 
century, Yezidis at the beginning of the 19th century, Armenians in the early 20th 
century). The history of how these categories of peoplehood were created, politicized and 
deemed dangerous or seditious is of the utmost importance in tracing the roots of the 
violence in the longue durée.  In this part of my dissertation, I will argue that for a 
complex set of reasons the State slowly moved toward the perception of Armenians as 
seditious.  This was not inevitable, and at least at first, many Armenians aided and 
abetted the conquest of the Ottoman State – or in the State’s eyes “centralization” – of the 
Eastern provinces.  The history of violence  (and mass forced migration) across the Black 
Sea by the Russian Empire, alongside a number of other factors contributed tremendously 
to a process whereby the Armenian population was seen as a potential fifth column 
within the body politic. 
 
Up until the mid 19th century much of the State violence was directed at the Alevi who 
were considered to be external enemies.  The Alevi had long been stigmatized and treated 
as possible fifth columns within the Empire.  In addition to the question of the finances, 
in addition to the political necessity of having Christians, there’s also this real fear the 
outsiders (Great Powers) were using the Christians for their own advantage.  And so 
eventually by 1915, you basically end up having the belief, widely held, that the 
Christians were dangerous, and the fact that they were dangerous, partly stemmed from 
the memory of a lot of Muslims who had themselves been forcibly removed from the 
Balkans and the Caucasus.  The experiences of many muhacir, or Muslim refugees, who 




had been forced from their lands, seemed to justify the fear with which the Christians 
were regarded. All of this fit in nicely with the old human tendency to covet, part of the 
violence stemmed from the fact that this represented an enormous opportunity to loot.   
 
If asymmetrical access to technologies of force is key to understanding the ability of the 
Ottoman State to conquer vast spaces within its own hinterland, the technologies of 
transportation and communication represented by the steamboat and the telegraph would 
have similar far-reaching consequences.  These technologies (alongside others, such as 
quinine and quarantines which I will not discuss) enabled the reach of the State to be far 
more dramatic than ever before.  If, as Weber says, the State was the monopolization of 
legitimate force, then these advances in transportation and communication allowed for 
the State to strive for a monopoly of legitimate mobility and legitimate narrative in ways 
that had scarcely been possible in the 16th century.  
 
At the beginning of the 19th century, the Armenian Patriarchate was considered an 
integral part of the Ottoman State.  The Patriarchate served a critical function as a 
network connector between the elite Armenian community of Istanbul (Amiras) and the 
Ottoman State.  Until the middle of the 19th century, the Ottoman State relied on this 
community to take out internal loans (internal debt).  It was necessary for the 
maintenance of the Ottoman State for the Armenian Patriarchy in a position of favor and 
power.  
 
The Armenian Patriarchate, charged with looking after the religious affairs of the 
Armenian millet, also paid little attention to the Armenian peasantries far to the East. To 
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some extent, this position reflected the socioeconomic makeup of those who held power 
within the Armenian Patriarchate. By the mid-19th century, there was a wealthy and 
powerful class of Armenians in Istanbul known as the Amira. The Amira consisted of a 
number of ‘connected’ families of architects, gunpowder makers, foreign advisers, and 
perhaps most importantly, bankers (sarrafs). Through patronage systems, these families 
wielded a certain degree of political influence on the workings of the Ottoman State. It is 
perhaps not that surprising to note that they were closely tied to the policy and elections 
of the Armenian Patriarchs. 
 
During the Crimean War, the Ottoman State for the first time began to take out 
international loans.   The Ottoman Bank was established to as joint venture between the 
Great Britain, France and the Ottoman State.   This began a spiral of external debt that 
threatened to bankrupt the State by the mid-1870s and had the unintended effect of 
lowering the importance of the Armenian Patriarchate within the structure of the Ottoman 
State.  Over the course of the next few decades, the Armenian Patriarchy began to be 
viewed ‘alien’ political body within a Muslim body politic.  
 
In the 19th century there was a struggle between the Amira, the traditional power holders 
within the Armenian community, and a burgeoning merchant class. This new bourgeoisie 
advocated for greater inclusion in the policymaking of the Patriarchate. The ensuing 
power struggle fundamentally altered the political makeup of the Armenian Patriarchate 
and the manner in which Patriarchs would be elected. These transformations were 
enshrined in the Armenian Constitution of 1863, which specified that the Patriarch would 
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be elected by a combination of traditional power holders, new elite from the bourgeoisie 
and even Armenians from the provinces. The patriarchal election of Mıgırdic Khrimian, 
who hailed from the distant southern shores of Lake Van, is a turning point in the politics 
of the Armenian Patriarchate.124 
 
After Khrimian was elected in 1869, he sent investigators from Istanbul to survey and 
report on the plight of the Armenians from the provinces. The reports brought the stories 
of hundreds of Armenian communities back to Istanbul, making it clear that reforms were 
needed in the East.  The most important issues that were brought up in these and 
subsequent investigations were that the Armenian peasantries experienced conflict with 
semi-nomadic Muslim herders (“Kurds” of that era), corruption ran rampant, and there 
was an overall lack of security.  These reports were passed onto the Ottoman State but 
little was done to solve the problems of the peasantries.  
 
At the same time, throughout the 19th century the Ottoman State continued to expand the 
area that it controlled directly.  During the first half of the century, the Ottomans 
succeeded in destroying the power of the large lowland principalities that had 
traditionally controlled their own internal politics.   After the Ottomans conquered these 
areas, they replaced the rule of local dynasties with bureaucrats appointed from the center. 
While the Ottoman State had sufficient force to conquer the area, it was often not able to 
maintain its rule without alliances with local Warlords.   
                                                        
124  For a careful analysis of the Amira class see Hagop Levon Barsoumian, “The Amira Class of Istanbul,” 
(PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 1980). For the struggles of the mid19th century within the 
Armenian community see Gerard Libaridian, The ideology of Armenian liberation (PhD dissertation, 





Into the place of an older tribute relationship (linking Istanbul to the rulers various locally 
controlled principalities) grew a new tribute relationship that relied on centrally 
appointed bureaucrats and military as intermediaries.  To maintain their rule, the 
bureaucrats and military officers Ottoman authorities made arrangements with local 
warlords.  This arrangement coincided with the Ottoman state debt crisis of the mid-
1870s and thus further encouraged bureaucrats to make their income from extraction 
from the local population.  This system dramatically increased tensions across the eastern 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire and led to increased struggles between centrally 





The Fedayi in Muş 
 
In the plains of Muş, a local struggle between a warlord named Musa Bey and the 
Armenian peasants inaugurated the birth of the Fedayi movement.  The Fedayi were 
ethnically segmented armed bands that acted both as protectors to the Armenian 
peasantries against corrupt officials and local warlords.  The Fedayi emerge between 
1885 and 1895 in the plains of Muş and the mountains of Sasun, an area that many locals 
continued to refer to as Taron.  The general tendency125 has been to present their 
                                                        
125 The standard work is still Louise Nalbandian, Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of 
Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century (1963). 
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emergence as a natural outcome of the foundation of exile nationalist groups like the 
Hunchak, founded in Geneva in 1887, or Taşnak, founded in Tiflis in 1890.126  However, 
little attention is paid to the local roots of the Fedayi, whose name hints at the local 
religious varieties of nationalism far removed from the socialists in Geneva and Tiflis.  I 
will sketch in Chapter Three how local bands of bandits (khachakhs in Armenian, eşkıya 
in Ottoman) were converted to become, as Gerard Libaridian put it, “soldiers for the 
revolution.”127 
 
According to Rouben Der Minasian, a former Fedayi himself: 
In the initial stages both youths were plain bandits, with 
this difference, however, that they robbed for the sake of 
fame, and not for gaining riches. If there were Ashirets 
among the Kurds, they reasoned, why should not the 
Armenians do the same? Having organized their bands on 
the model of the Kurdish Ashiret, they now thought they 
had a right to rob their enemies. Common bandits as they 
were, in the eyes of the Armenian people they became 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
126 The history of the term ‘Fedayee,’ or ‘Fedaï,’ is beyond the already copious framework of this 
dissertation.  It is by no means clear where the word even comes from.  According to an interview with 
Şakir Paşa recorded by the journalist Sidney Whitman, “When the [Armenian] insurrectionary movement 
was ripe, the men who appeared on the scene gave themselves the name of ‘Fedaïs,’ or the ‘Sacrificed for 
the Country.’  This is the sobriquet which the notorious Armenian revolutionist Daniel Tschoueh [sic] 
applied to himself.  Under the pretext of saving his country, he roamed through the vilayet of Sivas, where 
he simply committed acts of brigandage.” Quoted in “The Turk at Home,” Harpers New Monthly, vol. 97, 
p. 638.  A recent work by Fatma Müge Göçek in her recent Denial of Violence: Ottoman Pasts, Turkish 
Present and Collective Violence (OUP, 2015), p. 195, gives a very different explanation, noting that the 
Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) utilized the term to describe assassins.  Göçek notes that the term, 
“originated from feda, deriving from the first letters of filiyas elenikis desmos anton, meaning “This is a tie 
of Greek Friendship.  The term thus originally derived from Greek and Bulgarian guerilla activities in the 
Balkans and then also employed by Ottoman militia fighters.”  The earliest use of the term that I have been 
able to find in British Foreign Office documentation is from a report by Acting Consul Hampson to Sir N. 
Conor, dated October 19, 1903 where the turn is used as a synonym for “Armenian revolutionaries.” See 
FO 424/205, p. 181.  My own use of the term to describe Armenian revolutionaries may be very 
anachronistic.  
 
127 Gerard Jirair Libaridian, “The Ideology of Armenian Liberation: The Development of Armenian 




popular heroes because they symbolized the spirit of the 
revolt.128   
 
In late March of 1889, Musa Bey, the son of Mirza Bey, kidnapped and raped a young 
Armenian girl named Gulizar.  To protest against this local warlord, a deputation of 
inhabitants of Muş headed to Istanbul to protest in front of the Kum Kapı Cathedral, the 
seat of the Armenian Patriarchate.  The news of this protest in early May 1889 was 
swiftly carried over telegraph lines to London.  In the spring of 1889, newly formed exile 
Armenian organizations based in London and sympathetic Liberal MPs began to work 
together to broadcast the tribulations of the people of Muş in mass circulated newspapers 
and in the British Parliament.  Partly in response to this outcry, Sultan Abdülhamid II 
ordered that Musa Bey be brought to Istanbul to stand try on charges of murder, rape and 
larceny.  But the Musa Bey trial, held over three days in November was a farce of justice. 
Many in the Ottoman Empire became convinced that certain factions of the Palace were 
protecting Musa Bey, a loyal servant of the Empire in the East.   
 
The acquittal of Musa Bey radicalized a number of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. It 
was partly due to frustration and anger with the Musa Bey acquittal that a number of 
young students at the Royal Medical School help organize an Istanbul-based branch of 
the Hunchak along with intellectuals from the Russian-controlled Caucasus.  (It is 
interesting to observe that the Committee of Ottoman Union (İttihad-ı Osmanli Cemiyeti), 
an early iteration of the Committee of Union and Progress was founded at the same 
medical school in the same year.)     
                                                        
128 James Mandalian (trans. and ed.) Armenian Freedom Fighters: The Memoirs of Rouben Der Minasian 





Reactions to the Musa Bey trial exemplified many of the broader relationships in the age 
of telegraph.  Just as in the mass agitation over the Bulgarian massacres in 1876, the 
fervor over Musa Bey politicized and internationalized a local struggle.  The commotion 
over the Musa Bey affair alarmed many within the upper echelons of power within the 
Palace.  Over time, various factions within the Palace understood the cries for 
humanitarian intervention either as a ploy of Armenian exiles abroad to contest the State 
or as part of a Greater Power struggle over geopolitical ends. 
 
Back in the plain of Muş, a veritable small war broke out between the retainers of Musa 
Bey and the local Armenian peasantries.   Up until 1889, in the plain of Muş at least, the 
Armenians peasantries had been allowed to bear firearms.  However, after the Musa Bey 
affair of 1889 and 1890, the Ottoman authorities began to collect guns and ban access to 
the saltpeter flats in the plain.  In the end, the Fedayi were able to wield more power 
within the Armenian communities, as they were the only ones who possessed guns.    The 
situation in the plan worsened in 1891 when Hassan Tahsin Paşa was appointed Vali or 
Governor-General of Bitlis.  Tahsin Pasha used the Armenian issue for his own pecuniary 
ends.  Wealthy Armenians were threatened with imprisonment for sedition unless they 
paid up.  Anyone who protested the corruption was risked imprisonment, as did anyone 
who bore arms in self-defense.  To entrench his rule, Tahsin Pasa arrested school-
teachers, priests and bandits.  It was in the prison cells where many were radicalized 




Meanwhile, the Ottoman State was slowly exerting it authority over the mountain spaces 
that had been outside of their control.  Until the early 1890s, many of the villages in the 
mountains were simply not taxed by the central state.  Instead, older forms of tribute, 
known as ‘hafir’ continue to hold sway.  Villagers paid this tribute to the Kurdish tribal 
nomads who spent their summers in Sasun.  In the 1890s, the Governor General (Vali) of 
Bitlis, Tahsin Paşa, began to use certain Kurdish tribes (Bekranlı, Ruşkotanlı and 
Badikanli) as auxiliaries to reduce the autonomy of the mountains.  This was a variation 
of the divide et impera strategy that the Ottoman State had employed with the creation of 
the Hamidiye and had earlier used to conquer the East.  The presence of revolutionary 
Fedayi in the mountains was a pretext to conquer this controlled space.  In the summer of 
1894, Tahsin Paşa misrepresented a local struggle between Bekranlı and villagers as a 
serious rebellion against the State.  Abdülhamid II sent direct orders to the Fourth Army 
commander, Zeki Paşa to exterminate the ‘bandits’ and leave a ‘legacy of terror.’  The 
result was systematic murder of one to two thousands men, women and children in a 




Censorship and Dissemination 
 
In the fourth chapter, I will analyze how narratives of the Sasun massacres were 
disseminated along certain networks and how they were censored across others.  
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Eventually the ways in which these stories were told and censored played a role in the 
subsequent massacres from the fall of 1895 to the summer of 1896.   
 
After the Ottoman troops carried out indiscriminate mass killings in the summer of 1894, 
both the local authorities and the central authorities attempted to cover up the violence.  
To do this the local authorities tampered with evidence, intimidated witnesses, and 
fabricated false reports.  (All of these trumped up evidence is now employed by 
historians to prove that the Ottoman State did not carry out indiscriminate killings.) The 
only newspaper accounts that many people had access to in the Ottoman Empire were 
based on the accounts of the corrupt governor who oversaw the massacre.   The state 
perspective often reflected the vantage point of the corrupt governors.   
 
At the same time, ABCFM missionaries based in Bitlis began to attempt to get the 
accounts of violence out to the rest of the world.  By bearing witness to a broad reading 
public abroad certain locally born ABCFM missionaries hoped that news of what was 
happening could help change public opinion in Great Britain and pressure the Ottoman 
Government to reform its polices.  In the fall of 1894, the network of the ABCFM 
missionaries was connected through the efforts of the Ottoman-born missionary Frederick 
Davis Greene to the mass circulating press in Great Britain.  On November 17, 1894, a 
letter from a missionary in Bitlis was published in the London Times.  This ignited a 
cycle of news and repression.  The more that stories of the massacre appeared in 
newspapers abroad, the more the Ottoman State clamped down in order to maintain a 




The dramatic escalation of news about Sasun had unintended consequences for the 
Armenian peasantries of the East.  After the news of the Sasun massacres reached Europe, 
the Ottoman Government clamped down on all networks of information.  Between the 
fall of 1894 and the spring of 1895, the Ottoman State banned journalists from entering 
Anatolia, censored Ottoman newspapers, and attempted to prevent any newspapers that 
reported on the violence from circulating.  The Ottoman State also strove to prevent 
Armenian laborers from leaving their villages in the East by setting up an internal 
passport regime.  The Ottoman State also increasingly treated anyone who disseminated 
information to the Foreign Press as seditious.  This allowed corrupt governors in the 
Ottoman East to continue to legitimate their misrule. This created a negative feedback 
system of dissemination-control-violence which led to even greater tension between the 
Armenian population and the Ottoman State.  After Sasun, the membership in 
revolutionary organizations dramatically increased.  This feedback-loop laid the grounds 




The Internationalization of Sasun 
 
In the age of the telegraph, journalists played a critical role as vectors of information.  
However, the line between missionary and journalist was often a very thin one, if it 
existed at all.  From the beginning of the ABCFM endeavors in Anatolia in the 1830s, 
missionaries had written dispatches designed to be pared down and published in the 
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missionary press.  By the end of the 19th century the missionary press was integrated into 
the mainstream press.  The result was a dramatic expansion of the narratives disseminated 
by the ABCFM missionaries.   
 
Eventually, the British daily press and ABCFM missionary press were brought together 
in the spring of 1895.  The result were the mass dissemination of accounts of missionaries 
such as Rev. Royal M. Cole, Rev. Frederick Greene and Rev. George Perkins Knapp in 
mass circulation press such as the London Times and Manchester Guardian.129  The 
accounts of special correspondents, the indignation meetings and the debates in 
Parliament reinforced and compounded many times missionary reporting of the Sasun 
violence.  
 
The intense flurry of humanitarian-based attention sparked by these accounts of the Sasun 
massacres might usefully be compared to the attention afforded by the British reading 
public of the ‘Bulgarian Horrors’ – the atrocities at Batak that took place in the 1870s.  
The public outcry over Sasun also resembled the attention given to Leopold’s Congo half 
a decade later.130   
 
                                                        
129 Royal M. Cole’s letter dated October 9 appeared in the London Times on November 17, 1894.  George 
Perkins Knapp’s three-part investigation of the Sasun violence was published in the same newspaper on 
March 29, March 30 and April 13, 1895.  Frederick Davis Greene is the only one of the three to have 
published under his own name.  See, for example, articles about the daily life of people in Sasun published 
in the Manchester Guardian on May 1, May 21, and June 1, 1895.  
 
130 These violent atrocities were illustrated memorably by Adam Hochchild’s King Leopold’s Ghost: A 




However, the more the British press published about the plight of the Armenians, the 
more certain factions within the Palace believed that a broader conspiracy was at play.  
The overall effect of newspaper articles and outcry in the British public was not an 
amelioration of the conditions of the impoverished peasants, but instead a massive cover-
up, increased repression any unsanctioned narratives, and increased suspicion of Ottoman 
Armenian as a seditious community.  The Palace employed a number of different 
censorship strategies to prevent the dissemination of any narrative it deemed illegitimate.  
These strategies included, (1) the prohibitions against all special correspondents and any 
newspapers that differed from the ‘resmi tarih’ (official history) (2) the six-month long 
Commission that routinely pressured witnesses to conform to the legitimate narrative of 
Zeki Paşa and (3) arranging for correspondents such as Safir Effendi and Saturnino 
Ximénez to convey broadly the accounts preserved in Ottoman State documents.   
 
The efforts in London to disseminate accounts of massacre contrasted with the efforts of 
the Palace to suppress them.   The tension between the interpretation of Sasun as a 
massacre (as it was presented in newspapers printed abroad) and the interpretation of 
Sasun as a rebellion (as it was presented in the Ottoman newspapers) set up increasing 
tension within the Ottoman Empire that would play a role in the next bout of violence.  
The Palace’s efforts to crack down on ‘sedition’ – now understood to mean everything 
from bearing a weapon to passing on illegitimate narratives to journalists led to more 
radicalization.  This created a cycle of news stories proliferating in Europe that led to a 




The dissemination and censorship of accounts of Sasun was a primary cause for the 
contagion of violence breaks out throughout the Ottoman Empire. In other words, the 
ways in which Sasun was variously interpreted and understood set the conditions for 
greater violence that was almost unparalleled in the Ottoman East.   
 
On October 8 1895 violence broke out in Trabzon, and over the course of the next six 
months between 30,000 and 50,000 people are murdered in dozens of distinct episodes of 
mass violence.  Sometimes the violence was committed in a very systematic fashion.  For 
instance, in several cases, the violence was organized by prearranged signals such as 
bugle calls that marked the beginning and the end of the killing and looting.  In number 
of cases, members of the newly settled muhacir (refugees) communities are specifically 
identified as leading the killing of Armenian men.  It seems that many Muslims were 
terrified of the prospect of organized Armenian bandits, perhaps reminiscent of Christian 
paramilitary squads that carried out terroristic violence against Muslims in the Balkans 
and the Caucasus.   
 
Every bout of massacre, however, increased the radicalism of the Fedayi.  By the summer 
of 1896 the most radical of the Fedayi had began to employ terror-tactics to achieve their 
ends.  On August 26, 1896 two dozen Dashnak Fedayi, led by Papken Siuini and Karekin 
Pastermadjin, took over the French and British controlled Ottoman Bank in Istanbul.  
Karekin Pastermadjin131 threatened to blow up the hostages and themselves if their 
                                                        
131 Karekin Pastermadjian, better known by his nom de guerre Armen Garo, would later serve as a Deputy 
for the Ottoman Parliament (1908-1912).  He described the Ottoman Bank takeover in his appropriately 
titled memoir, Bank Ottoman: Memoirs of Armen Garo, the Armenian ambassador to America from the 
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demands were not met.  In response, the Ottoman State allowed mobs to target the 
Armenians from the East, especially in the khans (inns) where many of the poor labor 
migrants are living in overcrowded conditions.  Weapons were handed out to angry mobs 
and thousands were murdered.132 
 
In order to understand first the Sasun violence and the years of mass violence that 
followed, one must first look at the roots of violence in the East which will be discussed 













                                                                                                                                                                     
Independent Republic of Armenia, translated by Haig T. Partizian, edited, with an introduction by Simon 
Vratzian (Detroit, 1990).   
 
132 The best account account of this massacre is Sinan Dinçer, “The Armenian Massacre in Istanbul (1896),” 
Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Enconomische Geschiedenis vol. 10, no. 4 (2013), pp. 20-45.   See also, Edhem 




Chapter Two:  Conjunctures  
 
 
“Our problem now is to imagine and locate the correlations between 
the rhythms of material life and other diverse fluctuations of human 
existence.  For there is no single conjuncture: we must visualize a 
series of overlapping histories, developing simultaneously.” 





Conquests and Firearms 
 
At the beginning of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was composed of a patchwork 
of different polities.  In the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, under the rule of Mahmud 
II, the Ottoman State began to centralize control over its own hinterlands. The violent 
centralization by Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839), and his sons Abdülmecid (r. 1839-
1861) and Abdülaziz (r. 1861-1876), might usefully be compared to the centralization 
efforts in 19th century Germany, France, and Italy.  In these cases, independent or semi-
independent principalities were seized by the expanding power centers of Berlin, Paris 
and Piedmont.  The processes that unfolded across Eurasia bore striking similarities.  If 
we were to examine the Ottoman Empire, the Holy Roman Empire or the Italian 
Peninsula in 1789, we would be confronted with a welter of small semi-independent 
states ruled by various princely households, ultimately in allegiance to the broader 
Imperial State they were part of.  In the Holy Roman Empire they were known as 
Kurfürsten. In the Ottoman Empire, these local rulers were known as Ayan or Derebey.   
                                                        





Within the course of the next century, the imperial center replaced many of these local 
rulers with bureaucrats and military officials sent from the capitals.  From the point of 
view of many in the peripheries of the Ottoman realms, this centralization often 
resembled a violent conquest.134   Travelers during the 19th century often wrote 
poignantly about the state replacing the hilltop castles of the local rulers’ with a 
constellation of barracks, prisons, and schools.  
 
How was the Ottoman State able to destroy its internal ‘rivals,’ the Derebeys, or 
independent Valley Lords who ruled much of Anatolia?  It might be useful at this point to 
compare a couple possible explanations for this dramatic transformation in Ottoman 
Governance.  This pattern of hundreds of little states being absorbed into larger states 
occurred in Europe between the 16th century and the 20th.135  As Charles Tilly framed it,  
“The enormous majority of the political units which were around to bid for autonomy and 
strength in 1500 disappeared in the next few centuries, smashed or absorbed by other 
states-in-the-making.”136  Why do certain States ‘survive’ and not others?  Although Tilly 
offers a number of possible explanations (from “availability of resources” to “strong 
coalitions of the central power with major segments of the landed elite”) one of Tilly’s 
                                                        
134 Justin Sheil, “Notes on a Journey from Tabriz, Through Kurdistan, via Van, Bitlis, Se’ert, and Erbil to 
Suleïmaniyeh in July and August 1836,” in the Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London, Vol. 
8 (1838), p. 85; Horatio Southgate, Narrative of a Tour through Armenia, Kurdistan, Persia, and 
Mesopotamia (New York, 1840), pp. 263-264 and 267; William Ainsworth, Travels and Researches in 
Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Chaldea and Armenia (1842), pp. 249-251; Frederick Millingen, La Turquie 
sous le regne d’Abdül-Aziz (Paris, 1867), p. 19. 
 
135 Charles Tilly, Formation of National States in Western Europe (1975), p. 29.  
 




most famous arguments can be summed up with the formulation, “War made the State 
and the State made war.”137    Over time, Tilly identifies a feedback system where the 
expenditures of large standing armies lead to efforts to extract resources and then to the 
development of new bureaucracies to manage the extraction.  In turn, this leads to 
resistance from the population, more coercion and in the end long-lasting changes to the 
size and reach of the State.   
 
How well does this theory fit the Ottoman case?  Here, the efforts of the Istanbul-
Government to levy a large conscript army in the first place were to fend off an internal 
threat.  In this case, the internal threat was that posed by Egypt, one of the most powerful 
provinces in the Ottoman patchwork of States.  The ruler of Egypt, Mehmet Ali, had 
imported military talent from elsewhere in the Mediterranean and had raised a conscript 
army, drilled by French instructors and bearing the latest firepower from Europe.138  It 
was partly to contest this threat, and the threat of other powerful Derebey, that Mahmud 
II built a modern conscript military in the 1820s and 1830s.  In some ways, this 
resembled the last peak of centralization during the 16th century when the Ottoman State 
had originally conquered the Kurdish and Armenian-speaking regions of the Empire 
under Selim I (1512-1520).   
 
In order to contest powerful Derebeys such as Mehmed Ali of Egypt, Mahmud II needed 
a large conscript military.   
                                                        
137 Ibid, p. 42.  
 
138 Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali, his Army and the Making of Egypt (American 





One particularly interesting account of the 19th century Ottoman conquests of its own 
territories has been preserved in the letters that Helmuth von Moltke sent from the 
Ottoman Empire to his family back in Prussia.139  Von Moltke, who served for four years 
in the Ottoman Empire as a military adviser to Mahmud II, wrote extensively about how 
armies, equipped with the latest military technology from Europe and drilled by former 
soldiers of Napoleon, destroyed the semi-independence of the Derebeys.  Von Moltke 
described how the Ottoman Empire was politically divided into a patchwork of miniature 
states ruled by local potentates.  He wrote, "Thus, the Ottoman Empire has become an 
aggregate of kingdoms, principalities and republics, in fact, nothing holds it together 
aside from long habit and the unity of the Qur’an, and if you understand a ruler as a 
despot, whose will is the sole law, then the Sultan of Constantinople is far from being a 
despot.”140   
 
Von Moltke provided a striking account of how the Ottoman Conquest proceeded.  In the 
mountainous region of Sasun, Von Moltke described vividly how the Hafız Paşa 
conquered the mountains, where the Ottoman troops traded “trophies and prisoners; men 
and women with bleeding wounds, infants and children of all ages, severed heads and 
                                                        
139 Briefe über Zustände und Begebenheiten in der Türkei aus den Jahren 1835 bis 1839 [Letters on 
conditions and events in Turkey from the years 1835 to 1839] was originally published in Berlin in 1841, 
republished many times.  I am using a version published in 1876.    
140 Ibid. “So ist die osmanische Monarchie heute in der That ein Aggregat von Königreichen, 
Fürstenthümern und Republiken geworden, die nichts zusammen hält, als lange Gewohnheit und die 
Gemeinschaft des Koran, und wenn man unter einem Despoten einen Herrscher versteht, dessen Wille 




ears” for cash payment.141 Von Moltke wondered how one could ever lead a war in the 
mountains without such atrocities.142 
 
According to von Moltke, soldiers were encouraged and justified in destroying not just 
the combatants who resisted them but entire villages because the inhabitants were 
Yezidi.143  There are echoes of this violence against the people in the mountains from the 
1830s until the 1890s and it is important to track those whom the Ottoman State deemed 
as dangerous and worthy of extinction.   
 
By the 1890s, parallel violence would be visited upon the Armenian mountaineers in the 
same mountains.  This leads to a question that is critical to consider when reflecting on 
the origins of the violence in Sasun and Muş.  How did the Ottoman State shift from the 
                                                        
141 Ibid. "Ich war während dem zu Hafiß-Pascha geritten, welcher das Defilee geöffnet gefunden und dem 
Kampfe unten von einem kleinen Hügel zusah; dorthin brachte man die Trophäen und Gefangenen; Männer 
und Weiber mit blutenden Wunden, Säuglinge und Kinder jedes Alters, abgeschnittene Köpfe und Ohren, 
Alles wurde den Ueberbringern mit einem Geldgeschenke von 50 bis 100 Piastern  
bezahlt," p. 273.  
 
142 Ibid. “Das Schlimmste ist, wie soll man einen Volkskrieg im Gebirg ohne jene Scheußlichkeiten führen?” 
p. 273.  
 
143 Ibid. p. 274. Just like the term Alevi today, the term Yezidi encompassed many different localized 
religious practices and traditions.  As with most mountain people beyond the reach of the State, their 
practices were highly localized, sometimes involving allegiance to spiritual spaces, rocks, swords, and old 
Gods that no one heard of in the plains for a long time.  During the 19th century, many travelers reported 
that the mountains of Sasun were inhabited perhaps even by a plurality of Yezidi.  See, Xavier Hommaire 
de Hell, Voyage en Turquie et en Perse (1854), p. 475 and more recently, Suavi Aydın and Jelle Verjeij, 
“Confusion in the Cauldron: Some Notes on the Ethno-religious groups, local powers and Ottoman State in 
Diyarbekir Province, 1800-1870,” in Joost Jongerden and Jelle Verheij (eds)., Social Relations in Ottoman 
Diyarbekir, 1870-1915 (Brill, 2012), p. 23.  
 
It is worth noting here that the Ottoman State also violently attacked the Yezidis in Sinjar, where according 
to Austen Henry Layard, in Nineveh and Its Remains (1850), p. 181, “The inhabitants of Sinjar were soon 
subdued by Mehemet Reshid Pasha, and a second time by Hafız Pasha.  On both occasions there was a 
massacre, and the population was reduced by three-fourths.  The Yezidis took refuge in caves, where they 
were either suffocated by fires lighted at the mouth, or destroyed by discharges of cannon.” Hafız Paşa 




legitimate dehumanization of one category of mountain people (Yezidis) in the 1830s to 
another in the 1890s (Mountain-dwelling Armenians)?   
 
Any study of the long-term shift of the Ottoman State toward “legitimate” and 
“illegitimate” categories of people must take account, even tangentially, the long history 
of ‘demographic warfare’ carried out along the rim of the Black Sea by the Ottoman and 
Russian States.144 In many respects, the Russian State presented a mirror image of the 
Ottoman State.  Not only did access to modern firearms allow the Ottoman State to 
conquer and control more directly vast spaces of its own Empire, they also allowed the 
Russian State to expand dramatically into the Caucasus in the same period.  Throughout 
the 19th century, there were several wars between the Ottoman and Russian States in the 
Black Sea regions of the Balkans and the Caucasus.  Each war was accompanied by 
coerced mass migration.  With each war and bout of violence, the line between Christian 
and Muslim became increasingly politicized.  
 
During the 1827-1828 war, the Russian military captured Erzurum and its hinterlands.  
After the Treaty of Adrianople returned this territory to the Ottomans, the Russian 
military under Marshall Ivan Paskievich took with them, to some extent by force, most of 
the Christian population of Erzurum and its environs.145  At the same time, large numbers 
                                                        
144 See, Mark Pinson, “Demographic Warfare: an aspect of Ottoman and Russian policy, 1854-1866,” PhD 
Dissertation, Harvard, 1970. Also, see an unpublished paper I wrote, “Violence at the Ends of Empire: The 
Catastrophes of the Circassians and the Armenias.” (2007) 
 
145 Eli Smith, Harrison Gray Otis Dwight, Missionary Research in Armenia: Including a Journey Through 
Asia Minor vol. I (1832), pp. 120-121; 141-145; 164-166; Kemal Beydilli, 1828-1829 Osmanlı-Rus 
savaşında Doğu Anadolu’dan Rusya’ya göçürülen Ermeniler (Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988); Simon 




of Muslims were forced across the border into Ottoman controlled areas. According to a 
number of primary accounts, around 100,000 Armenian Christians from the Erzurum 
Province joined 30,000 Armenian Christians from Qajar territories. The result of this 
massive demographic transformation is a concentration of Armenians living in the 
Russian controlled spaces for the first time.146   
 
A couple of decades later, after the Russian State lost the Crimean war, blame was soon 
affixed on certain populations of Muslims who lived in the North-east Caucasus. In the 
post-Crimean era, the Russian military began a policy of extermination and removal of 
these ‘dangerous’ people of the mountains, forcing many to flee into the Ottoman Empire. 
As large numbers of people were violently removed from the Caucasus culminating in 
the Büyük Sürgün (‘great exile’) of the 1860s, this contributed both to the politicization 
of religious identity and to conflicts over land from the Danube River Basin to the plains 
of Muş. Every war led to a feedback loop of internecine forced removal, tension and 
violence. 
 
To maintain the territory gained in its conquests between the 1830s and the 1890s, the 
Ottoman State relied on a series of local alliances.  One set of allies whom the Ottomans 
initially secured support from were urban dwellers, many of them Armenian, who 
believed that they would benefit from becoming part of the Ottoman Empire.  The 
Ottomans even conscripted certain Armenian populations in the East in their efforts to 
                                                        
146 According to the research of Aleksander Yerits’ean, the growth rate in the Armenian population of the 
Caucasus was to a large extent the result of immigration (both coerced and non-coerced) from the Ottoman 
domains.  The numbers of Armenians in Yerevan Province alone increased from 164,450 in 1829-1832 to 
547,693 in 1873.  After the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878 it would be higher still.  See Lisa 
Khachaturian, Cultivating Nationhood in Imperial Russia (Transaction, 2009).  
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maintain power.147   At least at first, the Ottoman conquest of the East directly benefitted 
the Armenian Patriarchate, which gained access to large numbers of Armenians who had 
previously been under the secular rule of the Derebey and the religious rule of the 
Catholicos of Akhtamar and Sis. For the first time, the populations of Armenians in the 
East were brought under the control of the Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul.148  
 
The Ottoman conquest of the East was carried out in several stages.  Under the reign of 
Mahmud II, the Ottoman State first conquered the lowlands.  After the destruction of the 
Janissaries in 1826, large Ottoman armies under Reşid Mehmed Paşa and Hafız Paşa 
conquered the varied territories of semi-independent polities such as those of the Abd-el-
Jaleel in Mosul, Demiroğlu in Van, Çapanoğlu in Yozgat, and Küçükoğlu in Payas.149 
Throughout, the Ottoman State made frequent use of divide et impera tactics.  Frederick 
Millingen, aptly described these tactics in his discussion of the conquest of the House of 
Touzdjizadeh in Rize: 
 
                                                        
147 Rubina Peroomian briefly notes that, “To quell the Kurdish uprising led by Bakrkhan Bek in 1847, the 
Sublime Porte used the Armenians against the Kurdish tribesmen.  The Armenian Patriarchate of 
Constantinople was coerced into authorizing the formation of Armenian military units to participate in the 
campaign against the rebels.  This action was taken despite the fact that Armenians as non-Muslims were 
normally prohibited from bearing arms.” Quoted from “The Heritage of Van Provincial Literature,” in 
Richard Hovanissian (ed.), Armenian Van/Vaspurakan (Mazda, 2000), p. 134.  While Mıgırdiç Khrimian 
initially fled from Van to avoid conscription, his great rival in Van, Archbishop Boghos Effendi fought 
with Ottoman forces against Mehmet Ali’s forces in the 1830s.  See FO 424/162, “Career of Archbishop 
Boghos,” Annex 3, in a dispatch from Vice-Consul Devel to Consul Chermside, Van, April 13, 1889, p. 44.   
148 At the same time that the Ottoman State began to map, count and tax the populations in the East, the 
Patriarchate sent out investigators to map, count and describe the communities in the East.  See, for 
example, Armen Yarman (ed.), Palu-Harput, 1878: Çarsancak, Çamişgezek, Çapakçur, Erzincan, Hizan ve 
civar bölgeler (Istanbul, 2010).   
 
149 House of Abd-el-Jalil: Layard, ibid, p. 58; House of Demiroğlu: Frederick Millingen, Wild Life among 
the Kurds (1870), p. 193; House of Çapanoğlu: James Brant, “Journey through a part of Armenia and Asia 
Minor in the year 1835,” The Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London, Vol. 6 (1836), p. 217; 
House of Küçük Alioğlu: William Burckhardt Barker, Lares and Penates; or Cilicia and its governors 




“When, however, the government of the Sultan adopted the policy of 
centralization, the Touzdjizadehs, as well as all the other semi-
independent princes established under the suzerainty of the Porte, were 
doomed to destruction.  The plan, which the Ottoman government 
adopted for the execution of its projects, had all the merits of elaborate 
craft and of deep calculation.  Instead of becoming themselves the 
executors of their own policy, the Turks thought it more advisable to 
associate one of the victims to their cause by giving him the temporary 
commission of the hangmen of the others.  That nefarious task once 
achieved, the Turks reserved to themselves the performance of the final 
act, which was the extermination of the very man whom they had 
employed as the instrument of their policy.  While the jay eats the 
grasshopper, the hawk waits for the jay.  Everywhere the same 
principles seem to guide the animal kingdom.  On this occasion poor 
Beheram’s family [the House of Touzdjizadeh] was doomed to undergo 
the fate of the jay.  Haznehdar-zadeh Osman is named by the Porte 
Pasha of Trebizond, and receives orders to exterminate one by one all 
the chieftains within his reach.  Beheram’s father, being the first, is 
summoned to appear before the Pasha of Trebizond, while troops are 
sent in order to seize his territory.  The prince, seeing the approaching 
storm, gathers his forces and marches against the invaders.  Several 
actions take place, in one of which Beheram’s father is wounded and 
made prisoner.  His brother sustained a long siege within the fortress of 
Rizeh, where he was besieged by land and by sea.  … The power of the 
Touzdji-zadehs once crushed, all the members of that family were 
exiled to some remote corner of Asiatic Turkey.”150 
 
The House of Alaeddin, which ruled from their fortresses in Bitlis, Khınıs and Muş, was 
the last of the large Derebeys of the East to be overturned by the Ottoman Conquest.  
During the 1830s-1840s, the House of Alaeddin had maintained its power partly through 
allying with the Ottoman State against erstwhile rivals such as the Bedirhan, Khan 
Mahmud and Nurallah Bey.  The last ruler of the Alaeddin Emirate was Şerif Bey151, who 
ruled Bitlis from the early 1830s until his exile by the Ottomans in 1849.  Şerif Bey’s 
brother Emin Bey ruled the neighboring plain of Muş to the west, another brother, Murad, 
                                                        
150 Millingen 1870, op. cit. pp. 57-58.  
 
151 For descriptions of Şerif Bey and his rule over Bitlis and Muş see Richard Wilbraham, Travels in the 
Transcaucasian Provinces of Russia and along the southern shore of the Lakes of Van and Urumiah (John 
Murray: London, 1839), pp. 330-343; Southgate, op. cit., pp. 210-11 and James Brant, “Notes of a journey 
through a part of Kurdistan in the summer of 1838,” Journal of the Royal Geographic Society X (1841), pp. 




controlled the plain of Khinis to the north.  British observers who travelled to the area in 
the 1830s often drew analogies between the rule of the semi-independent Emirates, in 
their mountain fortresses and the rule of Scottish highlanders.152   
 
The Ottoman conquest of the semi-independent polities and the removal of their rulers 
created a power vacuum.  Into this power vacuum grew a complicated set of relationships 
between newly empowered bandit-warlords and Ottoman bureaucrats.  These 
relationships are well documented in hundreds of reports by consuls, missionaries and 
travelers.  Local notables who backed the Ottomans were often rewarded with 
bureaucratic positions.  In other cases, centrally appointed bureaucrats formed symbiotic 
relationships with the local notables based on a policy of extraction from the local 
population. In a report written in the summer of 1879, Vice-Consul Emilius Clayton 
observed that,  
 
 “Another great evil is the existence of certain influential families, 
whose members are all either Government officials, or have seats in the 
Local Councils and Tribunals, and who are in league with the Kurdish 
tribes, and obtain their share in the spoil of all robberies, on condition 
of protecting the robbers if arrested, which, from their official positions, 
they are able to do so.  Through the influence of these families crime 
goes unpunished, and all kinds of oppression and injustice are 
committed with impunity.  There are, some of them, so powerful, that 
even the Vali Pasha seems unable to withstand their influence.  There is 
such a family in this place [Bitlis] who are said to be the curse of the 
whole neighboring country, several members of the family being 
Kaïmakams, the others sitting in various Councils.”153 
 
A key example of this sort of relationship was that of the House of Mirza Bey which was 
empowered to rule over the plains of Muş.  The House of Mirza Bey hailed from the area 
                                                        
152 Wilbraham 1839, p. 345. It is striking that the structure of rule in the Emirate of Bitlis appeared to bear 
some resemblance to the Nakharar system of feudal rule in medieval Armenia.    




of Modikan, in the mountains to the south of the Muş Plain.  Many years before, during 
the Ottoman conquest of Emirate of Bitlis in the late 1840s, Mirza Bey had sided with the 
Ottoman forces of Topal Osman Paşa against the House of Bedirhan.154 The Ottoman 
State had rewarded him with a bureaucratic position of kaymakam of the Modikan region, 
which basically meant that Mirza Bey was able to continue to rule in the mountainous 
regions outside of State control.  The Modikan region, as late as the 1890s, continued to 
operate as a quasi-independent mountain polity.  According to the Eduard Nolde, who 
traveled through the region in 1892, “Modikanland” consisted of between 250 to 300 
Kurdish, Armenian and Circassian villages that did not recognize Ottoman authority, pay 
taxes or supply recruits to the Ottoman military.155  As the example of Modikan region of 
Sasun illustrates, the conquest of the dozens (if not hundreds) of small polities and 
autonomous regions nestled in remote mountainous regions took quite a bit longer, and in 
some ways was not completed until the 1930s with the conquest of Dersim.156  In many 
respects, many of these mountainous regions operated as frontier-lands.  Throughout the 
19th century, the garrisons and military outposts were often arranged along the borders of 
                                                        
154 Garo Sasuni, Kürt Ulusal Hareketlerei ve 15. Yüzyıldan Günümüze Ermeni-Kürt İliskileri (1992), pp. 
122-123 and fn. 13.  
 
155 Eduard Nolde, Reise nach Innerarabien, Kurdistan und Armenien (1892), p. 224. “… zwischen Sört und 
Musch gelegen, etwa 250 bis 300 kurdische, armenische, tscherkessische und gemischte Dörfer, die 
gewissermafsen ein Konglomerat von insofern unabhängigen Freistaaten bilden, als sie die türkische 
Verwaltung nicht anerkennen, derselben nichts zahlen, keine Rekruten stellen…”  
 
156 See Hans-Lukas Kieser, “Dersim Massacre, 1937-1938,” in the Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence 
(2011) and Martin van Bruinessen, “Genocide in Kurdistan? The Supression of the Dersim Rebellion in 
Turkey (1937-1938) and the Chemical War Against the Iraqi Kurds (1988)” in George J. Andreopoulos 





these mountainous regions.157  It is perhaps not a coincidence that it was precisely in 
these areas where the Fedayi first emerge.   
 
After conquering the lowlands in the first half of the 19th century, the Ottoman State 
organized both taxation and conscription along the religious-ethnic lines of the millet-
system.  Non-Muslims (gayrimüslim) paid the cizye, a poll tax, and Muslim men were 
conscripted into the Ottoman military. In the mountains of Sasun, these twin obligations 
to the central government were not exacted until the late 1880s.  This meant also that 
differences between Non-Muslims and Muslims were not as tightly regulated and 
allowed for a greater range of localized religious expression.  Travelers who journeyed to 
these mountainous regions describe a complex welter of local expressions of religion that 
belie the categories of “Christian” or “Muslim” and languages that belie the easy 
categorization of “Armenian” or “Kurdish.”   
 
Based on a journey he made to the Sasun mountains in 1861, the British Consul John 
Taylor described how an  “warlike, unruly set of Kurds called Baliki, swore by a church 
and never a mosque, or the deity, or any of the prophets.”  He continued: 
 
“After a great deal of intercourse with them in different places, I could 
not make more of their belief than what is expressed in the formula of 
faith which their headman repeated to me in Turkish, word for word, 
thus:- “Bin yakhadan bash guesterdi choklari saaldi gumana Bir 
yakhadan bash guesterseyidee chokler gelerdi imaneh,” which 
translated is, “A thousand ways he showed himself, but many remained 
in doubt: if he should show himself in one way, a great many would 
come to the faith.” And they explained it by saying that all the prophets 
mentioned in the Torat, Injeel, and Koran, were nothing more than one 
                                                        
157 While most scholarship has focused on the wars between the Ottoman Empire and its European imperial 
rivals, there has been little work on the history of ‘small wars’ of conquest in the mountainous territories of 
the Ottoman Empire.   
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and the same person, who had appeared at different epochs in different 
forms.  They thus ascribe divinity to all, though they forebear to 
mention one name more reverently than the other.  But, as they 
consider that the last shape he assumed was that of Ali, they attach 
more sanctity to his name than to Moses or Christ, while Mahomed 
they ignore entirely.”158  
 
In other words, in the mountains, the categories of ‘Kurd’ and ‘Armenian,’ which were to 
some extent defined in terms of religious difference, were not necessarily seen as 
mutually exclusive as they often are today.159  Additionally, according to the accounts of 
many travelers, many of the Kurdish populations of this region had been Armenian, or 
Yezidi a few generations before.  For instance, the powerful tribe of Bekranlı, for 
instance, was reputedly the descendants of the Bagratians or Bagratuni, an Armenian 
House that had long ruled in the area of Taron.160  And yet often this conversion was not 
                                                        
158 John George Taylor, “Travels in Kurdistan, with Notices of the Sources of the Eastern and Western 
Tigris and Ancient Ruins in their Neighborhood,” The Journal of the Royal Geographic Society, vol. 35 
(1865), pp. 23-24. This community might well be placed under the broad umbrella of ‘Alevi’ today. 
However, Harry Finnis Blosse who traveled to the Muş region in the late 19th century noted in his magum 
opus Armenia, Travels and Studies (1901), vol. II, p. 430 that the Baliki or Beleke who spoke a mixed 
language of “Arabic, Kurdish and Armenian” pointedly said that “Their religion cannot be classed either as 
Christian or Mohammedan nor even as that professed by the Kizilbashes.” There is some indication that 
before the imposition of Ottoman rule in the lowlands, this sort of local expression of religion was also 
prevalent in the lowlands of the plain of Muş.  See, for instance, George A. Bournoutian, The travel 
accounts of Simeon of Poland (Mazda, 2007), p. 17.  The 17th century traveler notes in his account of 
pilgrimage to Surb Garabed that, “...throughout the plain and province of Mush, the Kurds speak Armenian 
and swear by Surb Karapet.” This pattern of complex religious difference that belied the categorizations of 
the lowland States existed in the Sasun mountains in Byzantine era as well, where many of the locals 
practiced Paulicianism. For this, see Fred. C. Conybeare, The Key of Truth: A Manual of the Paulician 
Church of Armenia (London, 1898), p. lxx.  
 
159 The categories that we now employ for Armenian and Kurdish do not map well onto the population of 
Sasun in the 19th century.  Today, ‘Armenian’ is usually used to describe someone who has some familial 
relationship to the historical Apostolic Armenian Christian Church.  Recently, there has been a renewed 
scholarly interest in ‘Islamized’ Armenians – like the Hemşinli of the southeastern Black Sea.  The term 
‘Kurdish,’ on the other hand, is usually used to describe someone who has a familial relationship to 
speakers of Kurdish, regardless of their ancestral religious background.  In other words, regardless whether 
someone practices Islam, Judaism, or identifies as an Êzidî (Yazidi), they are generally seen as Kurds.  
During the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, there were populations that spoke Kurdish and practiced 
Armenian Apostolic Christianity.   
 
160 Mark Sykes, “The Kurdish Tribes of the Ottoman Empire,” The Journal of the Royal Anthopological 
Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. 38 (Jul. – Dec.), p. 464.  Also, citing Consul Taylor, Lynch 
1901, op. cit, p. 421, notes that the Mamakanlu are said to be descendents of the Armenian Mamikonians, 
another Armenian dynasty.   
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viewed in absolute terms.  Rouben Der Minasian deals with this complexity describing 
some of the highlanders at the turn of the 20th century as “half-Kurdified.”  
 
Our first missionary call was made at the Armenian village called Kedji 
whose natives, although originally Armenian, were half-Kurdified.  In 
the presence of Kurds they pretended kinship with them, but when 
alone they were fanatically Armenian.  The village chiefs Hassan 
Chavoush, and Tamo were Kurdified Armenians, and yet both were 
staunch friends of the Fedayees.  Hassan himself openly aligned 
himself with the revolutionaries and had become a member of the 
Gargar A.R.F. Committee.  Although in the presence of the Kurds he 
posed as a devout Muslim, his wife kept a cross and a holy Bible in a 
secret niche in her home where the family knelt in prayer each night.161 
 
In Sasun, it was often remarked by outsiders that both the Christian and Muslim 
mountaineers spoke a dialect of their own.  The former CUP member Esat Uras described 
this language as a “mixed language of Zaza and Kurdish.”162  On October 17, 1889, the 
Bitlis Gazette, described the people of Sasun thusly,  
 
“If, on account of its mountainous situation and remoteness, Sassoun 
has remained quite obscured from the rays of careful attention, 
inspection, and reform, no less that which depends on the light of 
prosperity – education – entirely failed to penetrate.  In as much as they 
had none among them capable of explaining the true creed, or of 
appreciating law and morality, the inhabitants, both Moslem and non-
Moslem, have remained in gross ignorance and abjectness of 
understanding, and whilst knowing nothing of religious duties or 
institutions, have even forgotten their language.  The language they at 
present generally use, which resembles a species of Arabic without a 
system, is in suitable relation to the strange barbarism which has 
produced it from the blending and mixing up of the Kurdish, Zaza and 
Armenian languages.  Kurds and Armenians converse in this language, 
and the individuals of both nations exercise of brute violence are as 
wild beasts, and in their actions and habits preserving give free license 
to villainy and aggression.”163  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
161 Der Minasian, 1963, p. 61.  
 
162 Esat Uras, The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question (Ankara, 1988), p. 726.  
 




The tone of the article is reminiscent of the language of the ‘civilizers’ in other Imperial 
regimes. The writer of the article is also open to admit that the Ottoman government 
knew little of the people of the mountains, where in view of the “wildness” of the 
inhabitants, “local conditions have prevented any census from being taken.”164   
 
As the Ottoman State conquered territory, it instituted divided the population into 
categories of “Muslim” and “Non-Muslim.”  To paraphrase James Scott, the Ottoman 
State did this to make the population ‘legible’ for administrative rule.165  In so doing, the 
Bureaucratic rulers of the State was aided and abetted by the office of the Armenian 
Patriarchate, which also attempted to fit the communities of heterodox Armenian 
Christians into the neat categories of lowland State rule.166  It is important to keep this 
process of categorization in mind, alongside that of the demographic warfare and 
politicization of identity, in the search for the roots of the Fedayi of Sasun and Muş.  The 
Ottoman State, like all States, often exercised violence against those populations that 
failed to conform to its pattern of legible categorization once those areas had been 
conquered.  Moreover, without these legible categories, the sort of sectarian strife that 
undergirded the history of Fedayi and Ottoman State violence at the end of the 19th 
century would hardly be possible.  As I will argue in the second section of this paper, the 
                                                        
164 Ibid. 
 
165 James C. Scott, Seeing like a State: How certain Scemes to improve the Human condition have Failed 
(Yale University Press, 1999). 
 
166 It is my suspicion that many of the Armenian-speaking communities that converted to Protestantism in 
the Sasun-Muş-Hınış region practiced local forms of religion.  For a trace of evidence in this direction, and 
discussion of how the Church dealt with heterodoxy see, Conybeare, op. cit., p. xxiii.  The Ottoman State 
had long supported the Armenian Patriarchate in this disciplining.  See, Bournoutian, op. cit., p. 185 for the 




Ottoman State was not alone in imposing legible categories of peoplehood.  The Fedayi 




Migration and Steam Travel 
 
If firearms allowed for both the Ottoman State to conquer and rule directly vast amounts 
of territory during the 19th century, the advent of steam-powered shipping transformed 
the socio-economic fabric of the Empire, altering patterns of labor migration and flooding 
the Empire with a vast array of manufactured goods.167  It was steamboats that facilitated 
the Russian expulsion of the people of the North Caucasus.  And it was steamboats that 
facilitated the movement of huge numbers of Armenians from the conquered territories in 
the Eastern provinces to Istanbul as labor migrants.  Before the advent of steam travel in 
the Black Sea, travelers often had to wait for the change in the seasonal winds to travel 
from Istanbul to ports along the coast.168  
 
Somewhat disconnected from the related study of forced migration, a small group of 
scholars169 have studied various aspects of labor migration in the late Ottoman Empire.  
                                                        
167 While scholarly attention has generally focused on the 1838 Treaty of Balta Limanı, James Brant noted 
in 1836 that, “That the Black Sea has gradually re-opened to European vessels has been owing to treaties 
extorted by Russia from Turkey at various period, at the point of the bayonet; and that the last treaty (that 
of Adrianople) finally rendered every part of the Euxine accessible to the commercial flag of all nations of 
Europe.” op. cit., p. 189.  
  
168 Eli Smith and Harrison Gray Otis Dwight, op. cit., p. 22.  
 
169 Christopher Clay, “Labour Migration and Economic Conditions in Nineteenth-Century Anatolia,” 
Middle Eastern Studies 34/4 (Oct. 1998), pp. 1-32; Donald Quataert, “Labor Policies and Politics in the 
Ottoman Empire: Porter and the Sublime Porte, 1826-1896,” in Health Lowry (ed.) Humanist and Scholar: 
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The overarching scholarly consensus is that labor networks changed dramatically over 
the course of the 19th century.  During the period of the Kurdish semi-independent 
Emirates, the bustling trade and industrial cities of Bitlis, Aleppo, and Diyarbakir were 
major destinations for laborers hailing from the plains of Muş and the mountain of Sasun.   
 
These patterns changed dramatically after the development of steam-powered technology. 
Steam-powered technology had two main consequences for labor migration in the eastern 
portions of the Ottoman Empire.  First, the introduction of steam-technology facilitated 
the influx of cheap manufactured goods from Europe (mostly from Great Britain).170   In 
turn, this influx of cheap manufactured goods, along with the opening of the Suez Canal 
in 1869, wreaked havoc on older textile manufacturing economies in Diyarbakir and 
Bitlis.  At the same time, as Christopher Clay has shown, the availability of steam-
powered travel via the Black Sea coast, especially after the 1860s, made it far easier for 
seasonal migrants to travel from remote areas like Sasun and Muş to travel to seek work 
via Erzurum and Trabzon as far as Istanbul.171   
 
The processes of labor migration and centralization occurred hand-in-hand.  Or to put it 
another way, the advent of telegraphs and steam-power re-oriented the political and labor 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Essays in honor of Andreas Tietze (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1993); Florian Riedler, “Armenian labour migration 
to Istanbul and the migration crisis of the 1890s,” in Ulrike Freitag, Malte Fuhrmann, Nora Lafi, Florian 
Riedler (eds.) The City in the Ottoman Empire: Migration and the making of urban modernity (Routledge, 
2011); Sinan Dinçer, “From Janissaries to Wage Workers: Porters and Lightermen in Istanbul (1800-1930),” 
(PhD dissertation, Leiden University, 2012); Vahram Shemmassian,  “The Sasun Pandukhts in Nineteenth-
century Aleppo” in Richard Hovannisian 2001; and Christoph Herzog, “Migration and the State: On 
Ottoman regulations concerning migration since the age of Mahmud II,” in Ulrike Freitag et all (2011).  
 
170 I owe a great deal to Zozan Pehlivan, currently a PhD candidate at Queens University, who is writing 
her dissertation on this topic.   
 




structures of the Kurdish Beyliks away from older political and manufacturing centers 
like Bitlis and Diyarbakir and toward Istanbul.  By the early 1890s, huge numbers of 
young men from the provinces, many from Muş and Sasun, worked as seasonal laborers, 
porters, and artisans in Istanbul.   
 
It is worth noting here that a large proportion of these laborers were Armenian.  As 
Christopher Clay has noted, this can be partly explained by the heavy toll that military 
conscription had on young Muslim men.172  While some Armenians from the provinces, 
such as those from Eğin (now Kemaliye), were enabled through communal connections 
to find work as bankers (sarraflar),173 most Armenian migrants from the provinces found 
only menial work as porters and in construction.   
 
Writing of the Province of Bitlis, Vital Cuinet noted that,  
“Quant à la population chrétienne, c'est précisément le contraire qui est 
arrivé: on a inscrit dans les registres du recensement environ 12 à 
15,000 habitants alors absent, mais qui avaient quitté le pays pour après 
avoir exercé durant plus ou moins de temps, dans la capitale ou dans les 
villes de littoral, les métiers de portefaix, maçon, manœuvre, cuisinier, 
etc. De la sorte, il semblerait que le nombre d'hommes, chez la 
population chrétienne, soit supérieur à celui des femmes, tandis qu'en 
réalité le chiffre de la population masculine est inférieur d'un sixième à 
celui de la population féminine.”174 
 
                                                        
172 Clay 1998, p. 9.  
 
173 Hagop L. Barsumian, “The Armenian Amira Class of Istanbul (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation), 
Columbia University, 1980.  
 
174 Vital Cuinet, La Turquie d'Asie: géographie administrative, statistique descriptive… (Paris, 1891), p. 
527. Also cited in Clay 1998. ["As for the Christian population, precisely the opposite happened, according 
to the census records approximately 12,000 to 15,000 inhabitants were absent.  They had left the country 
after working for more or less time, in the capital or in the cities of coastline as porters, traders, bricklayers, 
laborers, cooks, etc.  Thus, it appears that the number of men among the Christian population, is higher 
than that of women, while in reality the figure of the male population is less than one-sixth that of the 




The deluge of Armenians from the provinces transformed the politics of the Armenian 
community in Istanbul.  For instance, when the Armenian National Assembly was first 
set up, its attention (and even representation) was heavily focused on the concerns of the 
metropolitan Armenians of the Ottoman Empire.  As the large number of Armenians 
continued to arrive from the provinces, these priorities shifted to focus on the travails of 
those Armenians who lived in the provinces.  This shift might be best exemplified by the 
selection of Mıgırdiç Khrimian as the Armenian Patriarch in 1869.  Khrimian, a native of 
Van and former bishop of Saint Garabed Seminary in Muş, refocused the energies of the 
Patriarchate from its previous focus on the upper class Armenians of Istanbul, to the 
plight of the poor agrarian laborers of the east.  Although Khrimian was removed from 
his patriarchal position in 1873, he nevertheless continued to play a huge role as a 
religious nationalist in the politics of the Ottoman Armenian community, both in his 
efforts in representing the case for reforms in Berlin in 1878, and later as the Prelate of 
Van (1880-1885) and the Catholicos of All Armenians (1892-1907).  
 
The underlying demographic transformation of large swaths of Eastern Anatolia and the 
Caucasus was well-documented by the Armenian Patriarch, which received hundreds of 
petitions in the 1860s by the newly opened Armenian National Assembly.175 According to 
Lillian Ekmekjian, by the end of the 1860s, the problems of the provincials now became 
the active concern of the comfortable Istanbul Armenians who dominated the assembly.  
As a first step in reaching this goal, Bishop Khrimian, the leading champion of the 
                                                        
175 See Stephan Astourian, “The Silence of the Land: Agrarian Relations, Ethnicity, and Power,” in Ronald 
Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge Göçek and Norman M. Naimark (eds.), A Question of Genocide: Armenians and 
Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire (Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 59; Lillian Etmekjian, “The 
Armenian National Assembly of Turkey and Reform,” Armenian Review 29/1 (1976) 
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downtrodden provincials, was elected Patriarch (of Turkey) almost by acclamations.  In 
his audience with the Grand Vizier, Ali Pasha, the new patriarch gave a detailed eye-
witness report about the conditions of provincial Armenians, then added that the Moslem 
peasants were suffering almost as much at the hands of the officials.  Since the Moslems 
had no one to represent their grievances to the Porte, he wished to speak on their behalf 
too.”176  
 
According to the Ottoman military officer Frederick Millingen (who also went by Osman 
Seifi Bey and Alexis Andrejevitch),  
 
This great and constant emigration of the male population to the capital 
has for result that the villages of Armenia are almost entirely peopled 
by women.  Their husbands and brother leave them at home to take 
care of the fields and property.  The families manage to subsist with the 
produce of the soil, while the men accumulate wealth in Constantinople 
or elsewhere.  At different periods, they come to see their relatives, 
bringing with them the fruits of their earnings.  The male population 
that remains in the villages consists only of those who are strictly 
necessary to protect the families and help in the tillage of the fields.177 
 
The internal migration played a key role in changing the framework of the Armenian 
community in Istanbul.  Before the late 1860s, the Armenian population of Istanbul had 
paid relatively little attention to the provincials, often deriding them as “backward” and 
“uncivilized.”178  Steam and telegraphs were critical in bringing the bodies and stories of 
the Easterners into sharp focus.  It also changed the way that space was imagined.  As 
Gerard Libaridian has argued, the concept of Armenia as a geographic space starts to be 
                                                        
176 Etmekjian 1976, p. 38.   
 
177 Frederick Millingen, Wild Life among the Koords (London, 1870), p. 105 
 
178 Gerald Libaridian, Modern Armenia: People, Nation, State (Transaction Press, 2007), p. 75.  
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discussed for the first time among the intellectual classes of Istanbul as increasing 
numbers of peasants come from the new incorporated Eastern hinterlands.  By the 1860s, 
the pantukhs (labor migrants) from the Eastern provinces and the more established 




Narratives and Telegraphs 
 
If access to firearm technologies allowed the Ottoman State to conquer and consolidate 
rule over its hinterlands like the plain Muş, and steamboats in the Black Sea dramatically 
increased the ability of peasants from the East to journey to Istanbul, the advent of the 
telegraph brought about both new patterns of bureaucratic rule within the Ottoman 
Empire but also new methods of dissemination of information by non-state actors.  Or to 
express the matter a little differently, the modern firearms brought the rule of the 
Ottoman State to Muş, steamboats in the Black Sea brought the inhabitants of Muş to 
Istanbul, and telegraphs allowed the narratives and stories of events in Muş and Sasun to 
be broadcast around the world and more particularly, for the sake of this story, to a 
growing newspaper-reading public in Europe.  It is not a coincidence, as I will elaborate 
in the next section of this paper, that political organizations like the Hunchak or the 
Dashnak were organized around newspapers, or that anxieties of the Ottoman State under 
Abdülhamid II were fixated on the Armenian exile Press of Europe and their power to 




Although Bernard Lewis credits Feyzi Bey, a member of the Translation office, and 
Mustafa Bey, the progenitor of the Ottoman morse code, with the founding of Ottoman 
telegraphy,179 it is useful to remember that it was the former ABCFM (American Board 
of Commissioners for Foreign Missions) former employee Cyrus Hamlin who helped to 
set up the first experimental telegraph within the Palace in the late 1840s.  Cyrus Hamlin 
notes in his memoir that until the Crimean War no telegraphs lines were built as, “The 
pashas were against it.  They wanted no such telltale to report their doings every day, 
while in the distant interior.”180 Before the advent of the telegraph, information was 
disseminated through a system of horse-borne messengers, called Tatars.181  
 
In April and May 1876, a poorly organized uprising occurred in the central Bulgarian 
towns of Koprivshtitsa, Otlukköy, and Klisura.  During the course of suppressing the 
uprising, both Ottoman regular and irregular troops (başı bozuk) committed atrocities 
against the Balkan Christian population.182  In Great Britain, newspaper reports of mass 
murder played a direct role in the shift of British public opinion against the Ottoman 
Empire, and played an indirect role in precipitating the bloody Russo-Ottoman war of 
                                                        
179 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (first published 1961, repr. 1966), pp. 181-183.  For 
the good discussion of the impact of the telegraph in the Ottoman Empire see, Yakup Bektaş, “The Sultan’s 
Messenger: Cultural Constructions of Ottoman Telegraphy,” in Technology and Culture vol. 41, no. 4 
(2000), pp. 669-696.   
 
180 Cyrus Hamlin, Among the Turks (New York, 1878), p. 194.  
 
181 A good description of how this system worked can be found in Justin Justinian Morier, A journey 
through Persia, Armenia, and Asia Minor to Constantinople, in the years 1808-1809 (London, 1816), p. 
532 and p. 556.  
 
182 For the general historical context see, Charles and Barbara Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan 
National States, 1804-1920 (University of Washington Press, 1977).  The consular reports of J. Hutton 
Dupuis and Walter Baring, sent to investigate the violence, can be found in FO 424/43 and Parliamentary 




1877-78.183  In Great Britain, the Liberal MP William Gladstone lambasted the 
Conservative Disraeli government for concealing from Parliament and the British public 
what the British Foreign Ministry knew of the massacres.  By lending moral and material 
support to the Ottoman State, according to Gladstone, the Disraeli government was 
complicit with mass murder.184  In his widely read pamphlet, The Bulgarian Horrors, 
Gladstone called for the ‘Turks’ to “carry away their abuses in the only possible manner, 
namely by carrying off themselves.”185   
 
However, the Muslim population of the Balkans did not ‘carry off themselves.’  They 
were violently expelled.  During the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-78 (Doksanüç Harbi), 
and in the decades that followed, millions of Muslim refugees (muhacir) were forced 
from their homes in the Caucasus and the Balkans into Anatolia.186  Much of the violence 
was supported by the Russian military, and perpetuated by local Christian paramilitaries 
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185 Gladstone, op. cit. p. 31.  This has sometimes been read as inciting the forced removal of the Muslim 
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I hope clear out of the province they have desolated and profaned.” On this point see, Rodogno 2012, p. 
155.  
 
186 I discuss this in greater detail in an unpublished paper, “Violence at the Ends of Empire: the 
Catastrophes of the Circassians and Armenians).  See, Kamal Karpat, Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: 
Demographic and Social Characteristics (University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); Bilal Şimşir, Rumeli’den 
Türk Göçleri (reprint, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu 1989); Nedim Ipek, Rumeli-den Anadolu’ya Türk 
Göçleri (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999), Alexandre Toumarkine, Les migrations des populations 
musulmanes balkaniques en Anatolie (1876-1913).  The only English-language monograph on this subject 
remains Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of the Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922 




(çete). The refugees bore with them tales of organized mass murder and a policy of 
systematic forced migration.  Overall, the Russo-Ottoman war was a disaster for the 
Ottomans.  The Ottoman State lost more than one-third of its entire territory and a 
significant part of its population when the Treaty of Berlin (1878) provided for the 
creation of an independent Bulgaria.187   
 
Even years after the massacres in Bulgaria, both the British and the Ottoman 
governments had reason to be exceedingly cautious about reports of violence, if not the 
occurrence of violence.  For the British Foreign Office, the mass murder of Ottoman 
Christians, if broadcast in the press, could limit its ability to provide ‘moral and material’ 
support to the Ottoman Empire against the Russian Empire.   The Ottomans shared this 
concern, but understandably emphasized the subsequent removal of Muslims and the loss 
of sovereignty.   
 
At the same time that hundreds of thousands of Muslims were forced from their homes in 
the Balkans and the Caucasus during the war into the Ottoman realms, large numbers of 
Armenians were forced into the Russian domains.  Writing from Erzurum, Consul Trotter 
observed in a dispatch on October 2, 1880,   
 
                                                        
187 It was also at the Berlin Conference that the Armenian issue was internationalized for the first time, 
tacking on an ‘Armenian Question’ on the well-known ‘Eastern’ one.   Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty read, 
“The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the improvements and reforms 
demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to guarantee their security 
against Circassians and Kurds.  It will periodically make known the steps taken to this effect to the powers, 
who will superintend its application.” For more on the context, see, Arthur Beylerian, “La communauté 
arménienne de Trébizonde et le mouvement national (1878-1896),” Revue d’histoire arménienne I (1995); 
Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi: Birinci Meşrutiyet ve Istibdat Devirleri,1876-1907 (Türk Tarih Korumu 
Basımevi: Ankara, 1962), p. 126.  
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The state of the country is growing worse and worse; from many parts 
emigration on a considerable scale is taking place.  Many families of 
Greeks and Armenians have gone to Russian territory, and although 
these have been much more than replaced by the Moslem counter-
emigration from the recently annexed provinces, yet, the country 
generally gets poorer year by year in a rapidly increasing ratio.188  
 
This fact was brought to the attention of the Ottoman State in innumerable mazbata and 
petitions.  To give but one example, in a ‘Project of Reforms,’ composed in Erzurum and 
presented in to the Ottoman Imperial Commissioners, the issue of Muslim refugees 
(muhacir) was repeatedly brought up as one of the central concerns of the Armenian 
community. According to this report,  
 
Il sera bon aussi de prêter une attention particulière a l'émigration des 
Turcs, des Kurdes, des Térékémes, et des Tcherkeses, des environs de 
Tchelder et de Kars, qui est une nouvelle calamite pour notre province; 
ces émigres vont s'établir en ce moment dans les districts des Passins, 
de Kumis, d'Alacheguerde, et de Terdjan, déjà habites par des 
Arméniens.189 
 
In the aftermath of that war, the British consuls and ABCFM missionaries observed that 
the lines that sharply distinguished Muslim from Christian during the war continued to 
define who was granted State protection.  According to Captain Clayton,  
 
“From the district of Modki [Modikan]-Kurds came especially strong 
representation.  Neither property nor life is safe, from day to day.  Out 
of 1,000 Armenian families that were in the district forty years ago 
barely 300 now remain.  The others are either put to death, forced to 
turn Mussulman, or driven as outcasts from their homes.  Those who 
still remain protest that, unless some amelioration takes place in their 
condition soon, they will be forced to wander forth, as their present life 
is unendurable.  A force of military has been sent into the district 
ostensibly for their protection, but they are reported to be as bad as the 
                                                        
188 FO 424-107, p. 267. 
 
189 PP Turkey 1880/4, p. 20. [It will be good also to pay particular attention to the emigration of Turks, 
Kurds, Térékémes, and Tcherkeses, from the neighborhood of Tchelder and Kars.  This is a new calamity 
for our province.  These emigrants will be settled at this time in the districts of Passins, Kumis, 




Kurds themselves… they are under the command of Mirza Bey, a 
Kaïmakam, but himself a Kurdish Chief of notoriously bad character.  
His men quarter themselves gratuitously on the villagers, and ill-treat 









































                                                        




Chapter Three: Contingencies 
 
For the historian, this limitation appears as contingency: i.e. 
an incomplete determination of the present by the past.  
The past event which he cites as explaining why the present 
is what is it does not determine the present: it only 
determines possibilities between which the present may 
choose.  No historian can claim to have shown that a 
certain sequence of events must have fallen out thus and not 
otherwise.  
 – R.G. Collingwood191 
 
In late March 1889, a local warlord, Musa Bey, the son of Mirza Bey, kidnaped and raped 
a young Armenian girl named Gulizar in the Muş plain of eastern Anatolia.  This 
kidnapping led to a cascading series of events that precipitated protest movements in Muş 
and Istanbul and brought the ‘Armenian issue’ to the headlines of newspapers from New 
Zealand to London.  In Muş the kidnapping ignited a small war between Armenian 
villagers of the Muş plain, and supporters of the House of Musa Bey.  In Istanbul, the 
protest movement over the Musa Bey affair brought together peasants from the East, 
teacher-missionaries and student-activists studying at the Imperial Medical School, to 
form the Istanbul branch of the Hunchak Armenian nationalists in 1889.   
 
A few years later, over a two-week period in late August and September of 1894, 
thousands of Ottoman troops carried out massacres in the mountains of Sasun just south 
of the Muş plain.  Although that conflict began as a conflict between nomadic pastoralists 
and resident mountaineers, Hasan Tahsin Paşa, the governor of Bitlis, stylized it as a 
                                                        
191 Quoted in Jan van der Dussen, History as Science: The Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood (Springer, 




rebellion against the State.  Those two events, the rape of Gulizar and the massacre near 
Sasun, and the way they were understood by actors from Muş to London, are key to 
explaining Ottoman State violence against its Armenian population in the mid-1890s.192   
 
The broad narrative began with the tumultuous violence in the Balkans in the 1870s, 
followed by the bloody and destructive Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-1878, and then the 
ways the Hamidian regime increasingly singled out Ottomans Armenians in the East as 
an unreliable community.  Bureaucrats and warlords in the East used the anxieties of the 
central Ottoman State to enrich themselves at the expense of the local populations.  In 
turn, withdrawal of protection by the central Ottoman State led to a need for local 
villagers to support erstwhile bandits to protect them from the raids of warlords, which 
were often sanctioned by corrupt local officials.  But how exactly did local brigands who 
had guns, and the knowledge of how to use them, link up with missionaries of the 
Armenian nation and local priests? 
 
I.  
The Tanzimat in Muş 
   
Before tackling this question, it is critical to review the conditions on the plains of Muş 
and in the mountains of Sasun in 1889.  In the spring of 1889, reports from British 
consuls concluded that corruption was rampant in Bitlis. Moreover, the condition of the 
                                                        
192 That is not to suggest that Armenian Nationalism was a singular phenomenon.  Armenian nationalism 
looked differently in Geneva than in Istanbul or in Muş, and was connected to different localized traditions.  
In Geneva, lonely students dreamed of socialism being brought to the homelands of their parents, in 
Istanbul middle-class professionals and doctors, dreamed of the purity of the Classical Age of Armenia and 




Armenian peasantries was impoverished partly due to a lack of protection.  Nevertheless, 
in April of 1889 there was, according to Vice-Consul Devey, little sign of Armenian 
revolutionary activity, although the power of the Nakşibendi Sheikhs seemed to be on the 
rise.  Writing from across the lake in Van, Devey bluntly noted that: 
No Armenian question exists in the neighboring Vilayet of 
Bitlis, where so-called seditious movements have not 
sprung up and flourished at all.  Their condition is, however, 
miserable, for since the vilayet was established after the 
war it has ever been most corrupt, and during the last three 
years Moslem fanaticism has grown surprisingly; in the 
country round Kurdish oppression is as bad as ever, and 
neither effective protection nor justice is available.  Though 
there is no trouble with the police, their sufferings are 
really pitiable, and if they are not looked as seditious by the 
Government, the utter contempt and neglect they meet with 
must be felt as a sore burden.  Kurdish Sheikhs even hold 
that the vilayet is “bil istissna” (under exception), i.e., that 
the Laws and Regulations as in force elsewhere do not 
apply and act accordingly.193  
 
Vice-Consul Devey’s report was echoed in the report of Consul Chermside, who 
observed in May of 1889 that, “The vilayets of Van and Bitlis are in a very unsatisfactory 
state as regards the impunity which outrages and crime enjoy, and the supineness, apathy 
or culpable negligence of the Governors.”194  In a report composed after a tour in the 
                                                        
193 PP Turkey 1889/1, Vice Consul Devey to Consul Chermside, April 13, 1889, pp. 73-74. As Martin van 
Bruinessen observed in his seminal work, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and political structures of 
Kurdistan (Zed, 1992), and many primary accounts confirm, (For example, Millingen 1868, op. cit, pp. 15-
16; PP Turkey 1877/16, p. 19.) in the Muş-Sasun-Diyarbekir region, after the removal of the temporal 
power of the Emirs of Bitlis and Bohtan, the Nakşibandi Sheikhs acquired a larger share of political 
authority that they wielded in close conjunction to their role within the Nakşibandi tarikat system of the 
East.  For a similar argument on the power of the Sheikhs after the overthrow of the Derebey, see, Sasuni 
1992, op. cit., pp. 135-168.   
 
194 FO 424/162, Consul Chermside to Sir W. White, May 24, 1889.  It is worth noting that the Ottoman 
military was aware of this corruption and was highly critical.  Chermside continued: “The military 
authorities are by no means satisfied with the civil administration of the Kurdish provinces, and Turkish 
officers of very high rank have spoken to me on this subject.  It will, I think, interest your Excellency, to 
know that the Lieutenant-General Moussa Pasha mentioned to me the lamentable state of lawlessness of the 
Van and Bitlis Vilayets, pointing out how it reflected on the Government, and what a reasonable pretext it 
furnished to the enemies of the Ottoman Empire for well-founded accusations.  The military authorities, of 
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summer of 1889, Chermside stressed that in Van and Bitlis there was a “virtual inequality 
of Christian to Moslem, the want of efficient protection to the former, and of vindication 
of violence towards him.”  This was, Chermside observed, partly a result of the conquest 
of the region (‘Tanzimat’) and the replacement of the local noble Houses who provided 
protection for their peasantries.    Chermside wrote:  
Prior to the abolition of the feudal system by the enactment 
of the “Tanzimat” the Rayah received considerable 
protection from the Beys and Aghas to whom they were 
subject.  On the power of the latter being broken, and the 
substitution for it of a weak and often nominal government, 
the Rayah suffered much from the violence and oppression 
of their Kurdish neighbors.  At the same time, the 
descendents of the Beys and Aghas in many localities still 
exacted from the Rayah contributions and forced labour, 
and maintained other ancient customs for which they gave 
no just equivalent.  Remnants of feudality linger to the 
present day in Hekkiari, Bohtan, and a great part of the 
Bitlis Vilayet, the villages paying to the Aghas taxes 
termed, “Kabal.”195  
  
Under the Emirs of Bitlis, the peasants from the villages would have approached the 
House of Alaeddin directly and complained about ill-treatment, and the Emirs and their 
own military would have directly interfered, especially if it cut into their own income 
from the agrarian taxes.  The changes described by consuls Devey and Chermside meant 
that there was no longer an agrarian based State that was accountable locally for the well 
being of the peasants. Rather the situation devolved into one of exploitation, where the 
wealth was shuttled away by warlord-bureaucrats and made its way into the coffers of 
patrons in Istanbul.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
course, only take action in support of the Civil Administration by special order.  Moussa Pasha expressed 
himself very strongly as to the shortcomings of the Governors, and suggested representations to the Porte 
by your Excellency” pp. 33-34.   
 





In order to make sense of such widespread corruption, it is necessary to understand that 
many of the Ottoman State bureaucrats formed pecuniary relationships with local 
warlords and notables.  There are several explanations for these relations. For some 
bureaucrats, the corrupt relationships with local warlords enabled them to recoup their 
own expenditures when they bought their positions.  For other servants of the Ottoman 
state, participating in the rampant system of bribery allowed them to sustain themselves 
when their pay from Istanbul was in arrears.  Finally, for some elite bureaucrats and 
military officials, extraction of resources through relationships with local warlords 
enabled them to enrich themselves at the expense of the local populations.  The histories 
of the two central events of this chapter are intricately tied to the history of corruption in 
Muş, and particularly to the corruption of Edhem Paşa, the Vali (Governor-General) of 
Bitlis in 1889, and Hasan Tahsin Paşa, the Vali of Bitlis between 1891 and 1895.  
 
Corruption was endemic to this area because almost all of the bureaucrats and high-
ranking military officers in the East were outsiders. They lacked legitimacy, as they were 
seen as acting in the interest of elites in Istanbul, not the locals. Operating according to 
the principles of accountability, transparency, and legality would have undermined their 
very existence.  In fact, it is striking that the vast majority of the governors in the Eastern 
provinces hailed from either the Balkans (in the case of the bureaucrats) or the Caucasus 
(in the case of the military elite).196  In order to rule this area, which had only recently 
                                                        
196 One wonders to what extent their imprinted experiences from their homelands in the Balkans were 




been incorporated into the rule of Istanbul, bureaucrats and military officers relied on 





In the plains of Muş one of the most powerful of the local warlords was Musa Bey, the 
son of Mirza Bey, of the Motikan Mountains just south of Muş.197  Mirza Bey, murderous 
warlord that he was, was apparently respectful to most of the Armenians of the Muş plain.  
Gulizar, the young Armenian woman whose story began this chapter, spoke later to her 
daughter (Armenouhi Kévonian) of the ethnic complexities that have long been 
simplified as ‘Armenian’ or ‘Kurd.’  She noted that Musa Bey’s father, Mirza Bey, spoke 
Armenian and honored with ardor the Armenian saints.198  When Mirza Bey was killed in 
a feud with the Belleks (or Baliki)199 in 1885, his son Musa Bey, often identified with 
Kurds, became the de facto ruler of the Muş plains.  Later, Musa Bey became a central 
organizing figure for Ottoman Armenian fury, first in the plains of Muş and then as a 
                                                        
197 This sketch of Musa Bey draws from FO 195-1450, Eyres to Everett, August 16, 1883; FO 424/162, 
Consul Chermside to Sir W. White, May 24, 1889; FO 424/162, pp. 84-85.   
 
198 Armenouhi Kévonian, Les Noces Noires de Gulizar [The Black Weddings of Gulizar], p. 11, “Comparé 
à son effroyable rejeton, Mirza Bek ne s’était pas mal comporté à l’égard des Arméniens du district. Il 
parlait l’arménien et honorait avec ardeur les saints arméniens.”  Musa Bey also spoke Armenian, see 
Parliamentary Papers Turkey 1890, no. 1, p. 59.  
 
199 The Bellek or Baliki were one of the many communities that defy the modern ethnic categories of 
analysis (i.e. ‘Kurd’ vs. ‘Armenian’).  According to the British traveller Lynch, “Strange indeed are the 
anomalies which are presented in these little-known districts of Turkish Kurdistan.  On the southern fringe 
of Sasun live a tribe called the Baliki or Beleke, speaking a mixed language of Arabic, Kurdish and 
Armenian.  Their religion cannot be classed as either Christian or Mohammedan nor even as that professed 
by the Kizilbashes.  When they make an oath it is in the name of a church or monastery.  But they possess 
neither churches nor mosques.” (H[arry] F[innis] B[losse] Lynch, Armenia, Travels and Studies (1901), vol. 




symbol of corruption and violence across the Ottoman Empire and around the world.200  It 
is noteworthy that Musa Bey, as a younger man during the Russian-Ottoman war of 
1877-1878, first attracted the attention of British consular officers and the Armenian 
Patriarchate in Istanbul. Their reports cited Musa Bey for “ravaging the country at the 
head of a small body of cavalry.”201   
 
During the winter of 1888-1889, villagers in the Muş plains sent letters to Istanbul, 
complaining of violent predilections of Musa Bey.202  The chief organizers for this effort 
were Miro, the headman of Khars and Ohan, the headman of Argavank.   Due to these 
letters of complaint, Musa Bey was briefly arrested, but with a bribe of 300 lira and 
connections in the municipal government of Bitlis, Edhem Paşa, was released after only 
three days.203 Angered at these letters, upon his release Musa Bey responded with 
                                                        
200 Kévonian, ibid; Vice-Consul Devey to Colonel Chermside, April 27, 1889 in the Blue Book Turkey 
1889 No. 1, p. 67 and duplicated in FO 424/162, pp. 34-45.   
 
201 One wonders if it was during the violence of the 1877-78 war that Musa Bey developed his penchant for 
rape and murder.  According to C.B. Norman, Armenia and the Campaign of 1877, “In the neighborhood of 
Moosh, one Moussa Bey, a son of Mirza Bey, a Kurd from near Van, has been ravaging the country at the 
head of a small body of cavalry.  The villages of Moolah Akjam, Hodogan, and Kharkui, have been 
pillaged, were set on fire.  At Ardouk he exacted T.L. 60, and at Ingrakam T.L. 40 from the headman of the 
village, under pretense of sparing them from destruction, and straightaway set the places on fire.  He then 
proceeded to a Mussulman village called Norashen, and hearing that an Armenian merchant of Bitlis was 
passing through, robbed him of his goods, to the value of 30,000 piastres, and then ordered his men to 
murder him.  At Khartz this monster entered the house of an Armenian priest, who had lately brought his 
bride to his father’s house.  Binding the old man and his son together with cords, this inhuman scoundrel 
ravished the poor girl before their eyes and then gave orders for the murder of the three.” See also, James J. 
Reid, Crisis of the Ottoman Empire: Prelude to Collapse 1839-1878 (Franz Steiner Verlag: Stuttgart, 2000), 
p. 161 and S. Aslıhan Gürbüzel, “Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia (1878-1890),” Unpublished MA 
Thesis, Bilkent University, 2008 pp. 73-84.  
 
202 Sarkis Pteyan and Misak Pteyan, Harazat Patmutiun Tarono [The Familiar History of Daron], Cairo, 
1962, p. 42. 
 
203 Kévonian, p. 13: “À la suite de ces plaintes, Moussa Bek fut finalement arreté et incarcéré à Bitlis. Mais 
trois jours plus tard, il recouvra la liberté grace à son ami et complice Edhem pacha, vali de Bitlis que trois 
cents livres-or turques avaient suffi à corrompre.” In 1883, Musa Bey had been responsible for the brutal 
attack on two ABCFM missionaries in 1883.  Although the evidence in the ABCFM archive clearly 
indicates that Musa Bey was the culprit of this attack and that he was able to escape persecution due to 
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extreme violence, first waylaying Ohan, the headman of Argavank, and burning him 
alive.204  Next, at the end of March 1889, Musa Bey and his men attacked the house of 
Miro, the headman of Khars, and kidnapped his niece Gulizar.205  After demanding that 
she convert to Islam, Gulizar was then married to Musa Bey’s younger brother. That 
kidnapping was for many in the Muş plains the final straw. 
 
On May 2, 1889 a large crowd assembled outside of the Constantinople Armenian 
Patriarchate in the Istanbul neighborhood of Kum Kapı.  According to British consular 
reports, the crowd consisted of a deputation who had journeyed from the plain of Muş to 
deliver their complaints.  The deputation was supported by hundreds of Armenians from 
Muş, most employed as migrant laborers (Arm: pandukht).  The object of the gathering 
was to deliver a petition to the Armenian Patriarch Khoren Ashikian on the violent 
activities of Musa Bey.  According to a report by the British dragoman, or translator, 
Hugo Marinitch: 
The Patriarch having called upon some of them before him, 
they stated that Moussa Bey had been imprisoned on a 
charge of oppressing the Armenians, but had managed to 
escape, and in revenge, had collected his Kurdish followers 
and fallen upon the Armenian villagers, plundering houses, 
violating girls, and torturing and murdering the population, 
some of whom he had burned alive after pouring petroleum 
                                                                                                                                                                     
bribery with the Vali of Bitlis, Musa Şaşmaz has written an entire monograph attempting to resuscitate 
Musa Bey and shift the blame back on outsiders like the ABCFM missionaries and the British consuls.  See, 
Musa Şaşmaz, Kürt Musa Bey Olayı, 1883-1890 (Kitabevi, 2004). 
 
204 Garo Sasuni, Patmutiun Taroni Ashkharhi [History of the World of Daron], 1956, p. 542; Kévonian, pp. 
14-15; George Cushing Knapp, FO 424-162, p. 68, reproduced anonymously in Blue Book Turkey 1889, 
No. 1, pp. 68-69; Vice-Consul Devel to Col. Chermside, April 27, 1889, op. cit. 
 
205 Kévonian, pp. 21-27; Vice-Consul Devel to Col. Chermside, April 27, 1889, op. cit.; George Cushing 
Knapp, FO 424-162, op. cit; Sarkis Pteyan and Misak Pteyan, p.43; William Gladstone; Garo Sasuni 1992, 




over them.  Whilst these statements were being made to the 
Patriarch, a telegram was handed to him confirming them, 
from the inhabitants of Moosh.  It had come by post, its 
senders having been afraid to entrust it to the telegraph 
office.  The Patriarch endeavoured to calm the people, and 
decided to report the matter to the Grand Vizier, with a 
view to obtaining redress, and, at the same time, to send 
two or three of the deputation in case of necessity.  They 
were followed to the Vizirate by the greater part of the 
crowd, which was, however, dispersed by the police 
without resistance.206   
 
The protests against Musa Bey were amplified by the Armenian exile press in Marseilles 
(‘L’Armenie’) and London (‘Haïasdan’). Partly through the efforts of these publications, 
the case of Musa Bey became a cause célèbre.  Over the spring and summer of 1889, 
propelled by a small cadre of Parliamentarians and the Armenian exile Press, accounts of 
the misdeeds of Musa Bey brought the condition of the poor Armenian peasantries of 
Muş into the imagination of a broad British reading public.   Within days of the 
demonstration of Muş peasants at Kum Kapı, newspapers across Great Britain expanded 
their reporting of the Eastern Provinces of the Ottoman Empire.  For instance, on May 6th 
1889, the North-Eastern Daily Gazette of Middlesbrough, England reported that: 
The Porte is very much occupied with the Armenian 
question both at home and abroad, and foreign newspapers 
containing anything on the subject of Armenia are not 
allowed to enter the country.  Many Armenians have been 
arrested at Van, and representations are being made by Mgr. 
Ashikian, the Armenian Patriarch, on the subject.  He has 
been informed that the infamous Kurdish chief, Mussa Bey, 
has escaped from prison near Mouch.  He has signaled his 
escape by collecting some members of his old gang, with 
whom he attacked an Armenian village which had 
complained of his former depredations. He seized some of 
the notables, and set fire to them after petroleum had been 
poured over them.  The chief is stated to have watched 
                                                        




them burning while smoking his chibouk.207  
 
It is worth noting that some accounts, such as an article in the North-Eastern Daily 
Gazette, presented a rather exaggerated account of Musa Bey’s misdeeds (in fact only 
one notable was burned alive), yet other accounts seem to be based almost word-for-word 
on dispatches composed by British consular officers (and preserved in British FO 
archives) and the accounts of ABCFM missionaries stationed in nearby Bitlis.  At first, in 
the spring of 1889, the British newspapers devoted only short and rather vague accounts 
of Musa Bey.  Over the course of the next year, the number of articles and their length 
and detail expanded dramatically.208  This expansion of British Press interest was directly 
correlated to the number of minutes devoted in Parliament to discussions about the 
corruption of the Ottoman administration and the plight of the Armenian peasantries in 
the East [not sure about this last point!].  The last time that the British Press and the 
British Parliament had devoted this much attention to the Ottoman Empire was in the 
mid-1870s after the massacres at Batak, in Bulgaria.   
 
Much of the attention garnered in England was due, not only to articles in the Press, but 
also to several groups:  Liberal MPs, headed by James Bryce; a committed set of 
Armenian political exiles, like Garabed Hagopian (chair of the Patriotic Armenian 
Association); and to allies in both the Anglican Church and in various Protestant 
Churches in England.  
                                                        
207 The North-Eastern Daily Gazette (Middlesbrough, England), Monday, May 6, 1889.   
 
208 For a small sample of the wide press coverage of the Musa Bey Affair in Great Britain see, Citizen 
(Glouster), May 14, 1889 and January 25, 1890; Daily News (London), November 14, 1889 and January 2, 
January 25, February 11, February 22, April 5, June 7, July 17, 1890; Guardian (Manchester), September 5, 
1890; London Times, May 13, June 14, 1889 and September 17, 1890; Morning Post (London), January 3, 





No Due Process 
 
The involvement of these groups meant that the violence in Muş ranked high on the 
public agenda in London and Istanbul.  Under mounting political pressure, Abdülhamid II 
ordered that Musa Bey be brought to Istanbul for a trial and that Gulizar be brought to 
Bitlis.209   In a court in Bitlis, Gulizar was interrogated in Court: whether she was still a 
Christian (and should be returned to her family), or whether she had willingly chosen to 
convert and to marry Musa Bey’s brother.  Gulizar was told by her captors that she must 
insist to the officials that she had chosen to be Muslim of her own free volition and that 
the claims that she was kidnapped were false.   Gulizar ma3’q0naged to convince her 
captors that she was now Muslim and had no desire to return to her family.  Gulizar 
described in her memoir what transpired that day in court.210  Gulizar declared that Musa 
Bey attacked her father’s home, killed her relatives, and kidnapped her. [I need to release 
the tension better here] She stated, to the great anger of Musa Bey’s allies, that she was in 
fact Christian.  She was then reunited with her family.211   
                                                        
209 One the one hand, for historians working within the Turkish nationalist framework, like Esat Uras and 
Musa Şaşmaz, the case of Musa Bey aptly captures the meddling of the Foreign Powers and the hysteria 
and false representation of the Armenian exile press.  On the other hand, for historians working within the 
Armenian nationalist framework, the case of Musa Bey exemplifies the unequal power relations between 
powerful Kurdish warlords and impoverished Armenian peasants in the eastern portions of the Ottoman 
Empire, and the reluctance of the Ottoman State to respond to their cries for succor.  Both of these 
essentialist frameworks tell only part of a much more complicated story. 
 
210 Armenouhie Kévonian, Les Noces Noires de Gulizar (Paris, 1993), pp. 85-90.  
 
211 Gulizar’s grand-daughter, Anahide Ter Minassian, edited and wrote an excellent essay laying out the 
context.  See, “Mémoires Mêlées,” in Kévonian 1993, op. cit., pp.  117-154.  Selim Deringil provides a 
good discussion of the larger issues of kidnapping and forced conversion in Conversion and Apostasy in the 
Late Ottoman Empire (Cambridge University Press, 2012).  For his brief discussion of Gulizar, see p. 224.  
However, Deringil mistakenly refers to Musa Bey as a “Kurdish Sheikh.”  See also, Parliamentary Papers 




Upon her release from captivity, Gulizar and several dozen other witnesses from the Muş 
plain made the journey to Istanbul to testify against Musa Bey.212  Musa Bey was initially 
charged with several counts of murder, rape, arson and grand larceny.  Nevertheless, 
most of the cases were dropped, for lack of evidence.213  According to most observers, 
the first trial of Musa Bey (held over a three day period in November 1889) was a farce 
of justice.214 The Public Prosecutor, Khalid Bey, who was charged by the state with the 
responsibility of ensuring that the evidence presented was legitimate, played a key role in 
supporting Musa Bey.215  At the end of the trial, Khalid Bey accused the witnesses from 
Muş of lying and threatened to imprison them for false witnessing.216  According to the 
British Ambassador William White, the role played by Khalid Bey “savoured rather of 
that of lawyer for the defense than of a prosecutor on behalf of the Government, and is 
generally considered as unprecedented in the judicial annals of this country.”217  
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
212 Parliamentary Papers Turkey 1890, no. 1, Consul Longworth to Sir W. White, August 21, 1889, p. 16.  
 
213 FO 424/162, “The Charges against the Kurd, Moussa Bey,” p. 101.  
 
214 For a transcription of the trial with observations from Justin Alvarez, see FO 424/162, [Day 1], pp. 102-
110; [Day 2], pp. 121-129 [Day 3], pp. 142-150.   
 
215 FO 424/162, “Memorandum by Mr. Stavrides,” pp. 129-130. Justin Avarez was in agreement with his 
colleague Mr. Stavrides of the British Legation in Istanbul and wrote in a secret and confidential 
memorandum, “What struck me as well as M. Gargiulo almost immediately after the entry of the Judges 
into Court was the remarkable tone adopted by the Public Prosecutor, Khaled Bey, towards the plaintiffs in 
the case, and the manner in which he practically took upon himself the direction of the proceedings.  … 
This was evidently to discredit the witnesses as much as possible, and thereby secure Moussa Bey’s 
acquittal.” FO 424/162, “Memorandum by Mr. Alvarez,” pp. 130-132.  
 
216 FO 424/162, p. 162. Simon Tinghir Effendi, lawyer for the plaintiffs point out during the trial that, “for a 
witness to be called a false witness, the accused must be acquitted.  To give a decision of this sort 
beforehand implies the confirmation of the accused’s innoncence without giving a decision for his acquittal.  
This naturally is illegal.” (Parliamentary Papers Turkey 1890, no. 1, p. 76) 
 
217 FO 424/162, Sir W. White to the Marquis of Salisbury, December 17, 1889, p. 171. In the transcription 







Instead of noting the injustice committed by the State Prosecutor against the plaintiffs, 
the authorities resorted to conspiracy theories to explain the commotion created around 
Musa Bey.  The Ottoman State saw enemies everywhere: from the Foreign Press to 
seditious groups in the Eastern provinces.  According to certain articles composed in 
Istanbul, the Foreign Press was not only unreliable as a source of information, but it was 
clearly subservient to some sort of broader conspiracy to unfairly accuse the Ottoman 
State.218 Many contemporary observers at the time pointed out that the trial of Musa Bey 
was first and foremost about the image of the Ottoman Empire in the Press and not about 
the oppression of the Armenian peasantries in the East.219  Certain bureaucrats in the 
Ottoman Government (for instance, Cevdet Paşa) insinuated that this whole case had 
been blown way out of proportion and that the real issues were the seditious individuals 
who were smearing the Ottoman Empire abroad as well as a conspiracy of foreign 
                                                                                                                                                                     
client, Moussa Bey, forgets that Carabet is not a witness but a plaintiff, and does not scruple, at all events 
as regards the evidence given in Court about the extortion and violence, the most damaging against Moussa, 
to misrepresent th statements of witnesses and create imaginary inconsistencies.” (Parliamentary Papers 
Turkey 1890, no. 1, p. 76) 
 
218 See, for example, Hakikat of November 26, 1889.  Inclosed in FO 424/162, p. 117.  
 
219 For several months in 1889-1890 the Daily News published articles from a Muslim special 
correspondent in Istanbul.  According this anonymous writer, “It is well known here that Moussa Bey’s call 
to the capital was not for the sake of doing justice to the poor Armenians who suffered from his cruelties, 
nor was it for the sake of administrating justice to the Padishah’s subjects, but merely to oppose the London 
papers, and especially the Daily News, a denial of their disclosures of the real state of things in Armenia 
and Crete.  Sir William White has on several occasions called the attention of his Majesty the Sultan and 
the Sublime Porte to the statements of the Daily News with regard to the atrocities of Moussa Bey and the 




interests seeking to defame the Ottoman State for their own ends.220  In London, the 
Ottoman Ambassador Rüstem Paşa pointed out that the case of Musa Bey was parallel to 
the fervor over the massacres in Bulgaria and there was “no doubt whatever that these 
legends of atrocities were invested purely from a political aim.”221 
 
V.  
Protecting their Own 
 
The Musa Bey affair became an important symbol of the problems that existed in the 
Ottoman Empire and when he was acquitted in the first trial against him, it was viewed as 
a pretty damning example of malfeasance. Why had the Palace gotten involved in the 
outcome of this trial?  At least part of an explanation for the interference of the Palace 
was that Mirza Bey was connected through marriage to the last ruling family of Bitlis.222  
As the British Ambassador William White put it in a dispatch to the Marquis of Salisbury, 
“It was evident that there was a large and powerful clique at Constantinople ready to go 
to any length to prevent this Kurdish Chieftain from being punished.”223   
                                                        
220 Parliamentary Papers Turkey 1890-1, no. 1, “Memorandum by Turkish Minister of Justice,” p. 14.  
According to Cevdet Paşa, “Should the question be examined from this point of mine it naturally follows 
that the publications in European papers, and the outcries and demonstrations, both of those who maintain 
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who now appear here to make complaint.” See also, Parliamentary Papers Turkey 1890-1, no. 1, 
“Memorandum by Dragomans Stavrides and Alvarez,” p. 16.  
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Indeed, Bahri Pasa, one of the members of the Ottoman Household and an offspring of 
the Alaeddin family of the Emirs of Bitlis, convinced the Sultan that Musa Bey was first 
and foremost a loyalist, and should be protected at all costs because the symbolism alone 
could cost the Sultan dearly in the East. The process of elite formation in the Ottoman 
State explains Bahri Pasa’s support for Musa Bey. They were both [nope] children of the 
local elite, raised within the Palace and incorporated into the Ottoman household itself.  
As in earlier eras of Ottoman State centralization, the children of the local elite were 
raised within the Palace and incorporated into the Ottoman household itself.  This pattern 
continued during the 19th century, and Bahri Paşa, one of the children of the Alaeddin 
family of the Emirs of Bitlis was raised within the Palace itself.  As a loyal member of 
the Ottoman Household, Bahri Paşa, held positions first as the Mutassarıf of Pera and 
then as the Mutassarıf of Üsküdar.  According to British confidential documents, Bahri 
convinced the Sultan that Musa Bey was first and foremost a loyalist, and should be 
protected at all costs because the symbolism alone could cost the Sultan dearly in the East.   
 
Musa Bey eventually was exiled to the Hijaz, a common fate of many who were out of 
power.  Musa Bey later added the honorific qualifier of Hacı to his name, as fitting 
someone who had undertaken the Hajj or pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca. 
Nevertheless Musa Bey was able to return home to the plain of Muş before Gulizar was 
able to do so.  For years, Gulizar was stuck in Istanbul, along with many other witnesses, 
waiting to give testimony in their attempt to seek justice against the house of Musa Bey.  
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Eventually, in 1915, Musa Bey would play a major role in wiping out the Armenian 
population of Muş during the Genocide.224 
 
VI.  
The War against the House of Musa Bey 
 
While Musa Bey was absent in Istanbul, a small war broke out between the retainers of 
the Musa Bey family and the local defense groups, led by village teachers and priests.  
Musa Bey had a larger military force than the local Ottoman Vali and his men exacted 
their revenge for complaining to outsiders about Musa Bey.  The local defense groups, 
partly organized by Mihran Damadian and a student of Mıgırdiç Portakalian, fought back.   
The Ottoman State saw these little defense groups as potentially rebellious, and the 
danger posed to their local intermediary, Musa Bey, is taken as an affront to State 
authority in the region.  Some members of the Ottoman government became convinced 
that this local activism was an outcome of British consular and missionary interference. 
 
According to a number of accounts, it was shortly after this popular resistance against the 
House of Mirza Bey that Ottoman State began to crack down on Armenians carrying 
weapons and to monopolize access to the saltpeter deposits in the Muş plain, necessary 
for the production of gunpowder.  The investigative journalist Emile Dillon discussed this 
issue at great length in his articles.  Relying on the testimony of British and Russian 
consuls, local Armenians, Ottoman bureaucrats and ABCFM missionaries, Dillon 
described in vivid detail the efforts of the local authorities to seize all the weapons among 
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the Armenian peasantries of Muş.225  It was a period of great suspicion in the Muş plains, 
where the Armenians who had lived in Russia were held with great suspicion, as were the 
British consuls and ABCFM missionaries.  While the Ottoman State began to treat all 
outsiders as the dangerous conveyers of seditious ideas, it also developed an internal 
passport system to keep close tabs on movements within the population.  Journalists were 
particularly dangerous, for their words could have an impact on public opinion, British 
policy, and the image of the Ottoman State.  Increasingly, the Ottoman State under 
Abdülhamid II sought to control legitimate mobility and narrative in addition to 
legitimate violence.  




For many – both within the Ottoman Empire and outside of it – the Musa Bey affair 
increasingly seemed to exemplify the travails of vast numbers of Armenian peasantries 
who were exploited by a combination of warlords and bureaucrats, tied through 
                                                        
225 Emile Dillon, The Contemporary Review 68, pp. 171-2.  “In the spring of 1893 Hassib Pasha, the 
Governor of Moush, feeling the need of some proof of the disaffection of the Armenians of Avzoot and the 
neighboring villages, dispatched Police Captain Reshid Effendi thither to search for arms.  Reshid set out, 
made careful inquiries and diligently searched in the houses, on the roofs, under the ground, but in vain.  
There were no firearms anywhere.  He returned and reported that the villagers had strictly observed the law 
forbidding them to possess weapons of any kind.  But Hassib Pasha waxed wroth.  “How dare you assert 
that I know to be untrue?” he asked?  “Go back this minute and find the arms.  Don’t dare to return without 
them!”  The Police Captain rode off to Avzoot and searched every nook and corner with lamps, so to say, 
turning the houses inside out.  But he found nothing.  Then he summoned the villager Elder and said: “I 
have been sent to discover the hidden arms here.  Tell me where they are.”  “But there are none.” “There 
must be some.” “I assure you, you are mistaken.” “Well now listen. I have to find arms here, whether there 
are any or none, and cannot return without them.  Unless you deliver me some, I shall quarter myself and 
my men upon your village.”  This meant certainly plunder and probably rape.  The Elder was dismayed.  
“What are we to do?” he asked.  “We have no arms.”  “Go and get some, steal them, buy them, but get 
them.”  Two or three persons were accordingly sent to the nearest Koordish village, where they purchased 
three cartloads of old daggers, flint guns and rusty swords, which they duly handed over to Reshid.  With 
these he returned to the Governor of Moush, exulting Hassib Pasha, seeing the collection, rejoiced 
exceeding and said: “You see now, I was right. I told you there were arms hidden away there.  You did not 




patronage networks all the way to the Palace itself.   Genuine frustration over the poor 
conditions of the Armenian peasantries in the East, and over the whitewashing and 
apparent condoning of Musa Bey’s local rule, radicalized a number of Armenians in 
Istanbul and in Muş.  In 1889, Armenian students such as Hampartsoum Boyadjian and 
Dr. Jelalian studying at the Royal Medical School in Istanbul founded a local branch of 
the Hunchak.226   It is interesting to note that the earliest incarnation of the Committee of 
Union and Progress (CUP) was founded the same year, at the same institution.  The 
Hunchak and the CUP were in some ways twin organizations.  A small activist core of 
students and intellectuals composed each organization in their initial membership.  Three 
of the leaders of the Hunchak were Mihran Damadian, Hampartsoum Boyadjian and 
Harutiun Jangülian.  
 
Mihran Damadian was born in 1863 in Istanbul into a Catholic-Armenian family.227  Like 
many elite members of the Catholic-Armenian community in Istanbul, Damadian 
received his education at the Mekhitarist monastery on San Lazzaro in Venice.   Since the 
Mekhitarist Order was founded in the late 18th century the scholar-monks affiliated with 
this monastery published editions of the old Armenian texts from the “Golden days” of 
the Armenian Kingdoms of antiquity. Some of these texts came from a time before most 
Armenian-speakers were even Christian. Nevertheless, these Mekhitarist Order monks 
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were inculcating in their students a romantic sense of the grandeur and glory of the 
ancient times.  So young Mihran was converted to a particular strand of nationalism that 
was analogous to the pan-Hellenism of earlier decades, and the pan-Arabism that was 
beginning to circulate in the Arabic-speaking cities of the Eastern Mediterranean.   
 
After working for a short spell in one of the Catholic schools in Istanbul, Damadian 
found employment in 1884 as the principal of a school in Muş funded and organized by 
the United Armenian Societies.  The United Armenian Societies was part and parcel of a 
movement called ‘Tebi Yergir’ [Arm: ‘To the homeland’] that brought educated young 
Armenians to the imagined homeland in the East.228  This was a project that resembled in 
some respects the ‘back to the land movement’ that was taking place in the contemporary 
Russian Empire.  One of the earliest adopters of the ‘Tebi Yergir’ movement was 
Mıgırdiç Portakalian, a close ally of Mıgırdiç Khrimian, who opened up a school in Van.   
 
Both Mihran Damadian and Mıgırdiç Portakalian reproduced some of the education that 
they had received in Europe (Venice and Istanbul), and brought the missionary message 
of the greatness of the Armenian past to their Armenian students in schools in Muş and 
Van.  At the beginning of the 19th century, travelers had discussed how wealthy the 
peasants in this fertile region were.229  However, by the time that Mihran Damadian 
became a principal in the mid-1880s, observers almost unanimously described the utter 
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Parties through the Nineteen-Century (1963), pp. 51-52.  
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impoverishment of these same villages.  The English explorer, writer and natural 
historian Isabella Bird, reported the dire conditions of the Armenian peasantries in both 
her public writing,230 as well as in confidential reports she gave to both the British 
Ambassador and Ottoman central authorities.231  In a report dated April of 1891, Bird 
observed that the “Christians of the villages in the vilayets I have named have been 
reduced to extreme poverty, and their state of terror is truly pitiable.” She continued: 
I inquired in every place what were the grievances of which 
they complain, and the answer amounted substantially to 
this: - “The Kurds take by ‘demand’ or violence our wheat, 
money, jewels, bedding, sheep, cattle, and clothes, both by 
day and night.  They ill-use our women, and are even 
taking our girls, and they shoot us if we resist.  They 
sometimes beat us to death.  The lower officials are in 
league with the Kurds, and receive money from them; this 
we complain of most.  We pay heavy taxes, but we would 
not complain of this if we were protected from the Kurds.  
Things are growing worse and worse.  They are hardly 
leaving us our lives.232   
 
As principal of the Nersisian school, Mihran Damadian observed for the first time the 
poverty of the peasantries of Muş.  Over the course of four years, it appears that he 
became increasingly radicalized.233  A year after Damadian was appointed principal at the 
Nersisian Central School, in 1885, the Ottoman State created a special police force in 
Van to track sedition.  That police force started to go after many institutions, including 
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233 Ara Aharonian, Heroic Figures of the A.D.L. (2006), pp. 34-35. According to Aharonian, “The national 
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famine relief programs and schools, shut down the school that Portakalian was running, 
and started arresting and exiling the teachers.234 
 
When Portakalian was exiled, his students joined forces and restarted the school in secret. 
Alongside the secret school they set up an organization called the Armenakan, which is 
considered the first real political party in the Ottoman East.  At least one of Portakalian’s 
former students headed across Lake Van to Muş and along with Mihran Damadian began 
an organization tasked with organizing local self-defense groups among the villagers of 
the plain.235 
 
After Portakalian was exiled, he founded a journal in Marseille that began to advocate for 
reforms in the Ottoman East.  This journal was relatively moderate in tone and did not 
advocate violent revolution.  Some of his erstwhile student-followers in France, inspired 
by intellectual currents of Anarchism and Socialism, broke away and in Geneva in 1887 
began to publish a journal called Hunchak, or the Bell, a reference to the newspaper of a 
famous socialist named Alexander Herzen (At the time, Herzen’s name would have been 
as familiar to people as Marx).  As Louise Nalbandian and Anahide Ter Minassian have 
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235 It was in Muş that Damadian met Hairebed Janigian of Van, who was employed as a teacher for the 




shown, the Hunchak initially coalesced around a small handful of Russian-Armenian 
students studying in Switzerland.236 
 
After the acquittal of Musa Bey, young Armenian activists, including Mihran Damadian, 
Hampartsoum Boyadjian, and Harutiun Jangülian, helped to organize another large 
protest at the Armenian Kum Kapı cathedral, the center of the Apostolic Church in 
Istanbul and the location of the Patriarchate.  On July 27, 1890, large numbers of 
inhabitants from Muş and Van gathered to protest Patriarch Ashikian, who was held by 
many to have been too meek and subservient and had failed to represent the claims of his 
flock in the Eastern Provinces.237  One estimate from the Daily News suggests that up to 




Violence in Istanbul 
 
According to later recollections, Mihran Damadian, Hampartsoum Boyadjian and 
Harutiun Jangülian planned to stand up and interrupt the speech while the Patriarch was 
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237 Both The Guardian and The Morning Post (July 29, 1890) specifically notes that the “dense crowd” 
consisted mostly of “Armenians from Moosh;” More generally, for the July 27 Kum Kapı protest see, 
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238 The Daily News, “The Anarchy in America,” August 4, 1890; see also Florian Riedler, “Armenian Labor 





giving his blessing to the Congregation.239 They would then have presented a petition to 
the Patriarch, and accompanied him to the Sultan to address their concerns directly. As 
the patriarch, Achikian, presented his prayer there were rumors and rumblings from the 
audience of protest against him.  Jangülian stood up and began reading a petition. The 
petition was about how the Ottoman state, and more specifically Achikian, had been 
ignoring the oppression faced by the peasant Armenians in the East.240 The patriarch 
attempted to flee from the increasingly angry crowd, and one story goes that Jangülian 
took a gun and pointed it at the patriarch.241 The patriarch was able to flee the church, but 
the nascent revolutionaries caught him outside and demanded he accompany them to the 
Sultan himself to deliver the petition.242 
 
At that point nearby police heard the skirmish, and tried to break apart the mob. Violence 
ensued. No one knows who fired the first shot, but when the mayhem was over several 
policemen and protestors lay dead.243  When the violence against the Ottoman police 
                                                        
239 Chalabian 1994, p. 25. 
 
240 According to Edwin Pears, the correspondent for the Daily News in Istanbul, “The document which an 
Armenian attempted to read was a petition from his countrymen of the provinces.  It stated that in Armenia, 
the oppression of the Kurds, and the Turkish officials have become insupportable, and that the Kurds were 
invading the villages, burning, ravishing, murdering, and pillaging in open daymight.  It was stated that 
hitherto all the representations of the Patriarch to the Sultan and the Government had remained without 
result, for which reasons the petitioners requested his Beatitude to leade them personally to the Sultan, that 
the people themselves might appeal to his Majesty to ameliorate their condition, as they were confident that 
the Sultan himself had no knowledge of the facts.” From Daily News, August 2, 1890.  
 
241 Chalabian 1994, p. 25; Daily News, July 30, 1890.  
 
242 Chalabian 1994, p. 26.  
 
243 Various sources differ on the causaulties, Chalabian wrote, “Manuk Nalbandian of Bitlis, A. Nazaretian 
of Van and Hovhannes Ghumruian of Sebastia were killed on the spot.  On the other side a number of 
policemen were wounded.” Chalabian 1994, p. 26; the Guardian (July 29, 1890), notes that “four soldiers 
and three Armenians were killed;” the Daily News (August 4) conveyed an account from the Porte which 
indicated that “two Armenians were killed by musket shots” and “some soldiers were severely wounded;” 
citing the Tan newspaper, Musa Şaşmaz noted that twelve people were killed and six wounded, “Kum Kapı 
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occurred in July 1890, it was perceived by the Ottoman State as an Armenian insurgency.  
The Ottoman State cracked down on all suspected militants in the capital,244 arresting 
(and in some cases torturing) many connected to the Hunchak student group that had 
been formed at the Imperial Medical School a year earlier.245 
 
However, some of the activist-students and their supporters, managed to escape from 
Istanbul.  Mihran Damadian and Hampartsoum Boyadjian took refuge in Athens.  
Harutiun Jangülian didn’t escape.246  For his involvement in the Kum Kapı protest, he 
was arrested, imprisoned, and sentenced to death by a military tribunal.  His sentence was 
reduced to life imprisonment.247   He was taken to one of the harshest prisons in the 
Ottoman Empire in Akka, where he remained for the next six years.  In 1896, he either 
escaped or was released, and continued his activism within the Hunchak party.248 
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the Sultan…” (1890, p. 806).  
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In Athens, the remnants of the Istanbul Hunchak activists and their allies reached out to 
other communities of Ottoman opposition exiles from Crete and Macedonia.  Some of the 
activists were interested in greater autonomy; others were interested in independence, 
while others were more focused on administrative reforms that respected the rights of the 
minority communities.  On the one-year anniversary of the July 1890 Kum Kapı protests, 
in July of 1891, the Hunchak party organized a protest march in Athens. The Ottoman 
consul in Athens attempted to squash this by putting pressure on the Greek Government 
to prevent the commemorative march, but was not successful in his endeavor.249  
 
IX. 
Regrouping and Reorganizing 
 
After the protest march in Athens, Mihran Damadian traveled to Sasun, disguised as a 
porter from the Muş plains, to organize the mountaineers.250  He played a very important 
role, in close conjunction with a local priest named Armenak Ghazarian (Hrayr), who 
was a writer, a local intellectual and the son of a priest.  The two of them worked on 
organizing the people of the mountains.251  According to Garo Sasuni, different villages 
had been riven by divisions and feuds, and an outsider like Mihran Damadian was able to 
help organize a self-defense network linking the communities, and perhaps aided the 
communities in securing gunpowder and weaponry.  Also according to Sasuni’s account, 
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this alliance between the various mountaineers was also probably facilitated by a sense 
that the situation in the plains was spiraling out of control as conflict in the plains 
between the house of Musa Bey and the villages of Çukur Bulanık spiraled out of 
control.252  
 
Damadian’s arrival coincided with increased willingness, by certain factions within the 
local Armenian Church, to allow some churches and monasteries to be utilized by the 
organizers of the local protection groups.253 To understand why this was the case, we 
need to discuss briefly the history of Church-Ottoman relationships, and particularly the 
case of Nerses Karakhanian, a bishop of Muş and long time supporter of Khrimian.254  
Bishop Nerses Karakhanian wielded enormous ecclesiastical authority in the Muş region 
and was respected and popular.255  
 
                                                        
252 According to Sasuni, “In those days, the Sasun Armenian Beys were at odds with each other.  However 
the increase in outside danger froced the Beys to begin joint talks.  In this enterprise, the Muş based 
“United Organization” teachers, and especially of those teachers Damadyan, played an important role in 
Sasun.  He was aided at the same time by Hrayr.” (1992, p. 183) [“Sasun Ermeni beyleri kendi aralarında o 
zamanlar anlaşmazlıklar içindeydiler, fakat dış tehlike arttığında mecburen bu beyler görüşmelere 
başlamaya karar verdiler.  Bu yöndeki atılımda Muş’taki “Birleşik Örgüt’ün öğretmenleri, özellikle de bu 
öğretmenlerden o sırada Sasun’da bulunan Damadyan büyük bir rol oynadı.  Ona aynı zamanda Hrayr 
yardım ediyordu.”]  
 
253 Chalabian 1994, p. 29, 161 
 
254 Ararat, vol. 1, issue 1-2 (1913), p. 463. 
 




Karakhanian lent increasing support to teachers and local activists.  His actions were 
perceived as seditious by the State and in 1893 Bishop Karakhanian was imprisoned.256   
According to the Erzurum-based British Consul Robert Graves: 
His arrest has produced a painful impression among the 
Armenians of Moush, who are convinced of his innocence, 
and believe that the accusations against him have been 
trumped up by the police with the view of extortion and 
intimidation.  It is reported that a police officer visited 
Boulanik for the purpose of collecting evidence against the 
Bishop, who succeeded in extracting no less than 580 liras 
from the villages, some of those who refused to pay being 
arrested and taken to Bitlis.257 
 
According to one source, it was after his arrest that Karakhanian and his supporters began 
to support the more radical nationalist activists in their struggle against warlords like 
Musa Bey and bureaucrats like Tahsin Paşa, who was appointed Vali of Bitlis in 1891.  
 
 X. 
Corrupt Bureaucrats  
 
There is quite a bit of evidence to suggest that Hasan Tahsin Paşa, a bureaucrat with a 
military background, had been appointed Vali through the efforts of Süreyya Paşa, the 
head-secretary of Abdülhamid II, and one of the most powerful figures in the Palace 
system. Tahsin Paşa served as the governor-general of the vilayet or province of Bitlis 
between 1891 and 1895.  He was also a former military commander.  According to the 
                                                        
256 According to Markosian (cited by Chalabian 1994, p. 203) the bishop Nerses Karakhanian was arrested 
after he complained about the destruction visited upon the villages of Avzut and Vartennis.  He remained in 
prison in Bitlis for years.  For more on his imprisonment see, FO 424/175, Consul Graves to Sir Clare Ford, 
November 8, 1893, p. 251. 
 




observers François-Armand Cholet and Robert Graves, he was an impressively self-
possessed, French-speaking Albanian who had once been a close associate of Midhat 
Paşa.258 
 
Tahsin Paşa frequently employed the “Armenian issue” that so preoccupied the Ottoman 
State to his advantage.  It is critical to stress here that Tahsin Paşa was far from alone in 
using the ‘Armenian issue’ for financial or political gain.  According to the ABCFM 
missionaries (and the British), Tahsin Paşa used his position and the increasing anxieties 
of the State, to arrest wealthy Armenians, then blackmailed them with the threat of 
imprisonment or torture.  Using this strategy, Tahsin Paşa was able to extract the 
equivalent of thousands of liras from wealthy Armenian families in the Bitlis province.259  
Bishop Karakhanian apparently tried to call attention to this corruption.  Tahsin Paşa 
managed to buy off or convince a couple of local Armenian priests to claim that Nerses 
Karakhanian was a dangerous radical. It was based on the testimony of these two priests, 
                                                        
258 Robert Windham Graves, Storm Centres of the Near East: Personal Memories, 1879-1929 (1933), p. 
121; Armand-Pierre Cholet, Voyage en Turquie d’Asie: Arménie, Kurdistan et Mésopotamie (Paris, 1892), 
pp. 232-233.  
 
259 According to an article Frank Scudamore wrote for the Daily News on April 20, 1895, “It was Hassan 
Tahsin Pacha [sic], the late Governor of Bitlis, and for the past month, in honourable retirement at 
Constantinople, who first inaugurated this happy system of milking Armenians.  He found it very 
succcessful.  He extorted by this means in the past two years from the Christians of his vilayet no less a 
sum then twenty-five thousand pounts.”  Consul Graves wrote that “Numerous telegraphic Petitions have 
been addressed to the Sultan, Grand Vizier, and other Ministers at Constantinople by the Bitlis Armenians, 
almost all the signatories to which, including the principal men of their community, have been ill-used, and 
imprisoned by the Governor-General.  In one of these Petitions, they declare that they can prove that Tahsin 
Pasha, has extorted [from] them no less a sum than 35,000 liras.” (FO 424/181, Consul Graves to Sir P. 
Currie, December 21, 1894, reproduced with some redactions in Parliamentary Papers Turkey 1895, no. 1, 
p. 68); Knapp estimated a lower amount of “as much as twenty thousand liras” (FO 424/182, p. 71.) 
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according to British and Missionary sources, that Karakhanian was charged with sedition 
and arrested in 1893.260 
 
And, of course, the incentive was that many of the local provincial authorities (not just 
Tahsin), benefited from the Armenian issue in various ways.  Some of it had it to do with 
purely financial incentives.261  As many observers (consuls, journalists, missionaries) 
noted the rampant corruption was rooted in the systematic failure of the Ottoman State to 
pay the salaries of officials on time.  According to the journalist George Hughes 
Hepworth,262  
A quick observer said to me, “How can a man help 
cheating the government when it has not paid him a piaster 
in eighteen months?  To be behindhand in a matter of this 
kind is to put a premium on corruption.  The Vali 
[governor-general], the Kaimakam [sub-provincial official], 
the Zaptieh [jandarma], never get their money till long after 
it is due.  …Take the case of an ordinary Zaptieh or 
policeman.  His wages are small enough at best, but if they 
are not paid, he is forced to steal or cheat in order to meet 
his bills, for he must live.  If he collects taxes, he adds 
something to the total amount for his personal purposes, 
                                                        
260 According to a Patriarchal Report sent to the British Government, “Quoique les deux Archimandrites 
précités aient pu plus tard s’emparer de diverses fonctions, grâce à une vie d’apparence correcte, l’inimitié 
de Tahsin Pacha, Gouverneur-Général de Bitlis, contre le Prélat Nersès Carakahnian, Métropolitain de 
Mouche et Supérieur du Couvent de Sourpe Garabeth…” (FO 424/182, p. 41) 
 
261 Over the course of decades, one of the perennial concerns of the British-ABCFM information sharing 
network was identifying which officials and notables had a reputation for corruption.  One Governor-
General who was deemed ‘corrupt’ wherever he went was Arif Paşa, the first Vali of Bitlis in the early 
1880s.  As one British consular report had it, Arif Paşa “appears to have occupied the whole of his time in 
studying the most effectual methods of filling his pockets.  The result is, a consdition of things very similar 
to that which obtained in the Sandjak of Bayazid under the rule of Ibrahim [Kâmil] Effendi, the late 
Mutessarif.” (FO 424, p. 17) For additional detailed accounts of Arif Paşa corruption and his relationship 
with Mirza Bey, the father of Musa Bey, see espeically FO 195/1450 When the population of Bitlis 
attempted to send complaint documents (mazbata) in the post to the Porte, “Aarif Pasha hearing that [there 
was] such a document in the mail stopped the post which had already left Bitlis and extracted the 
obnoxious petition.” (FO 195/1450, no. 6 (Eyres to Everett, September 15, 1883).   
 
262 For more on George Hughes Hepworth, who was invited by Sultan Abdülhamid to conduct an 




and the people who know how things are managed, 
grumbling pay it. … If the government paid its servants, it 
could require them to be honest, and punish the dishonest, 
but if it practically cheats its servants of their salaries, who 
can blame these fellows for following the example and 
cheating others?263 
 
Sometimes, corrupt bureaucrats would arrest people, and threaten to charge them with 
treason unless they paid some sort of ‘protection’ costs.  Additionally, provincial 
authorities sometimes used the Armenian issue to gain status in the eyes of Istanbul by 
claiming that there were many Armenian revolutionaries running about.264 
 
Damadian was also arrested in spring of 1893. As former students and teachers connected 
to the United Society school of Muş and Portakalian’s school in Van ended up in prison, 
they came into close contact with Armenian bandits and local Armenian priests. It was in 
the prisons that local Armenian priests (many of them followers of Khrimian), the 
missionary-teachers like Damadian, and local bandits first began to coalesce into what 
later writers called the Fedayi.  In other words, the Fedayi emerged from a synthesis of 
local bandits like Mkho-Shahen of Derkevank, and his near-contemporary Stepanos 
Mekhitharian, known by his nom-de-guerre "Arabo," missionaries of the Armenian 
nation like Mihran Damadian and Hampartsoum Boyadjian, and imprisoned clergy such 
as Nerses Kharakhanian.265  
                                                        
263 George Hughes Hepworth, Through Armenia on Horseback (London, 1898), p. 257.  
 
264 According to Consul Devey, writing in Van in 1889, “One or two local functionaries of the same time 
have not been remiss, and let so fine an occasion for the display of their zeal, and whilst devoting their time 
and energies to the discovery and scotching of Armenian revolutionary plts and societies, many of which 
were purely imaginary or misunderstood…” (Parliamentary Papers Turkey 1889, no. 1, Consul Devey to 
Consul Chermside, April 13, 1889), pp. 71-72.   
 





Soon after Damadian was arrested, Hampartsoum Boyadjian made his way to Sasun, 
disguised as a Dervish.  Once Boyadjian arrived in the mountains, he continued to work 
on forging the disparate mountain communities into a defensive alliance.266 
 
At the same time, in 1893, Hasan Tahsin, working closely with a local Nakshibandi 
authority, Mehmet, the Sheikh of Zeilan,267 began to organize an alliance of different 
Kurdish nomads stretching from the plains around Diyarbakır to the mountains of Sasun.  
This was a sort of a parallel structure to Boyadjian’s Armenian alliance in the Sasun 
mountains, Tahsin and Mehmet’s alliance comprised different Kurdish communities that 
had been riven by feuds and tensions.268 
   
XI. 
Violence in the Mountains 
 
In the late spring of 1893, the Bekranli,269  Rushkotanli, Badikanli, and other nomadic 
tribes (aṣiret), who traditionally had spent the winter in the plains around Diyarbakir, set 
off with their flocks of sheep for their summer pastures in the mountains of Sasun to the 
north.  For several years before, the movement of these nomadic tribes into the mountains 
                                                        
266 Chalabian 1994, p. 79. 
 
267 Verheij 2012, p. 94, fn. 30.  
 
268 Parliamentary Papers Turkey 1895, no. 1, p. 350;  
 
269 According to Armenian clergy who spoke to Mark Sykes, the Bekranlı were the descendants of the 
Armenian Bagratid dynasty.  (Mark Sykes, “The Kurdish Tribes of the Ottoman Empire,” The Journal of 




had been tightly controlled by the Bitlis authorities.270 However, with the appointment of 
Hasan Tahsin as Vali of Bitlis, those restrictions were lifted and the tribes resumed their 
yearly peregrination into the mountains.   The seasonal migration of 1893 ended in 
violence between the nomadic Kurds and the Armenian mountaineers of Talori, a prelude 
to the greater violence that would follow one year later. 
 
In many respects, the community of Talori in the mountains of Sasun271 resembled that of 
Zeytun, some three hundred miles to the west.  Both Talori and Zeytun were inhabited 
almost exclusively by Armenian mountaineers, and both were famous for their 
metallurgy.  Making use of rich deposits of iron ore near their village, the Talori 
Armenians crafted ploughs and other farming implements during times of peace, and 
axes, knives and swords in times of war.272  Unlike the Zeytunli, however, the people of 
                                                        
270 FO 424-181, Memorandum by Consul Graves, p. 22.  Also, PP Turkey 1895/1, pp. 70-1. This is 
supported by a coded telegram from Zeki Paşa to General Staff of the military (Makam-ı Seraskeri), which 
notes that passage of the Bekran tribe through Talori was blocked by the Ottoman authorities of Bitlis for 
several years [“Bitlis vilayetince birkaç seneden beri men’ edilmesidir”]. See, document no. 11 in Osmanlı 
Arşivi Yıldız Tasnifi: Talori Olayları, henceforth OAYT.  
 
271 According to vice-consul Hampson, the geographic term ‘Sasun’ broadly was employed to refer to 
entire mountainous region between the plains of Muş on the north and Siirt, Khyan, and Kulp in the 
south.  It consisted of a extensive area between Genç on the west and Mutki and Mount Maratong on the 
east.  More narrowly Sasun refers to the administrative district (kaza) linked to the sub-province (sancak) of 
Muş, and encompassed the area from the Komlik mountains on the north to the borders of Siirt on 
south.  The western boundary of the administrative district was the Talori Su while the mountains of 
Maratong was the frontier on the east.  The residence of the kaymakam was at the town of Hazo.  Talori, on 
the other hand, only refers most narrowly to the various wards (mahale) of the village of Talori connected 
to the sub-province of Genç although often referring in Foreign Office, ABCFM and Ottoman documents 
to the area between the cazas of Kulp and Sasun.  PP Turkey 1895/1, Vice-Consul Hampson to Consul 
Graves, August 18, 1895, pp. 200-1. It should be noted that this area is not the same as the present-day 
district of Sason in Batman Province.  According to Jelle Verheij, “Presently the Talori area is part of the 
district of Sason (in the Batman province).  The area called Sasun in the 19th century lies north of this 
district and at present belongs large to the central district of Muş Province.”  Verheij 2012, p. 93, fn. 26.  
 
272 It is also possible that the metal workers of Talori made their own guns. See Hodgetts 1896, p. 91 on 




Talori were subject to certain tribute relations (‘hafir’) with Kurdish power holders.  In 
exchange for tribute, the Kurdish chiefs guaranteed their protection against other tribes.   
 
The villages of Talori seem to have been under fewer obligations than other communities 
in the mountains273 and were deemed by Garo Sasuni to have been in a state of half-
independence (‘yarı bağımsız durumu’).274  Nevertheless, every spring, representatives 
from seven Kurdish tribes would make their rounds of the various wards of Talori and 
demand their share (‘besh’) of the resources.   According to one account, in the years 
before the violence of 1893, the relations between the Armenian mountaineers and their 
feudal lords took a turn for the worse.275 
 
According to Talori native Vartan Dilloyan, the Ottoman authorities encouraged the tribal 
chiefs to increase their tribute demands.276  This assertion may have some basis in 
fact.  Tahsin Paşa was accused by both the ABCFM missionaries and British consular 
officers of being corrupt and using ‘blackmail’ to extract resources from wealthy 
Armenians in his district.  In any case, by the early spring of 1893 the demands of the 
Kurdish Chiefs (Ağa) were heavier than ever.  Seven tribal chiefs representing the tribes 
                                                        
273 See the pamphlet Facts about Armenia (New York, 1895), henceforth Facts, published by the Armenian 
Patriotic Union, p. 7. 
 
274 Sasuni 1992, p. 182. 
 
275 “Despite such continuous spoliation by Kurd and Turk, the Armenians managed to get along tolerably.  
But in the course of recent years, their condition was rendered intolerably worse.  Turk and Kurd became 
more exacting, the Kurd being instructed by the Turk.  The Kurds would be satisfied with the traditional 
tribute, but the Turkish authorities incited them to demand more, to plunder and to kill.  The Kurds, at first 
unwilling to follow Turkish policy, told the Armenians, in confidence what the Osmanlis were urging them 
to do.  But the practing of the Turks did affect gradually the Kurdish mind.  … Friction, quarrel between 
the two races grew more and more frequent, to the hearty satisfaction of the government.” (Facts, p. 8) 
 




of the “Oovedoon, Buzuktsi, Khanavdali, Balaktzi, Khiantzi, Bakrantzi, and Badkantzi” 
came to collect tribute.  The first five Kurdish tribes were paid their share of the tribute--
the last two were not.277   
 
Dilloyan recounts:  
The Armenians of Dalvorig undertook this time to reason 
more plainly with the Kurds.  “Why do you not,” asked 
they of the Kurds, “treat us as your fathers used to do.  You 
demand from us every year more; besides you behave with 
us like enemies, you carry off our flocks, you watch our 
caravans and attack them.  Your manifest intention is to 
ruin us.  Now you cannot be our friends and our enemies at 
the same time.  We can endure this no longer.”  The Kurds 
did not understand reason, refused the proposition of the 
Armenians, and the Armenians refused to pay them any 
tribute.  The Kurds returned with the intention of coming 
back in greater force.278  
 
In the middle of June, large numbers of Kurdish tribesmen from the south279 began to 
gather below the village of Talori.  As the numbers of incoming tribesmen grew, the 
inhabitants of Talori became increasingly convinced that the underlying purpose for this 
assembly was an attack on the village.  Urgent requests for aid were sent to other villages 
in the Sasun mountains and to Hrayr (Armenak Ghazarian) and his band of nationalist-
converts from the highlands and the plains.  
                                                        
277 FO 424-182, “Deposition of Ovig Vartanian,” p. 52.  
 
278 ibid, p. 9 
 
279 FO 424-181, Memorandum by Graves, p. 22.  Also PP Turkey 1895/1, pp. 70. Vartan Dilloyan 
describes these same three tribes as the Pakrantzik, Khiyanzik and Baduktzik.  See Facts about Armenia 
(New York, 1896), p. 9. According to the missionary account almost assuredly written by George Perkins 
Knapp, “most of them were of the Bakranlee tribe.” FO 424/182, p. 71.  According to the three natives of 
Talori interviewed by Edward Arthur Brayley Hodgetts, these included the Riantzi and the Bagrantzi. 
Hodgetts, 1896, p. 90. Ovig Vartanian is even more precise in his deposition, kept in British confidential 
print, testifying that the tribes gathered under Ömer of the Bekranlı and Şakir of the Badikanlı. (FO 





On June 26, 1893280 the defenders of Talori precipitated the conflict by firing on the 
gathering tribesmen.281  For the next four days fighting continued with increasing 
intensity as mountaineers from other parts of Sasun reinforced the inhabitants of Talori282 
and hundreds of supporters of the Sheikh of Zilan283 arrived to aid the Kurds from the 
plains.284 Although the defenders of Talori were far outnumbered by the Kurdish 
tribesmen, they had at least two advantages over the attacking force: intimate knowledge 
of the mountainous terrain and the added firepower of Hrayr’s fedayis, some of whom 
may have been armed with modern rifles (tüfenk) instead of flintlocks (çakmalı).285   
While the numbers of combatants and the casualties286 vary considerably in accounts of 
the violence composed by locals and outsiders, the general consensus is that the Kurdish 
tribesmen were conclusively defeated by the mountaineers and their allies.  
                                                        
280 Antranig Chalabian, citing Der Minasian’s seven-volume memoir (vol. 3, pp. 97-100), dates the 
beginning of the conflict to June 14, according to the ‘old system’ of the Rumi calendar, or June 26 
according to Gregorian.  Chalabian 1994, p. 160.  
 
281 FO 424/182, p. 71. Redacted versions of this same account appear in The Hartford Seminary Record, 
Vol. 5, pp. 251-279 and in three installments in the Times (London), on March 29, 30 and April 13, 1895.  
 
282 Chalabian 1994, p. 161; FO 424/182, “Deposition of Ovig Vartanian,” pp. 51-52. 
 
283 Thomas Boyajian is mostly likely referring to Şeyh Mehmed of Zilan (alternatively spelled Zileh and 
Zeilan), the descendant of a line of Nakṣibendi ṣeyhs from the village of Zilan (Yeniçağlar).  According to 
Jelle Verheij, “Locally, his important role in bringing together a coalition of Kurdish tribes is still 
remembered.” Verheij 2012, p. 94, fn. 30.  
 
284 Chalabian 1994, p. 160.  
 
285 When Murad (Hampartsoum Boyadjian) was captured a year later by the military authorities his small 
band of fedayi was armed with “five Russian made bolted rifles, two flint guns with their cartridges, a 
locally made grenade made from bronze with thirty-one capsules and a sword” [“beş aded Rusya sürmelisi 
iki çakmalı tüfenkle cephâneler ve ma’mûlât mahalliyeden tunçtan ma’mûl otuzbir kapsüllü bir el 
humbarası ve bir kılıç”] 
 
286 Chalabian 1994 and Sasuni 1992 state that the Talori Armenians suffered casualties of 200 while those 
of the Kurds suffered about a 1000.  Dilloyan and the ABCFM sources agree that the six inhabitants of 





It is important to recall that this conflict took place just weeks after Mihran Damadian 
was arrested, and it is telling that according to one account, the Kurdish tribesmen first 
demanded that the people of Talori hand over “Murath, an agitator educated at Geneva” 
(presumably Hampartsoum Boyadjian), who had been living with them in the 
mountains.287  On the other hand, the Vice-Consul Thomas Boyajian288 was convinced 
that the violence was to a certain extent based on the misrepresentation of certain Kurds 
who were seeking to enrich themselves.  According to Thomas Boyajian’s account, those 
Kurds: 
...went to the Sheikh of Zileh, and, with the intention of 
arousing the anger of the said Sheikh, invented the 
following calumnious story: that the Armenians of Talori 
had seized his (the Sheikh’s) brother, maltreated him, and 
forced wine down his throat, and thus polluted him, 
&ct.  This story, as you will perceive, had the desired effect, 
for the Sheikh, feeling naturally very angry, sent orders at 
once to his followers, commanding them to go and punish 
the said Armenians, upon which, I am told, about 2,000 
Kurds responded to the call and started for the villages in 
question, the Sheikh also following them … But while the 
Sheikh was nearing the scene of the tragedy he thought to 
send a messenger to his brother, who at the time was with 
his flock in a neighboring mountain to ascertain the truth of 
the facts which he was told by the Kurds.  To his great 
surprise, his brother sent word that all that he had heard 
was false, and that the Armenians of Talori had always 
been kind to him.  Moreover, he begged his brother not to 
do any injury to them.  Soon after receiving his message he 
sent orders to the Kurds to the effect that they should 
withdraw, and not molest the villagers, but it was too late, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
287 Hodgetts 1896, p. 90.  
 
288 Thomas Boyajian was an ABCFM pastor, former member of the Diyarbekir government and ‘acting’ 




for the mischief was already done...289   
 
By Boyajian’s account, the decision to commit violence was at least in part based on 
rumor that proved to be untrue.  At nearly the same time as Boyajian was conducting 
research in Diyarbekir (in the south), further to the north, across the mountains, the 
ABCFM missionaries in Bitlis were compiling their own accounts of the violence.   Their 
interpretation dwelt less on the contingent individual choices emphasized by Boyajian, 
but connected the violence to a broader pattern of local governance.  According to their 
narrative, the Vali of Bitlis, Hasan Tahsin Paşa, was employing the governing tactic of 
divide et impera, using the Kurdish tribesmen from the south as a ‘cat's-paw’290 against 
the autonomous mountaineers of Talori.    
 
George Perkins Knapp observed that: 
Some of the sheikhs, in their simplicity, showed the written 
orders the government had sent them, urging them to make 
an attack.  This is a point I have carefully worked up, and I 
am thoroughly convinced, that … the government gave oral 
and written orders to the Koords to attack the Armenians, 
‘Spoils yours, heads ours.’291   
 
It is not clear whether or not the authorities in the Istanbul government condoned this 
strategy.  The Istanbul government, for their part, provided yet another interpretation of 
                                                        
289 PP Turkey 1896/6, Vice-Consul Boyajian to Consul Graves, March 16, 1894, pp. 73-74.  Boyajian bases 
his account at least in part on a “private source” connected to the Ottoman bureaucratic apparatus.  This 
makes sense given the fact that in addition to being a leading Protestant notable of Diyarbekir and pastor, 
he also served at one point on the local Diyarbekir council (meclis).  
 
290 According to the most detailed report from an ABCFM missionary, written by George Perkins Knapp, 
“The Koords felt very sore after the Dalvoreeg battle and somewhat bitter towards the government for thus 
being made its catspaw.”  FO 424/182, p. 71 
 
291 ibid, pp. 71.  Ovig Vartanian also points out that the tribal Kurds had a written order that authorized 
their attack on Talori, see FO 424/182, pp. 51-52.  On this policy of divide et impera, see also Chalabian 




the violence, one completely divorced from the accounts of ABCFM missionaries, the 
British consuls, and Armenian survivor accounts.  After the British passed on Boyajian’s 
account, the Grand Vizier Ahmed Cevad Paşa gave the British their own account of what 
had taken place: 
Within the course of the last year, the Armenians of the 
village of Talori in the district of Genç, who had yielded to 
criminal instigations, assaulted the Muslim population and 
mutilated their corpses, which lead to a conflict between 
them and the Kurds.  However, thanks to measures taken 
immediately by the Government, appeasement was restored 
to their minds.  The Kurds, as well as the Armenians, who 
had isolated themselves behind redoubts that they 
previously erected in the mountains, returned to their 
villages towards the middle of the month of July 
1893.  Since that date nothing has occurred to disturb the 
tranquility of the country.  Moreover, no one on the two 
sides has been imprisoned for the incident, and 
consequently, there is no one today in prison for this 
affair.292   
 
Robert Graves, the British consul in Erzurum, was convinced that this version of the 
events was based on reports sent by the Bitlis authorities to the Istanbul government.293 
Upon reading the account circulated by the Istanbul government, Thomas Boyajian 
defended his own account: 
                                                        
292 FO 424/178, Memorandum inclosed in a dispatch from P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley, May 23, 
1894, pp. 145-146.  [“Dans le courant de l’année passée les Arméniens du village de Talori, district de 
Ghendj, cédant à des instigations criminelles, avaient attaqué les Musulmans et profané des cadavres, ce 
qui amena une rixe entre eux et les Kurdes.  Mais, grâce aux mesures immédiatement par le Gouvernement, 
l’apaisement se fit dans les esprits.  Les Kurdes, ainsi que les Arméniens qui s’étaient enfermés dans les 
redoutes précédemment élevées par eux-mêmes dans les montagnes, rentrèrent dans leurs villages vers le 
milieu de mois de Juillet 1309.  Depuis cette époque rien n’est venu troubler la tranquillité du 
pays.  D’ailleurs, des deux côtés, personne n’a été emprisonné pour cet incident, et, par conséquent, il n’y a 
personne aujourd’hui en prison pour cette affaire.”]  
 
293 According to Consul Graves, “I can only say that Mr. [Thomas] Boyajian’s proved caution and accuracy 
in reporting such cases makes me inclined to credit his rather than this vague official version of the affair, 
which is no doubt based upon the reports of the Governors’ of a notoriously ill-administrative [sic] district.” 
(PP Turkey 1896/6, p. 98, Consul Graves to Sir P. Currie, June 1, 1894).  While Graves speaks in general 
about the corrupt governance of Bitlis, it is worth emphasizing again that Hasan Tahsin Paşa was the Vali 




The account which I gave in my dispatch I collected after 
careful inquiry from a reliable source.  There may be some 
errors in details, but in the main I believe them to be 
correct.  The reply of His Highness the Grand Vizier is, of 
course, from the authorities of the Bitlis Vilayet, who are, 
as you justly say, most probably to blame for the 
affair.  But still in the official version, with a moment’s 
consideration, we can at once see that the statement of the 
Bitlis authorities is anything but the correct one.  The 
Memorandum says that the Armenians of Talori last 
summer, yielding to criminal instigation, attacked the 
Mussulmans and desecrated their corpses, which caused a 
fight between them and the Kurds, &c, but that no one on 
either side was imprisoned for this affair.  Now, is it likely 
that the Armenians should attack and kill Mussulmans and 
desecrate their corpses, and that the authorities of Bitlis be 
so indifferent, not to say lenient, to the Armenians as not 
arrest any of the criminals?  This would be, if nothing else, 
contrary to the principles of justice, and sheer neglect of 
their duty; and besides, was the scene of the tragedy Talori, 
the Armenian village, or some Mussulman Kurdish 
village?  If Talori, what business had so many Kurds to 
crowd there?  Was it for attacking or to be attacked?294 
  
After the outbreak of violence between the Kurdish tribesmen and the Talori Armenians, 
Mustafa Paşa, the Mutasarrıf of Genç arrived in Talori with Ottoman soldiers.295  Mustafa 
Paşa reported to his bureaucratic superior, the Vali of Bitlis, Hasan Tahsin, that the 
Armenians of Talori were in revolt against the State.296  A battalion (tabur) of troops 
from Erzurum with mountain guns and ammunition was promptly ordered into the 
                                                        
294 PP Turkey 1896/6, Acting Vice-Consul Boyajian to Consul Graves, June 16, 1894, pp. 110-111.  
 
295 PP Turkey 1896/6, p. 74.  
 
296 Turkey 1896/6, p. 74. Three men from Talori interviewed by Edward Arthur Brayley Hodgetts, an 
investigative journalist from the Daily Graphic in Tiflis, tell a slightly different story, “It appears that the 
Kurds went to Moosh, the neighboring garrison town, and reported the insubordination of the Armenians, 
complaining how they had been treated and repulsed, and exaggerating the armed strength of the peasantry.” 




mountains above Muş to quell the ‘rebellion.’297  Additional violence seemed 
impending.   However, according to Boyajian, it was at precisely at this point that Sırrı 
Paşa, the Vali of Diyarbakir, contradicted the claim made by Mustafa Paşa, the 
Mutasarrıf of Genç, that the Armenians were rebelling against the State.  Boyajian 
observes that it was because of this divergence of official accounts that Mustafa Paşa was 
eventually removed from his office.298 
 
The soldiers sent from the lowlands arrived to find Talori deserted.  Upon learning that 
they had been marked as rebels, at the approach of the troops the people of Talori fled 
further into the mountains.299  For about a week,300 the soldiers remained in the village, 
where they “pitched camp near the villages, and in a famine year tied their horses in the 
standing grain, and generally laid the fields waste.”301  According to Ovig Vartanian, it 
was only two days after the soldiers left that a tax collector named Malik Efendi arrived 
in Talori to collect yet further tribute, this time for the Ottoman State.  The now 
impoverished population of Talori pleaded that the Kurds from the south had just 
plundered them, and they were unable to pay their taxes.  Promising to regain their cattle, 
                                                        
297 FO 424/182, Memorandum by resident of Bitlis [George Perkins Knapp], p. 71 specifies ‘several’ 
battalions;  Facts, p. 10 indicates simply ‘soldiers’; a letter dated July 25, 1894 from Zeki Paşa to the 
General Staff of the Ottoman military (Makam-ı Seraskeri) supports these accounts, [“Geçen sene Talori 
Ermenileriyle o civardaki aşayir beyninde hudûsu melhûz olan münazaa ve müsademenin men’i için bâ-
irâde-i seniyye-i mülûkâne Erzurum’daki kuvve-i cünûdiyye bir tabur asakir-i şâhâne sevk olunmuş ve 
muahharan bu ihtimalin haber … esas ve ehemmiyet olmadığı tebeyyün ederek mezkûr tabur yine geçen 
sene geri aldırılmıştı.”] See document no. 11 in OAYT.  
 




300 Facts, p. 10 
 
301 FO 424/182, Memorandum by resident of Bitlis [George Perkins Knapp],  p. 71; this is supported by the 




Malik Efendi then took three leading men from Talori to identify which ones belonged to 
the people of Talori.  Malik Effendi was apparently successful in this task, “obtaining 
about thirty mules, some oxen and sheep,” but “instead of returning the animals to 
Davorig [Talori], he carried them off in the direction of Diarbekir, together with Boghos 
Khevo and Ghazar, who we never saw again.”302 
 
According to Garo Sasuni, in the autumn of 1893, the leaders of the mountain 
communities in Sasun met and planned their next move.  Since the closure of the saltpeter 
fields north of Muş a few years earlier,303 gunpowder was hard to come by in the 
mountains, one of the few things that the inhabitants couldn’t make themselves.  The 
notables pointed out that they didn’t have sufficient military supplies to continue to 
defend their semi-autonomy.  Hrayr, Ishkhan Grgo of Shenik and Vardan Vardabet used 
muleteers to transfer gunpowder and bullets from Farkhin to Aharonk and from there to 
Talori and Shenik.304  Some of these weapons likely came from Russia via Iran; others 
were bought from the Hamidiye, the irregular soldiers of the Sultan.  Vali Hasan Tahsin 
was apparently informed of the increase in weapons and war material being transferred 
into the country and on April 16, 1894 he apparently alerted the Palace of this fact by 
                                                        
302 FO 424/182, “Deposition of Ovig Vartanian,” p. 51-52; Facts, p. 10.  Thomas Boyajian reports that two 
or three men who were arrested after the violence in Talori died in a Bitlis prison.  PP Turkey 1896-6, p. 74.  
 
303 According to Knapp, writing in early 1895, “at the village of Tserouk, on the plain about nine miles 
directly north of Muş, where saltpetre abounds, and where the making of gunpowder had been prohibited 
for the last four or five years…” (FO 424/182), pp. 70-87.  
 
304 Garo Sasuni, Patmutiun Taroni Ashkharhi [History of the Taron Region] (Beirut, 1956), p. 573. It is 




telegraph, warning ominously that trouble makers had “organized themselves in the same 
way as the Bulgarian committees.”305 
 
XII: 
Oppression and Extortion 
 
The winter of 1893-1894 was a time of anxiety for the inhabitants of Gheliéguzan306 and 
the surrounding villages of the valley of Kavar,307 around six hours by horseback to the 
south of the city of Muş in the Sasun308 mountains.  The villages in this mountain plain 
were Semal, Shenik, Aliantz and Gheliéguzan, the last under the towering heights of 
Andok Dağ. 
 
Gheliéguzan was a sprawling mountain village of around three hundred houses.  In the 
whole village there were a couple hundred families, whose wealth consisted primarily of 
                                                        
305 Haluk Selvi, Armenian Question: From the First World War to the Treaty of Lausanne (Sakarya, 2007), 
p. 41 fn 69 citing BOA Y.Mtv 2006/33. 
 
306  Gheliéguzan (Kurmanji : literally ‘Walnut Valley’) 
 
307  According to the survivor accounts the villages of Gheliéguzan, Shenik, Alianz and Semal were in 
Kavar or ‘homeland region’ in Western Armenian. The Ottoman State considered that these villages were 
within the administrative boundaries of the central kaza of Muş. The Armenian Patriarchate regarded 
Gheliéguzan, Shenik, Alianz and Semal in Shadakh although it is worth recalling that the Patriarchate in 
Istanbul was like the Ottoman State a distant entity for the people in the mountains of Sasun. According to 
a “Report by the Armenian Patriarchate respecting the Sassoon Massacres,” (FO 424/181, pp. 192198), the 
Shadakh region was one of the eight regions of Sasun. Shadakh thus included the villages of Shenik, Semal, 
Alianz, Gheliéguzan, Aghpi, Heytink, Guermar, K’op, Dapek, Yeritsank’, Hushnamerg, and Keghashen. 
Some of the British and ABCFM documentation follows this distinction, and it is maintained in the map 
drawn by vice-Consul Hampson. [see Map 4] The six villages of Shadakh, according to this map are K’op, 
Germav, Yeritsank’, Tapik, Hushnamerg and Keghashen. This paper will follow the geographic distinction 
made by the survivors and refer to this area as Kavar. 
 
308  Sasun did not have a readily agreed upon meaning. For the State it referred to a particular kaza, under 
the administration of a Kaymakam based in Hazo. It was a region at the frontiers of Ottoman control. My 
use of the term accords with that of Jelle Verheij. Sasun thus includes the entire mountain region from the 
southern slopes of the Kurtik Mountains to the town of Hazo, incorporating parts of the sancak of Muş and 
parts of the sancak of Genç in the vilayet of Bitlis. As Verheij points out, this covers the contemporary 
districts of the central district of Muş, Sason and Kozluk (Batman), Kulp (Diyarbekir) and Mutki (Bitlis). 
See Verheij 2012, fn. 26. See also Lynch 1901, vol. II, p. 429. 
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the thousands of head of sheep they possessed. Khamo Movesian, a young survivor from 
the village, interviewed after the violence, recalled that rumors widely circulated that 
“extensive preparations were being made by both the Government and Kurds” for a 
general attack on Sasun.309  According to the testimony of Tavo, a 40-year old father 
from the neighboring village of Semal, at the beginning of spring the Kurds were saying, 
“An order has come from the authorities to kill the Armenians.”310 
 
The villages nestled in the valley of Kavar were almost entirely composed of Apostolic 
Armenians, although several families of Muslims lived in Gheliéguzan. Unlike the 
villages of Talori, further to the south into the mountains, the villages of Kavar were 
closely tied to economic and political structures on the plains below.  The whorls or knots 
of the walnut wood in the mountains were highly valued in Europe, and an export market 
had developed.311 
 
The valley of Kavar and the nearby valley of Shadakh also served as a pastoral pantry for 
the city of Muş, keeping the city supplied with products from the myriad flocks of sheep 
in the alpine meadows.312  The villages of Kavar were widely considered to constitute the 
                                                        
309  FO 424/182, “Deposition of Khamo Movsesian,” p. 47; henceforth ‘Khamo 1895.’ 
 
310  PP Turkey 1895/1, “Procés Verbal No. 19, Sitting of the 15th of February 1895,”p. 216; henceforth 
Tavo 1895. 
 
311  According to Lynch, “the knots or whorls on the trunks of the numerous walnut trees sustain an 
industry which attracts the most adventurous of native traders, causes them to sojourn in these wild districts, 
and enables them to supply the markets of Europe with excellent material for veneering purposes.” Lynch 
1901, vol. II, p. 394. 
 
312  According to the muleteer Ali, the son of Gulali, Sasun was considered the larder of Muş. 
For his deposition recorded by Consul Graves, see FO 424/182, April 26, 1895, pp. 267-268. The Istanbul-
raised journalist Frank Scudamore, the Special Correspondent of the Daily News tasked with investigating 
the Sasun violence, was the first to get in contact with Ali.  Scudamore published a detailed account of his 
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wealthiest community (‘nahiye’ in Ottoman Turkish) in the Sasun mountains.313   
Süleyman, a soldier who had been employed on tax-collecting ventures into the 
mountains, described their wealth: 
The people of Shenik, Semal, and Ghelié Guzan had every 
kind of property flocks, cattle, mules, horses, big orchards, 
numbers of mulberry trees. And their houses were rich also. 
They had quantities of carpets and rich clothing, and silver 
ornaments and copper vessels. Great, big houses they were, 
full of long corridors, leading from room to room; very 
dark, the rooms only lighted from the timber roof with 
small square cloth skylights here and there. Some of them 
were houses where a man might lose himself without a 
guide, and in no one were there less than fifteen to twenty 
people, the grandfather being always the head of the house, 
and every one obeying him.314   
 
The villages of Kavar paid tribute to nomadic and settled Ağas in a dense web of 
protection obligations. Erko, a village elder from the nearby village of Shenik explained, 
“The inhabitants of the villages pay this contribution through the intermediaries of their 
kâhya, kâtibs and council of elders,” to the tribes of Bekranlı, Badikanlı, Xoşekanlı, 
Garzanlı, and Xiyanlı.315 Tavo, of Semal, is even more specific, pointing out that the hafir 
                                                                                                                                                                     
interview with Ali in the Daily News, March 21, 1895. Henceforth, ‘Ali 1895.’ 
 
313  FO 424/181, “Report by the Armenian Patriarch respecting the Sassoon Massacres,” 21 Janvier, 1895, 
the region of Shadakh is described as “La plus riche partie du district de Sassoun,” p. 194. This region 
includes the village of Kavar. 
 
314  Süleyman’s account is found in two different variations. The longer and more detailed version is an 
interview with the journalist Frank Scudamore, “The Armenian Atrocities,” Daily News , March 29, 1895; 
henceforth ‘Süleyman 1895’. The second and shorter version is included in FO 424/182, Consul Graves to 
Sir P. Currie, March 16, 1895. Consul Graves was confident of the “genuineness of the statements, 
notwithstanding possible slight inaccuracies of detail.”  
 
315  The testimony of Erko, son of Kurki, is included in the documentation produced by the European 
delegates to the Sasun Investigation Committee. Erko was arrested when he presented a Petition to the 
former head of the Ottoman Investigation Committee and charged with the disappearance of one Khurshid, 
on the mountain of Passur. Given the systematic nature of the the coverup, 
the real reason for his arrest was more likely that he was willing to speak out about the violence. PP Turkey 




was paid to individual Ağas within the tribes, and not the tribe as a whole. The village of 
Semal traditionally paid the hafir to Bekranlı ağas such as Ömer, Cevhi, Risgo and 
Hüseyin.316 
 
The villagers of Kavar had complained of the hafir to the Ottoman authorities, in 
telegrams and petitions for the last two years, and it was because of this constant 
petitioning, recalls Erko of Shenik, that the Garzanlı and Xiyanlı had made no claim for 
hafir. According to Erko, if the hafir wasn’t paid, the Ağa might attempt to levy the 
flocks by force. However, unlike many of the Armenian peasants in the plains below, the 
villagers of Sasun were armed. The inhabitants of Kavar wielded axes, swords and flint 
firearms. As Giragosian, an inhabitant of Gheliéguzan, pointed out, “we were generally 
able to retake our own, or others in their place.”317  This sort of raiding was a frequent 
occurrence in the summer months, and Giragosian admits that several raiding campaigns 
ended in bloodshed where the dead were quickly buried. 
 
It was at the beginning of the harvest of the wheat, in late June, while the Bekranli Ağas 
were collecting their hafir from the villages of the Kavar, that two companies (bölüks) of 
Ottoman troops from the 31st regiment of Muş came up from the plains below and 
camped at Merghémuzan, about 30 minutes away from the villages of Shenik and 
Semal.318  These two companies had initially been assigned to go up to Talori, to “protect 
                                                        
316  Tavo 1895, p. 218. 
 
317  The narrative of Asdadur Giragosian of Gheliéguzan can be found in Edwin Munsell Bliss, Turkey and 
the Armenian Atrocities  (M.J. Coghlan, 1896), p. 374; henceforth ‘Giragosian 1896.’ 
 




the peace” (‘âşayişi muhafaza eylemek için’) as the tribes from the south moved up from 
their winter grazing grounds to the south.319  The arrival of the troops, along with an 
unusual number of tribes from the south, altered the traditional patterns of pastoral life.  
Tavo of Semal recalled that under normal conditions the flocks are sent to their grazing 
ground on the Kurtik Dağ, but “on the arrival of the troops and Kurds they were brought 
back close to the village.”320  This was the second time in two years that the soldiers had 
camped at Merghémuzan. In 1893, one year before, during the period of violence in 
Talori that was discussed earlier, an entire battalion of troops had moved up from the 
plains to the camp of Merghémuzan.  The notables of Kavar went to the commander of 
the troops bearing gifts. In some ways, the inhabitants of Kavar treated the commander 
the way they would a member of the noble class (Ağa).  Süleyman, who had been 
stationed at Merghémuzan, recalled that (in 1893): 
They said they were taxpaying villages and they besought 
protection in the event of an attack by the Bekranli and 
Reshkotanli Kurds. They brought many presents to the 
soldiers. Bedo, a rich man of Ghelié Guzan brought a 
copper bowl full of gold coins to the Major commanding 
the battalion, and every week the Tchaoush [çavuş], of each 
village brought sheep and honey and butter for the men. 
But the Kurds did nothing, and the battalion did nothing, 
and when the snows came, the soldiers raised the camp and 
came back into Moush for the winter.321 
 
The summer of 1894 was different. Rumors were brought from allied Kurds to the 
villagers of Kavar that the presence of the soldiers foreshadowed violence. Both Hebo 
and Shenik and Khazar of Semal recollected that “friendly Kurds arrived and informed 
                                                        
319  OAYT, Makamı Seraskerî to Fourth Army Command, June 13, 1894, pp. 94-95 
 
320  Tavo 1895, p. 218. 
 




the villagers that the soldiers meant mischief and urged them to fly.”322 
The Ottoman soldiers carried with them a request from the Vali of Bitlis, Hasan Tahsin 
Paşa, that the notables of Semal and Shenik present themselves in the capital of the 
province. The notables refused to go with the soldiers, possibly wary of the fate of other 
wealthy Armenians in the province of Bitlis under Tahsin Paşa.  The soldiers then seized 
several of the notables and took them to Bitlis.  
 
XIII: 
Resistance and the Outbreak of Violence in Sasun 
   
It had been only a year since Tahsin Paşa had arrested the headman of Semal and held 
him ransom until certain inhabitants of his family had given up Damadian into the arms 
of the Ottoman State. As was discussed earlier, Tahsin Paşa was also known for ‘trading’ 
on the Armenian issue, threatening the wealthy with arrest and imprisonment for being 
revolutionaries, and then letting them go for a certain sum of money. 
 
Perhaps with all this in mind, and most likely accompanied by Hampartsoum Boyadjian 
and his gang, certain armed villagers pursued the Ottoman soldiers out of the town and 
rescued four of the seized notables.323  According to Giragosian, the soldiers “wished to 
arrest some of our notables and take them to Mush as revolutionists, saying, “You have 
revolutionary societies here. We resisted and prevented their taking our men.”324  Other 
                                                        
322  Both the testimony of Hebo, son of Mosse, of Shenik and that of Khazar, son of Der Arakel, of Semal 
were interviewed by Consul Graves in Erzurum and marked “confidential.” Both can be found in FO 
424/181, p. 224 and p. 209 respectively; henceforth ‘Hebo 1895’ and ‘Khazar 1895.’ 
 
323  FO 424/181, “Memorandum by Consul Graves, December 27, 1894, p. 22. 
 
324  Giragosian 1896, p. 374. 
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Sasun villages resisted the arrest of notables in similar ways. At about the same time that 
the notables of Kavar were being arrested, in the nearby area of Kulp, the villagers of 
Akçesser sent their Kaymakam (subgovernor) packing when he came to collect taxes and 
arrest certain individuals.325 
 
By this point in the early summer, the Palace (Mabeyn-i Hümayun) had been receiving 
reports from the provinces that there was a black hat gang of Armenian brigands who 
incited the local population not to pay their taxes and who had taken a Muslim child and 
his father to the mountains.326  There was a standing imperial order to seize these 
dangerous men, “dead or alive” (“hayyen ve meyyiten derdest edilmeler”).327  Tahsin 
Paşa asked for additional troops to escort the kaymakams in their hunt for the persons 
carrying out disturbances (“mefsedet”) of the order of the State. 
 
Different villagers give slightly different accounts on how the violence of 1894 began. 
According to three inhabitants of Gheliéguzan, the conflicts began at the end of July and 
the first week of August, when the Bekranlı came down from the grasslands around the 
valley and took cattle from the shepherds tied to the village of Semal.328  One of the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
325  PP Turkey 1895/1, “Report of the Consular Delegates attached to the Commission appointed to inquire 
into the Events at Sasun,” p. 164 
 
326  OAYT, Makamı Seraskerî to Fourth Army Command, July 2, 1894, pp. 9697. In response to an inquiry 
from the Ministry of the Interior, the authorities of Bitlis had conveyed reports of “siyah kalpaklı ve martini 
tüfenkli bir kaç şahsın ol havâlide dolaşarak Ermeni vergi vermemeğe teşvik etmek ve bir Islâm çocuğu 
pederiyle dağa kaçırmak.” [“a handful of black hatted and martini wielding persons who roam about the 
area, inciting the Armenian population not to pay taxes and taking (kidnapping) a Muslim child and his/her 
father to the mountains.”] 
 
327  ibid. 
 
328  Hodgetts 1896, p. 93. The three survivors of Gheliéguzan interviewed by Hodgetts specify that this 
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shepherds, a “friendly Kurd” who worked for the villagers of Semal, was killed in the 
raid.  Erko, the village elder of Shenik, is more precise in his description.  The conflict 
with the nomadic Kurds began with the theft of three heads of cattle stolen by the 
Velikanlı Kurds from the Armenians of Semal, and the seizure of sheep from the 
Armenians of Shenik.329  Khazar of Shenik and Hebo of Shenik credit “friendly Kurds” 
with the rumor that the Bekranlı were incited to do this by the soldiers.330  George 
Perkins Knapp is adamant about this point in his investigation of the violence. It was in 
the latter part of June, he insisted that the local Ottoman authorities gave the tribesmen 
“carte blanche to do what they could do to the Armenians.”331 
 
The villagers responded by forming an armed band of their own and recovering their 
stolen beasts from the Velikanlı shepherds who were camped nearby by force of arms. In 
these pastoral raids and counter raids, two or three Velikanlı shepherds were killed.332  
This time the armed band of Kavar villagers were not able to bury the bodies of the 
tribesmen who were killed in the struggle for pastoral resources.333 
 
The Velikanlı took their dead shepherds to the commander of the regular troops at 
                                                                                                                                                                     
happened on July 19, 1894. As this date was presumably based on the Rumi or Julian calendar, this would 
have been July 31 according to the Gregorian. Unless otherwise specified, I have translated the dates to 
accord to the Gregorian calendar. 
 
329  Erko 1895, p. 198. 
 
330  Khazar 1895, p. 209; Hebo 1895. 
 
331  FO 424/182, “Report of Sassoon Affairs by a Resident of Bitlis,” p. 72; henceforth ‘Knapp 1895.’ 
 
332 Erko says one and Giragosian says two; Hebo, Khamo and the Delegate Report indicate that three 
Velikanlı shepherds were killed.  
 




Merghémuzan.334  The commander of the troops ordered the Velikanlı to take the dead 
bodies to Muş in the plains below. According to Giragosian, when the dead were brought 
down to the city, “a great tumult resulted.” Along with the dead bodies two rumors were 
reported. First, it was reported that ‘The Armenians of Sasun have rebelled” and that they 
have “massacred the Muslim inhabitants.” The rumor also circulated that the Armenians 
in the mountains were armed with rifles and cannons.335 
 
Did Tahsin Paşa believe that there was an open rebellion in the mountains? The portrait 
of him that has been uncovered so far is of a self-serving and conniving individual. The 
Russian, French, British consuls, a large sweep of the Ottoman political and military 
administration, the ABCFM missionaries, and survivor accounts all testify that at this 
point, the Vali of Bitlis reported to the Palace (Mabeyni Hümayun) that the Armenians 
were in revolt without inquiring into the cause of the trouble.336  On August 7, 1894 
                                                        
334  Khamo 1895, p. 48 
 
335  Giragosian 1896, pp. 374375. 
 
336  Russian: Mkrtich Gegamovich Nersisian, Genocid Armjan v. osmanskoj imperii: sbornik dokumentov i 
materialov (1982), document 19, Consul General Maximov to Ambassador Nelidova, October 1, 1894, p. 
26,"Битлисский вали Тахсинпаша, с намерением отклонить от себя ответственность за происшедшее 
движение, представил его Порте как восстание армян." [“Tahsin of Bitlis, with the intention to evade 
responsibility for the incident, presented it to the Porte as a rebellion of the Armenians.”] I’d like to thank 
Dr. Sergey Trostyanskiy for translating this for me. French: Ministère des affaires etrangères, Affaires 
Arméniennes: projets de réformes dans l’Empire ottoman: 1893-1897 (1897), document 17, M.P. Cambon, 
Ambassadeur de la République française à Constantinople, à M. Hanotaux, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, 
7 décembre, 1894, pp. 22, “Je lui ai signalé des deux graves erreurs commises: la première, imputable au 
Vali de Bitlis, qui aurait pu régler sur place les revendications entre Kurdes et Arméniens et qui a 
transformé en agitation politiques des querelles de tribus…” [“I have signaled that two grave errors have 
been committed: the first, without a doubt, is that of the Vali of Bitlis under whose reign the claims and 
conflicts between the Kurds and Armenians was transformed into one of political agitation instead of that 
of tribes…]; British: FO 424/181, Consul Graves to Sir P. Currie, December 27, 1894, p. 23. ABCFM :  
Reel 694, Constantinople, Oct. 31, 1894, pp. 355-356, republished in Greene 1895, document 4.  Ottoman : 
Officials who identified Tahsin Paşa as the culprit included Sırrı Paşa, the Governor-General (Vali) of 
Diyarbekir (FO 424/178, Vice-Consul Boyajian to Consul Graves, November 23, 1894, p. 311) and Said 
Pasha, the Foreign Minister of the Ottoman Empire (FO 424/178, Sir P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley, 
November 10, 1894). For survivor accounts that place responsibility for the violence on Tahsin Paşa see the 
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Süreyya Paşa, the head secretary of Sultan Abdülhamid (başkâtip) gave authorization to 
mobilize a reserve force and ordered that if “the Armenian brigands exhibited the 
smallest transgression they should be immediately obliterated.337   
 
Meanwhile, the rumors of the violence in the mountains continued to spread in the 
lowlands below. According to Süleyman, who was stationed in the early summer in the 
garrison town of Muş, the rumors began that there was trouble in the mountains as the 
snow melted. “It was the Kurds who brought these reports, and as the season advanced, 
they came in more and more frequently to make complaints. They reported that all the 
Armenians of Sassoon had risen and were destroying the Kurds. It was a big war, they 
said, and the Armenians had rifles and cannon.338 
 
At Merghémuzan, the captain (‘kolağası’) of the two companies of Ottoman soldiers, 
Hacı Mustafa Effendi began to hear rumors that the Kavar Armenians were planning on 
attacking the soldiers as well.  Captain Hacı Mustafa recalled that he understood that this 
was the intent of the local Armenians because, “a Kurd of Sasun sent one warning 
through a zaptiye [gendarme] advising us not to go to sleep that night, we remained alert 
until morning.” According to Captain Hacı Mustafa, “The Armenians came as far as the 
rear of the heights where we were; we heard their voices. However, seeing that we were 
                                                                                                                                                                     
account of an unnamed peasant from Kamirtch in FO 424/181, p. 26. 
 
337  OAYT, Süreyya to Makamı Seraskerî, August 7, 1894, pp. 112-113 [“ Ermeni eşkıyasının cüz’î bir 
hareketi tecavüzkâriye bile mücaseretleri halinde hemen kahr ve tedir edileleri”] 
 




on our guard, they deferred their designs.”339 
   
IV. 
Rumors and Reprisals 
 
Did the Armenians of Kavar intend to attack the soldiers? This is highly unlikely given 
the predicament of the villagers. The locally born ABCFM missionary George Perkins 
Knapp suggested, in his own account of the violence, that Murad (Hampartsoum 
Boyadjian) urged the townsfolk to attack the soldiers and that they had refused.340  There 
is no evidence that I’ve found,341 that Murad had this intention. It is worth pointing out 
here that the ABCFM and the Fedayi bands were separate networks with separate 
agendas of religious or nationalist conversion. What is clear is that during this time, 
Murad was active in continuing Damadian’s task of organizing protection networks 
among the various Armenian mountain villages. The survivors from Gheliéguzan recalled 
that the villagers had “Murath as their leader” and he “seems to have promised them help 
from England.  He had two assistants and the village priests acted as his lieutenants.”342 
 
Hacı Mustafa’s account of what he believed was an averted night attack was relayed up 
through the military hierarchy but at some point the underlying message was changed. By 
August 11, 1894, the Müşir of the Fourth Army, Zeki Paşa reported the rumor that the 
soldiers were going to be attacked as the fact that they had been attacked.  In a dispatch 
                                                        
339  Hacı Mustafa’s testimony can be found in PP Turkey 1895/1, Procès verbal No. 9, sitting of February 4, 
1895, p. 201. 
 
340  Knapp 1895, p. 73 
 
341 At least not in the memoirs of Rupen Der Minassian or Garo Sasuni. 
 




to the Makam–ı Seraskerî (General Staff of the Military), Zeki Paşa reported that a 
considerable number of the “armed malicious Armenian bands” (“Ermeni fesedei 
müsellehası”) had intended to assault the two companies that were previously stationed at 
the village of Shinik.343 
 
The European delegates who (later) accompanied the Sasun investigation commission 
pointedly noted that Captain Mustafa Effendi based his account for the intended attack 
solely on information received from a certain Kurd of Sasun via a zaptiye.  In their joint 
report, the Delegates concluded, “the reported planning of an attack on the soldiers must 
be considered as mere rumor.”344 As this rumor hardened into “fact,” the military 
machinery sprang into action; Zeki Paşa requested that additional reserve troops be called 
up345 and sent into the mountains to destroy the Armenian brigands (‘Ermeni eskiya”). 
 
Back in the mountains, the violence over stolen sheep led to increased tension, by 
Armenians in the villages of Kavar, and by Velikanlı tribesmen.  The Velikanlı sought 
assistance from the larger tribe of the Bekranlı.346  According to Khamo, it was not long 
after the violence that the Bekranlı Ağas, Ömer and and Şakir arrived and demanded 10 
liras from each village.  Khamo believed that this was a pretext for a quarrel, but the 
                                                        
343  OAYT, Zeki Paşa to Makamı Seraskerî, August 11, 1894, pp. 118-119; “Bu kerre süvari fırkası 
kumandanlığından mevrûd telgrafnâmede kuvvei mürettebei mezkurenin vürûduna kadar fesedei 
merkumenin evvelce Şinik karyesinde bulunduran iki bölük asâkiri şâhane üzerine hücum sadedinde 
bulunmalari…” 
 
344  PP Turkey 1895/1, “Report of the Consular Delegates attached to the Commission appointed to inquire 
into the Events at Sasun,” p. 181 
 
345  ibid. 
 
346  PP Turkey 1895/1, “Report of the Consular Delegates attached to the Commission appointed to inquire 
into the Events at Sasun,” p. 167; 
137  
 
villagers nevertheless told the Bekranlı that, “We have no money; take anything else 
sheep, beds or oxen.”  The Bekranlı chiefs insisted on money, which the villagers were 
unable or unwilling to pay.347   
 
In the middle of August 1894, some days after the festival of Vartavar, the Bekranlı Ağas 
Ömer and and Şakir visited the military camp at Merghémuzan and with sixty or eighty 
of their men, attacked the villages of Shenik and Semal.348  News of the attack spread 
quickly.  Khamo and other inhabitants of Gheliéguzan, some two hours distant, heard of 
the plight of their Kavar neighbours and the attack of the Bekranlı. The next morning, 
Khamo recalls that, “about 250 of us went to the help of our friends, I being among them. 
On arriving we made a united attack and drove off the Kurds, recovering the two villages. 
Several Kurds were killed, and of the Armenians six men and one woman.”349 
 
After three days of skirmishes between the villagers and the nomads, Khamo and the 
other villagers received word from Armenians who had been enlisted to serve in the camp 
at Kavar. According to these accounts, the Bekranlı told the commander of the troops 
“that the fighting had gone far enough; it was a pity to kill more, and that at any rate they 
could not carry on the fight alone any longer; either the soldiers must help them or they 
                                                        
 
347  Khamo 1895, p. 48. Tavo of Semal recounted a similar account to the Commission to investigate the 
events at Sasun. Tavo said that, “two or three days before the attack on his village, a man in the service of 
Ömer Ağa, of the Bakiranlı, named Akho, said to him secretly. The order has come to you to massacre you; 
we shall do it if you do not  pay 30l. to my master.” The witness [Tavo], saying that he could not credit an 
order on the part of the authorities.” (Tavo 1895, p. 216) 
 
348  PP Turkey 1895/1, “Report of the Consular Delegates attached to the Commission appointed to inquire 
into the Events at Sasun,” pp. 166. It is worth noting that the date given by them is either August 1st or 
August 2nd (according to the Rumi takvim) or August 13 or 14 according to the Gregorian. 
 




would go home.”350 
 
By August 15, the two companies of Ottoman soldiers had been brought up to battalion 
strength.351 The villagers of Kavar almost all recounted the same story.  They said that it 
was soon after the troops had been reinforced that, “Some regular soldiers were then 
dressed in Kurdish costume to join in the fight.” Hebo, of Shenik, said he knew they were 
soldiers “because they carried military rifles and bayonets, and maneuvered to bugle 
calls.”352  Khamo found, among the dead bodies of the attackers, “half a dozen bodies of 
Turkish soldiers with a Kurdish garment over them.”353  Khazar heard from ‘friendly’ 
Kurds “that some of the supposed Kurds were disguised soldiers, and they resolved to 
abandon the village and fly, “not wishing to fight against the Government.”354 
 
Over the next two days, many of the villagers from Shenik and Semal fled, “with their 
sheep, cattle and such goods as they could carry to Ghelié Guzan.” Others fled to the 
heights above the two villages at Köprüşerif. 355 
 
                                                        
350  Khamo 1895, p. 48.  
 
351  PP Turkey 1895/1, “Report of the Consular Delegates attached to the Commission appointed to inquire 
into the Events at Sasun,” p. 166. 
 
352  Hebo 1895, p. 224 
 
353  Khamo, p. 49 
 
354  Khazar 1895, p. 209. 
 
355  Anna, daughter of Boghos, from the village of Shenik, recalls that some of the villagers first fled to 
Afsark where the people of Shenik pastured their flocks. From there they went up to the heights of 
Köprüşerif, which separated the villages of Gheliéguzan on the one side, and Shenik and Semal on the 
others. After several days in Köprüşerif, Anna fled with the people of Shenik to Antok Dağ. (PP Turkey 




According to Khazar, “some of the aged and very young people remained in the village, 
which was sacked and burned, those who remained being burnt in their houses.” The day 
after the villagers of Semal abandoned their village, Shenik was also burned.356 
 
Throughout the conflict between the Bekranlı and the villagers, Khamo and other 
villagers were aware that “soldiers were continually arriving, and were massed at camp 
Mergemozan.”357  The number of Kurdish tribesmen from the south was also increasing. 
Süleyman recounted that unlike the year before, his battalion took with them two 
mountain guns when they were ordered to go into the mountains. 
 
According to Süleyman: 
The men pitched their tents on the same ground as before at 
Merghé Moussan, but this time rather nearer to Ghelié 
Guzan. They lay there for ten to fifteen days. The hills were 
full of Kurds. There was fighting going on all the time day 
and night, between the Kurds and the villagers. But the 
Kurds could never get into the villages, and many were 
killed. They used to come and ask for aid from the troops to 
avenge their dead and punish the Armenians. But the troops 
had no orders, and therefore remained quiet. They had, 
however, orders to supply the Kurds with ammunition, and 
many of these Kurds had muzzle loading guns, they had 
brought quantities of powder and ball especially for them. 
To the Kurds who had rifles they gave cartridges. … The 
Armenians also came and sent very often to ask for help. 
Again they brought many presents. At first the officers 
replied that they could do nothing, because they were 
without orders, but finally they became angry, and drove 
                                                        
356  Khazar 1895, p. 209. According to the evidence given by Tavo of Semal, it was the soldiers who 
burned the buildings, not the tribesmen from the south. The procèsverbal of the European Delegates reports 
that Tavo indicated that “The villagers, who had brought with them women, children, and flocks, and such 
of their effects as were transportable, had left behind in their villages at the moment of their flight only 
some three little children and old people, who could not follow them. These latter, to the number of about 
twenty, according to the witness, perished in the conflagration lit by the soldiers.” (Tavo 1895, p. 216). 




the Armenians out of the camp with blows. They were told 
to go back to the rocks and kill or be killed, as might 
happen, but to importune the Sultan’s troops no more on 
pain of death.358 
 
As the refugees from Shenik and Semal flocked in, the village of Gheliéguzan became 
“excessively crowded,” as the street as well as the houses became packed with 
survivors.359   
 
The Kavar villagers organized a system to move the women, children and elderly to 
Mount Antok, the giant of the Sasun mountains, directly to the south of the village of 
Gheliéguzan. The fighting men of the villages divided into three groups, one to defend 
the village, one to defend Mergir halfway to the approach to Mount Antok, and a third 
group at the mountain itself. The tribesmen attacked in force all three points, but after 
great loss of life they were repulsed once again by the villagers. Khazar testified that 
large numbers of villagers were able to escape into the high recesses of the mountains, 
along with their flocks.360 
 
After this last effort, the assaults on the villagers practically ceased. Meanwhile, even 
more troops from Erzincan and Erzurum were heading south to follow out the Imperial 
                                                        
358  Süleyman 1895. 
 
359  Khamo, p. 48. 
 
360  Khazar 1895, p. 209. Apparently, the villagers of Semal arrived with their flocks in large numbers one 
or two days before villagers from Shenik and Gheliéguzan. See the testimony of Mariam of Semal included 
in the process verbal no. 19 of the sitting of February 15, 1894 in PP Turkey 1895/1, p. 293. Tavo of Semal 
also brings this point up in his testimony. Chronologically speaking, this makes a lot of sense. Süleyman 




orders to destroy the brigands in the mountains.361  As the troops headed south, tribal 
forces from Diyarbakir gathered until, as Süleyman recalls, “the hills were black with 
their goat hair tents.” 
Most of the tribes brought their families and their flocks, 
and camped on the mountain pasture land. The Zèlan 
Sheikh, an old man, was the chief among all the Kurds. 
Five big tribes were under his orders: the Bakranli, the 
Batikanli, the Velikanli, and Khiyanli and the Reshkotanli, 
and there must have numbered between ten and eleven 
thousand fighting men at least. And there were many other 
tribes, some from as far away as Diarbekir. They came 
pouring in day after day like pilgrims to a religious 
festival.362 
 
The beleaguered villagers then received dire news from Hishman Ağa of the Sasun Kurds. 
According to Khamo, Hishman Ağa warned the people of Gheliéguzan that “all the 
Kurds together with the Hamidieh and the Turkish regular soldiers were preparing to join 
in a united attack in which no quarter would be given man or woman, or child and that 
we had better save ourselves as best we could.”363  By the time that Hishman came with a 
warning, Khamo recalled that, “We saw the whole region was covered with Turkish 
troops and Kurds. We had never seen so many men together, it seemed as if all the 
soldiers in the world had come to fight us.”364 
                                                        
361  OAYT, Makamı Seraskerî to Fourth Army Command, 16th August, 1894; pp. 132-133. 
 
362  Süleyman 1895. 
 
363  Khamo 1895; see earlier note about Hishman Ağa’s own testimony. See also, Hodgetts 1896. In one of 
his letters to the Daily Graphic, Hodgetts interviewed rather extensively three survivors from Gheliéguzan. 
They emphasized that there were ‘hostile’ Kurds and ‘friendly’ Kurds. From his ‘informants’ Hodgetts 
gathers that, “the Harzan [Garzan] tribe was friendly; their chief was subsequently arrested. I have heard it 
stated that these friendly Kurds actually took the part of the Armenians in the proceedings which followed.” 
(Hodgetts, 1896, 93) 
 
364  Khamo 1895. According to British Foreign Office and ABCFM accounts, the Hamidiye were not 





It is worth noting here that Erko, the village elder from Shenik, who was arrested when 
he delivered a petition to the violence, testified that Hishman Ağa had also been arrested 
when he refused to obey, “orders from a ‘Mir Alai’ (Colonel) to join the other Kurds for 
the purpose of attacking the Armenians.”365 
 
There is a striking shift in the language of violence employed in the Ottoman documents 
over the course of two months between July and August. At first, the orders were 
concerned with ‘obtaining’ or ‘strengthening the peace’ (‘te’mîni âşayiş’ or ‘takviyei 
âşayiş’) in the mountains as the tribes moved up from their winter grounds.366 Later, at 
the beginning of August, a striking phrase shows up. In a dispatch from Rıza Paşa, chief 
of staff at the Makamı Seraskerî (General Command) to Sultan Abdülhamid, there is a 
brief mention of the existence of an Imperial Order to obliterate the Armenian sowers of 
discord.367  Ottoman soldiers are now instructed to obliterate the Armenian bandits, if 
they make even a hint of rebellious activity.368 
                                                        
365  Erko. Hishman Ağa of the Sasun Kurds gives a very different rendition of this during this own 
testimony. During the sitting of March 13, 1895, Hishman’s testimony reflected fairly well the basic 
contours of the narrative embraced by the Ottoman State. According to this, after burning their own houses, 
the Armenians of Kavar and Talori went up to Antok Dagh and became rebels against State authority. PP 
Turkey 1895/1, pp. 259-260. Hishman further, “denied that he had ever seen the man Erko after the events 
anywhere but in prison, or that he had said to him that he had been arrested because he refused to plunder 
the Armenian villages, as he had received orders to do from the Mir Alaï, on the demand of the Consular 
Delegates.” (p. 260) It is imperative that Hishman Ağa’s testimony be seen in the context of efforts to 
cover-up the violence carried out by the local Ottoman authorities. Erko was not the only Kavar survivor to 
credits Hishman for warning the beleaguered people of Gheliéguzan of the impending attack by the 
combined forces of the Ottoman regular army and their tribal allies. (Khamo 1895, p. 49) 
 
366  OAYT, Fourth Army Command to Makam-ı Seraskerî, May 27, 1894, pp. 84-85. 
 
367  OAYT , Makam-ı Seraskerî to Sultan Abdülhamid II, August 6, 1894, pp. 108-109; “Ermeni fesedesin 
kahru tedmîrleri muktezâyı emr ü fermanı hümayunı cenâbı mülukâneden bulunmuş…” 
 
368  OAYT, Süreyya to Makam–ı Seraskerî, August 7, 1894, “Ermeni eşkayasının cüz’î bir hareketi 




On August 24, 1894, in a special dispatch from the General Staff of the Ottoman military 
to the Mabeyn-i Hümayun, troops under the command of Edhem Paşa reported that the 
number of “Armenian sowers of discord” approached four thousand on Antok Mountain. 
These numbers were taken with a grain of salt by the military, which indicated that the 
numbers may be exaggerated (‘eşkıyâı merkumenin mikdarının bu derecesi mübalağalı’). 
The rumor that the number of bandits was estimated to be around four thousand was 
received with anger at the Palace. Sultan Abdülhamid II, through his head secretary 
Süreyya, berated the General Staff (Makam-ı Seraskeri) for learning at such a late stage 
of extent of the situation. Süreyya, recorded the following rebuke from the Sultan: 
Allowing grounds for the brigands to reach the number 
three thousand [sic], and the fact that the figure was 
discovered at such a late stage is a work of great error and 
heedlessness. This is a case which could solely emerge on a 
desert outside the administration of a state. However, this 
issue for the State is one of life or death. May God forbid it, 
under these conditions, it could well occur an event like the 
Otlukköy and Bosnia and Herzegovina, before the war in 
Rumeli, well known by the military general staff. To such 
error and thoughtlessness, foreign interference and the great 
opportunity for a group of the seditious to sow their discord. 
The force that was sent is insufficient from the perspective 
of the numbers of bandits...369 
 
To rectify this situation, Sultan Abdülhamid provided authorization to the Fourth Military 
to deploy additional troops, including the Hamidiye regiments. There is a key clause 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
369  [“Eşkıyanın üçbine bâliğ olmasına meydan bırakılması ve evvelce mikdarları tahkîk olunmıyarak 
üçbine bâliğ olduktan sonra anlaşılabilmesi pek büyük bir gaflet ve tekâsül eseri olup âdetâ idarei 
devletin haricinde bulunan bir çölde vuku' bulabilecek hâlatdan olduğundan ve halbuki bu madde devlet 
için hayat mes'elsei olup maâzallâhi teâla Rumeli'de muharebe-i zâileden evvel zuhura ve netîce zâtı Vâlâyı 
seraskerîlerince de ma'lûm olan Otlukköy ve Bosna ve Hersek vak'aları gibi bir hadise zuhûru ile netîcei 
gaflet ve bîkaydî olarak müdahalâtı ecnebiyye ve bir takım fesedenin icrâyı mefâsidene büyük bir meydan 
ve fırsat bıragılmış olacağından ve sevk olunan kuvvet eşkıyanın mikdarına nazaran gayri kâfi olup…”], 




toward the end of this order. When the troops that are being sent join those which have 
already been sent, “all of the bandits should be immediately violently obliterated in such 
a way that they are left with an extraordinary terror and this degree of discord would be 
prevented from repeating again.”370 
 
According to Süleyman, it was this order, or one rather like it, that was read to the troops 
before the assembled Ottoman soldiers after Colonel Ismail arrived in the mountains with 
troops from Erzurum and Erzincan. After his arrival, Colonel Ismail ordered that all the 
troops be paraded into a square. Standing on a rock in the middle of the assembly, 
alongside a civilian dressed in black, Colonel Ismail delivered a speech to the Ottoman 
soldiers. Süleyman recounted that: 
Colonel Ismail Bey held up a paper and said, “This is the 
Firman of the Padishah.” Then he hung the document 
around his neck, on his breast and the secretary read it 
aloud to the troops. The Firman said that the Armenians 
were in rebellion against the Sultan’s authority, and that 
they were to be punished with blood. They were to be made 
an example to others. Colonel Ismail Bey then addressed 
the troops. He said that the villages of the rebels were to be 
destroyed by fire; that the rebels themselves were to be put 
to the sword; that the soldiers were to do as they would 
with them, so that they destroyed everything that had life. 
This was the order of the Sultan. Then the soldiers cheered 
three times and were dismissed.371 
                                                        
370  Italics added. [“...hemen eşkıyayı külliyyen ve kendilerine bir dehşeti fevkalâde îras edecek ve bu 
misillû mefasidein bir daha tekerrürüne kat’ıyyen mani’ olacak suretde şedîden kahr ve tedmîr etmeniz”], 
OAYT , pp. 160-161. 
 
371 Frank Scudamore, “The Armenian Atrocities,” Daily News  (London, England), Friday, March 29, 1895. 
See Süleyman’s deposition to the British consul at Erzurum, FO 424/182, “State of Turkish ex-Sergeant 
Suleiman,” p. 3. A similar scene is described in the narrative of George Perkins Knapp. However, the 
timing and the identity of the individual who reads the Sultan’s order are distinct. Knapp places the reading 
of the Sultan’s order after the destruction of Gheliéguzan and mass murder of villagers that followed and 
casts Hasan Tahsin Paşa as the conveyor of the Imperial decree. Knapp writes, “...the troops were brought 
into parade and the governor-general of Bitlis province, Hasan Tahsin Pasha, went to a hill above 
Galeogozan, produced the firman of the Sultan, and hanging it over his breast, had it read by a Secretary 




At the end of August, the soldiers moved to attack Gheliéguzan.372  According to 
Giragosian, as the bugle calls sounded, the remaining families and their animals struggled 
to flee to Mount Antok, two hours distant. Not all the inhabitants left the village. Some 
children and elderly were left in the village, many of them hidden in various recesses of 
their houses. 
 
Khamo recalled that about three hundred inhabitants of the Kavar villlages of Semal, 
Shenik and Gheliéguzan (260 men, 40 women) decided make a final stand in 
Gheliéguzan. Some, like Giragosian, were able to secure positions in the rocks above the 
village: 
Our position enabled us to withstand them all day, but we 
could see that they had burned the village of Husentsik, 
near our own. Towards evening they made a fiercer attack 
and got nearer us. Our ammunition was nearly exhausted, 
and we began to retreat. They now set fire to our village too, 
and from a distance, in the dark, we could see it burning. 
We fled to Andok, where our families and animals had 
                                                                                                                                                                     
wiped out. The governor followed in a harangue in which he told the troops and Kurds to spare no one or 
nothing; that they did this for their king and their prophet.” (FO 424/182) This same scene was also 
represented in one of the earliest ABCFM documents, the letter dated October 9, 1894 that was published 
by the Times on November 17, 1894. According to this early account, the Ferik Paşa from Erzincan read 
the orders. 
 
372  It is difficult to construct an absolutely certain chronology of the events of the violence of Sasun. A 
letter composed by the inhabitants of Murad, and included in the British documentation of the Sasun 
Investigation Commission, indicates that the initial attack of the Bekranlı was on either August 13 or 14, 
1895. The letter also indicates that the people of Kavar continued to fight against the tribesmen for eleven 
days. It was at the end of this day, corresponding to August 25, 1894, that first Huseinstik and then 
Gheliéguzan were attacked by the regular Ottoman military forces that had gathered at Merghémuzan. This 
also fits with the deposition given by Colonel Tevfik and the dates testified by the muleteers who 
accompanied the 3rd and 4th brigades into the mountains on Saturday and Sunday (April 25 and 26). This 
chronology suggests that by the time that Süreyya Paşa conveyed Sultan Abdülhamid II’s imperial decree 
to the Ottoman military, the village of Gheliéguzan was already a smoldering pile of ruins. Knapp notes in 
his account that, “The twenty-fifth of August was signalized by great slaughter. We know this date, because, 
as if to commemorate the event, a wonderful meteor burst from the sky that evening.” (FO 424/182, 






The night attack was described with horror by many survivor accounts. Khazar recounted 
that as the troops set fire to the village, the villagers who remained in their homes tried to 
escape and were killed by the Ottoman troops. Most were killed with bayonets.374 
Süleyman, with the advancing troops, said that: 
There was a mass of people in the street when we got near 
the villages. The topjiler [‘artillery men’] laid two guns and 
fired, and then the people dispersed. In the morning we 
found pieces of them plastered on the walls. It was just 
daybreak when we entered the village. The Kurds were 
breaking all the houses whose doors were shut, and were 
dragging all the goods into the street. There were a good 
many people hidden in the dark corners of some of these 
houses. But the Kurds found them. Some of them were 
dragged out into the street and killed there, but most 
remained in the houses. A good many young children and 
women were roasted in the houses when we set them on 
fire. They could have come out then, but the soldiers 
wouldn’t let them. … An officer came up and upbraided 
the soldiers. He told them not to waste time in the villages, 
but to pursue the fugitives, otherwise they would escape. 
Outside the village the slope was covered with people 
running in all directions. Some were carrying goods, some 
had children in their arms, others were helping each other 
along. They (the soldiers) pursued them; the officers 
running with their men and shouting, “Kess Kess!” (kill, 
kill) some of the soldiers were firing at the villagers as they 
ran.375 
 
Khamo recounted that after the destruction of Gheliéguzan, the surviving Kavar villagers 
on Mount Antok held a council where it was clear that “all hope being at an end, it being 
clear that to remain was sure death, it was decided to scatter at once in different 
                                                        
373  Giragosian 1896, p. 375. 
 
374 Khazar.  
 




directions, each one to save himself.” The people of Shenik went toward Passur, in the 
district of Kulp, the people of Alianz towards Unguznag (Xiyan), and the inhabitants of 
Gheliéguzan and Semal took refuge in the thick oak forests of Çorud below Talori. 
Khamo notes that, “I think more of the Shenik people escaped than any other, because 
they did not try to take their flocks; we tried to save ours, and could not go so fast.”376 
Some, like Khazar of Semal, remained atop Antok, “eating raw mutton chiefly and 
defending themselves as best they could, rolling down rocks on their assailants and firing 
at them.”377 
 
Meanwhile, the Ottoman soldiers set up their camp in the ruined village. Over the next 
few days, Süleyman and the other soldiers were ordered to kill the survivors who had 
scattered in the oak forests surrounding the camp. At first, the artillery shot shells into the 
forests, with little effect. The soldiers then used petroleum to begin to set fire to the dry 
forests, burning one patch of forest after another, and killing those who attempted to 
escape from the flames.378 
 
According to accounts of the survivors, almost all of the killing over the next ten days 
was done by the Ottoman soldiers. As Khamo put it, “The Kurds gave their attention 
principally to securing the plunder of flocks and herds, but the regular soldiers, who 
bothered themselves only with the objects of special value and money, made a business 
                                                        
376  Khamo 1895, p. 49. Anna of Shenik recalls that the men of Semal were concerned that that if the 
soldiers managed to find their way up Mount Antok they would all perish. And so, ”In a word we were 
forced to fly.” 
 
377  Khazar 1895, p. 209 
 




of exterminating.”379  The soldiers at least understood that they were following orders. 
Tavo son of Artin, a muleteer impressed into service to carry supplies from the plains 
below, accompanied the soldiers into the mountains.380  Tavo described in his testimony 
how as soon as the soldiers got to the camp, a bugle sounded and they headed off into the 
forests in small groups where he heard incessant gunfire.381 
 
According to the muleteer, Tavo son of Artin: 
I went up near the camp [at Gheliéguzan], where I met an 
old man wounded and an old woman and two girls who 
were crying. They were surrounded by soldiers. I ventured 
to ask the woman the cause of their tears. She replied she 
was weeping over the murder of her son, the father of these 
two girls. One of the soldiers replied that they shouldn't 
weep for the death of a dog, and besides they would share 
the same fate. The next morning I did not see them again at 
the camp, and when I asked a soldier for the reason, he 
replied that their marching orders had come and they had 
dispatched them.382 
 
After a few days of unrestricted killing, Süleyman recollected that Colonel Ismail ordered 
that the troops bring Armenians alive and unmolested to the village.383  According to 
Anna of Shenik, the soldiers dutifully followed orders, and soon soldiers and Kurds were 
urging the refugees that they encountered to come and surrender, saying, “Come and 
                                                        
379 Khamo 1895, p. 49. See also, Erko 1895 and Hodgetts 1896. 
 
380 On August 25, four additional battalions from Muş, Van, Bitlis and Erzurum arrived in the mountains. 
The soldiers were accompanied by baggage trains composed of muleteers who had been impressed into 
service by gendarmes (zaptiye). Garabed son of Bagdassar, Minas son of Agop, and Tavo, son of Artin, 
arrived with the 3rd Bitlis Battalion on August 26. The 4th Bitlis Battalion arrived the next day with 
Garabed, son of Khazar, and as well as Ali, son of Gulali, both of the Muş plains. This chronology is based 
mostly on their testimonies. For the accounts of the Armenian muleteers see, see PP Turkey 1895/1, part II, 
pp. 370-378. 
 
381  Tavo son of Artin, PP Turkey 1895/1, part II, p. 370. 
 
382  ibid. 
 




surrender to the troops; no harm will be done to you.”384 
  
XV: 
Surrender and Slaughter 
 
There was apparently some debate about the prospect of surrender. Some of the refugees 
from Kavar, such as Kirko of Shenik, were dubious of the promises of the government 
and opted not to surrender.385  Der Ohannes, the priest of Semal, surrounded by hungry 
and now homeless villagers from Kavar, advocated heading down into their valley to 
demonstrate their submission to the State. 
 
A day or two following this order, before noon on August 28th, about 100 to 120 of the 
villagers from Semal386 led by their priest Der Ohannes came from Antok Dağ to the 
soldiers’ encampment at Gheliéguzan. According to Garabed son of Khazar, “The 
Colonel and the Commander of the Battalion were looking through their glasses from 
their tents to see what this numerous group was, and they saw it was composed of men, 
families, and children, and in disorder.” Gendarmes were sent out to meet them.  After 
some discussion, the women, girls and boys under fifteen were separated. The men and 
older boys, who numbered around 40, were divided out among the tents of the companies 
and guarded over by sentries.  The women and young children were taken to a field 
                                                        
384  Anna of Shenik, PP Turkey 1895/1, part II, p. 369. 
 
385  Mariam of Semal, PP Turkey 1895/1, p. II, p. 293; henceforth ‘Mariam 1895’; Tavo 1895, p. 217; 
Khazar 1895, p. 217. 
 
386 Garabed son of Artin saw around 100 to 120 people coming toward the camp from the south. The group 
included people from other villages of the Kavar. For his account see PP Turkey 1895/1, p. 370, also see 
the accounts of Minas son of Agop (ibid, p. 372), Garabed son of Bagdasser (ibid, p. 374), Garabed son 




above the church of Gheliéguzan.387 
 
The women were divided again, between the younger women and the older ones. 
According to Anna of Shenik: 
On our arrival there they separated us, that is, the women 
who were in the majority, were separated from the men of 
Semal and Alian, and they took us to a place apart, saying: 
“Don’t be afraid.” Then from among this group of women 
they separated those newly married and who were young 
women. Separating us from the other group, they took us 
towards the church of Ghelieguzan, where a Kurd came up, 
and taking me by the hand said, to the gendarmes, “I leave 
you all the rest, and take this woman only; I shall take her 
for my child.” Then he led me to his encampment, where 
he did not stay. I remained among their women. As regards 
men, only his son was with us. They said to me: “Become 
Mussulman, and don’t be afraid.” “I replied: “My family 
has become scattered and massacred; I have no one left; our 
village is burnt; I embrace your religion.388 
 
In an earlier deposition given to Consul Graves in Erzurum, Anna says that she was taken 
to the tent of Ömer Ağa and raped. This was also the fate of many of the other women 
back in the camp at Gheliéguzan. As Mariam of Semal put it, during the first night the 
soldiers came and, “we lost our honour.”389 
                                                        
387  See the accounts of the four Christian muleteers from the plain: Tavo son of Artin (p. 370); Minas son 
of Agop (p.372); Garabed son of Bagdasser (p. 375); Garabed son of Khazar (p. 377), all included in PP 
Turkey 1895/1, part II. See also the accounts of Süleyman and Ali son of Gulali included in FO 424/181, 
pp. 24 and pp. 267-268 and the account of the Muslim muleteer Ali son of Gulali, in FO 424/182, pp. 211-
212. 
 
388 Anna of Shenik’s first deposition was taken in Erzurum by Consul Graves and can be found in FO 
424/181, “Statement of Anna of Shenik,” and included as an enclosure with a dispatch from Graves to 
Currie, March 8, 1895, pp. 225-226. Anna was also interviewed by the European delegates, H.S. Shipley 
(Britain), M. Vilbert (France) and M. Prjevalsky (Russia) on June 4, 1895. This interview can be found in 
PP Turkey 1895/1, part II, pp. 367-369. Garabed son of Khazar recalls seeing Ömer Ağa of the Bekranlı in 
the camp. Anna eventually managed to escape her captor and told her story to Robert Graves and the 
Delegates of the European Commissioners. 
 





Meanwhile, in the tents of the soldiers below, for two days, the Kavar men were 
questioned extensively by the military officers. Knapp points out that, “If the government 
had really been led into believing that there was a large army of insurgents in the 
mountains, it was now undeceived.”390 
 
At sunset, the men of Semal were brought out in front of the paraded troops. According 
to several accounts, Colonel Ismail asked the villagers, “Who is first among you?” Der 
Ohannes responded, “It is I.” The people of Kavar were asked a second time, and they 
responded that Der Ohannes was the leader (‘kehaya’ or headman).391 
 
Then the colonel said, “What should be done to one who so misleads the people?” The 
Kehaya, answering himself, said, “Kill me if you will; I take the responsibility of all that 
has been done by us.” Someone (he did not know whether a soldier or an Armenian) 
cried, “Let him be blinded he has already been blind.”  The Colonel then gave the order 
to “Take out his eyes,” and one of the soldiers pried them out with a knife. “The Kehaya 
then cried, “Let me die,” and three soldiers bayoneted him in the body.392 
 
The other men were taken to a trench dug in the millet fields of Bedo, the Headman of 
Gheliéguzan, and killed with bayonets in a similar fashion.  Ovak of Semal, a very young 
                                                        
390  Knapp 1895, p. 74. 
 
391  Mevlud Ağa 1895; Süleyman 1895 and Knapp 1895 for accounts that differ only in detail. 
 
392  Mevlud Ağa’s story was recorded by Consul Graves and published by Frank Scudamore in the Daily 




man of around sixteen, survived the massacre of the men of Semal.  Ovak recounted that 
first, “the soldiers seized the priest, put out his eyes, mocked him, threw his body into a 
trench and covered it with soil.”  At around 2 in the morning on August 30, 1894, the rest 
of the men of the Kavar were murdered and their bodies thrown into the prepared 
ditch.393  Ovak witnessed the killing of his father and a cousin and was himself severely 
wounded by bayonet thrusts and fell unconscious under the bodies of his family and 
neighbors.  Ovak recounted his story of survival to the ABCFM missionary Mary Ely in 
the city of Muş in mid-February of 1895: 
Rousing from a well nigh death stupor in the night he 
extricated himself with much difficulty by pushing away 
the corpses above and around him. Slowly and painfully, he 
made his way to some low bushes, among which he hid for 
three days, eating leaves, roots and gum from the shrubs. A 
cousin, Hachig by name, and also from Semal, in passing 
saw Avak and helped him get to a shelter of rock not far 
away. There in pain and weakness, he stayed three days, his 
cousin bringing him little food by stealth. Finding he could 
walk he set out alone and by stages was able to reach the 
village of Shushanamerg, where he had an uncle living. 
Here his friends wrapped him in the skin of a freshly 
slaughtered sheep.394 
 
According to many non-Ottoman sources, the arrival of Zeki Paşa meant the end of the 
violence. According to an unpublished manuscript written by the missionary Royal M. 
Cole, “Zekki Pasha assailed fiercely the Bitlis Gov. Gen. Tahsin Pasha for calling up so 
many troops and instituting such a slaughter on so small a pretense. ‘Are these few poor, 
                                                        
393 The delegates were convinced that this took place, having seen the pits themselves. Ovak, Süleyman 
and Mevloud were eyewitnesses to the massacre. Tavo son of Artin heard the violence. And many 
witnesses saw the pits. For instance, Priest Hohannes or Der Ohannes of Semal, who had persuaded many 
to return, was himself horribly mutilated. I saw his body; he was in the prime of his life, and had a long 
black beard. The two other pits had been prepared in the expectation of larger numbers of victims, but the 
villagers, learning the situation, refused to come in. 
 
394  The missionary sources refer to him as “Avak,” this quotation comes from ABCFM Reel 694, pp. 410-




abject looking Armenians I see about, such a menace to our government? Absurd!’  But 
the Nero of a Governor had betaken himself off to Bitlis without confronting the 
commander. Fearing greatly the effect of the news on Europe this prodigy of a mal-


































                                                        




Chapter Four : Interpretations 
 
 
Government institutions, like most humans, have a reflexive reaction to 
the exposure of internal corruption and wrongdoing: No matter how 
transparent their effort, their first response is to lie, conceal, and cover 
up.  Also like human beings, once an institution has embraced a 
particular lie in support of a particular coverup, it will forever 
proclaim its innocence. 
- Ron Ridenhour396 
 
That is the account of the affair which was sent to Yildiz, and that story 
contains all that the Sultan has any means of knowing about it. It is a 
most remarkable story, and the discrepancies are as thick as leaves in 
Valambrosa. On the face of it, it cannot be true, and before a jury it 
would have hardly any weight as evidence. It is extremely important, 
however, because it is probably a fair sample of the official 
representation of the occurrences of the last few years. That it is a 
misrepresentation, so much so that it can fairly be called a fabrication, 
becomes clear when you look at it a second time. ... There is a strong 
odor of romance about the whole account, and yet it is from an official 
document which the future historian will read when he wishes to 
compile the facts concerning those massacres. 




There is very little evidence, aside from reports by Ottoman officials, that violence in the 
Sasun Mountains in the summer of 1894 stemmed primarily from an attempt by villagers 
to rebel against the Ottoman State.  Nearly all of the non-Ottoman documentation about 
the Sasun violence presents a different story, similar in broad strokes, yet with distinct 
variations, which suggest multiple viewpoints.  All of the missionary accounts, published 
and confidential consul documents, investigative journalist reporting and Armenian-
language memoir accounts stress that the Ottoman military committed indiscriminate 
killings of unarmed mountaineers in Sasun based on faulty – and likely intentionally 
                                                        
396 Ron Ridenhour, “Perspective on My Lai,” Los Angeles Times, March 16, 1993.  
 
397 George Hughes Hepworth, Through Armenia on horseback (London: Isbister and Company, 1898), pp. 




faulty – information from the Vali of Bitlis, Tahsin Paşa.   While there is a lot of variation 
in the details – on how people were killed, and how many – there is very little variation 
on the basic underlying story.   
 
This is not the narrative that the most widely published Ottoman accounts present. In fact, 
all of those accounts are not merely similar in form; they often contain exactly the same 
details.  The fact that the specifics were nearly all the same in Ottoman sources – unlike 
every other set of sources that feature many different details – strongly suggests that the 
Ottoman State was utilizing one or two sources for its narrative.  Most of the Ottoman 
documents that are printed and widely reproduced trace back to a single report produced 
by the commanding military officer, Zeki Paşa.  When scholars follow a single self-
affirming line of documents the result will be written history that doesn’t question those 
sources, but simply reproduces them.  In this chapter, I will discuss the production, 
dissemination and censorship of narratives of the 1894 violence in Sasun over the course 
of the following year.  I will attempt to evaluate each source by careful examination of 












During the last days of August and the beginning of September 1894, the British 
Ambassador Philip Currie in Istanbul began to receive reports that a massive rebellion 
had broken out in the remote district of Sasun.  According to the dispatches of Consul 
Robert Wyndham Graves in Erzurum, the rebellion was perceived to be of such 
seriousness by the local military authorities that not only were reserves mobilized – an 
action usually reserved for wartime conditions – but regiments of Hamidiye irregular 
cavalry were sent alongside regular troops to Muş.398   
 
At the nearly same time that Consul Graves was observing the mobilization of troops 
from Erzurum at the end of August, Cecil Marsham Hallward, the newly appointed vice-
consul in Van, was given two conflicting stories about what had happened in Sasun.  The 
official sources of the Ottoman bureaucracy and military informed Vice-Consul Hallward 
that a conflict south of Muş had led to the killing of two members of the provincial 
security force (zaptiye) and ten soldiers.  Unofficial sources informed Hallward that the 
conflict had emerged between the Kurdish inhabitants of the mountains and soldiers.  He 
admitted in a letter to Consul Graves that “it is impossible for me to say at present what 
the truth of the case may be, but I will not fail to communicate to you any further reliable 
details of the occurrences that I may be able to furnish.”399  At first, both Graves and 
Hallward were limited to the information provided by the Ottoman State and basically 
relayed to Istanbul what the Ottoman military was telling them.   
                                                        
398 FO 424/178, pp. 204-5, Consul Graves to Sir P. Currie, September 1, 1894. 
 




The inclusion of Hamidiye irregular troops alarmed Ambassador Currie who, like almost 
all his contemporaries, recalled the events of Bulgaria nearly two decades before.  After 
the April Uprising of 1876, the Ottoman State had sanctioned the use of irregular 
(başıbozuk) forces to put down the uprising.  In a few striking cases, such as in Batak, 
these paramilitaries carried out mass murder of their Christian neighbors.  Bulgarian 
students at Robert College carried these stories to their Professors, who in turn informed 
the American and British legations and the press.  In Great Britain, these accounts of 
violence transformed public opinion, leading eventually to the fateful decision of the 
British Government not to support the Ottoman Empire against Russia in the Ottoman-
Russian War of 1877-1878.  Within Great Britain, a crisis over the nature of the 
relationship between Her Majesty’s Government and the Ottoman Empire was a 
precipitating factor in the overturning of Disraeli’s Conservative Government.   
 
On September 2, Ambassador Currie wrote a private letter to the Grand Vizier, 
Kabaağaçlızade Ahmet Cevat Paşa.400  In this letter Currie warned Cevat Paşa that if the 
news of the inclusion of Hamidiye were true, “a state of things would arise which could 
not fail to have the most lamentable results to the interests of the Empire.”  To drive his 
point in further, Currie ended his missive with, “I need hardly remind your Highness that 
                                                        
400 Cevat Paşa served as Grand Vizier on between September 1891 and June 1895.  Educated at both the 
Harbiye and Erkan-ı Harbiye before his appointment to the post of Grand Vizier, Cevat was known mostly 
for being first an author of cavalry tactics and the managing editor to the military journal, Ceride-i Askeriye.  




it was the act of irregular troops in Bulgaria which produced so painful an impression on 
Europe, and were the cause of so many misfortunes in Turkey.”401    
 
Grand Vizier Cevat Paşa assured Ambassador Currie that only regular troops would be 
employed in suppressing the rebellion and that, moreover, Zeki Paşa, the Müşir of the 
Fourth Army in Erzingân had been given “the strictest injunctions to see that no excesses 
are committed.”402  However, by the time this letter was sent, the villages of Shadakh and 
Talori were already smoldering ruins and many of their inhabitants had been murdered.   
 
The commander of the Fourth Army, Zeki Paşa departed from Muş for the Sasun 
Mountains behind the city on the dawn of September 9, 1894.403  Both survivors and 
perpetrators of the Sasun massacres reported that Zeki Paşa put a stop to the 
indiscriminate killing.404  According to an unpublished memoir of Bitlis-based 
missionary Royal M. Cole, Zeki Paşa was very upset to find such death and destruction.  
                                                        
401 Parliamentary Papers 1895, no. 1, p. 4, Sir P. Currie to the Grand Vizier, September 2, 1894; Osmanlı 
Belgelerinde Ermeni-Ingiliz Ilişkileri, vol. III, 1894-1895 (henceforth, “OB III”), September 2, 1894, pp. 
24-26, citing BOA, Y. A. HUS, 308/5.   
 
402 PPT 1895/1, p. 2, Sir P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley, September 3, 1894.  While I have not been able 
to locate any orders from the Ottoman State that specified that non-combatants should be protected, 
absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.  
 
403 Ertuğrul Zekâi Ökte, Osmanlı Arşivi Yıldız Tasnifi: Ermeni Meselesi cilt I (İstanbul, 1989), henceforth 
OAYT/I, pp. 254-255.  
 
404 PPT 1895/1, p. 215. According to Sako of Şenik, “As soon as the Mushir Zekki Pasha arrived, the 
Armenians entered into possession of their villages again.”  This report is seconded by an interview carried 
out by the Special Correspondent Frank Scudamore with Mevlut Ağa who noted that when Müşir Zeki 
arrived from Muş, “orders were given that the slaughter should cease.” Reported in Daily News, March 21, 
1895.  Consul Robert W. Graves recorded this same interview in FO 424/181, p. 212.  Likewise, according 
to the interview with Süleyman, “if the Mushir had not arrived and stopped it, they would have killed out 
all the Christians as far as Sairt.” FO 424/182, “Statement of Turkish ex-Sergeant Suleiman,” p. 4.  This 
interview is reproduced with greater detail in the Daily News, March 29, 1895 under the title, “The 




In his memoir, Rev. Cole describes how Zeki roundly lambasted Vali Hasan Tahsin for 
exaggerating the rebellion.405 
 
Zeki Paşa interviewed the captured Hampartsoum Boyadjian and his small band of 
followers on September 13, 1894 in the now desolated village of Semal.406  Within a 
week Zeki Paşa returned to Muş.  On September 16, 1894, Zeki Paşa sent an account of 
what transpired in the mountains of Sasun to the Ottoman Military Command (Makâm-ı 
Seraskerî).407  According to Zeki Paşa: 
I returned to Muş after touring and inspecting Talori and its 
vicinity. The enterprises and movements of the Armenian 
bandits and the details of the Majestic Imperial Army are 
submitted as below.  Talori and its vicinity are located 
fourteen hours to the southeast of Muş.  As the area 
between Muş’s district (kaza) of Sasun, and the Genç’s 
district of Kulp is highly mountainous and as the people are 
entirely Armenian this region was turned into the epicenter 
of sedition (darü’l-fesad).  Due to the favorable nature of 
this area, three or four years ago Damadian came with the 
treacherous intention of forming a rebellious band (fırka-i 
isyanniye).  After the aforementioned individual was 
arrested his treacherous place was taken by the evil 
Hamparsun, who bore the assumed name of Murad, and for 
two years carried out acts of disorder (icrâ-i mefsedet). It is 
                                                        
405 Already quoted at the end of Chapter Three.  See, Royal M. Cole, Interior Turkey Reminiscences: Forty 
Years in Kourdistan (1910), this unpublished manuscript can be found in the Amherst College Special 
Collections, for this quotation see pp. 245-6.  This account, written many years later, is supported by a near 
contemporary account preserved in the British confidential records. On September 30, Ambassador Currie 
informed the Earl of Kimberley that, “Consul Graves telegraphs that Zeki Pasha passed through Erzeroum 
on his return to Erzingan.  Mr. Graves informs me that the disturbances were much exaggerated, and that 
the troops will be withdrawn from Mush.” See FO 424/178, p. 209.  
 
406 PPT 1895/1, p. 169.  
 
407 For the full report see Türkân Erbengi and Emin Kutluğ, Müşir Mehmed Zeki Paşa ve Belgelerle Ermeni 
Olayları (İstanbul, 2005), pp. 87-9.  The document was also published with a facsimile, transliteration and 
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translation issues seem to be typos, such as representing ‘cenub-ı şarki’ as ‘southwesterly’ while other 
translation errors are more egregious such as translating ‘eşkıya’ [bandit] as ‘insurgent’ and ‘Islamları’ as 




clear based on his own confessions, that the evil 
Hamparsun hailed originally from the people of Haçin in 
the Vilayet of Adana. He studied medicine in the Royal 
Civil Medical School (Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Mülkiye-i 
Şahane) for eight years and participated in the mischief-
making of the Kum Kapı events and upon being pursued in 
the Gate of Felicity (Dersa’âdet) escaped first to Athens 
and from there to Genoa [sic].  Afterwards he went again 
under a pseudonym and in disguise from Alexandretta to 
Diyarbekir to this vicinity and began acts of disorder in 
partnership with five mischievous individuals. While in 
Athens, it is understood that the aforementioned individual 
wrote malefic articles in the newspaper Hıcakyan [sic].  To 
the guileless people he represented himself as a European 
from Europe, and seduced the Armenians of Shenik, Semal, 
Ghelieguzan, Ahi, Hotek, Sinank, Sheknih, Efkard, Hozoz, 
Akçasor and the seven that make up Talori into such 
foolishness as soldiers would come from England in 
balloons and that the Great Powers were united in 
protecting the Armenians and that such a movement would 
succeed in creating an Armenian government.  The seven 
villages of the Shadakh nahiye were not seduced and 
remain innocent and protected from the blemish of 
treachery.408     
 
Zeki goes on to describe how in the middle of August, the seditious inhabitants had 
                                                        
408 Talori ve havalisini devir ve teftīş ederek Muş'a avdet eyledim Ermeni eşkıyasının teşebbüsāt ve 
harekātıyla bunlar üzerine sevk olunan cünūd-ı cenāb-ı mülūkānenın harekātına dair olan tafsīlāt ber-vech-i 
zīr arzolunur.  Talori ve havalisi Muş'un cenūb-ı şarkīsine doğru ondört saat kadar imtidār eder. Muş'un 
Sason kazasıyla Genç Kulp kazası arasında vākı gayet dağlık ve menī' ve ahalisi kāmilen Ermeni'den ibaret 
olduğundan Ermeni burayı dārü'l-fesād ittihāz etmelerine müsāid ve mevki'-ı ma'ruzun işbu isti'dādindan 
nāşīdir ki mukaddema Damadyan bir fırka-ı isyaniye teşkil etmek maksad-ı hāinanesiyle üç dört sene evvel 
buralara gelmiş ve merkūm der-dest edildikten sonra hainin yerini Murad nām-ı müste'ārıyla iki seneden 
berü burada icrā-yı mefsedet eden Hamparson nam şerir tutmuştur.  Kendi ifade ve itirafıyla da sābit olduğu 
vechile bu Hamparson şeriri an-asl Adana vilayetine merbūt Haçin kasabası ahalisinden olup mekteb-i 
Tıbbiye-i Mülkiyye-i Şâhâne'de sekiz sene kadar tahsilde bulunmuş ve Kumkapı hadisesini īkā' eden 
müfsidler miyanında bulunmasından nāşī Dersaadetçe taharrī olunduğu sırada Atina'ya ve oradan 
Cenova'ya firar etmiş ve muahharan tebdīl-i nām ve kıyafetle İskenderun tarikiyle Diyarbekir'den bu 
havaliye gelerek ve daha beş nefer müfsidi pay-dāş ederek icrā-yı mefsedete başlamışmış. Merkum 
Atina'da ki Hıçakyan nâm gazeteye muzır bendler yazdığı anlaşılmış ahaliye kendisini Avrupa'dan gelmiş 
bir Avrupalı gibi göstermiş ve ihtilāl eylediklerini müteakip İngiltere'den balonla asker celb edeceğini ve 
umum devletler Ermenileri himāyede müttefik olduğundan böyle bir harekette bulunurlarsa bir Ermeni 
hükümeti teşkiline muvāfık olacaklarını daha bir takım ebleh-fīrībāne tefevvühāt ile Şinik ve Semal ve 
Geligüzan ve Ahi ve Hotek ve Sinank ve Elifkard, ve Hozuz ve Etek ve Akçaser karyeleriyle yedi 
mahelleden ibaret Talori karyesi Ermenilerini iğfāl etmiş ve on yedi pāre karye ile karışık 
olup Şadak? nahiyesini teşkil eden yedi karyedeki Ermeniler merkūmun iğfālātına kapılmadıklarından 




abandoned their villages, and then carried their worldly possessions and women and 
children to inaccessible places.  Thereupon, uniting with bandits from the Muş plain and 
with the Kulp and Silvan kazas, their numbers grew to over three thousand. Armed with 
flintlocks, axes and daggers, the main goal of the Armenian bandits was to destroy those 
Muslims who were in front of them, and then to attack the city of Muş and to arm 
themselves with reserve munitions and thereby increase the scope of the rebellion.  Five 
hundred of the bandits then, according to Zeki, attacked the Vilikan tribe, killing a few of 
the tribesmen and seizing much of their property.  However, due to the arrival in Muş of 
additional Ottoman troops, the bandits did not have the courage to attack the city.  The 
bandits divided themselves into small groups and began to attack the ‘Bekran’ and 
‘Barkan’ tribes.  The bandits filled the belly of Hacı, the nephew of Ömer Ağa, a leader 
of the Bekran tribe, with gunpowder and burned him alive.  The bandits also raped three 
or four Muslim women in the village of Ghelieguzan and subsequently murdered them.   
According to Zeki Paşa, the bandits forced Muslims to bow before the cross, cutting off 
the ears and plucking out the eyes of others and denounced the Muslim state and religion, 
shouting as one, “Long live our king Murat!”409  
After describing the atrocities and insult to religion and state, Zeki Paşa observes that, as 
the units of soldiers were so quickly mobilized and perfectly ordered, they were able to 
capture Murat and his band in a cave, and thanks to God and his Imperial Majesty, the 
rebellion and brigandage was destroyed in such a manner that a movement would not be 
possible again (‘isyan ve şekaveti ol sûretle mahv u izâle etmişdir ki ba’demâ buralarda 
                                                        




böyle bir hareket vukû’ına ihtimâl verilemez’).410  Zeki then turns to the details of the 
campaign itself, noting that as the women and children had already been removed from 
the villages, the troops opened fire into the villages without reservation.  In the actual 
battle with the insurgents, the military suffered relatively light casualties of one officer 
and six soldiers dead, and sixteen wounded. Overall, Zeki concludes, the affair was a 
remarkable success with no incident taking place contrary to the wishes of the Imperial 
majesty and food and clothing and all kinds of succor given to women, children and the 
needy.  Zeki notes that this report was based on the account of Ibrahim Paşa, the 
Mutassarıf of Genç and on Zeki’s own research during the inspection.  In the end, peace 
and order have been restored to a turbulent area where the locals have long dodged their 
taxes for the past eighteen years.411  
On September 18, 1894, Zeki Paşa’s report was presented to the Sultan.412  It quickly 
become the reigning narrative within the Ottoman State, widely reproduced both 
internally and externally over the course of the next year.  Most of the Ottoman 
documents that are widely printed and widely reproduced trace back to that single report 
produced by the commanding military officer, Zeki Paşa.  For instance, in an interview 
with Ambassador Currie on December 19, 1894 the former Grand Vizier Kâmil Paşa 
specified that he had read the reports of Zeki Paşa and observed that they had 
“exonerated the troops from all blame in the matter.”413  Over a month earlier, on 
                                                        
410 OAYT/I, pp. 292-293.  
 
411 OAYT/I, pp. 294-301.  
 
412 OAYT/I, p. 288-289, “Sureti fî 6 Eylül 310 (1310), tarihinde arz-ı hâk-i pây-i âlî kılınmışdır.” 
 




November 16, as the accounts of massacre first began to appear in the European Press, 
the Ottoman Foreign Ministry sent versions of the Zeki Paşa report to its diplomatic 
representatives in Great Britain and the United States.414  From the offices of Mavroyeni 
Bey in Washington D.C., Zeki Paşa’s report made it’s way into the New York Times and 
the New York Herald.415  Rustem Bey in London relayed the report to the Times and the 
Daily News.416   
The narrative offered in Zeki Paşa’s report remains in wide circulation within the 
framework of Ottoman Studies.417   
                                                        
414 For Great Britain, see, FO 424/178, pp. 264-265, Rustem Pasha to Foreign Office, November 16, 1894.  
For the United States, the same report in English appears in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the 
United States (1895), p. 718, Said Pasha to Mavroyeni Bey.  The report sent to Mavroyeni Bey in 
Washington D.C. and Rustem Paşa in London repeats certain specific points from Zeki Paşa report. These 
include (1) the troops restored public order and protected the local ‘submissive’ part of the population (2) 
that the Armenian brigands stored their goods in safe places before revolting (3) that the Armenian bands 
brutally murdered Hacı, the nephew of the Bekranlı chieftain Ömer Bey (although he is named only as a 
Bekranlı Muslim in the report).  One of the key additions to the report sent to Mavroyeni Bey and Rustem 
Paşa is the fact that it stresses that the Armenians joined “Kurdish insurgents” in order to commit excesses 
and that they burned a burned and devastated Muslim villages.  I suspect that these two additions stem from 
the reports of Tahsin Paşa as neither one can be traced to Zeki’s report.   
 
415 New York Times, December 12, 1894.  The exact same report appears in the New York Herald, where it 
is quoted fully in An American Observer [Alexander Russell Webb], A Few Facts about Turkey under the 
Reign of Abdul Hamid II (New York, 1895), pp. 57-58 and in Esat Uras, The Armenians in History and the 
Armenian Question (Istanbul, 1988), pp. 731-732. These articles feature almost word-for-word translations 
of sections of Zeki Paşa’s report.  
 
416 The same report that was sent to Mavroyeni Bey and Rustem Paşa was officially delivered in Istanbul on 
November 16, 1894.  It was published in the London Times and Daily News of November 17, 1894.  For a 
line-by-line analysis and rebuttal of the account published in the Daily News, see FO 424-181, pp. 5-6, Vice 
Consul Hallward to Sir P. Currie.   
 
417 See Salahi Ramadan Sonyel, The Ottoman Armenians: Victims of Great Power Diplomacy (K. Rustem 
& Brother, 1987), p. 160; Jeremy Salt, Imperialism, Evangelism and the Ottoman Armenians, 1878-1896 
(Routledge, 2013), p. 74.  Salt accepts without question the version that Abdülhamid II presented to US 
Minister Alexander Terrell.  Quoting a report from Minister Terrell, Abdülhamid II described how, “A man 
called Mourad, the same Armenian who was at the bottom of the troubles at Coum-Capou (Stamboul) two 
years ago [sic] and made his escape to Athens and from there to Geneva, found his way to Sasun and raised 
up all the population of eight or nine villages by telling them that ‘there is an army coming to their help 
which is to reach Sasun in balloons.”  He got them to abandon their villages and carry off all their property 
and families into secure places and then all the able men, being armed with flint guns, sabers, knives and 
axes, went up to the monastery on the top of a mountain nearby after having burned their villages and 




According to Zeki’s account all the violence can be traced back to the Armenian radicals. 
The Armenian radicals incited the local Armenians to kill the local Muslims. The blame 
can thus be placed on Armenian radicals, especially those with Western education, and 
the Western political figures who incited the local population to rebel. That is the theory 
that remains in the scholarship and that was the theory that the Foreign Ministry 
perpetrated in a propagandistic sort of way.  In examining this report a bit more carefully, 
it would be helpful to know a little more of its author.   
Born in Aleppo in 1862 into a Circassian family, Mehmet Zeki Paşa graduated from the 
Harbiye military academy in 1883 and the Erkan-ı Harb Subayı in 1886.418 Zeki Paşa 
rose swiftly through the military ranks partly because of his ties with the Palace where his 
sister was reputedly a favored consort of Abdülhamid II.419  As a trusted member of the 
Palace inner circle, Zeki Paşa had opportunities to enrich himself far beyond the salary of 
even a Marshall (Müşir), the highest ranked general in the Ottoman military.420  A 
                                                                                                                                                                     
is the correct state of Mourad in his declaration on his cross-examination as reported by the Chief 
Commander of the 4th Army Corps.”  The most detailed use of Zeki Paşa’s account occurs in Justin 
McCarthy, Ömer Turan, and Cemalettin Taşkiran, Sasun: The History of an 1890s Armenian Revolt 
(University of Utah Press, 2014), especially, pp. 33-37.  
 
418 Janet Klein indicates that Zeki Paşa was born in Istanbul in 1846 and entered into service in 1876 (1859-
60), and “began his career in the Palace before Sultan Abdülhamid ascended the throne.”  This seems to be 
incorrect and probably refers to another Zeki Paşa of Circassian origin.   
 
419 Charles Clive Bigham Mersey, A Ride through Western Asia (London, 1897), p. 52.   According to 
Mersey, “His rapid rise to power – he is now only forty – was due almost entirely to the influence of his 
sister, who is one of the Sultan’s favourites in the harem of Yildiz Kiosk, and either by wit or luck he has 
managed to never give offence to the great Palace party in Constantinople.”  
 
420 This extraction took place across the Ottoman East.  For instance, according to an account by the 
Harput-born ABCFM missionary H.M. Allen, the Vali of Van, Süleyman Bahri of Çürüksu, “impoverished 
the province by sending enormous sums of money, taken from the revenue, to his military chief at Erzingan 




reminder of this vast fortune is still visible today.  In the summer of 2013, his yalı, or 
seaside mansion along the Bosphorus, was put on auction for nearly £75 million.421   
 
Aside from his close links to the Palace, and great power and wealth, Zeki Paşa is chiefly 
known among historians as one of the principle architects of the Hamidiye, the irregular 
cavalry force modeled explicitly after the Cossacks.422  In many respects, the Hamidiye 
can be seen as part and parcel of an attempt by the Palace to centralize political and 
military power.   
Quite a few historians have identified the Hamidiye as the culprits in the Sasun 
violence,423 yet there is little evidence that this was the case.424  Despite the widespread 
rumors of their role in the violence, missionaries who were stationed in Bitlis were very 
clear that the military units of Hamidiye remained stationed in Muş.425  
Zeki Paşa based his report partly on Ibrahim Kâmil Paşa, the Mutassarıf of Genç.  
                                                        
421 Daily Mail, June 7, 2013.   
 
422 The best historical examination of the Hamidiye Hafif Suvari Alayları (Hamidiye Light Cavalry 
Regiments) is Janet Klein, The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone (Stanford 
University Press, 2011).  
 
423 Historians who might agree on little else often indicate that the Hamidiye were responsible for the 
violence.  See for example, Garabet Moumdjian, “Struggling for a Constitutional Regime: Armenian-
Young Turk Relations in the Era of Abdulhamid II, 1895-1909,” Unpublished PhD dissertation UCLA, 
2012, p. 45; Erik Jan Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History (I.B. Tauris, 2004), p. 83; Christopher Walker, 
The Survival of a Nation (St. Martin’s Press, 1980), p. 142 and p. 146; Evren Balta, “Military Success, 
State Capacity, and Internal War-making in Russia and Turkey,” Unpublished PhD dissertation, NYU, 
2007, p. 72, fn. 59; Robert Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 
1880-1925, (University of Texas Press, 1989); Paul J. White, Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary 
Modernizers? (Zed, 2000), pp. 60-61; Erickson, Ottomans and Armenians: A Study in Counterinsurgency, 
p. 51 
 
424 The most careful secondary accounts of the Sasun massacre are those written by the independent scholar 
Jelle Verheij.    
  
425 According to George Perkins Knapp, the Hamidiye were held in reserve in Muş.  Perkins supposed that, 
“Those who assert that “Hamedia” were in the mountains probably mistook the Bakranlee horsemen as 




Ibrahim Kâmil Paşa was one of the most corrupt officials in the Ottoman Empire.  The 
trail of accusations of his pecuniary habits could be traced back to his stint as the 
Mutassarıf of Bayazid in the aftermath of the Ottoman-Russian war of 1877-1878.  
During his time in office in Bayazid (1879-1881) his reputation for  “extortionate, cruel, 
and corrupt practices” led him to be disciplined:  “in consequence of the strong 
representations of Her Majesty’s Ambassador, he was suspended, and ultimately 
dismissed from office.”426   
In the middle of June 1877, Bayazid had been the scene of one of the worst cases of 
massacres carried out by irregular soldiers.427  Ibrahim Kâmil Paşa was accused of: 
failing to carry out orders from the Ottoman Government to investigate the massacre; 
and of appointing one of the accused progenitors of the massacre, Şerif Efendi, as 
President of the Committee of Collection of Taxes.  Ibrahim Kâmil Paşa apparently 
wrote to the Vali of Erzurum, arguing that, “such a Commission would be injurious to 
the interests of the country.”428 While he was accused of having a particular ax to grind 
against the Christian population, Ibrahim Kâmil Paşa was further accused of refusing to 
distribute bread to famished peasants, “and forty-five 
 Kurds were allowed to die from hunger where a little ordinary charity might have kept 
                                                        
426 PPT 1896/6, p. 1, Consul Graves to Sir Clare Ford, December 9, 1893. 
 
427 For accounts of this massacre, see London Times, August 24, 1877, p. 10; C.B. Norman, Armenia and 
the Campaign of 1877 (London, n.d.), pp. 220-221; Captain McCalmont, “Captain McCalmont to 
Lieutenant-General Sir C. Dickson, Headquarters Camp, Right Wing Turkish Army, Bayazid, July 30, 1877, 
in Kenneth Bourne, D. Cameron Watt and David Gillard (eds.), British Documents on Foreign Affairs, 
1877-1878, I-B (University Publications of America, 1984-85), 4, p. 38. 
 
428 FO 424/122, p. 80, “Additional Charges preferred by the Christian Inhabitants of the Sandjak of Bayazid 
against the Mutessarif.” 
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them alive.”429  In addition, other charges against him included sharing in the booty from 
attacks on certain Kurdish tribes, selling the appointments of political positions to the 
highest bidder, and “when grave crimes had been committed, the Mutassarif, instead of 
sending the criminals to be tried as they ought to before the Central Court, has extorted 
money from the culprits and let them out of prison.”430  
The Zeki Paşa report of September 1894, based on information provided by Ibrahim 
Kâmil Paşa, places all the responsibility for the violence on outside agitators and claims 
that non-combatants were not harmed whatsoever by the efforts of the Ottoman army to 
quell the disorder and protect the Muslim population. 431  The Ottoman State adopted this 
report as its legitimate432 history, and eventually a number of scholars working within the 
vein of Ottoman Studies adopted it without much corroborating evidence. 
There is very little specific in Zeki’s account.  For instance there were almost no names 
of Muslims who were threatened or killed.  One name that is brought up is that of Ömer, 
whose nephew Hacı was killed in the violence.  There is evidence to suggest that he 
probably was killed in the local conflict between the Bekranlı and the people of Semal.433   
                                                        
429 FO 424/123, p. 123. 
 
430 FO 424/123, p. 124.  
 
431 However, oddly enough, less than a month after Zeki Paşa submitted his report to the Sultan, Vice 
Consul Thomas Boyajian, wrote in a report that, “While in Kharput I learned from a good source that the 
Mushir, his Excellency Zeki Pasha, stated that he Vali of Bitlis and the Mutessarif of Gendj, by reporting 
the Armenians as rebels and setting the Kurds upon them, were responsible for all the mischief done, 
whereas the Armenians were not in reality in rebellion.” FO 424/181, Acting Vice-Consul Boyajian to 
Consul Graves, October 15, 1894, p. 50.  
 
432  The use of italics here is for words with different connotations, used by one party to the conflict 
(Ottoman, in this case) and not shared by other parties to the conflict. 
 
433 According to the joint report composed by three European delegates in the summer of 1895, “According 
to Captain Mustafa Effendi… Hadji Agha was killed ruing the attack by the Armenians on the Bekranli on 
their way to their summer pastures, but the other depositions on this subject, including those of the Bekranli 
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I have found no evidence, other than in Zeki Paşa’s report, that a single Muslim village 
was actually attacked during the summer of 1894.  
It is clear that Zeki Paşa’s report is reproduced, nearly verbatim, and transmitted around 
the world.  Sometimes errors of orthography, that were included in the original report, 
show up in all the different iterations. For instance, in Ottoman Turkish there is only a 
slight difference between the words Genoa and Geneva. If one uses one letter, the word 
spells Genoa if you use another letter it looks like Geneva.434 The original report that 
Zeki sent out to the government indicated that Hampartsoum Boyadjian, supposedly the 
main instigator of the violence, had gone to Genoa.435  That must be an error of 
orthography as according to almost every other account, Hampartsoum Boyadjian 
actually went to Geneva.436  That orthographic error is reproduced in a number of widely 
disseminated translations of Zeki Paşa’s report.437  
                                                                                                                                                                     
themselves, do not confirm either the fact of the mutilation of the corpse or, that of the fight in the 
circumstances related by Captain Mustafa Effendi.” Parliamentary Papers Turkey 1895, no. 1, p. 180.  
 
434 In Ottoman, the only difference is a single 're' demarcating the difference between Cenevre 
(Geneva, Genève) where Hampartsoum Boyadjian actually went and Cenova (Genoa, Gênes).  This 
error is reproduced in endless documentation, a useful means to track the provenance of the endlessly 
reiterated reports. 
 
435 FO 424-178, October 20, 1894, p. 240; Erbengi and Kutluğ, Müşir Mehmed Zeki Paşa ve Belgelerle 
Ermeni Olayları, p. 87. 
 
436 Parliamentary Papers Turkey, no. 1, Vice-Consul Hallward to Consul Graves, January 31, 1895, p. 85.  
In this dispatch, Hallward relays a dispatch from a “trustworthy source from Bitlis” – almost assuredly Rev. 
George Perkins Knapp.  Compare with FO 424/182, pp. 82-83 and The Hartford Seminary Record, vol. 5, 
pp. 273-4. Other accounts that specify that Hampartsoum Boyadjian was in Geneva – not Genoa – abound.  
See, for instance, Christopher J. Walker, Armenia: The Survival of a Nation (1980, republished 1990), p. 
433.  
 
437 See, for instance, “Turkish View of the Massacres,” New York Times, December 12, 1894 and An 
American Observer, [Alexander Russell Webb], A Few Facts about Turkey Under the Reign of Abdul 
Hamid II (New York, 1895) p. 57; this error was ‘corrected’ in later accounts that reproduce Zeki Paşa’s 




As late as the spring of 1895, Zeki Paşa’s report was still being used as the official 
explanation of what took place in Sasun in the late summer of 1894.  Henry Cust, the 
editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, reported that he was given a detailed account of what 
transpired by Abdullah Paşa, an aide-de-camp of the Sultan who had been sent to 
investigate the violence in the winter of 1894-1895.438  Abdullah Paşa reiterates the 
narrative described by Zeki Paşa and is adamant that this was the “whole truth, shirking 
no horrid patches of pain and shame.”439   According to Abdullah the trouble began when 
Mihran Damadian arrived to incite the local Armenian population in the mountains of 
Sasun against the Ottoman State.  Abdullah explained that: 
Such evil efforts were naturally in vain.  Damadian’s 
failure was complete, and caught by the police and taken to 
Constantinople he was freely pardoned, the Blazing Sun 
showing his lavish mercy once again by giving him an 
appointment in a Government office at T.L. 168 a year. … 
On the tracks of Damadian came one Mourad, and for two 
years agitated at large.  His seed misfortunately fell on 
more fertile soil.  However, he imported some 500 rifles.  
The captain of the protecting battalion found that he could 
get no longer from the Armenians the supplies that he 
desired for his men, and in the spring of 1893 [sic, this 
should be 1894], he noticed with sorrow and horror that all 
the fighting men were going up unto the hill, even to the 
fastnesses of Antok.  He gathered that they expected an 
attack from their old Birkranli foes – which was absurd. 
Whatever they expected, what they did was to go for the 
guileless Bikranli, on sight, in large force and with 
unequalled ferocity… The Bikranli struggle in vain and 
suffer fearful things and fly in rout.  After their last 
dispersal the infamous Mourad issued a manifesto.  “We 
have conquered the Bikranli,” he said; “we will now 
conquer the Government troops.  We will then have a life-
size revolution and possess ourselves of the arsenal at 
                                                        
438 See, “The Shadow of God and the P.M.G.” The Pall Mall Gazette (London, England), May 21, 1895.  
This is the fourth part of a sixth part series of articles.  
 
439  ibid.  
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Moush.  Foreign help already promised will pour in, and 
there we are.”  This programme was passing popular to the 
Armenian hearts, and to still that fever Government troops 
were at last advanced.  A paltry body, just two battalions, 
one squadron, and two guns, under Tewfik Bey.  … Not a 
man of the Hamidieh was there.  They all stayed at Moush.  
A civil summons was repeatedly sent both by the 
Government General [sic] and the Commandant, inviting 
the Armenian leaders to drop in and drop in and talk things 
over.  But such suggestions were contumaciously refused.  
Nay, more, the Armenians actually began to bully the 
helpless troops when chance offered.440 
 
What Abdullah Paşa, a high level official of the Ottoman government reports to Henry 
Cust is almost precisely the same turn of events as represented by Zeki Paşa.  This is 
rather striking.  For the next year almost every account that the Ottoman State produced, 
that explained, analyzed and expounded the events in Sasun in the summer of 1894, was 
rooted in the report by Zeki Paşa.  Zeki Paşa is thus, in some ways, the first widely 
published disseminator of the Sasun violence.  And although few, aside from the 
Ottoman State and its apologists abroad, believed his account, it was endlessly 
reproduced within the bureaucratic structures.  Employees of the Ottoman government 
assumed that Zeki’s report represented the truth, and busily compiled all ‘evidence’ to 
support it.  Generations of historians have in turn reproduced the accounts recorded by 
these bureaucrats. 
The Ottoman Empire State wanted to ensure that it controlled the narrative.  It is very 
possible that the vast majority of bureaucrats of the Ottoman State truly didn't know what 
was going on due to the local cover-up carried out by both the local authorities and the 
                                                        
440  ibid, Henry Cust, the editor of The Pall Mall Gazette, is careful to stress at the end of this article that, 
“This account is written from full notes, taken at the Pasha’s request during the discussion, and I fear it is, 
as a report, most lamentably accurate.”  See Henry Cust’s biography in Appendix III.   
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Palace.  Investigators and journalists described in great detail that many within the 
Ottoman State believed the account of Zeki Paşa.  The weight of recent violence in the 
Balkans rested heavily on the minds of many.  In the mid-1870s insurgencies had broken 
out and in the war that followed hundreds of thousands of Muslims were violently taken 
from their homes.  Insurgencies in Eastern Anatolia would not have been a stretch of the 
imagination.  This fear of insurgencies and Christian bandit violence was thus confirmed 
by Zeki Paşa’s report.  Once Tahsin and Zeki had sent confirmations of this fear, no one 
bothered to look for evidence that challenged this conviction, but instead looked for 
evidence that confirmed this narrative. 
Given all this production, the question of evaluating Zeki Paşa’s report is critical.  On 
close examination of this account, there are some parts of the report that are widely 
seconded in other sources.  There is no doubt that Hampartsoum Boyadjian was involved 
in the Kum Kapı demonstration of 1889, arrived near Muş in 1892, and began work as a 
missionary of the Armenian revolution in the small hamlets scattered in the Sasun 
mountains.  It appears evident from a number of sources Boyadjian did indeed adopt the 
name Murad.  He built on the work of local actors to unite settled villagers of the 
mountains.  At the same time, in the plains to the south, semi-nomadic tribes such as the 
Bekranlı, Ruşkotanlı and Nakşibendi were being organized by the efforts of the 
Nakşibendi Sheikh Mehmet of Zilan and Mollah Omer of Ghedorni.441  
However, Zeki Paşa’s report diverges from all other reports on the key issue that all 
                                                        
441  According to H.S. Shipley, the British delegate to the Sasun Commission of Inquiry,  “For the last three 
years, on the advice of the Sheikhs and Mollahs, of whom the chief are Sheikh Mehemet of Zeilan and 
Mollah Omer, of Ghedorni, the Kurds have ceased to protect their Armenians against others, adopting the 
system of avenging themselves against those of their adversaries.” Parliamentary Papers Turkey, no. 1, p. 




other sources agree: the Ottoman military carried out indiscriminate killing of large 
numbers of men, women and children in the Sasun mountains.   
Ten days after Zeki Paşa composed his report, the missionaries of the American Board 
(ABCFM) station in Bitlis began to record eyewitness accounts of the violence.  Over the 
course of the next few weeks, the missionaries began to send reports to both the British 
Consul in Erzurum and to others tied into the missionary network.  According to a letter 
dated September 26, 1894: 
There seems little doubt that there has been repeated in the 
region of Moosh that which took place in '77 in Bulgaria.  
The sickening details are beginning to come in.  As in that 
case, it has been the innocent who have been the greatest 
sufferers.  Forty eight villages are said to have been wholly 
blotted out.442  
In 1894 the senior members of the mission were George Cushing Knapp and Alzina 
Knapp. The Knapps first sailed to the Ottoman Empire in 1855, and after two years in 
Diyarbekir, spent the next four decades living in Bitlis.443  Their four children were all 
born in Bitlis, and grew up speaking Armenian and Turkish. Two of these children, 
George Perkins Knapp (1863-1915) and Grace Higley Knapp (1871-1953) followed their 
parents footsteps and became ABCFM ‘missionaries appointed for life service.’ As per 
ABCFM missionary custom, all of the Knapp children were sent to the United States for 
high school and college. George Perkins Knapp attended Harvard (class of 1887) and 
                                                        
442  ABCFM, The Near East 1817-1919, Unit 5, Reel 694, p. 354.  This letter was published by Frederick 
Davis Greene, first anonymously, in The Review of Reviews, “The Armenian Crisis,” Vol. 11 (January 1895), 
p. 48 and then in three months later, Frederick Davis Greene, The Armenian Crisis in Turkey: The Massacre 
of 1894, its antecedents and significance with a consideration of some of the factors which enter into the 
solution of this phase of the Eastern Question (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1895), pp. 10-11.  
 




Hartford Seminary (class of 1890). Grace Knapp attended Mount Holyoke Female 
Seminary (class of 1893). Both immediately returned home to Bitlis after they finished 
their education.  In addition to the Knapps, by the mid 1890s, the ABCFM mission in 
Bitlis was composed of Royal M. Cole and his family, and two sisters, Mary and 
Elizabeth Ely. 
The ABCFM-missionaries often collected rumors, stories, and eyewitness accounts from 
the point of view of the Protestant Armenian community.  Many missionaries were 
bound to these communities as much through their memories of  “home” (their 
birthplaces in the Ottoman Empire) as for their zeal for converting others.   The 
missionary evidence is useful in certain respects.  It gives us a broad set of the stories 
that were current within the communities in which they lived.   Many of the accounts that 
the missionaries recorded were eyewitness accounts.  Others were second-hand rumors. 
One of the missionaries’ strongest arguments for the existence of massacres was that, 
near the violence, there were six different missionary stations which received 
independent accounts at the same time, both from Ottoman soldiers and from the 
survivors of the violence in the mountains.444 
The missionaries had often acted as witnesses.  They played a key role in conveying 
accounts of mass violence to a broader newspaper-reading public.  This practice of 
bearing witness to violence and then alerting the press goes back to 1860 and continued 
until 1915 in the Ottoman Empire.  Throughout those decades, the missionaries, because 
they were on the ground, collected the accounts of survivors and relayed them to a 
                                                        
444 Frederick Davis Greene, The Armenian Crisis in Turkey: The Massacre of 1894, its antecedents and 
significance (G.P. Putnum’s Sons, 1895), p. 1.  
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broader audience.  This was true of the events near Mt. Lebanon in 1860 and remained 
true during the Armenian Genocide of 1915.  Some of the missionaries in 1915 even 
went with the convoys of forced evacuees, accompanying their charges into the (Syrian) 
deserts of Der Zor.  The evidence that was compiled during the war by Arnold Toynbee 
and Lord Bryce and edited in the Blue Book of 1916 was predominantly made up of 
accounts that came from individual ABCFM missionaries.  Missionaries were 
responsible for the bulk of reports of the 1890s Hamidian violence, the 1876 violence 
against the Bulgarian peasantries committed by paramilitary forces during the 
suppression of the April Uprising, and the 1860 violence that was reported in Damascus, 
that eventually lead to the creation of the autonomous region called Mt. Lebanon.  Even 
in cases where Christians were not the victims of mass murder, the missionaries played a 
role, although admittedly a far more limited one, in conveying the narrative of violence 
to a broad audience.  For instance, in 1892, when Yezidis were being slaughtered in the 
Sinjar Mountains, the ABCFM missionaries called attention to this fact.445  
They had connections to journalists, to public figures, to supreme-court justices in the 
USA who were their relatives and friends, and they were able to get this information out 
in a very organized fashion.  There was a set of missionaries who were deeply engaged 
in journalistic activities by gathering up large numbers of local accounts and 
disseminating them broadly.  We might want to call them missionary journalists.  In this 
chapter I will discuss in detail two missionaries, one of them Frederick Greene, and the 
other one George Perkins Knapp.  They both wrote long reports.   
                                                        




What was the central thesis made by the missionary arguments, in all their myriad detail, 
about what happened in Sasun?  All the missionary accounts that I have read have placed 
an enormous burden of responsibility for the mass murders on Tahsin Paşa, whom they 
often referred to as ‘Nero’ or the ‘Fiend.’446  They were not alone in this. At the time, the 
British, Russian, French, Italian and American consul reports also placed much of the 
responsibility for the Sasun massacres on Tahsin Paşa.   
By the end of September, Consul Robert Graves in Ezrurum was beginning to become 
convinced that the ‘rebellion’ had been exaggerated.447  This suspicion was more than 
confirmed by the reporting of Vice-Consul C.M. Hallward, who on September 26 left 
Van for an investigation of the violence in Bitlis vilayet.  Hallward’s departure was long 
overdue.  Earlier in the summer, Consul Graves had suggested that Hallward journey to 
Bitlis and Muş to investigate “oppression and exactions” of Tahsin Paşa.448  On his way to 
Muş, Hallward met an officer and zaptiye, or provincial security forces.  They bore a 
cordial message from the Vali of Bitlis, Tahsin Paşa and attempted to dissuade Hallward 
from going to Muş.449  As he made his way to Muş, Hallward learned that what had taken 
place in the mountains had been “far more serious than the vague rumours current in 
Van.”450  Hallward quickly discovered that an accurate story of what had taken place 
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447 FO 424/178, p. 209, Sir P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley, September 30, 1894.  This may have been 
the result of information either directly or indirectly given by Zeki Paşa himself, who passed through 
Erzurum on his way to Erzincan.  
 
448 PPT 1895-1, Consul Graves to Sir P. Currie, p. 1, July 12, 1894.  
 
449 PPT 1895-1, p. 13, Vice-Consul Hallward to Sir P. Currie, October 9, 1894. 
 




would be very difficult to learn in Muş, as the local population – particularly the 
Christian part of that population – was afraid to go near him.  According to Hallward: 
I attempted to see the representative of the Armenian 
Orthodox Bishop (the latter has been in prison at Bitlis for 
the last two years), but he sent an urgent message begging 
me not to come near him.  I have heard indirectly that many 
Armenians would be only too glad to see me, and give me 
all the information they can, but they are afraid of the 
Government, and I am bound to say their fears are justified 
by experience.  Last year, Mr. Lynch, an English traveler, 
changed some money at an Armenian’s shop here, and after 
his departure the Armenian was thrown in prison here, and 
subsequently sent to Bitlis, where he was released after 







It was at the beginning of October that Robert Graves, the consul in Erzurum, received 
confirmation that the massacres had indeed taken place.  In his memoir, written at the end 
of his life, Graves recalls that the confirmation did not spring from the letters of the 
missionaries (which had yet to arrive), or the first detailed account from Hallward (which 
Graves would not receive until two weeks later).  A friend of Graves, Ibrahim (a nephew 
of the prominent Mehmet Rauf Paşa), who had recently served as the Mutassarıf of 
Akhlat (just two days travel from the Sasun Mountains), was passing through Erzurum on 
                                                        
451 Ibid, p. 13. According to an earlier report composed by Consul Graces (FO 424/178, p. 158, May 29, 
1894), the man arrested for speaking with Lynch was Stephan Kenderian of Akn/Eğin, today the town of 
Kemaliye.  His arrest may have had as much to do with local politics.  As Grave reported earlier, “Shortly 
after Mr. Lynch’s visit he was thrown in prison, and two or three days later sent to Bitlis, where he 
remained a prisoner for two or three weeks.  My informant could not say whether his communications with 
Mr. Lynch were the direct cause of his imprisonment, but believed that the ostensible reason given was that 
he has been falsely denounced for seditious practices by an Armenian who had unsuccessfully sought his 
daughter in marriage, and this is probably the explanation which would be given to authorities.  When no 
proofs of his guilt were obtained by the Examining Magistrate at Bitlis, he was set at liberty, and allowed to 




his way to Istanbul and told Graves that the Ottoman State had exercised great violence 
in the mountains of Sasun.452   
 
Meanwhile, in Istanbul, on October 1, Hasan Tahsin’s fabricated petitions (mazbatas) 
were published in the Istanbul press.453  
 
 At the same time that Graves was receiving confirmation of the Ottoman State’s violence 
from a high-ranking bureaucrat (Ibrahim, the Mutassıf of Akhlat), the Ottoman State-
controlled press was relaying the efforts of Tahsin Paşa to whitewash the use of military 
force.  The Mutassarıf of Akhlat was not the only official who had serious misgivings of 
the use of violence against the villagers of Sasun.   According to confidential British 
reports, the newly appointed governor of Muş, Celaleddin Bey, was also perturbed by the 
massacres.454  However, unlike Ibrahim, Celaleddin did not pass on information to the 
British about the scope of the violence.  Instead, Celaleddin wrote a report to the Ottoman 
Interior ministry documenting the violence, and apparently suggesting that as many as ten 
thousand inhabitants of the mountains had lost their lives.455 
 
                                                        
452 Graves 1933, p. 144-5; Parliamentary Papers Turkey, 1896 no. 6, p. 168.  Elsewhere Graves notes that, 
“Ibrahim Bey, a most active and capable official… has earned the confidence and gratitude of all classes, 
excepting the evil-doers, in whose pursuit he is indefatigable.” See, FO 424/172, p. 80.  
 
453 The Literary Digest, Feb. 2, 1895, pp. 422-423 republishes announcement that appeared in the Press 
along with an analysis of censorship particularly around the issue of Sasun.  Both Knapp and Hallward 
discuss the collection of the mazbata in their accounts, respectively in FO 424/182, pp. 80-81 and FO 
424/178, p. 55.  
 
454 FO 424-178, p. 304.  
 




Celaleddin Bey456 had arrived in Muş in the middle of August,457 shortly before soldiers 
under the command of Ismail Bey went into the mountains of Sasun.  A month and a half 
later, C.M. Hallward, the new British vice-consul from Van met him in Muş at the end of 
September.458  At first, Celaleddin Bey promised to grant Vice-Consul Hallward an escort 
from Muş to Bitlis via Sasun, and specifically visiting villages of Semal, Şenik and 
Gheliéguzan.  However, it appears that Celaleddin Bey was given direct orders from 
Tahsin Paşa not to allow Hallward to make his way into the mountains.  On October 3, 
1894, Hallward visited Celaleddin Bey.  According to Vice-Consul Hallward: 
When I went he was visibly embarrassed, and I waited 
some time to see what he had to say.  At last I remarked 
that I wanted to start next day for Bitlis, as I had already 
told him.  He then said he had received an official 
communication from the Military Commandant to the 
effect that as there was still a battalion of soldiers at Semal, 
it was desirable to preserve them from infection, and, 
therefore, a sanitary cordon must be placed between the 
town and that village.  I then offered to go to Talori by 
another road, but he said that I could not go there without 
passing the cordon at Semal, and that he must telegraph to 
the Mutessarif of Ghinj [Genç] to inquire whether there 
was not a cordon there also.  In fact, he gave me clearly to 
understand that he did not mean to let me go by that road at 
                                                        
456 According to some reports, such as FO 424/178, p. 321, his name and title is written as “Jelal Pasha,” 
according to others, such as PPT 1895-1, p. 13, he appears as “Jelal-ed-din Bey.”  I have been unable to 
find much about him.  I suspect – but cannot prove – that Jelal Bey might be Mehmet Celal Bey (1863-
1926).  According to Küneralp. Mehmet Celal Bey served as the Vali of Erzurum between 1910-1911 and 
then briefly as the Minister of Interior for the Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası.  He is particularly known for 
serving as Vali of Aleppo and then Konya during WWI where he repeatedly defied the deportation orders 
to send the Armenian inhabitants of first Aleppo and then Konya into the desert.  For accounts of Mehmet 
Celal, see, Taner Akçam, A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish 
Responsibility (Picador, 2007), pp. 146-147, p. 153 and p. 167; Jacques Derogy, Resistance and Revenge 
(Transaction, 1990), p. 28; Racho Donef, “1915: Righteous Muslims during the Genocide of 1915,” pp. 6-
7; Girgoris Pala’kean, Armenian Golgotha: A Memoir of the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1918 (Vintage, 
2009), p. 444; Keith David Watenpaugh, Being Modern in the Middle East: Revolution, Nationalism, 
Colonialism and the Arab Middle Class (Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 124.  
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all, and I have no doubt that he had instructions from the 
Vali to that effect.459  
 
Hallward was doubtful that ‘cholera’ was the real reason for, as he observed, 
“Considering that the cholera originated with the soldiers, and that, moreover, the 
battalion at Semal is in communication with the authorities at Moush, the plea to preserve 
them from infection is lamentably weak.”460  When Hallward pressed Celaleddin Bey and 
Edhem Paşa, the Military Commandant, for an account of what had transpired: 
They both stated rather vaguely that the original cause was 
a disturbance between the Armenians and the Kurds.  I did 
not expect to get much information from either of them, but 
thought they might possibly offer some explanation of the 
severe measures adopted against the Armenians, but I 
failed to elicit anything of the sort from either of them, in 
fact they did not attempt to attach any special blame to the 
Armenians. What I chiefly gathered from their tone and 
conduct was that they were both extremely anxious to hush 
up the whole affair.461  
 
The Bitlis-born ABCFM missionary George P. Knapp observed that Celaleddin told 
Hallward that there was trouble between Armenians and Kurds, the government had been 
obliged to call in the troops to restore order.  According to Knapp, Celaleddin “admitted 
that some of the troops had been guilty of adapsuzluk – shamelessness.”462  Although 
Celaleddin did not provide much information about what took place to Hallward, it 
appears that the Ottoman government was convinced that he was providing information 
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462 This example of information sharing between Foreign Office consuls and the ABCFM missionaries can 




to the British.   The Ottoman Government sought first to delegitimize Celaleddin, then 
proceeded to transfer him to Kirkuk, and then to dismiss him.  
When Ambassador Currie first alerted Grand Vizier Ahmet Cevat of the telegraphed 
account of Hallward, he was informed that, “Mr. Hallward’s sources of information, 
including the Mutessarif of Moush, who is actuated by a personal feeling of hostility to 
the Vali of Bitlis, are unreliable.”463   Within two weeks, Celaleddin was transferred to 
Kirkuk464 and by November 23, dismissed from the Ottoman Government.465  However, 
before Celaleddin was removed from his office, he apparently telegraphed the Ministry of 
Interior “defending the Sassoon Armenians against them.”  In a secret dispatch 
Ambassador Currie wrote to the Earl of Kimberley (Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs), Currie said that he acquired a copy of this telegram from a secret source and that 
in the telegram, Celaleddin, “protests against the employment of armed forces against the 
Armenian, refuses to share responsibility of such action, and begs, if he is not listened to, 
to be relieved of his duties.”466 
Celaleddin Bey was by no means the only member of the local Ottoman State elite who 
vehemently opposed the violence directed against the Armenian inhabitants of the Sasun 
                                                        
463 PPT Turkey 1895-1, p. 7, Sir P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley, October 9, 1895.  
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424/182, p. 80 where Knapp observes that, Celaleddin was, “soon after removed to Kergute, and has since, 
I understand, been dismissed.”  
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Mountains.  There is evidence to suggest that the highest ranked military officer in Muş, 
Ferik Edhem Paşa (1844-1909)467 refused to carry out the orders that were sent from the 
Palace.   At the beginning of November, Consul Graves wrote to Ambassador Currie that: 
The cavalry General, Edhem Pasha who has for some time 
been stationed at Moush, has just passed through Erzeroum 
on his way to Constantinople.  I have learnt on excellent 
authority that while he was in Erzeroum he expressed the 
opinion that the officers chiefly answerable for the 
massacre of Armenians in Sassoun were Staff-Colonel 
Ismail Bey, who is now at Erzroum, and the infantry 
colonel, named Tewfik Bey.  I heard on the same authority 
that the battalion of rifles from Erzingian took an active 
part in the excesses committed.468 
A little more than a month later, Consul Graves further informed Ambassador Currie that 
while Ferik Edhem Pasha was stationed at Muş he had received “telegraphic instructions 
from the Mushir Zeki pasha ordering the slaughter of the Sassoon Armenians.”  
According to Grave’s source within the Ottoman Government, “These orders he 
absolutely refused to carry out himself, and their execution then devolved upon Colonel 
Tewfik Bey.”469  In January 1895, Consul Graves suggested that it was critical that the 
British Government get in contact with Edhem Paşa, to ascertain the relative 
responsibility for various military officers.  However, after Edhem Paşa left Erzurum for 
Istanbul, in November of 1895, the British Embassy was unsuccessful in their efforts to 
                                                        
467 Edhem Paşa is chiefly remembered for his leading role commanding the Ottoman military in the 1897 
war with Greece.  For his efforts in this conflict, Edhem was subsequently awarded with the honorific title 
“Ghazi.”  After resigning from the War Ministry, he went into exile in Egypt.  See S. Tanvir Wasti, “The 
Last Chroniclers of the Mabeyn,” Middle Eastern Studies, 32/2 (1996), p. 28, fn. 38.    
 
468 FO 424/178, p. 386, Consul Graves to Sir P. Currie, November 6, 1894.  
 
469 Graves continued that, “Edhem Pasha subsequently left Moush for Constantinople on his own demand, 
and is said to have taken the Mushir’s telegram with him, presumably for the purpose of communicating 
them to the Minister of War, who is his friend, and justifying his act of insubordination.” FO 424/178, p. 





Edhem Paşa’s reported refusal to carry out the Sultan’s orders, to leave them “with an 
extraordinary terror,”471 are in keeping with other accounts of him.  Edhem Paşa enjoyed 
a very high reputation as both a soldier and as an administrator.472   According to one 
report written by the British consul Henry D. Barnham, Edhem Paşa was “keenly 
desirous in reforms, both because he is a good man and because he has vested interests in 
the country.”473  Edhem Paşa was also widely credited for his role in preventing violence 
in Aleppo in November of 1895.474  By 1906 Edhem’s reputation as an almost saintly 
figure was so vaunted, that the story of how he prevented a massacre was included in a 
collection of moral tales for children.  According to this tale, just as a mob of Muslims in 
a mosque was preparing to wreck havoc in the Armenian community, Edhem Paşa 
entered the scene: 
The eyes of the crowd were turned to the door.  A Turkish 
officer, or pasha, had entered.  Walking with a resolute air 
through the mob, he went up to the priest and quietly asked 
for the copy of the Koran. Having taken the book into his 
hands, he held it up before all the people. They watched 
with great curiosity.  He was well known to them all.  His 
name was Edhem Pasha, and he was in command of the 
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garrison of Turkish troops which was guarding the city of 
Aleppo.  “I have just been told,” said Edhem Pasha, “that 
you folk have a mind to do an ill deed.  I have just been 
told that you mean to go forth and carry death to the 
Armenians of Aleppo.”  No one spoke.  Not a sound was 
heard.  Edhem Pasha opened the Koran.  “Here,” he went 
on, “is the blessed book given by the prophet Mohammed 
to the world in the name of Allah, who is the one true God.  
I ask you if there are any words in this book which prove 
that it is a right thing to slay men, women and children who 
live at peace in the same city as ourselves, just because they 
belong to a different faith and have different ways and 
different speech.” There was no response.  “I will turn my 
own guns,” cried Edhem Pasha, “upon the first man who 
lifts his hands against the Christians.”  The people looked 
at him.  The brave officer faced them with a calm gaze.  
His heart did not flinch at their savage scowl.  He was 
determined to save innocent persons from death.  Presently, 
the crowd broke up and went homewards. The Armenians 
of Aleppo were saved.  They were saved by the Turkish 
pasha’s courage.475 
 
Meanwhile, the vice-consul of Van, C.M. Hallward, had arrived in Muş.  Throughout his 
time in the Muş Province, the local Ottoman authorities kept close track of his 
movements.  According to Knapp, "His movements were carefully watched, and 
everything done to prevent any one from seeing him. He had hardly been seated at one 
village when a zabtieh came post-haste after him, and had all the villagers who were in 
the house with him driven out."476  Hallward spoke with Edhem Paşa and Celaleddin Bey, 
the highest ranked military and bureaucratic authorities in Muş.   Both gave Hallward 
rather vague answers to his queries.  Neither one described the violence as the 
suppression of an Armenian revolution.  Hallward also met survivors of the violence who 
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described entire villages destroyed.  Hallward met one old man and his grandson who 
reported that they were the only survivors in their family.477   
 
Faced only with a welter of rumor about the severity of the violence, Hallward realized 
that the only way to know the extent for sure was to head into the mountains to the south 
of the plain.  Hallward first visited the monastery, Surb Garabed, one of the centers of 
Apostolic Armenian veneration.  At the monastery, Hallward reported that an 
undercurrent of fear was the dominant emotion, many of the priests already in prison and 
the remaining inmates under guard.478  Hallward planned to head into the mountains to 
verify the reports of massacre.  However, while Celaleddin had initially sanctioned 
Hallward’s itinerary, it appears very likely that he received direct orders from Tahsin, the 
Vali of Bitlis, to not let him go into the mountains under any condition. The pretext that 
the local authorities used to deter Hallward’s venture in the mountains was that due to the 
cholera outbreak in the lowlands all travel to the mountains was not allowed.479  Hallward 
readily agreed to undergo the necessary quarantine, but was told in no uncertain terms 
that the authorities won't allow him to pass without orders from Istanbul.480  After 
Ambassador Currie received a telegraph from Hallward asking him to arrange the 
requisite central authorization into the mountains, Currie approached Grand Vizier 
Ahmet Cevat.  However, Ahmet Cevat refused to allow Hallward into the mountains, not 
because of the quarantine, but due to the risk that Hallward’s very presence in the 
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mountains would lead to a renewal of seditious activity.481  In response to this point blank 
refusal, the Earl of Kimberley, stressed that without further investigation the British 
Government would not be in a position to counter any rumors of violence that may 
emerge.482 
 
On October 6, Consul Longworth, the British Consul in Trabzon, reported that Armenian 
migrant laborers seeking to travel to Istanbul were being ordered back to their houses.483  
It was speculated by a number of observers that the goal was to try to limit the amount of 
information about Sasun.484  Was this control of movement part of the cover-up of the 
Sasun violence? It is difficult to say for sure.  On the one hand, the Vali of Trabzon 
privately confided to Longworth that the orders were based on preventing a reoccurrence 
of the protests at Kum Kapı in 1890, where migrant laborers from the East had protested 
the conditions faced by the peasantries in the Van basin and its hinterlands.485  On the 
other hand, both Tahsin and Zeki had already written reports that covered up the extent 
and nature of the violence in the mountains.  Tahsin had taken this coverup one step 
further and had begun to report that Hallward was encouraging sedition against the 
Ottomans Government.  Did the Ottoman State officials in Istanbul buy these 
explanations at this point?  Did the central authorities accept the reports of Zeki and 
Tahsin to be unquestionably true?    It is exceedingly difficult to unravel exactly what, at 
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that time, was known of the violence by different parts of the Central Ottoman 
Government (the Palace, Porte and the Patriarchate). 
 
Three days after Consul Longworth reported that peasants from Muş were being turned 
away at the port of Trabzon, Ambassador Currie met with Grand Vizier Ahmet Cevat and 
alerted him to telegraphs from Hallward describing rumors of widespread massacres 
carried out by Ottoman Imperial soldiers.486 Ahmet Cevat refused to accept the reports 
from Hallward as accurate. The Grand Vizier declared that Mr. Hallward's sources of 
information, including the Mutassarıf of Muş were unreliable.  It is worth mentioning at 
this point that the Mutasarrıf of Muş had not passed on any information about massacres 
to Hallward.  Did Tahsin suspect the new Mutasarrıf of passing on information?  Or were 
the Ottoman central authorities concerned that Celaleddin was passing on accounts of the 
violence?   Much rests on how the news travelled within the Ottoman bureaucracy and 
how it was evaluated.  Zeki Paşa and Tahsin Paşa were both military men with tight 
connections to the Palace structure.  Zeki Paşa was, after all, reputedly the brother of one 
of Abdülhamid’s favorite concubines. Likewise, according to distinct accounts Tahsin 
Paşa was a close ally of Süreyya Paşa, the head of the Palace bureaucracy. 487  Far less is 
known about what relationship Celaleddin Bey bore with the Palace, if any, but it was 
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487 The missionary Rev. George P. Knapp noted that Süreyya Paşa was the “great friend of Tahsin Paşa.” 
(ABCFM Reel 694, G.P. Knapp to Allen and Raynolds, March 26, 1895).  This was independently noted in 
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Kietabet) was the real center of the administration of the whole Empire.” (Ármin Vámbéry, “Personal 





very shortly after Hallward’s visit to Muş and his letter to the Interior Ministry that 
Celaleddin was transferred first to Kirkuk and then removed from office entirely.488 
 
Over the course of three or four days in mid-October, three separate accounts were 
written from the East.  The first letter was composed in Bitlis on October 9, mostly likely 
by Royal M. Cole, an ABCFM missionary of long tenure in the Eastern Provinces.  This 
report was particularly significant because it would later be the first detailed accounting 
of the violence in Sasun, and the efforts to cover it up, that reached the European Press.  
This letter would pass through a number of hands before it was eventually published on 
November 17 in the London Times.489 
 
Four days later, on October 13, Consul Graves in Erzurum compiled a report based on 
Armenian sources.  Graves was skeptical of 'Armenian' sources and stressed that this 
particular version was "ex-parte" or one-sided.   In this stance, Graves reflected a general 
sentiment within the British State.  The British tended to accord far more weight to the 
reports of ABCFM missionaries or the accounts delivered by Ottoman Protestants, but 
often withheld judgment until additional supporting evidence could be obtained. The 
Armenian account that Graves discussed in this dispatch is based on a letter from 
Hampartsoum Boyadjian.490  The earliest generation of Hunchaks491 often acted as 
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489 I will discuss how this letter travelled from Bitlis to London a little later in this chapter.  Aside from 
appearing in the London Times of November 17, this same letter was reproduced by former ABCFM 
missionary Frederick Davis Greene in The Review of Reviews, Jan. 1895, pp. 45-54.  
 
490 FO 424-178, October 13, pp. 246-247.   
 
491 It should be recalled that the political party was named after the journal (Hunchak) and not the other 
way around.  Mihran Damadian, Hampartsoum Boyadjian and Armenak Ghazarian all wrote for the 
Hunchak newspaper as correspondents.   
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missionary journalists.492  At one level, they performed the task of missionaries insofar as 
they organized communities along the networks of affiliation of the new ‘religion.’  On 
the ground, Boyadjian used his medical training and connections to the outside world to 
entice the local communities in the mountains to affiliate themselves with his world-view.  
And, like all processes of conversion, the new belief system was interpreted according to 
local idioms that drew sharper lines between the alpine villages of Armenians and the 
communities of nomads who every summer headed up into the mountains to graze their 
flocks.  At the same time, Boyadjian published his accounts of conversion, as well as 
‘news’ of these regions, in the Hunchak journal.  The ABCFM and the Hunchak were 
competing networks of conversion.493   
It would take weeks for these three independent reports, written in three different places, 
based on three different sets of sources, to reach London.494  However, in the first part 
of October, the bureaucrats of the Foreign Office in London were still pretty much in the 
dark about what took place in late August and early September.  Possessing only 
Hallward’s initial telegraph that massacres had taken place, Earl of Kimberley chose to 
take a cautious ‘wait and see’ course of action.  He instructed Ambassador Currie to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
492 According to Graves, Hampartsoum Boyadjian’s letter was to be published in newspapers in Tiflis.  The 
basic story encapsulated in this letter was reproduced in Tiflis newspapers, and eventually made its way to 
expatriate Armenians like Minas Cheraz, living in distant London.    Compare, for instance, Minas 
Cheraz’s account of Sasun violence that can be found in the Glasgow Herald, November 23, 1895.  
 
493 It is important to distinguish them as distinct networks as there have recently been a number of 
secondary works, mostly written within the vein of Turkish nationalism, which have, on the one hand, 
conflated all Armenians into a single essentialist category, and then assumed that the ABCFM and 
Hunchak had a parallel set of goals and ideologies.  This was far from the case and in certain areas, like 
Marsovan and Zeytun, the ABCFM and Hunchak converting efforts were oppositional in nature.   
 
494 Graves compiled one set of sources based explicitly on the letter of Hampartsoum Boyadjian.  Hallward 
compiled his sources with conversations with the local Armenian population in Muş.  The ABCFM 




remonstrate with the Ottoman Government about the barriers placed in the path of 
Hallward, but that he should “not at the present moment push matters further."495 
Back in Istanbul, Ahmet Cevat, the Grand Vizier, continued to insist that events in the 
mountains had proceeded along the lines that Zeki described.496  In the middle of October, 
Ambassador Currie met again with Cevat.  Cevat was adamant in this meeting that no 
women and children were harmed in military's effort to put down the rebellion.  Currie 
pointedly notes that while Hallward's trip to Sasun would be postponed, the British 
government would "not be in a position to correct even the most exaggerated versions of 
what happened that might reach England."497   
 
While Ambassador Currie was meeting with Cevad, Tahsin’s reports of a seditious 
British vice-consul were continuing to make headway within the Palace.  Derviş, an aide-
de-camp (Yâver-i Ekrem-i Şehriyârî) of Abdülhamid, drew up a memo warning that 
certain British functionaries – in this case specifying Hallward – were engaged in inciting 
rebellion and interfering in Ottoman internal business contrary to international 
agreement.498  Hallward, meanwhile, was continuing his investigation of the violence in 
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496 A good example of this reproduction of the Zeki report, complete with the error that Hampartsoum 
Boyadjian had gone to Genoa instead of Geneva, was presented to Currie on October 20, 1894.  Said's 
summary of Zeki's account is full of 'copying errors' as well, most obviously, misidentifying Damadian 
with Boyadjian and badly misspelling the names of tribes and place names. It is apparent throughout that 
the Ottoman State had only a vague idea of where these villages were and which tribes were which.  This 
level of ignorance of local matters might be starkly contrasted with the local ABCFM materials.  These 
reproduced a far more local vision of affairs based on years of living in the region. For Said’s version of 
Zeki’s report see, FO 424-178, October 20, 1894, p. 240; also, PP Turkey 1895/1, pp. 10-12.    This 
error is reproduced in endless documentation, a useful means to track the provenance of the endlessly 
reiterated reports.  
 
497 FO 424-178, October 13, 1894, p. 227. 
 
498 OB III, October 13, 1894, p. 31. 
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Avzut, one of the villages in the Muş plains that been an episode of violence in the war 
with the house of Musa Bey.499  For the next ten days, while undergoing quarantine, 
Hallward began to piece together a story of extreme violence.  Throughout his 
investigation, he reported that he had considerable difficulty obtaining reliable 
information.   
 
His own narrative would be ‘confirmed,’ at least for him, when Hallward reached Bitlis 
on October 25 or 26.500  There he stayed in the house of Royal M. Cole and almost 
certainly compared his research with that of the missionaries.  From this point onward, 
the accounts from Hallward and the ABCFM missionaries in Bitlis would closely 
resemble each other, paraphrasing the basic narrative and sometimes the exact same 
phrases.  This new synthesis would make its way through various byways into the press.  
Consuls Graves, Hallward and Cumberbatch often cited the missionaries obliquely, 
referring in their dispatches that they received this piece of information or that from 
"trustworthy" sources.   
 
While this new synthesis was being sewn together by the ABCFM missionaries and 
Hallward, at the end of October, Currie received Hallward’s first substantial dispatch of 
the violence, composed nearly three weeks earlier in Muş.   Alarmed by Hallward’s 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
499 FO 424/178, Vice-Consul Hallward to Consul Graves, November 10, 1894, p. 312.  Hallward wrote, “I 
spent ten days in quarantine at Avzout, a village with a mixed population of Kurds and Armenians, in the 
plain of Moush, near the village of Khivnir (or Khevian), where Moussa Bey formerly resided, and where 
some of his family still live. … On the 21st October, at about 9 pm, I heard two gun shots in the village, 
next morning I found that an Armenian, named Krikor, had been shot by the son of Kurd, named Selim Bey, 
who lives in the village, and is a cousin of Moussa Bey.  The head of the gendarmerie … [was] at Selim’s 
Bey’s house at the time of the murder.  When I left four days after the corpse was still waiting to be 
examined previous to burial.  There was no particular motive for the crime as far as I could see, the same 
young man shot another Armenian in the same village last year.”   
 
500 FO 424/182, p. 82.  
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account, Ambassador Currie immediately telegraphed Kimberley.  Would it be possible, 
Currie asked, to bypass the usual channels of the Porte and the Grand Vizier and submit 
Hallward’s report directly to the Sultan himself?501 The Earl of Kimberley granted 
Ambassador Currie’s request.   
 
By this point, in the last days of October, accounts of the massacres were being carefully 
compiled at the ABCFM headquarters in Istanbul, where Joseph Kingsbury Greene and 
other missionaries began to realize that the violence was far worse than they had feared.  
It is very likely that within the course of the next few days, the ABCFM missionaries 
would share their information with Edwin Pears, 502 the longstanding correspondent in 
Istanbul for the Daily News. On October 31, one of the missionaries in Istanbul wrote in a 
private letter: 
This awful story is just beginning to be known here, though 
the massacre took place early in September. The Turks 
have used infinite pains to prevent news leaking out, even 
going the length of sending from Trebizond many hundreds 
from the Moush region who had come this way on business. 
This massacre was ordered from Constantinople in the 
sense that some Kurds having robbed Armenian villages of 
flocks, the Armenians pursued and tried to recover their 
property, and a fight ensued in which a dozen Kurds were 
killed. The slain were "semi-official robbers," i.e. enrolled 
as troops and armed as such, but not under control. The 
authorities there telegraphed here that Armenians had 
"killed some of the Sultan's troops." The Sultan at once 
ordered infantry and cavalry to put down the Armenian 
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502 Edwin Pears (1835-1919), a lawyer by profession, has usually been credited as the first journalist to 
write about the massacres that took place at Batak.  By 1894, Pears had lived in Istanbul for 21 years.  For 
Pear’s own account of Batak, see his memoir, Forty Years in Constantinople: The Recollections of Sir 
Edwin Pears, 1878-1915 (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1916), pp. 12-24.  Pears received an 
initial report about Sasun from the former ABCFM missionaries and Robert College professors George 




rebellion, and they did it; only, not finding any rebellion, 








At the beginning of November, Ambassador Currie passed a synopsis of Vice-Consul 
Hallward's reports along to Süreyya Paşa, the head of the Palace complex. 504   Within a 
day or so, Sultan Abdülhamid II responded.  Claiming that he had no knowledge of the 
events, Abdülhamid II wrote that he read Hallward's account with "horror and sorrow.”505  
The Sultan assured Ambassador Currie that he would immediately inquire further into the 
matter.  However, within a couple hours, Süreyya presented Adam Block, the chief 
dragoman of the British Embassy, with an official account of what took place in Sasun 
that closely followed that of Zeki Paşa.  
                                                        
503 Many of the accounts that are preserved in the ABCFM archives (this one can be found in ABCFM Reel 
694, pp. 355-356) were over the next few months published under a number of different auspices.   This 
account arrived in Boston on November 26, 1894 where it was published anonymously the next day in the 
New York Herald (November 27, 1894).  The letters were described in the newspapers as “private” and 
“from the highest authorities in such matters – but not from Armenians.”  This dispatch was subsequently 
published by Frederick Davis Greene (anonymously) in the Review of Reviews of January 1895 and then in 
his book two months later. (Greene 1895, pp. 12-13)  Lady Henry Somerset, an ally of the ABCFM, passed 
the same letter on to the Foreign Office (FO 424-181, p. 114).  As was often the case, certain ABCFM 
letters (and the narratives that they presented) were disseminated very broadly.  For example, this letter was 
reproduced in The New Outlook vol. 50 (December 8, 1894), p. 975 and The Churchman, vol. 71, March 23, 
1895, p. 425. It is worth mentioning that a version of this quotation ended being misattributed to Zeki Paşa 
in the anonymously composed article, “The Evil of the Turk.”  See, Arman Dzhonovich Kirakosian, The 
Armenian Massacres, 1894-1896: U.S. Media Testimony (Wayne State University Press, 2004), pp. 63-64.  
 
However, for the most part, aside from the removal of the name of the writer when it was published, the 
dispatch written in Istanbul was faithfully re-produced.  In fact, much of American and British Press 
coverage and the Foreign Office documentation of the violence was composed of accounts relayed directly 
by the ABCFM missionaries.   
 
504 FO 424-178, November 2, 1894, p. 248. Currie recommended to the Ottoman State that independent 
inquiry be carried out without delay. 
 
505 FO 424-178, November 3, p. 249.  As mentioned before, Sultan Abdülhamid II had been presented with 





Did Abdülhamid II already know that a massacre had taken place?  Or was this the first 
time that he had read an account of the violence that was not based on his network of 
‘trusted’ household members like Zeki Paşa and Tahsin Paşa?   While Zeki was the 
brother of a Palace concubine, Tahsin Paşa was closely allied with Süreyya Paşa, the First 
Secretary of the Palace.506  In fact, according to the British chief Dragoman, Adam Block, 
Süreyya Paşa had recommended Tahsin Paşa for the governor-general post in Bitlis.507  
Did Süreyya cover for Tahsin Paşa?    
 
On November 2, 1894, the day after Currie conveyed Hallward’s report to the Sultan, 
Tahsin Paşa made some accusations of his own.  In a dispatch to the Central Government, 
Tahsin claimed that after Vice-Consul Hallward arrived in Bitlis, he had secretly 
assembled a number of Armenian notables, by night, and with his Dragoman asked them 
to prepare a report (mazbata) against the Ottoman State.  It is interesting to note that this 
accusation was a mirror image of the accusations against Tahsin Paşa.  Tahsin further 
alleged that Hallward had been directed by the British government to inquire into their 
grievances. In this memorandum, Tahsin identifies a conspiracy that links the British 
Consul with Armenian notables and with the brigands in the mountains.508   
                                                        
506 Antranig Chalabian, Revolutionary Figures: Mihran Damadian, Hambardzum Boyadjian, Serob 
Aghbiur, Hrair-Dzhoghk, Gevorg Chavush, Sebastatsi Murad, Nikol Duman (A. Chalabian, 1994), pp. 70-
71.   
 
507 FO 424-178, December 2, 1894, p. 388.  
 
508 “...Bitlis Vilayeti İdare Meclisi Üyesi Avadis Hacı Manuk, İstinaf Mahkemesi Üyesi Hınceyan Setrak, 
tüccarlardan Bakkalyan Serkis, Kendiryan Artin, Kirkoryan Cercis, Sucenkyan Sirob, Kagosyan Avadis ve 
Basmacıyan Hacı Manuk ismindeki kişilerin adı geçen Avadis'in evinde toplanarak isyan yollu konuşmalar 
yaptıkları...” BOA, Y.A. HUS, 308/5, reproduced in OB III, November 2, 1894, pp. 35-36.  This telegraph 
is referenced in the memo that the Sultan gave to Block the following day. See FO 424-178, November 3, 
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By November 3, Abdülhamid II had openly rejected Vice-Consul Hallward’s account of 
the violence.  In support of his rejection, Abdülhamid II argued that the Bulgarians had 
‘fabricated’ the accounts of violence in the 1870s and that subsequently the British State 
“extended a certain protection to the Bulgarians, who have now been formed into a 
separate province.”  He continued: 
This cannot possibly, however, happen in the case of the 
Armenians. The Armenian population is spread over a large 
extent of country, and in no place are they in a majority. 
Their expectations, therefore, can never be realized, and all 
the exaggerated stories of oppression and persecution, got 
up the object of exciting European sympathy to enable 
them to obtain an impossible end, should not be relied on. 
Unfortunately, a great deal of false information is given to 
British newspapers, which accept the facts related as true, 
and convey a false impression to their readers. His Majesty 
counts upon your Excellency's assistance of false 
intelligence in the British press.509 
 
Meanwhile, back in London, by this point Hallward’s report had reached the Foreign 
Office.  On November 5, Kimberley confronted Rüstem Paşa, the Ottoman Ambassador, 
with the account of violence and cover-up.510   The Earl of Kimberley described Rüstem 
as somewhat caught off guard by this account.  Two days later, Rüstem and the Earl of 
Kimberley met again.  This time, Rüstem Paşa brought up the subject of the ‘Armenian 
committees’ in London.  Rüstem claimed that the Foreign Office correspondence with 
Armenian committees implies "official countenance." Whenever the British accused the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
1894.  “Indeed, His Majesty received on the 2nd instant, a telegram from the Vali of Bitlis to the effect that 
Mr. Hallward has arrived there, and that through his Dragoman he has secretly collected some Armenians, 
suspected of sedition, by night, and asked them to prepare a “Mazbata” or Report against the Government, 
which they accordingly have guven to him, and that furthermore, he has informed them that he has been 
commissioned by the British Government to inquire into their grievances.”   
 
509 FO 424-178, November 3, pp. 261-2, also, Parliamentary Papers Turkey 1895/1, pp. 20-1; FO 424-, 
November 3, 1894, p. 249 
 
510 Hallward's report was received in London on November 5, 1894, see FO 424/178, p. 252, for the 
meeting see, Turkey 1895-1, p. 16 
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Ottomans of corruption, misgovernment or indiscriminate violence, the Ottomans often 
responded to the British with counter-accusations.  According to Kimberley: 
I remarked that I was somewhat surprised at these 
reiterated complaints, as his Excellency was well aware 
that Her Majesty's Government had carefully avoided 
taking any action which could have the appearance of want 
of friendliness to the Sultan, or would give colour to the 
supposition that they gave encouragement to the disloyal 
subjects of His Imperial Majesty.511  
 
Kimberley then changed the subject and pointed out that the Foreign Office had supplied 
the Sultan with Hallward’s report.  If even a fraction of Hallward’s report was true, there 
was sure to be a "burst of indignation" in Great Britain when it became more widely 
known. Kimberley stressed that the greatest danger for the Ottoman state was not the 
agitators, but the corruption of local authorities.  
 
Just one day later, the Ottoman State again accused Hallward of organizing sedition in 
Muş.  Late on the night of November 8, the Ottoman government sent Currie a notice 
laying out charges made by Tahsin Paşa against Vice-Consul Hallward.  Based on 
Tahsin’s report, the Ottoman State said that Hallward, “while exhorting the Armenians 
through his Dragoman to hold meetings, has gone so far as to urge them to rise against 
the Imperial Government."512    
 
The next morning, Ambassador Currie called on Said Paşa and informed him that the 
accusations against Hallward had surprised and alarmed him.  Colonel Chermside, the 
Military Attaché of the Embassy would be sent to investigate charges against Vice-
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Consul Hallward. Currie was quickly assured by representatives of the Porte that the 
charges against Hallward were unofficial, and that therefore Chermside's investigation of 
Hallward would not be necessary. Currie responded that the suggestion that a British 
consul was inciting the locals was a serious charge.513  Later the same day, Abdülhamid 
II summoned Adam Block, the First Dragoman of the British Legation and repeated once 
again that he had received word from Tahsin that Hallward was forcing Armenians to 
sign petitions against the Sultan and encouraging sedition.514    
 
In a letter to the Earl of Kimberley, Currie stressed that he had the utmost confidence in 
Hallward's truthfulness and discretion.  Currie believed that simply the threat of sending 
Chermside would probably suffice in pressuring the Ottoman Government to withdraw 
its claims. According to Currie, "The Vali is simply trumping up false statements, 
supported by false witnesses, as a defence against the exposure of his misdeeds."515  
Implicitly, Chermside’s investigation of Hallward would involve an investigation of what 
had taken place in the mountains behind Muş.   
 
It is important to stress again at this point that different actors in the Ottoman State had 
very different responses to the Sasun massacre.  Both Tahsin and Zeki were part of the 
Palace system.   They both stressed that there had been no indiscriminate killings.  The 
Porte seemed to be willing to admit that violence had taken place, and suggested that 
Tahsin and others be held responsible.  On November 10, Said Paşa, the Minister of 
                                                        
513 BOA, HR. SYS, 2842/9, reproduced in OB III, pp. 36-37; FO 424-178, November 9, 1894, pp. 257-259.  
 
514 FO 424-178, November 9, 1894, p. 258 
 




Foreign Affairs, even admitted to Ambassador Currie that some sort of mass killing had 
taken place and that Tahsin was to blame.516   Currie asked again for the proper facilities 
for the departure of Colonel Chermside.   
 
Meanwhile, the ABCFM missionaries continued to circulate accounts of what took place 
to the British consuls and to different mission stations.  Many of these letters would 
eventually be widely published in the press.  Others were sent on to the Foreign Office as 
more evidence of what was taking place in Anatolia.517  It was likely through these 
networks of information dissemination that the first news of Sasun finally reached the 
mainstream British Press.  On November 12, Edwin Pears, the Daily News Correspondent 
in Istanbul, who had close ties with the ABCFM, reported that: 
It is impossible to obtain the correct details of the massacre 
of Armenians in the region of Sassoun, near Moosh, 
because all news is carefully interdicted, and the Turkish 
officials deny that there has been anything more than the 
suppression of a small rising by the Armenians who refused 
to pay taxes. But details have nevertheless been received by 
merchants and others which give reason to fear that very 
grave outrages have been committed. One account speaks 
of three thousand being killed, including women and 
children, and twenty-five villages as being destroyed. The 
nearest English Consul is at Van, and at this season the 
district in question is almost inaccessible from Van. The 
version most commonly credited here is that certain 
villages were looted by Kurds in the absence of the men, 
that the latter soon afterwards followed and recaptured their 
own property, but that troops were then sent against them 
and their villages ruthlessly attacked. The matter has been 
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517 ABCFM archives, Reel 694, November 10, 1894; also, published in Greene 1895, as Document No. 7, 




for some time engaging the serious attention of the 
Ambassador.518 
 
This report received little attention in Great Britain.  It wouldn’t be until November 17, 
nearly five days later, that the news of Sasun would begin to attract widespread public 
interest.   
 
The Ottoman State was doing everything it could to prevent Chermside from leaving 
Istanbul and heading to conduct an investigation in Muş and Sasun.  Said Paşa, the 
Foreign Minister, suggested that the presence of a military attaché of the British Consul 
might enflame seditious sentiment.  Said Paşa requested in the name of the Sultan that 
Chermside's investigation be cancelled. Currie and Said discussed the possibility of 
removing Tahsin and of appointing Graves to investigate Hallward instead.519  
Ambassador Currie agreed to postpone Chermside’s investigation.  Nevertheless, it was 
increasingly clear that solutions that would have sufficed for both the Porte bureaucracy 
and the British government were not acceptable for the Palace.   The Sultan roundly 
rejected both of the proposals made by Foreign Minister Said Paşa.   
 
Back in Istanbul, the evidence that something horrible had taken place in Sasun continued 
to mount. In a confidential dispatch, Currie reported that Nélidoff, the Russian 
Ambassador, had confronted the Ottoman Government about the events in the Sasun 
Mountains and admonished the Sultan for responding with such severity.520  In response 
                                                        
518 Daily News, November 12, 1894. 
 
519 FO 424-178 - Currie, pp. 265-266; BOA, Y. EE, 160/76 reproduced in OB III, November 13, 1894, pp. 
37-40.  
 




to the increasing attention, the Palace began to disseminate more broadly their version of 
events.  Making extensive use mostly of Zeki Paşa’s account, Süreyya presented another 
memorandum to Ambassador Currie on November 15.521   This same memo was sent the 
next day to Ambassador Rüstem in London and to Ambassador Mavroyeni Bey in 
Washington D.C.522  This same report was published in the British and American press 
soon thereafter as the official account of what took place in Sasun.  According to this 
official story:  
Some insurgent Armenians, with arms from abroad, are 
committing outrages, and have joined some rebel Kurds 
and burnt and devastated Mussulman villages, situated in 
these parts. To give some idea of the ferocity of these 
Armenian bands, it is sufficient to state that, among other 
acts, they have burnt alive a Mussulman after inserting 
explosives in his stomach. 
 
Some regular troops have been sent to the locality, with 
orders to protect the peaceable inhabitants from all these 
depredations; and contrary to the calumnies which have 
been uttered with respect to the military expedition, the 
troops have not only protected and respected the 
submissive part of the population and the women and 
children, but have also, in the loyal discharge of their duty, 
restored order and public tranquility to the satisfaction of 
the peaceable inhabitants. It has also been alleged that the 
Kurds laid hands on the furniture, effects, and cattle of the 
fugitive Armenians. Such is not the case. The brigands 
themselves carried them off with them to the mountains 
before rising in revolt, and placed them in the charge of 
their Kurdish friends. Neither it is true that several 
Armenian women were abducted by the Kurds; these 
women, of the families of the bandits above mentioned, 
betook themselves of their own accord, to the insurgent 
Kurds.  
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November 15, 1894, p. 270 also, PP Turkey 1895/1, pp. 25-26.   
 
522 FO 424-178, pp. 264-265, November 16, 1894; Foreign Relations, p. 718.  Another variation of this 





As regards the Armenian villages which are said to have 
been destroyed, the villages in question were in fact those 
of the Armenian insurgents, which had been cleared out by 
them before they took to brigandage.  
 
As to the statements in a certain report to the effect that the 
Armenians are oppressed and ill-treated by the Kurdish 
tribe "Bekranli," they are a pure invention; and, moreover, 
the unfortunate man, who was burnt and tortured by the 
Armenians, was one of the tribe in question. 523 
 
 
In a last ditch maneuver, Said Paşa once again tried to dissuade Currie from sending 
Colonel Chermside to investigate Vice-Consul Hallward by proposing that a commission 
made up of trust-worthy men from the Sultan’s household investigate, “into the events 
which have taken place in the Sassoon district as well as into all the reports mentioned in 
the Memorandum presented to his Imperial Majesty by Her Majesty's Embassy on the 1st 
November.”  Abdülhamid II stressed that it was in “his own interest to inquire into the 
facts as reported,” and promised the Ambassador that the investigation “will be carried 
out in a just and impartial manner, and that punishment will fall on the guilty.”524 
 
Finally, to remove any need for an investigation of Hallward, the Sultan assured the 
British that he didn’t believe that Vice-Consul Hallward had incited the local Armenians 
to rebellion and offered to drop all the charges.  This seemed like a good offer, and Currie 
suggested to the Earl of Kimberley that they accept the proposal as long as it was strictly 
adhered to. In a confidential dispatch to the Earl of Kimberley, Currie wrote that, “given 
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524 FO 424/178, Sir P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley, November 16, 1894, pp. 265, also reproduced in 




the Sultan's determination to prevent Chermside from conducting an investigation, his 
presence will do the Armenians "more harm than good."525  The Earl of Kimberley was 
pleased that the Sultan promised an impartial investigation. He noted to Ambassador 
Currie that, "For your confidential information I may add that accounts of the massacres 
have reached the Armenian Association, and a cry of indignation in the press here is to be 
expected."526   
 
The News of Sasun reaches London 
 
On November 15, Garabed Hagopian, the chair of the Armenian Patriotic Association 
sent the Earl of Kimberley a letter on the violence in Sasun with a supporting document 
from Bitlis dated October 9, 1894.527  The document from Bitlis was anonymous and 
spoke in rather vague terms.  But what it described was the systematic ravaging of the 
mountain communities of Sasun by Ottoman regular troops: 
Bitlis, October 9, 1894 – You have queried as to the 
soldiers being at Moush, and so bringing cholera.  Prudence 
hints brevity, and an indirect route.  Our chief magnate 
seems like another Nero.  Last year great things were going 
on in the mountains south of Moush.  Though only a very 
few Nationalists seemed to have been there, a battle took 
place in their self-defense, the magnate got his medal from 
Constantinople as having wiped out a big rebellion.  This 
year a few more Nationalists, perhaps 10 to 14, were said to 
be there.  The leading Sheikh was forced to set the ball 
rolling to escape a trap for himself.  The Kurds made a dash 
and carried off oxen of Armenians; the latter find their oxen, 
one just killed, and three wounded.  The Kurds at once 
carried their dead down to Moush, and thrown them down 
before the Government, saying Armenian soldiers had 
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overrun the land, killing and plundering them, &c.  This 
furnished the pretext for massing troops from far and near, 
cholera or no cholera.  Erzingan (?), pasha of soldiers, 
made a desperate race on, the marshal coming a little later; 
the pasha is said to have hung it from from his breast, after 
reading it to his soldiers, an order from Constantinople to 
cut the Armenians up, root and branch, adjuring them to do 
if they loved their King and Government.  Nearly all these 
things are related here and there by the soldiers who 
participated in the horrible carnage, some of them weeping, 
claiming that the Kurds did more and declaring that what 
they did was to obey orders.528 
 
At the same time, Ardern George Hulme Beaman, the Varna-based correspondent for the 
Standard, published another article on Sasun.  Beaman had been part of the first class of 
Levant Student Interpreters and had served as a British Foreign Officer in Beirut, 
Damascus, and Cairo before becoming a journalist. 529  Both articles (the anonymous 
from Bitlis and Beaman’s) drew comparisons between what happened in Batak in the 
1870s, and what happened in Sasun in the summer of 1894.530  And both articles placed 
greatest responsibility for the violence on the shoulders of Tahsin Paşa, the Vali of Bitlis.  
The ‘anonymous’ report from Bitlis went so far as to liken Tahsin to “another Nero.”531  
The articles also differed greatly in tone and detail.  It is very likely that Beaman retained 
a number of important contacts within the British Legation in Istanbul.  In very similar 
words to Currie’s reports, Beaman’s report in the Standard noted that the, “Sultan 
expressed his horror" at Hallward's report.532   
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529 See Ardern George Hulme Beaman, Twenty Years in the Near East (London, 1898). 
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531 London Times, November 17, 1894.  
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It is worth taking a moment here to emphasize a rather simple point.  Ever since the days 
of Stanford Shaw, and reiterated as gospel by many of his academic descendents in the 
United States, there has been a hoary impression within Ottoman Studies that the British 
Press was a rather ‘unreliable’ source of historical material for the Ottoman Empire.  
(One wonders to what extent the fears of the Hamidian State concerning dangers of the 
Press have influenced the convictions of historians toiling in the Ottoman Archives.)  
Based on a careful examination of the material from ABCFM archives, confidential 
British documentation, and the British Press, it is clear that the lion’s share of the articles 
that were published in the Press can be traced back to sources either from (1) special 
correspondents conducting investigative journalism; (2) missionaries and (3) consuls.  
The sources for each of these three classes varied tremendously, although certain patterns 
might be observed.   
 
The special correspondents relied on a combination of local intermediaries, but, as we 
shall see as this chapter unfolds, often worked closely with the British consuls in 
interviewing a wide range of local inhabitants.  The missionaries often gathered their 
accounts from their Protestant community.  In the case of Sasun, however, the 
missionaries often received their narratives from the rumors carried by both soldiers and 
survivors.  In turn, the British consuls relied on the accounts furnished by members of the 
ABCFM, as well as accounts officially and unofficially relayed from members of the 
Ottoman State.  In other words, the articles in many of the leading organs of the British 
Press broadcast accounts that were very similar to those held in both missionary and 




foreign office possession.  In order to evaluate each article, one must first understand 
where the story came from, and who told it.  The strategy adopted here has been to trace 
each narrative of violence – regardless of where they appeared – back to its original 
sources.   In order to do this, it is important to construct an understanding of the 
information network, or how information travelled from Bitlis, Muş and Sasun to distant 
cities such as Istanbul, London and Boston.    
 
The ABCFM missionaries acted as brokers between the local communities and outsiders. 
The ABCFM missionaries often exchanged narratives with the British consuls.  
Sometimes the missionaries would send letters to the British consul in their region, and 
sometimes they would pass information along when the British consul stayed at their 
house.   The ABCFM missionaries also sometimes passed information directly to 
travelers or to journalists.  When the ABCFM sent reports to the Bible House in Istanbul 
or to the headquarters of the American Board in Boston, they were aware that parts of 
their letters would be published in missionary publications like the Missionary Herald.  
However, over time the editors of Missionary Herald grew increasingly cautious about 
publishing sensitive material that may endanger the lives of missionaries or threaten to 
destabilize their relationship with the Ottoman government.  In frustration, several of the 
ABCFM missionaries who were born in the Ottoman Empire – and may have felt that 
‘their’ communities were of greater importance that the ‘mission’ of the Board – began to 
send material directly to newspapers and to write articles themselves.533   
                                                        
533 The three most important examples of this pattern are George Perkins Knapp, Orson Pardy Allen and 
Frederick Davis Greene.  I will discuss Allen and Davis in a different section.   As with almost all the 
missionary documentation, George P. Knapp’s letter was reproduced in a number of different places, 





After accounts of the Sasun violence had been published in two solidly Conservative 
bastions like the Standard and the Times, in addition to the Liberal Daily News, 
newspapers across Europe and United States began to address the issue of massacres.  On 
November 18, Ambassador Currie urged the Sultan to send the Commission of Inquiry 
“as soon as possible.”534  Currie warned the Sultan that without an investigation “it would 
be impossible to arrest a torrent of accusations, true or false, which will turn against the 
Sultan and his Government and may have effects that were as regrettable as those which 
followed the incidents in Bulgaria.”535 
 
Back in London, on November 17, a vigorous debate was launched over two questions.  
First, was there in fact a massacre in Sasun?   And, second, if there was, did 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(FO 424/182, pp. 83-84.)  A version that is slightly redacted or censored appears in The Hartford Seminary 
Record, vol. 5 (1895), pp. 273-4. An abbreviated and paraphrased version appears in a consul dispatch from 
Hallward to Graves from the end of January 1895 (Parliamentary Papers Turkey 1895, no.1, Vice-Consul 
Hallward to Graves, p. 85). It is very likely that Knapp wrote his letter with the help of the other ABCFM.  
Although his name is no where listed, the evidence strongly points to his authorship.  First, and foremost, 
the level of detail suggests that this is from someone who lives in Bitlis.  Second, based only on the fact 
that this was published in the Hartford Seminary suggests that the writer was part of the ABCFM network.  
Third, while there were certainly other graduates of Hartford Theological Seminary in the Ottoman Empire 
(for instance, George White, ’87), George Perkins Knapp (’90) was the only graduate in Bitlis. We have 
confirming evidence from Grace Higley Knapp, the sister of George Perkins Knapp.  In her work of 
collected memoir, The Tragedy of Bitlis, she wrote, “Refugees escaping to Bitlis brought stories of fearful 
atrocities perpetrated in those remote fastnesses. Afire with indignation and horror, Mr. Knapp wrote an 
account of what happened, and sent it to the London Times.” (p. 114).  A redacted but faithful version of 
this long same text was published in the London Times over the course of three days (March 29 and 30 and 
April 13, 1895.   
 
 
534 FO 424-178, November 18, 1894, p. 267.  
 
535 Currie wrote: “L'urgence d'une telle enquête est aujourd'hui beaucoup plus grande. Les informations, qui 
n'étaient alors qu'en route, sont maintenant arrivées et commencent à être circulées par la presse 
Européenne. A moins que le Gouvernement Anglais et les autres Gouvernements qui veulent du bien à 
l'Empire Ottoman ne puissent dire qu'une Commission d'Enquête est déjà partie, ou est sur le point de partir, 
il deviendra impossible d'arrêter le torrent d'accusations, fausses ou vraies, qui sera tourné contre le Sultan 
et son Gouvernement et qui pourra avoir des effets aussi regrettables que ceux qui ont suivi les incidents en 




responsibility lie with the ‘Kurds’, with the local authorities, or with the central Ottoman 
Government?  Different responses to these debates were encapsulated within the pages of 
the London Times.  In the same issue, the London Times published: a version of the Zeki 
Report provided by the Ottoman Foreign Ministry to Ambassador Rüstem Paşa; the 
account from Bitlis dated October 9 published by Garabed Hagopian; and a very cautious 
statement from the London Times.  On the one hand, the editors conceded that it was 
“only too probable that something of the kind has occurred.”  On the other hand, the 
editors carefully distanced themselves from “the alleged atrocities, as to which, it is right 
to observe, no particulars of place and time were given, were carried out under direct 
orders from Constantinople.”  The editors continued, “It is, unfortunately too true that the 
well-known humanity of the Sultan is not always found to be operative all over his vast 
empire.”536 
 
Much depended on the provenance of the (anonymous) Bitlis letter.  Was it written, as 
certain writers claimed, by the Armenian Committees in London?  Was the writer in a 
position to learn what had happened in Sasun?  Did the writer possess evidence that the 
central Ottoman government had been involved?  Two days later, Hagopian defended the 
source of his letter, which he stressed, “is not from any political source whatever.”  
Hagopian described the writer as “an independent observer on the spot,” who “records 
what he has heard and knows.”  Moreover: 
He is not of Armenian nationality and has had no relations, 
direct or indirect with the Armenian Patriotic Association.  
The letter was sent in a roundabout way and finally reached 
a gentleman of this country, himself not an Armenian.  His 
                                                        




first thought was to send it to you for publication in the 
Times; then a high dignitary of the Church of England 
offered to write to [Prime Minister] Lord Roseberry about 
it, but they finally determined that it would be best to send 
it to me, as probably having the readiest means of reaching 
headquarters.  A more careful perusal of the letter from 
Bitlis will reveal to you the fact that it is a[n] original 
document, that that the writer writes it with no other object 
than to acquaint his friends about the things the Turks 
themselves were reporting in the city of Bitlis and the 
region where he had been touring – events of appalling 
horror, which had revolted his feelings as a man, a 
Christian and a philanthropist.  The letter may be, as you 
say, “distinguished by the absence of specific indication of 
dates and places, but you forget the difficulties of his 
situation.  He could not verify dates and places without 
exciting the suspicion on the part of those whose dark 
deeds he feels compelled and has the misfortune to 
report.537  
   
Who wrote this letter?  The author was almost certainly Royal M. Cole, a longstanding 
ABCFM missionary who had lived in the Ottoman Empire for many years.538   Born in 
1839, Royal M. Cole belonged to the generation that fought in the Civil War.  He 
followed a pattern held by many members of the ABCFM born in the United States.  
After an undergraduate education at Amherst and graduate study at Bangor Theological 
Seminary, he was ordained by the ABCFM.  And, like many of the missionaries, he met 
Eliza Cobleigh , soon to be his wife, through a missionary dating network.  The ABCFM 
assigned Royal and Eliza Cole to Erzurum in 1868.  Aside from three furloughs (about a 
                                                        
537 Garabed Hagopian, London Times, November 19, 1894.  
 
538 While I was not able to locate this letter in the ABCFM archives, it is republished by Frederick Davis 
Greene in The Review of Reviews, January, 1895, pp. 45-54. According to the forward of an unpublished 
memoir written sixteen years later, James Barton, the head of the ABCFM observed that, "The pen of Dr. 
Cole was the first to give the facts of the Sassoun slaughter of Christians to the world..." See, Royal M. 
Cole, Interior Turkey Reminiscences: Forty Years in Kourdistan (Armenia), MSS, Archives & Special 
Collections at Amherst College, p. 1.  A close reading of the 9 October 1894 letter reveals additional 
evidence that its author was Royal M. Cole.  Most tellingly, Tahsin is referred to as “Nero” in both the 9 




year each), Royal Cole lived in the Ottoman Empire for the next thirty years.  Like many 
of the missionaries, during this long period of his life, Cole spent the first few years 
learning the local languages.  Within the first year, Cole was delivering sermons in 
Armenian.  In an 1873 letter to a professor at Amherst, Cole noted that he had “come to 
speak with about as much freedom, I think, as I should in English. Of course, I have not 
so wide a range of words.”539   
 
The Coles lived through the Anatolian hardships of the war years and famine during the 
late 1870s and early 1880s.  In 1885, the Coles moved from Erzurum to join the Knapps 
in Muş.540  The Coles’ move to the city of Muş coincided with the advent of the 
Armenian United Society School.  The ABCFM was often in competition with the 
Armenian Society School, both of which operated as vehicles of conversion.  Both the 
Armenian United Society School and the ABCFM had parallel ‘civilizing missions’ 
although they were often not in alignment.  Cole described the struggle between the 
schools in the region in nearly zero-sum terms.  In 1893, Cole wrote that, “The 
Armenians were not slow to note the importance of such a centre, and early made it one 
of their first strongholds for educational work; but being nationalist, sui generis, their 
schools came into conflict with the government, and some of their teachers, with pupils, 
have been sent off into exile, thus crippling their cause but turning the people toward us 
all the more.”541  
                                                        
539 Cited in Rebecca Hennings, description of “Interior Turkey Reminiscences” written for the Archives & 
Special Collections at Amherst College.  
 
540 Missionary Herald 89, September 1893, p. 357.  
 





Meanwhile, both the ABCFM and the United Society were taking jaunts into the 
mountains to spread their gospels.  The schools of the ABCFM, the United Society, and 
the Ottoman State all aimed at reproducing the notions of ‘civilization’ and the 
distinctions drawn between people (i.e. Armenian vs. Kurd) of the lowlands.  When Cole 
first arrived in Bitlis, he described his first encounter with the mountain people as one of 
shock.  In January 1885 Cole wrote: 
Oh, so little like human beings are the people! so near to a 
level with their domestic animals among which they 
hibernate!  Christians in name, but as far removed from its 
principles as the east from the west.  Many of the children – 
some of decidedly larger growth, were almost in a state of 
nudity, and what is more, not ashamed, however much we 
might be.  As for readers in the village, you might as well 
ask for a philosopher! Much as they had degenerated, we 
noticed their language had quite kept pace.  They could no 
more speak correctly than they could boast of proper 
religious principles. When good, pure Armenian was aimed 
at them, they would open their eyes in astonishment, as if 
another unmeaning Bable had been let loose upon them.  
For them to speak is to mix Koordish, Armenian, and 
Turkish in such a medley as to make rational people go 
mad, and wish that they had the good sense to distinguish 
the race they belong to and make their language 
conform.542 
 
It is interesting to note that Cole’s description of the people of the mountains is 
reminiscent of descriptions from the Bitlis Gazette discussed in Chapter Three.  
 
By the 1890s, Cole documented a radical increase in suspicion and arrests.  
In April 1894, a few months before the massacres, Cole was preaching in 
Derkevank, one of the villages in the Muş plains. Suddenly: 
                                                        




All at once comes in a regimental wearer, who sets to 
driving them all out, with such flourishes of his stick as 
indicated what they would have felt if I was not present.  
“What are you doing here?  Who is this?” coming in front 
of me.  On his questions as to whether we were having 
some religious meetings, I answered him squarely as to 
who I was and my office, referring him to his governor, 
whose road paper was in my pocket.  Upon this, he 
subsided as far as I was concerned, though the insults and 
abuse for the people had but begun.543 
 
Cole described in his memoir how a general context of suspicion had enabled Tahsin 
Paşa to exaggerate the situation in the mountains and thereby attain an Imperial order for 
the destruction that took place in the late summer of 1894.  If Tahsin had taken the 
“trouble – or the courage – to investigate they might have found perhaps a score of well-
armed desperate Armenians” bent on organizing the Mountaineers into self-defense 
bands: 
But instead of investigating to see what might be casting such rebellious 
shadows Tahsin sets about inciting the Kurdish aghas to an open attack, 
assuring them the rich plunder that will be theirs.  ‘But,’ say the Kurds (to 
whom Armenians pay certain tribute, as well as taxes to the Government), 
‘how can we do this wicked thing against our Armenians who so largely 
constitute our livelihood, paying us tribute as well as serving in other 
ways.’  But the regular soldiers were used to obeying orders and especially 
when their fiendish officers threatened to turn the cannon on them if they 
did not slay the Armenians pitilessly, the slaughter was not long 
delayed.544   
 
Throughout this period, the ABCFM missionaries scattered across Anatolia continued to 
keep each other abreast about what happened in Sasun.  Variations of Cole’s October 9th 
letter were passed from one missionary station to another.545  Some copies ended up in 
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the hands of British consuls.546 On the one hand, many of the ABCFM missionaries 
wanted to make sure that the news of the massacres was reported in the press.  Passing on 
the news to the British consuls may not be enough.  The British consuls were under strict 
orders not to communicate with the Press without authorization.  On the other hand, if the 
Ottoman State discovered that the missionaries were relaying the stories they were 
hearing from survivors and soldiers, the very future of the ABCFM in the Ottoman 
Empire might be imperiled.  A missionary letter dated November 19, 1894 made both of 
these concerns clear:  
The Bitlis friends are justly anxious to have the truth of this 
dreadful matter known in the outside world, but it is utterly 
impossible for them to get it out. The Government seems to 
be looking out well for their outgoing letters, as we know a  
number have been sent to us which have not come through, 
and it is probable all their letters may be suppressed, or at 
least examined. Should the Government find accounts of 
this matter in their letters, or be able to trace such accounts 
in them, or us, they would doubtless contrive to wreak 
some form of revenge on them or their work, so it is very 
important that whatever is published should be in such a 
way that it can't be traced to us. 
 
It does seem as if complete ruin of the Armenian race in 
Turkey were impending unless some outside influence is 
brought to bear, and with them would go our work, and all 
the outlay that has been made, and which ought to bring 
enlightenment ultimately to the Moslems as well as the 
Armenians. 
 
Our English Consul has just visited Moush, and secured 
accurate information, which confirms all that is contained 
in the inclosed letters. This information has been sent to his 
Government, but he is not at liberty to write to the press, 
and I do not know to what extent this official information 
will get before the general public. So anything we can do to 
enlighten the world is desirable.547 
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While it is difficult to trace exactly how Cole’s account from Bitlis dated October 9 
ended up in the London Times of November 17, it is very likely that the ex-missionary 
Frederick Davis Greene was instrumental in getting the letter to Garabed Hagopian.548   
 
Frederick Davis Greene was born into an ABCFM missionary family in the Ottoman 
Empire in 1863.   Greene spent his childhood in Bursa before moving with his father to 
Istanbul.  Like many American-Ottoman children, he was sent to the United States for his 
higher education.  He attended Phillips Academy, and like Cole and many other ABCFM 
missionaries, Amherst College.549  He attended graduate school at Chicago Theological 
Seminary, Yale Divinity School and Andover Theological Seminary.550  Greene served 
for four years as a missionary with the ABCFM in Van between 1890 and 1894.   
Ordered back to the United States for his health, Greene resigned from the board in 1894.  
It is possible that he resigned in order to publically begin preaching on behalf of the 
communities of Armenian Protestants in the Ottoman Empire.  As Greene put it in a mass 
meeting in June 1895, “It is five years since I sailed from these shores a missionary from 
Christendom to Armenia, I find myself now a missionary from Armenia to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
548 Aside from being a member of the ABCFM, Greene was also a member of the Anglo-Armenian 
Association.  See, Haïasdan, January – April 1892.  According to British confidential documents, it was 
Rev. F.D. Greene who served as a conduit linking the ABCFM with the Anglo-Armenian Association.  F.S. 
Stevenson, the head of the Anglo-Armenian Association and Member of Parliament then passed the 
information on to the Foreign Office.  Greene was the son of Joseph Kingsbury Greene (1834-1917).  
Joseph Kingsbury served as an ABCFM missionary for over five decades and had served as an editor of the 
ABCFM-organ Avedaper, published in Armenian, Armeno-Turkish and Greco-Turkish between 1862 and 
1874.  He is very possible that he passed on ABCFM news to his son.  
 
549 Amherst College had been founded to provide education for missionaries.  The motto of the school 
“Terras Irradient” (“that they may illumine the lands”) reflected this.   
 




Christendom.”551  Over the next few months, Greene would become a key figure in the 
effort to publicize the Sasun violence in both Great Britain and the United States.   
 
The London Times publication of Garabed Hagopian’s memorandum on November 17 
opened space for a debate about the nature of the Ottoman Government that was carried 
out in the Press.  These responses can be roughly divided into three different camps.  In 
the first camp was Canon Malcolm MacColl, a longstanding ally of Gladstone who had 
risen to particular fame for reports on the Bulgarian atrocities of 1876.  In an article in the 
Liberal organ, The Daily News, Canon MacColl lambasted The Times for calling into 
doubt the provenance of the October 9 letter published by Garabed Hagopian and foretold 
that the “Commission nominated by the Sultan will confirm the audacious fiction which 
even The Times laughs to scorn, namely that the atrocities in question were committed by 
Armenian brigands acting in concert with bands of Kurds.”552  Canon MacColl’s writing 
was colored by more than a tint of Islamophobia and maintained that there was a 
conspiracy organized by the Ottoman State to oppress its Christian population.   
 
Henry Felix Woods, a decorated British-Ottoman member of Abdülhamid II’s military 
household, exemplified the second camp by vociferously defending the Ottoman Sultan 
and State.  Writing in the Conservative daily The Morning Post, Woods praised the 
regime of Sultan Abdülhamid II, who was ‘solicitous’ for all his subjects.  Woods 
implied that the October 9 letter was simply a fabrication of Armenian Societies, 
“strenuously endeavoring to make capital out of certain unfortunate events that have 
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occurred within the last few months in the eastern part of Asia Minor, for the furtherance 
of their ambitious and impractical designs.”553  Even if some violence had occurred, 
Woods explained that, "insurrection cannot be suppressed with rose water."  Woods Paşa, 
the perennial advocate of the Sultan, maintained that there was a conspiracy organized by 
Armenian Committees in Europe against the Ottoman State.  
 
Between the attack on the Sultan, brandished in the Daily News, and the defense of the 
Sultan carried out by the Morning Post, was the third camp which eschewed sweeping 
conspiratorial theories and focused instead on the widespread corruption in the Ottoman 
East and the problems of centralization.  Harry Finnis Blosse Lynch was a good example 
of this third perspective.  Unlike MacColl, who had travelled only to the Balkans in his 
earlier investigations of Batak in the 1870s, and Woods Paşa, who rarely left Istanbul, 
Lynch based his arguments on extensive travel in the Eastern portions of the Ottoman 
Empire.  His family had long been associated with the Ottoman Empire.  His mother was 
Harriet Taylor, the daughter of Colonel Robert Taylor, a British political resident in 
Baghdad, and his Armenian wife, Rosa Mosco.  His father was the Irish traveler, Thomas 
Kerr Lynch, who spent years travelling in the Ottoman and Qajar Empires.  Lynch was 
educated at elite schools such as Eton, the University of Heidelberg, Trinity College, 
Cambridge and Middle Temple.  Instead of pursuing a career in law, in the late 1880s 
Lynch opted to work for his family’s company, Lynch Brothers, a commercial firm that 
exported goods from Great Britain to the Ottoman Empire.  In 1893-1894, Lynch traveled 
first to the Russian controlled Caucasus and then to Erzurum, Van and Bitlis.   
                                                        





Writing to the editor of the Times after reading Garabed Hagopian’s memorial, Lynch 
laid out some context based on personal observation and close study.  Lynch wrote: 
The Sasun is a mountainous region on the south of the great 
plain of Mush, and forms a part of the zone of terrace 
ranges that lead down from the plateau of Armenia to the 
alluvial flats through which the Euphrates and the Tigris 
flow.  The authority of the Turkish power is scarcely more 
than nominal in the district.  The Armenians who inhabit it 
have been obliged to seek the protection of the neighboring 
Kurdish tribes and to place themselves in what resembles a 
feudal relation to their protectors in order to escape a more 
irregular, but less tolerable exploitation at the hands of 
marauding Kurdish bands.  The tribes with whom they have 
associated themselves are not always on the best of terms 
with the Ottoman officials, and the revolutionary party in 
Armenia, despairing of effecting anything among their 
countrymen on the plateau whose spirit has been cowed by 
the severe measures enforced by the local governors against 
them, have betaken themselves to this wild country and 
have no doubt exercised a fermenting influence upon the 
elements antagonistic to Ottoman rule. The leader of the 
movement during its period of inception was one Damadian, 
an Armenian of some education, who is supposed to have 
been connected with the affair of Koum Kapou. Last year 
this man fell into the hands of the authorities -- he was 
probably betrayed by his own people -- and he was lying in 
the prison of Bitlis at the time of my visit during the 
autumn of 1893. While it is true, on the one hand, that the 
left wing of the Armenian party cannot escape the 
responsibility of having promoted the troubles which have 
disturbed and are still agitating the Sasun, it would be 
unjust, on the other hand, to exonerate the Turkish officials 
from blame in connexion with this matter. I cannot help 
thinking that the Governor of Bitlis, in personally 
conducting an expedition into the country last year, 
considerably magnified the proportions of the difficulty, 
and it is certain that he gained high favour in Government 
circles at Constantinople on the ground of having quelled 
an Armenian revolt.554  
 
                                                        




Upon the publication of Cole’s letter, the Anglo-Armenian Association leadership555 sent 
a letter to the Earl of Kimberley, the Foreign Minister, stating that the Ottoman-organized 
Commission of Inquiry was “a totally inadequate measure.”  Instead, the Anglo-
Armenian Association made two requests:  that the British Government organize an 
international commission to investigate the violence in Sasun, and then publish copies of 
the consul reports from the Ottoman East. 
 
In a letter dated November 21, the Foreign Office maintained that while they were unable 
to provide the reports, they promised the Anglo-Armenian Association that the Sultan 
was conducting an impartial investigation.556  This exchange was published in the British 
Press on November 22.557 The Foreign Office’s promise that the Sultan was investigating 
the Sasun massacres was now a matter of public record. It was in this context that the 
Earl of Kimberley wrote a strict letter to the Ambassador ordering that Currie make sure 
that the commission organized by the Sultan was impartial and began as soon possible.  
The Earl of Kimberley recommended using the threat of sending Chermside to ensure 
compliance from the Ottoman Government.558  
 
                                                        
555  James Bryce and other Radical Liberal Parliamentarians initially founded the Anglo-Armenian 
association in 1890, the year after the Musa affair hit the British Press. Ever since their formation their 
demands had rested on two pillars.  First, the Anglo-Armenian Association wanted the Foreign Office to 
publically release consular reports.  Second, the Anglo-Armenian Association wanted the British State to 
protect the lives and livelihoods of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.  The Anglo-Armenian Association 
lambasted the British Foreign Office for withholding the situation’s severity in the Ottoman East.  In the 
eyes of the Anglo-Armenian Association, the Foreign Office was complicit in covering up the massacres in 
the Ottoman Empire.  
 
556 FO 424-178, November 21, 1894, p. 272 
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While the Press in Great Britain was beginning to devote more attention to the Sasun 
violence, there was a conspicuous silence about Sasun in the multilingual Ottoman Press.  
Not only were all the newspapers forbidden from printing anything about Sasun, most of 
the leading British, French, Russian and Greek newspapers published between the 14th 
and the 18th of November were confiscated by the Ottoman authorities.559   So far, the 
only article about Sasun that had been published in any Ottoman paper was the 
mazbata560 relayed by Tahsin Paşa from Armenians “who had no part in the acts of the 
brigands and armed rebels of the town of Talouri in the district of Sasun” and who 
wished to show their gratitude to the Ottoman State for the “method of the dispersion of 
said brigands.”561  On November 23, the Ottoman Government caused a second article to 
be published about Sasun.  According to this article: 
Some newspapers lately published in Europe have declared, 
contrary to the truth, that some Armenian villages in the 
township of Sassoun have been destroyed by Ottoman 
troops, and that at this time some loss of life has occurred.  
Others, exaggerating this news, have said that the reason 
why this has not been known in Europe until this time is 
that travelers who have started from that region have been 
prevented from traveling.  It is perfectly manifest that His 
Majesty’s subjects residing in the township of Sassoun are 
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560 It might be worth taking a moment to reflect on the issue of mazbata or petition letters. There are dozens 
of documents in the British confidential sources that call attention to the many ways in which these petition 
letters reflected not the ‘independent’ will of the local Ottoman population but rather the local power 
structures within the bureaucracy.  This was particular the case for politicized issues like the violence at 
Sasun.   According to the British and missionary sources, the local population was often forced to sign a 
petition to the Ottoman government.  These petition letters either usually indicated how everything was 
tranquil under the benevolent rule of the local Ottoman authorities.  Another common trope of coerced 
petition writing were those casting aspersions on outsiders such as the British consuls or 
missionaries.  Outsiders were frequently blamed in these petitions as the perennial progenitors of inter-
communal violence. Those inhabitants of the vilayet of Bitlis who refuse to sign mazbata are viewed as 
seditious and are thrown in prison. 
 
561 See, “The Turkish Press and the Armenian Massacre,” in The Literary Digest, vol. 10, no. 14 (February 




occupied with their own work at present, as always 
heretofore, in complete quiet and comfort, and that 
travelers are going in perfect security to whatever place 
they wish.  But a number of Armenian brigands have 
yielded to the incitements of revolutionists, some time ago 
dared to engage in criminal acts of a nature to disturb the 
peace and security in the neighborhood of Talouri, killing 
stealing, burning and engaging in highway robbery.  Upon 
this the Government naturally took the necessary measures 
to repress the disturbance.   A sufficient number of Imperial 
troops from the Fourth Army Corp were sent, and the evil 
was not allowed to spread, and quiet having been restored, 
the Imperial troops returned to their posts.  In this matter 
there was no intervention of Kurds, but as said above, as is 
proven by the representations of the General commanding 
the Fourth Army Corps and the authorities of the Province 
of Bitlis.  Hence a Commission (the names follow), is about 
to be sent this week to make investigations into the 
unlawful acts of the above mentioned-brigands. Since the 
Imperial Government is well known never to allow conduct 
like that of the recent publications, in respect to the various 
classes of subjects dwelling in quality under its mild and 
equitable rule, this present publication is made to set forth 
the truth and brand these publications as false.562  
 
As this article makes clear, for the Ottoman State, the only ‘true’ accounts of the events 
in Sasun were those represented by the Imperial Servants of Empire: Tahsin Paşa, the 
Vali of Bitlis and Zeki Paşa, the Müşir of the Fourth Army Corps.  Moreover, the 
Commission of Inquiry was being sent “make investigations into the unlawful acts” of 
the Armenian brigands in the mountains.  This statement was completely contrary to the 
agreements carefully arranged between Ambassador Currie and Foreign Minister Said, 
and to the published promises made by the Earl of Kimberley to the Anglo-Armenian 
Association.  On the same day, the Ottoman Government published Imperial Decrees 
conferring decorations on the Mufti of Muş (who was said to have incited the troops 
                                                        
562 The Literary Digest, ibid, p. 422; a slightly different worded version of this communication was 




against the Armenians in the mountains) and Zeki Paşa. Finally, the Ottoman papers 
notified the reading public of the Empire that Celaleddin, the Mutassarıf of Muş (who 
had protested against the massacres) had been dismissed.563   
 
When the Earl of Kimberley learned that “the inquiry is represented as one into the 
criminal conduct of Armenian brigands, and not into the truth of the reported massacre of 
Armenians” he was ‘surprised and pained’.564  Publically embarrassed by this 
announcement by the Ottoman press, from this point forward the British Government 
would make every effort to uncover what took place in the Sasun Mountains in the 
summer of 1894.  Ambassador Currie suggested to Kimberley that the announcement was 
necessary for the Ottoman State to save face, and that while the culprits would be 
publicly whitewashed, they were sure to be privately dealt with.  But for the Earl of 
Kimberley, now that the Foreign Office had publicly made promises that the Ottoman 
State would investigate this matter impartially, this behind-the-scenes justice was no 
longer sufficient.565   
 
On November 25, Ambassador Currie met with Foreign Minister Said.  Currie 
emphasized that the announcement that the Ottoman Commission of Inquiry had been 
                                                        
563 Parliamentary Paper Turkey 1895, no. 1, Sir P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley, November 23, 1894, p. 
27.  
 
564 FO 424/178, The Earl of Kimberley to Sir P. Currie, November 23, 1894, p. 273.  
 
565 FO 424-178, November 24, 1894, pp. 273-4.  It is worth noting that the instructions announced in the 
papers were the same as that given to the Commissioners sent by the Ottomans to investigate.  In a letter to 
the Earl of Kimberley, Ambassador Currie noted that “I am confidentially informed that the instructions 
received from His Imperial Majesty by First Commissioner Abdullah Pasha, were in accordance with the 
version [published in the newspapers], and were so distasteful to that functionary, who is said to have 
honest intentions, that he was with difficulty persuaded to start.” FO 424/178, Sir P. Currie to the Earl of 




charged with investigating the misdeeds of the brigands in the mountains, and not 
whether or not massacres had occurred, left a very bad impression in London.  Currie 
said “that if steps were not taken to satisfy Her Majesty's Government that the Sultan's 
promise would be fulfilled, they might find it necessary to claim a right under the LXIst 
Article of Berlin to send Colonel Chermside to inquire into the treatment of the 
Armenians, and that they might also be forced to publish the Consular Reports from the 
Asiatic provinces, which had been so long withheld.”566  The next day, the Earl of 
Kimberley met with Rüstem, the Ottoman Ambassador.  The Earl of Kimberley informed 
Rüstem that the matter was of such seriousness that the British Cabinet Council had been 
called together to decide the course of action. In a letter reporting the conversation to 
Currie, the Earl of Kimberley wrote that, “I could not impress upon him too earnestly the 
gravity and extent of the consequences to which this entire nullification of the promised 
investigation might give rise.  It was even possible that it might develop into an European 
Question.”567   
 
As November drew to a close, the circulation of news on the violence was beginning to 
escalate dramatically.  Newspapers across Europe were beginning to pick up on the story.  
For instance, on November 23, the Glasgow Herald published an account that reported 
that the Ottoman Government was attempting to cover up the massacre through various 
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567 FO 424/178, The Earl of Kimberley to Sir P. Currie, November 26, 1894, p. 277; BOA, Y. PRK, EŞA, 
20/81 reproduced in OB III, pp. 53-55. It is interesting to observe that the British Legation in Istanbul was 
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stratagems.568  On the evening of the next day, the Anglo-Armenian Association 
announced that the constitution of the Ottoman Commission of Inquiry “was regarded as 
extremely unfortunate.”569  Over the course of the next few months the small membership 
of the Anglo-Armenian Association would become central in efforts to organize mass 
public demonstrations in Great Britain.   
 
On November 27, the Anglo-Armenian Association brought together members of the 
British Parliament with Armenian exiles such as Garabed Hagopian of the Armenian 
Patriotic Association.  The Anglo-Armenian Association resolved:  to request from the 
British Government the last four years of unpublished reports from the consuls in 
Anatolia, to reform the administration of Armenia with an international consular 
commission, and to adopt a “more vigorous policy in dealing with scandals which 
attended the administration of Armenia, and which arrested the attention of the Press and 
people of Europe.”570  Through the following months, the Anglo-Armenian Association 
would continue to demand information and reforms.571   
                                                        
568 Glasgow Herald, November 23, 1894.  This anonymous account seems to have been based on insider 
information from British sources, for it rather vividly describes Tahsin’s quarantine, the charges against 
Hallward and the efforts of the Ottoman State to prevent Chermside from conducting an investigation.  
 
569 Birmingham Daily Post, November 26, 1894. 
 
570 London Times, November 28, 1894.  
 
571 Or as Francis Seymour Stevenson, MP, the chair of the Anglo-Armenian Association put it in a letter to 
the Daily News, the goal was to: “…urge the desirability and necessity of publishing the consular reports 
which had been received by the British Embassy at Constantinople on the subject of the recent massacres, 
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‘adoption of the principle of eternal silence about the horrors that prevail in Armenia.’  The only effect of 
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the country in common with other signatory Powers, by Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty, as well as the 
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While the dissemination of news of Sasun proceeded apace in Europe, the British and 
French governments received further consular confirmation that massacres had taken 
place.  On November 24, the French Consul in Erzurum wrote that in three villages of 
Sasun the people had been systematically put to the sword and the functionaries of the 
Ottoman government seemed to have receive marching orders not to discuss Sasun.572  
Vice-Consul Hallward’s second major report on Sasun, composed nearly three weeks 
earlier, finally reached Istanbul on November 26.  In a note to the Earl of Kimberley, 
Ambassador Currie observed that there were similarities between Hallward’s second 
report and the Royal M. Cole letter published in the Times on the November 17.573 This 
was not a coincidence.  Hallward based his second report on the accounts collected by the 
Bitlis-based ABCFM missionaries.574  
 
The stories of atrocities in Sasun were often interpreted according to local context.  In 
Great Britain, the reference point was often the politics around British rule in Ireland.  In 
the United States, the reference point was lynching in the South of United States and the 
legacies of slavery.  On November 26, the ABCFM headquarters in Boston received 
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573 FO 424-178, November 26, 1894, p. 277. 
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documentation from missionaries across Anatolia depicting the Sasun violence.575  On the 
same day, a mass ‘indignation meeting’ was held at Faneuil Hall in Boston, 
Massachusetts.   The audience was made up mostly of Armenians migrants although the 
speakers included a veritable who’s who of New England liberal and radical Protestants.  
Many of the speakers, like Julia Ward Howe, were well known for their efforts to end 
Slavery three decades before.  The meeting resolved that “whereas, it was the American 
Commission of Inquiry that first convinced Mr. Gladstone of the truth of the Bulgarian 
atrocities,” petitions would be sent to President Cleveland asking him to instruct the US 
Minister in Constantinople, Alexander Terrell, to investigate the matter, either by sending 
investigators independently or by joining a broader investigation by the European 
Powers.576  William Lloyd Garrison, the son of the famous abolitionist of the same name, 
addressed the stake of the United States in violence in distant Sasun:  
America has a two-fold interest in the matter.  The first is 
on account of Armenians, who through persecution have 
sought an asylum here, and many of whom have become 
citizens of the United States.  The other consideration is 
that of humanity.  No nation, in the close relationship 
which modern science and communication establish, can 
regard with impunity wrongs that ostensibly concern only 
the tyrant nation.  They inevitably touch its neighbors also.  
We are all parts of one another.  When a limb is wounded 
the whole body cries out.  Human rights disregarded in 
Louisiana or South Carolina menace human rights 
everywhere.  The protests from abroad, therefore against 
American lynchings are not inopportune, but on the 
contrary are most helpful.  … Men come to me with bated 
breath, pledging me to profoundest secrecy as regards their 
personality, before they divulge atrocities which have come 
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576 Our Day: A Record and Review of Current Reform, Vol. 13, pp. 578-579.  See also, Laura E. Howe 
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to their notice, and which would put them or their relatives 
at home in peril if they should speak.  It brings back to me 
the recollections of the fugitive slave days, when free 
speech was dangerous, but fortunately no Turkish slave-
hunter can pursue and drag back his victim.  But the 
utterance of an imprudent Armenian here might bring 
retaliation up his family in Asia Minor.577   
 
The response of the Ottoman State to increasing articles about Sasun written in the US 
Press was to issue a blanket ban on all newspapers originating from the United States.578  
 
However, at the same time as the news from multiple sources was spreading in Europe 
and the United States, the Ottoman State continued to receive reports from the same 
sources.  According to confidential British sources, the Sultan still refused “to admit to 
any but the version officially published.”579  In a dispatch dated November 26, Tahsin 
Paşa continued to draw conspiratorial links between the “lies published in the English 
newspapers” and the Armenian brigands.  He observed that, “in the Court of Indictment, 
some of the companions of Hampartsoum Boyadjian reported that Boyadjian had said, ‘If 
you spill blood, the British State will send soldiers and establish borders’ [for your 
State].”580  Without naming any names, Tahsin stressed once again that in the Talori 
events, it was the Armenians who had committed atrocities on the loyal Muslim 
population, not the other way around.  Tahsin supported his account by carefully citing 
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the authoritative Zeki Paşa’s report twice.581    
 
Did the Ottoman Government accept Tahsin’s reports at face value?  One explanation 
assumes that the Sultan accepted all the reports from Zeki and Tahsin as true and treated 
the British reports as politically motivated, and thus false.  If this was the case, however, 
why not send Chermside to investigate Hallward and the situation?  Was the Sultan so 
suspicious of British intentions that he believed that Chermside would also report 
falsehoods?  If the Sultan only accepted accounts to be true from those loyal to him, he 
was effectively caught in an echo chamber where his servants reported only what he 
wanted to hear.  Alternatively, if the Sultan knew that massacres had actually occurred, 
there may have been several cover-ups occurring simultaneously.  At the same time that 
Tahsin, the Vali of Bitlis, was attempting to cover his tracks by manufacturing mazbata 
and accusing Hallward of sedition, the Sultan may have been attempting to cover his own.   
 
Based on almost daily interviews with actors both in the Palace and the Porte, Adam 
Block, the chief Dragoman of the British Legation, was convinced that the Sultan “has 
from the first known that a massacre took place in consequence of his orders, and hence 
his aversion to any inquiry.”582  
His Majesty is firmly convinced – and is encouraged in his 
belief by the misleading intelligence from Provincial 
Governors and evil counsel of his entourage – that there is 
a widespread sedition among his Armenian subjects and 
like any other Oriental Ruler, his only method of dealing 
with dissatisfaction and revolt is to break and annihilate the 
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authors of it.  The Vali of Bitlis had informed the Palace 
and the Porte that thousands of Armenians had assembled 
in open rebellion, and the Sultan, in a moment of panic or 
irritation, gave order to stamp out the movement and 
destroy the villages.  It is said that even the Grand Vizier, 
who is the most subservient tool of his Imperial master, 
hesitated to send on the orders, and did not come down that 
day to the Porte, finally he was obliged to obey.583   
 
When the Sultan learned that the news of massacres had reached the press in Great 
Britain, he very angrily reprimanded Süreyya Paşa, the first secretary of the Palace.  
Süreyya Paşa died soon after.  According to Block, there were three different 
explanations for Süreyya’s sudden death.  The first was that, “the Sultan finding out that 
he had been misled by the Vali of Bitlis, Hassan Tahsin, severely reproved and upbraided 
Sureyya, who had recommended him for the post.”  The second explanation was, “That 
Surreya Pasha had remonstrated against the Sultan’s action, and referred to the sweeping 
instruction that he had been ordered to convey to Zeki Paşa, and that thereupon there was 
a scene, in which the Sultan applied to him words of strong abuse, [calling him a] ‘traitor 
and dog of Armenian origin,’ Surreya’s grandfather having been a renegade.”  Finally, 
“that the Sultan had reprimanded and blamed Surreya in no measured terms for having 
exaggerated his orders.”584   
 
This last explanation is very plausible and fits well with the memoirs of the former Grand 
Vizier Kâmil Paşa.  When Kamil Paşa was summoned to the Palace the Sultan confided 
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584 FO 424-178, December 26, p. 389.  According to Dadrian, the French Ambassador Paul Cambon 
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For three nights, I have been unable to sleep.  Having been 
apprised of the savage assaults of the Armenians of Sasun, 
I ordered the apprehension of the rebels and the repression 
of the uprising.  It develops, however, that chief secretary 
(Süreyya Paşa, who subsequently and rather mysteriously 
died and was replaced by Tahsin Paşa), had sent a telegram 
urging the use of severe methods… If I said, “strike” I did 
not say to massacre them.585 
 
Ismail Qemal Bej Vlora586 told a similar story in his memoirs.  According to his account: 
 
The Sultan, in fright sent for Kiamil Pasha, the ex-Grand 
Vizier, one night and instructed him to go to the [British] 
Ambassador and explain to him that the Sultan had given 
no order to massacre, but to put down the revolt by legal 
means.  If there had been excess, it was the fault of the First 
Secretary [Süreyya] in drawing up the telegraphic order 
given to the Commander of the Fourth Army.587 
 
As Adam Block laconically observes, “It is not to be wondered at in these circumstances 
that the Sultan does not want a full inquiry.”  Block continued: 
[Abdülhamid II] thought he could resist the isolated 
pressure of this Embassy by simple denials; he thought he 
could even accuse a British consular official with impunity, 
and that we should remove him, for the note of the Porte 
was written by his orders.   
 
When Colonel Chermside was suggested he immediately 
backed down, and was prepared to do anything to prevent 
his going; he withdrew his accusation against Hallward, 
which he said he never believed in, and promptly suggested 
in his Commission, stating that he did not admit the 
massacres, and that it was the Armenians who were to 
blame.  … Then came the official Communiqué to the 
                                                        
585 This was cited by Dadrian 2001, p. 33, and originally appears in Kamil Paşa’nın Anıları (1989), pp. 
188-189.  
 
586 Ismail Qemal Bey Vlora (1844-1919) was born into a wealthy family in Vlorë.  Ismail Qemal Bey was a 
close associate of the liberal reformer Midhat Paşa.  He was exiled by the Hamidian regime.  After the 
Constitution Revolution of 1908 he was elected to the Ottoman Parliament.  When Albania became 
independent, Ismael Qemal Bey served as its first President.  
 
587 Sommerville Story (ed.) The Memoirs of Ismail Kemal Bey, (London, 1920), p. 259.  
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Press; the Grand Vizier and Saïd Pasha have said it was the 
mistake of a clerk, others after Sureyya’s death attributed it 
falsely to him, for there is no doubt that it was inserted by 
the express orders of the Sultan, and the Grand Vizier told a 
foreign Ambassador that the Director of the Press had 
informed him (‘Iradé’) from the Palace to publish it.”588 
 
As Block understood it, there was a conflict within the Central Ottoman Government 
between Abdülhamid II who wanted to “hush up the affair, whitewash the culprits and 
prevent the sultan’s orders from becoming known” and the Porte which has been 
“endeavoring to satisfy us that our assistance on the Commission is a thorough guarantee 
for an impartial inquiry.”589   
 
Meanwhile, back in Bitlis, Tahsin Paşa was continuing his own coverup of the massacres.  
On November 22, Tahsin Paşa  returned from Siirt and imprisoned around twenty 
Armenian notables of Bitlis who had been active in sending complaint telegrams to 
Istanbul.590  Hampartsoum Boyadjian and the other prisoners arrested after the massacres 
were tortured to secure testimonies that the Armenian notables of Bitlis had been 
complicite in the “rebellion” in the mountains.  Within a matter of months, nine of the 
twenty-seven Sasun prisoners died.  While the official explanation in the local 
newspapers was cholera, George Perkins Knapp said that several had died of torture.  
Hampartsoum Boyadjian was tortured with a particular aim.  According to George 
Perkins Knapp, the local Ottoman authorities, “wanted to get [Boyadjian] to testify that 
the notables had backed him, that some foreign country, especially England, had sent him 
                                                        
588 FO 424-178, December 26, p. 389. 
 
589 FO 424-178, December 26, p. 390.  
 















































                                                        










In the Ottoman Empire, the press is not only controlled but, it would be 
no exaggeration to say, edited by the Censor. 
- Habib Anthony Salmoné592 
 
 
The telegraph and the printing press have converted Great Britain into 
a vast Agora, or assembly of the whole community, in which the 
discussion of affairs of the state is carried on from day to day in the 
hearing of the whole population. 
 - W.T. Stead593 
 
 
The officials at Constantinople were concerned with nothing less than 
the extension of good government.  But they were clever enough to 
perceive that such modern inventions, as, for instance, the telegraph, 
gave them the means of controlling for their own purposes distant 
territories which, in former times had been left more or less to 
themselves.  The telegraph substituted the authority of a clique in the 
Palace at Constantinople for the rough-and-ready but often honest and, 
on the whole, well-meaning methods of a Turkish pasha of the old 
school. 




Like all technologies, the telegraph was a Janus-faced tool. It could help actors 
disseminate information, but it could also help them control information. In the Ottoman 
Empire, the telegraph allowed the state to centralize information by controlling its flow. 
Newspapers at this time would use telegraphs to relay stories around the world, but all of 
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593 W.T. Stead (1849-1912) was widely regarded as an innovator in investigative journalism.  He was an 
advocate of what he termed “Government by Journalism.”  See Contemporary Review vol. 49 (1886), p. 
654.  
 
594 Harry Finnis Blosse Lynch, Armenia, Travels, and Studies, vol. II: The Turkish Provinces (Longmans, 




that information passed through the watchful eyes of the Ottoman State.  From a certain 
perspective, never before had the Ottoman state had such control over information flows.  
 
This control of information from the top down allowed the state to centralize narrative. 
That is, promote one narrative it preferred while obstructing competing narratives. This 
centralization of narrative helps explain how Zeki Paşa’s report was endlessly reproduced.  
It was the legitimate narrative, or official history (resmi tarih), and all other narratives 
were deemed ‘reliable’ or ‘unreliable’ based on their adherence to it.  This centralization 
of narrative went hand-in-hand with censorship.  This censorship delegitimized any 
narrative that differed from that told by the Ottoman State.  
 
Yet, the telegraph also disseminated narratives collected by missionaries, consuls and 
journalists to a newspaper reading public around the world, largely circumnavigating 
Ottoman censors.  
 
In this chapter, I will discuss how, within the Ottoman Empire, centralization entailed not 
only the monopolization of legitimate violence (as Weber has so famously said about the 
State)595 but also the monopolization of legitimate mobility and narrative.  Although Zeki 
Paşa’s report was composed just days after the end of the mass killing in September, it 
remained the only legitimate account embraced by the Ottoman State.  Over the next few 
months, the Palace strove to exert its control of the narrative and censored any 
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illegitimate,596 or unreliable, narratives that challenged their singular idea of truth: the 
central narrative.   
 
I will also discuss how different narratives of Sasun, from many points of view, were 
disseminated in church meetings, newspapers and political assemblies.  Outside of the 
networks controlled by the Ottoman State, there was no singular legitimate account of 
Sasun.  There was a cacophony of many stories, often with dizzying contradictions about 
the events that had taken place.  To evaluate all these accounts, many observers fell back 
on other sources of legitimacy – the church-pulpit, political party newspapers, or 
community assembly halls.   
 
Accounts of Sasun traveled farther and faster thanks to telegraph and mass publications.  
However, it is critical to understand that these stories were interpreted according to 
varying contexts.  Responses to the events in Sasun were structured by local conflicts 
around the world.  In the United States, for instance, Post-Civil War political alignments 
played out in the dissemination of the Sasun narratives.  Memories and factionalism of 
the Civil war played out in tensions between American citizens in the Ottoman Empire.  
At the very heart of the efforts to disseminate accounts of the massacre in the United 
States were the ABCFM missionaries.  However, the reception of these accounts in the 
United States was shaped by local politics.  Many of the ABCFM missionaries came 
from families that had been deeply engaged in the struggles over first abolition and then 
women’s suffrage.  It was within the ABCFM network that accounts of violence in Sasun 
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(Ottoman, in this case) and not shared by other parties to the conflict. 
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were first disseminated.  Many in this community understood the events of Sasun in 
terms of their own struggle against the lynching of African Americans in the post-






A residence in the southern portion of the United States at the close of 
our late Civil War had prepared me to anticipate the fearful era 
through which we are passing here.  I had seen the resentful violence of 
a proud, dominant race, which was increased by the arrogance of the 
enfranchised Negroes, and which resulted in Ku-Klux outrages. 
- A.W. Terrell597 
 
 
In 1894, the US Minister in Istanbul was an ex-Confederate brigadier general and judge 
from Texas named Alexander W. Terrell.598  Since his appointment in the spring of 1893, 
Terrell had often been a target in the US press for failing to protect naturalized US 
citizens in the Ottoman Empire.  According to an article in the New York Times: 
Letters from Armenian-born American citizens, now 
abroad, are filled with statements that United States 
Minister Terrell has refused to furnish them with protection.  
Several cases of alleged flagrant outrages perpetrated in the 
City of Constantinople, it was said, were treated by him 
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598 President Grover Cleveland appointed Terrell to his post in the spring of 1893. For more on Alexander 
W. Terrell (1827-1912) see, Lewis L. Gould, Alexander Watkins Terrell: Civil War Soldier, Texas 
Lawmaker, American Diplomat (University of Texas Press, 2004). See especially, Chapter Seven, “At the 
Court of the Red Sultan.” President Grover Cleveland appointed Terrell Minister in the spring of 1893.  
This selection by Cleveland, the first Democrat appointed to office since the Civil War, upset many 
northern Republicans, particularly because Terrell was believed to have authored a poem honoring John 
Wilkes Booth.  John McKee Barr, Loathing Lincoln: An American Tradition from the Civil War to the 
Present (Louisiana State University Press, 2014).  At a lecture held in Boston on January 28, 1895 about 
the massacres in Sasun, Rev. Joseph Cook, noted that, “Our American Minister at Constantinople, is a great 
favorite of the Turkish Court.  He was a Texas Confederate brigadier, and has published an ambitious poem 
in eulogy of Booth, the assassin of Abraham Lincoln.” From Our Day: The Altruistic Review, vol. 14, issue 
3, p. 121. This journal was closely associated with ABCFM circles and their supporters.  Almost all the 




with complete indifference.599  
 
If Minister Terrell often had a strained relationship with the ‘Yankee’ missionaries,600 he 
was unabashedly biased toward the regime of Abdülhamid II.  In a private letter to Lord 
Rosebery (UK Prime Minister), the British diplomat Sir Arthur Nicolson wrote about 
how the ‘rugged, rough-hewn Texas judge’ had been charmed by the Sultan.  In the 
hyperbolic language of Nicolson, Terrell was convinced that “the Sultan is the best man 
that ever breathed and only his agents are vile.”601  Or, as Terrell put it himself, “I regard 
him as the ablest sovereign in Europe.”602   
 
At first, based solely on conversations with Grand Vizier Ahmet Cevat, Terrell was 
convinced that the accounts of violence that had appeared in November in the US and 
European press were “sensational and exaggerated.”  In a report dated November 28, 
1894, in response to an inquiry from the State Department, Terrell telegraphed that: 
The killing was in a conflict between armed Armenians and 
Turkish soldiers.  The Grand Vizier says it was necessary 
to suppress insurrection and that about fifty Turks were 
killed.  Between three and four hundred Armenian guns 
were picked up after the fight, and reports that about that 
number of Armenians were killed.  I give credit to his 
                                                        
599 New York Times, December 20, 1894.  However, according to George Washburn, a former-treasurer of 
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600 The ABCFM missionaries mostly hailed from the States that had made up the Union such as Vermont, 
New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, New York and, overwhelmingly, Massachusetts.  Many came from 
communities that had once been abolitionist centers. 
 
601 Harold George Nicolson, Sir Arthur Nicolson, Bart, First Lord Carnock: A Study in Old Diplomacy 
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It is clear that Terrell’s telegraph was using information from the Ottoman state’s central 
narrative, Zeki Pasa’s report.  For instance, his data on confiscated weapons and 
Armenian dead matched Zeki Paşa’s exactly.604  At the beginning of December, after a 
long conversation with British Ambassador Currie, Terrell began to doubt the accuracy of 
the Ottoman state’s central narrative.605  On December 2, Terrell sent a second dispatch 
to Minister Gresham in Washington D.C., admitting that the information from Currie 
suggested, “far more loss of lives in Armenia, attended with atrocities” than in his earlier 
report of November 28th.606   
 
In January 1895, Terrell was interviewed by the British journalist Edward Arthur Brayley 
Hodgetts, a special correspondent for the Daily Graphic.  According to Hodgetts, Terrell 
retained the “greatest personal regard” for Sultan Abdülhamid II.   In his interview, 
Terrell said that the Armenians were “a bad, intriguing lot” who had for “years been 
plotting rebellion against Turkey.”  Terrell was convinced that: 
These massacres were… the result of a deep laid plot, of a 
revolutionist movement that had extended for years.  He 
did not believe in the massacres.  They were all lies 
invented by malignant Armenians in London and 
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604 Zeki Paşa wrote, “Apart from the arms that had been lost or destroyed in the creeks flowing at steep 
areas, some three or four hundred rifles, swords, and other weapons have been recovered from the 
insurgents who were captured dead or alive and were handed over to the arsenal of the reserve militia at 
Muş. [“Maktûlen ve hayyen der-dest edilen eşkîyanın sarp derelere düşerek zâyi’ olan ve kırılan 
eslahsından ma’dâ elde edilen üç dörtyüz raddelerindeki tüfenk ve kılıç vesâire Muş Redif deppoyunu 
teslim edilmişdir.”] See OAYT/1, pp. 298-299.  
 
605 FO 424/178, December 2, 1894, Sir P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley, p. 290.  
 






At nearly the same time, the Foreign Office was attempting to convince the United States 
government that the presence of an American representative would be of “importance in 
the interests both of the Turkish Government and of the Armenians, and serious 
diplomatic complications may be averted by it.”608  At first, Secretary of State Gresham 
and President Cleveland were very reticent to involve the United States government in 
the Sasun investigation.  This hesitation was based on two objections: first the US 
government had, “no one at Constantinople to whom they could possibly entrust” and 
furthermore, “that to interfere in the matter at all might lead the United States 
Government into complications which it was always their policy to avoid.”609   
 
To a certain extent, President Grover Cleveland’s decision not to involve the United 
States seems to have reflected the polarized domestic politics in the United States.  When 
the British Ambassador observed to Secretary of State Gresham that “several important 
and representative meetings had been held in the United States, at which Resolutions had 
been passed, begging the President to join with other Powers in causing the 
circumstances of the massacres to be investigated,” Gresham replied that those meetings 
had mostly been held in Massachusetts (a state that President Cleveland had lost in three 
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608 FO 424/178, p. 291 
 
609 FO 424/178, Mr. Goschen to the Earl of Kimberley, December 3, 1894, p. 331; FO 424/178, Sir P. 




presidential bids).610   
 
Public outcry in New England prompted the Republican Senator George Frisbie Hoar of 
Massachusetts to introduce in the US Senate on December 3, 1894 a resolution 
demanding that President Cleveland communicate to the Senate “any information he may 
have received in regard to the alleged cruelties committed upon Armenians in Turkey.”611    
According to his biographer, Secretary of State Walter Gresham, was “loathe to see the 
United States become involved in the matter,” and withheld from Congress dispatches 
from Terrell stating that he had received an earlier “entirely reliable” account that a 
massacre had occurred in Sasun.612  On December 11, President Cleveland assured the 
Senate that, “I have no information concerning cruelties committed upon Armenians in 
Turkey … except such information as has been derived from newspapers and from two 
telegraphic reports from our minister at Constantinople.”613  Due to increased public 
sentiment,614 President Cleveland belatedly accepted the Sultan’s request to send Consul 
Milo Jewett to investigate Sasun.615  The Ottoman government declined the offer,616 
                                                        
610 Ibid. Grover Cleveland lost Massachusetts to his Republican opponents in 1884, 1888 and 1892.  
 
611 New York Times, December 12, 1894; Nick Cleaver, Grover Cleveland’s New Foreign Policy: 
Arbitration, Neutrality and the Dawn of American Empire (Palgrave, 2014), p. 183; Arman Dzhonovich 
Kirakosian, The Armenian Massacres, 1894-1896, U.S. Media Testimony, p. 37; FO 424/178, “Extract from 
the “Congressional Record,” of December 12, 1894, pp. 368-369.  
 
612 Charles W. Calhoun, Gilded Age Cato: The Life of Walter Q. Gresham (University of Kentucky Press, 
1988), p. 183. See also, Donald A. Ritchie, “Congress confronts the Armenian Genocide,” in Jay Winter 
(ed.) America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915 (Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 278-279.  
 
613 A Compilation of the messages and papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, vol. 9, p. 557.  
 
614 Voroujan Karentz, Mitchnapert the Citadel: A History of Armenians in Rhode Island (2004), p. 110; The 
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private communities.”  
 
615 FO 424/178, Mr. Goschen to the Earl of Kimberley, December 6, 1894, p. 343.   
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much to the relief of Secretary of State Gresham who wrote privately that the United 
States was, “better out of the matter than in it.”617  By the end of December, the US 
government abandoned any efforts to investigate Sasun.618 
 
Reviewing the month’s events, we note that early in December mass ‘indignation’ 
meetings addressing the Sasun massacres were held across the United States.  A map of 
these meetings would roughly coincide with the areas of the country where the ABCFM 
missionaries originated.619  These towns were also where there was a relatively compact 
number of Armenians from the Ottoman Empire.620  Perhaps the most famous case of this 
pattern of migration was the town of Worcester in Massachusetts.621  Mass immigration 
of Armenians to the United States, “in the strictest sense of the word, commenced 
immediately after the massacres of 1894.”622  Before 1894, most of the Armenians who 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
616 Daily News, “The Armenian Atrocities,” December 15, 1894. According to a Reuter’s Agency article 
republished by the Daily News, “The Sultan has withdrawn the invitation given to the United States to 
appoint a member to act on the Commission of Inquiry into the recent occurrences in Armenia, on the 
ground that the limitation imposed by President Cleveland on the functions of the American delegate 
prevented the latter from taking part in joint action with the representatives of the other Powers.  The 
appointment of Dr. Jewett to accompany the Inquiry Commission consequently lapses.” 
 
617 Calhoun 1988, p. 183.  
 
618 FO 424/178, Sir P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley, December 27, 1894, p. 380.  
 
619 Aside from Fresno and Chicago, all of the major colonies of Armenians in the United States at this time 
were in towns and cities where support for the ABCFM was particularly strong (ex: Worcester, Boston, 
Providence, Hartford, Philadelphia, Hoboken, and Troy).   M. Vartan Malcom, The Armenians in America 
(Pilgrim Press, 1919), p. 61.  
 
620 According to Malcom, in 1894 there were not more than three thousand Armenians living in the United 
States, ibid.  
 
621 See Hagop Martin Deranian, Worcester is America: the story of Worcester’s Armenians (Bennate 
Publishing, 1988). As M. Vartan Malcom noted “Both the first Armenian Apostolic Church and the first 
Armenian Protestant Church were building in Worcester, Mass.” (p. 100, fn. 1).  By 1919, Worcester was 
the official residence of the Armenian Apostolic Prelate in the United States. (p. 102, fn. 3).  
 
622 Malcom 1919, p. 66.  
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migrated to work in the mill towns of England were connected, in one way or another, to 
the ABCFM.623  The first Armenian to live in Worcester was Garo, of Bitlis, a servant 
who travelled with Rev. George Cushing Knapp in 1867.624   
 
On December 8, 1894 a mass meeting in Worcester brought together prominent citizens, 
including former missionaries, the Mayor, mill owners and their Armenian laborers. The 
participants drafted an open letter to President Cleveland “calling attention to the recent 
massacres.”  Copies of the letter were sent to Massachusetts Senator George Hoar, and to 
the legations of Great Britain, France and Germany in Washington D.C.625  On the very 
same day that the town of Worcester was drafting letters to President Cleveland, 
Mavroyeni Bey, the Ottoman Minister in Washington D.C., was circulating a succinct 
and carefully edited version of the Zeki Paşa Report to the U.S. Government.626 
Mavroyeni Bey prefaced the Zeki Paşa Report with a short introduction on the Armenian 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
623 During this period, the ABCFM “gradually expanded its activities throughout Turkey.  It had founded 
schools and churches not only in Constantinople, but also in other cities like Smyrna, Adana, Marash, 
Diarbekir, Harpout, Marsovan and Sivas.  The increase of American missionary work brought with it a 
corresponding increase of Armenian immigration to the United States.”  Malcolm 1919, pp. 59-60.  
 
624 Varaztad H. Kazanjian, The Armenians in Massachusetts (Armenian Historical Society, 1937), pp. 26-7 
According to Kazanjian, in a visit to the United States Rev. Knapp, “bought with him his Armenian servant 
Garo or Garabed, who was to receive in America his accustomed monthly remuneration of seventy-five 
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625 New York Times, December 9, 1894; FO 424/178, Sir J. Pauncefote to the Earl of Kimberley, December 
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626 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United State (1895), Mavroyeni Bey to Mr. Gresham, 
December 8, 1894, pp. 720-721. According to this report, “Towards the end of July last, and at the 
instigation of an Armenian Hampartzoun by name, the men of ten villages near Moush, organized into 
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this tribe, and then made an onslaught on the tribes of Bekiran and Badikian.  These bands burned the 
nephew of Eumer Agha, one of the chiefs of the Bekiran tribe, Hadji, alive and not only outraged the 
Moslem women of Kelli-guzat village, but also put them to an atrocious death.”  This follows almost word 




population resident in the United States.  Marvoyeni wrote: 
The intrigues of the Armenians residing in the United 
States, their bold-faced slanders, as well as their public 
endeavors to disparage the Imperial Government (and I 
confess with grief that they have found in this country, 
where religion is proclaimed to be a matter of conscience, a 
notable encouragement at the hands of credulous people as 
well as those who through religious intolerance believe that 
these Armenians ought to be upheld, not by reason of any 
imaginary persecution of their race, but solely because they 
are Christians and regardless of their guilt as subjects), all 
these facts, I say, must, I am sure have given your 
Excellency evidence of the kind of people who in reality 
compose the Armenian colony in the United States, people 
who nearly all acquire American citizenship for the purpose 
of returning to Turkey, as acknowledged by Mr. Terrell 
himself, and thus propagate their revolutionary theories, the 
existence of which is no longer established by mere 
assertions but by documents published in the whole press 
of the United States and by facts.  For all these reasons, the 
Imperial Government is placed in the attitude of legitimate 
self-defense, and like all constituted Governments, should 
never allow that rebellion be organized and propagated in 
any part of its territory.627 
 
The sweeping claims of Mavroyeni Bey – which bore little resemblance to reality – 
exemplified strategies used more broadly by the Ottoman State.  First, Mavroyeni 
essentially accused those who criticized the Ottoman State of outright sedition.  Second, 
Mavroyeni Bey reduced all the activities of Armenians in the United States to the 
workings of some sort of conspiracy against the Ottoman State.  Finally, Mavroyeni Bey 
employed a variation of what the sociologist Robert Melson called ‘the provocation 
thesis.’  According to adherents of the provocation thesis, any violence the Ottoman State 
employed was always viewed as a legitimate effort to protect itself from Armenian 
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aggression.628   
 
Mavroyeni Bey sent longer versions of the Zeki Paşa Report to newspapers in the United 
States.  On December 12, the Zeki Report was first published in English in the New York 
Times, entitled, “The Turkish View of the Massacres.”629  This version of the Zeki Paşa 
Report was somewhat different from the one Marvoyeni had sent to Secretary of State 
Gresham four days earlier.630 
 
On December 17, the ABCFM Board published its first response to the massacres in the 
New York Times.  Their press release stressed that the situation of 177 missionaries in the 
Ottoman Empire was an “extremely delicate one.”   On the one hand, the missionaries 
sympathized deeply with all those who suffered, “by reason of poverty, oppression, and 
misrule.” On the other hand, they stressed that the ABCFM missionaries “have never 
countenanced sedition or rebellion” and have always “been loyal to the Government 
under which they have lived.”  At least judging by their private letters and diaries this 
                                                        
628 Robert Melson, Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust 
(University of Chicago Press, 1992), especially Chapter 2, pp. 43-69.  
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630 The version published in the New York Times on December 12 1894 was more than twice as long as the 
version sent by Mavroyeni Bey to Secretary of State Gresham (645 to 251 words).  Sometimes the 
translation is word-for-word (The New York Times article reads, “This Hampartzoun, born in Hadjin 
(Viyalet of Adana), after having for eight years studied medicine in the Civil Medical School of 
Constantinople and participated in the disorders of Coum-Copou, fled to Athens and thence to Genoa.”  
The Zeki Paşa report reads, “It is certain through his own declarations that this evil individual Hamparsun 
is originally of the village of Haçin belonging to the Vilayet of Adana.  He has received medical training at 
the Royal College of Medicine of Constantinople for some eight years.  Since he was amongst the evil-
doers who organized the notorious Kumkapı revolts, while the authorities were searching everywhere in 
Istanbul for him he fled to Genoa via Athens.” [“Kendi ifade ve i’tirâfâtıyla da sâbit olduğu vechile bu 
Hamparsun şerîri an-asıl Adana Vilâyeti merbut Haçin kasabası ahalisinden olup Mekteb-i Tıbbiye 
Mülkiye-i Şâhâne’de sekiz sene kadar tahsilde bulunmuş ve Kumkapı hadisesini iykâ eden müfsidler 
meyanında bulunmasından nâşî Dersa’âdet’ce taharrî olunduğu sırada Atina’ya ve oradan Cenova’ya firar 




was very true.  Although the Ottoman State might have held the ABCFM missionaries to 
have seditious tendencies, there is little evidence of this.  In fact, there is plenty of 
evidence that most of the ABCFM missionaries were very wary of Armenian nationalist 
inclinations.631   
 
The ABCFM had expanded its religious authority in step with the expansion of the 
Ottoman State.  This ABCFM expansion was often in competition with the Armenian 
Patriarchate, and later, with the (Armenian) United Societies Schools, which were viewed 
as competing missionary and education networks.632  For instance, Royal M. Cole, in a 
letter describing Muş, commented on the ancient monasteries on the mountain peaks 
around the plain.  The most famous of these monasteries was Surb Garabed.  Cole wrote: 
To this monastery thousands upon thousands of pilgrims 
used to come to pay their vow in the palmy days of their 
religion, not a few hailing from distant Russia, where there 
are many Armenians.  But we would show such poor 
deluded ones a better way – bring them back good 
principles near to which, doubtless, their wonderful 
Gregory, “the Enlightener,” who they claim built this 
famous convent, left them. How they have wandered away!  
How much they need the pure gospel and proper Christian 
                                                        
631 There is very little that is wholly positive about the Hunchak in the writings of the ABCFM nationalists.   
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coming to the conclusion that he was a revolutionist, the Rev. Edw. Riggs said to Zakhariantz, in the 
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Zakhariantz replied, “It is a case of life for life.  If you denounce me, you will be killed by my friends.” 
Rev. E. revised his decision, and did not denounce Zakhariantz, who left the college and a few weeks later 
was killed by the Turkish police in another place.”  Another version of this same story can be found in the 
London Times, February 4, 1895.  
 






Or, looked at from another point of view, once the Protestants became a juridical and 
political community or Millet (‘Nation’) in the eyes of the State, the Ottoman State had 
for decades supported the Protestants against the much larger community of Apostolic 
Armenians.  From its cautious tone, it is clear that the Board’s intended audience was not 
only in the United States, but also presumably in the Ottoman Empire.  The depiction of 
what took place makes frequent use of letters from missionaries.  If the Ottoman 
government constructed its story from the accounts of its bureaucrats and military 
officers, the ABCFM constructed its stories from the writings of the ABCFM 
missionaries based in Anatolia.  The ABCFM had received these letters at the end of 
November.634  However, it is striking how the ABCFM interprets these “primary 
documents” in such a way that both Abdülhamid II and Tahsin Paşa are exonerated.  
According to the Board, the violence in Sasun stemmed from miscommunication and 
misunderstanding.   
In the Sassoun region, south of the Moush Plain, there are, 
or recently were many villages inhabited by Armenians.  
These people were systematically robbed of their flocks by 
Koords, and in the latter part of the summer the Armenians 
pursued the robbers in the endeavor to recover their 
property.  In the fight which ensued a dozen of these 
Koords were killed, among whom were some who were 
enrolled as Turkish soldiers.  When information was given 
that the Armenians had killed some of the Sultan’s troops, 
the charge of rebellion was made and orders were sent to 
put down the insurrection.  The result was that these 
lawless and uncontrolled soldiers made indiscriminate 
slaughter of the people who had sought to defend their 
property.  In the horrible massacres which followed 
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thousands were slain, some state 6,000 others 10,000.  The 
details of this wretched affair [are] not obtainable, even by 
those near the scene.635   
 
The ABCFM suggested that what was necessary was for Foreign Governments to “insist 
upon a thorough investigation conducted by foreigners.”636  The reason was simple.  The 
ABCFM Board stressed that local evidence had been fabricated.  The ABCFM explained 
that there was a mazbata (or petition) that claimed to give the judgment of the local 
inhabitants that the “thousand slain in Talvoreeg met their just deserts.”637  However, the 
Board acknowledged that, “Though our missionaries in Eastern Turkey are often upon 
the Moush Plain, where there are many outstations in which evangelical work is 
conducted by them, yet their work has not extended into this Sassoun district, and hence 
they have no direct reports from the scenes of the massacres.”  Left unsaid, although 
emphasized in the original letters of the missionaries, was that many of the stories came 
from the accounts of Ottoman soldiers. The Board cautioned that an investigation was 
necessary in order either, “to relieve the government from unjust charges, if the 
statements are incorrect, or, if they are proven, to bring about the condign punishments of 
the guilty parties.”638   
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The supporters of the ABCFM in the United States included many of the luminaries from 
the religious abolitionists such as Julia Ward Howe, Samuel J. Barrows and William 
Lloyd Garrison, Jr.639  In mid-December, Samuel Barrows and William Lloyd Garrison, 
Jr. wrote to the British Liberal organ, The Daily News.  Barrows and Garrison 
immediately likened what had happened at Sasun to what had happened in Bulgaria 
almost two decades earlier.  Barrows and Garrison believed that the Press could serve as 
an implement of justice.  They wrote: 
We have not forgotten the ‘splendid service,’ as Mr. 
Gladstone truly describes it, which, “The Daily News” 
rendered at the time of the Bulgarian horrors, and which led 
that honoured statesman to say, “It is even possible that, but 
for the courage, determination, and ability of this single 
organ, we might, even at this moment, have remained in 
darkness and Bulgarian wretchedness might have been 
without its best and brightest hope.” … All that our own 
Government can do with reference to the oppressed 
Armenians is to help to set the facts before the world, and 
to exert a moral influence in behalf of liberty and justice.  
But we believe that the English Government, backed by the 
enlightened conscience and sturdy will of the English 
people, may do something more, by insisting that Turkey 
shall fulfill the pledges for reform which it has long since 
made.640 
 
On the evening of December 18, an ‘indignation’ meeting was convened in Chickering 
Hall in New York City, the location of many earlier struggles in the abolitionist 
movement.  The purpose of the meeting was to protest the violence and call upon the 
United States government to take action.  A panel of speakers composed of former 
ABCFM missionaries such as Istanbul-born E.M. Bliss and Cyrus Hamlin were joined 
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with a consortium of prominent clergymen of New York City.  Rev. William C. Ward, 
the editor of the Congregationalist church organ The Independent, declared that, “Our 
Government must insist, first, upon getting the facts of these outrages, and then we 
should insist that the Signatory powers shall interfere and say to Turkey that the outrages 
must end.”  The former US Consul General of Beirut, Jeremiah Augustus Johnson, said 
that if the United States Government did not act directly, “public opinion could be 
aroused so as to compel the British Government to interfere.”641  The older networks that 
had been employed to combat slavery, and more recently for women’s suffrage, were 
now being employed to bring the issue of Sasun to prominence in the United States.  
 
In the press and from the pulpit, analogies often linked the condition of African 
Americans in the South of the United States to the condition of Armenians in the Eastern 
regions of the Ottoman Empire.  Moreover, as one Republican newspaper in Philadelphia 
put it, “the same sentiment which condemned those atrocities in Armenia will denounce 
just as strongly the occurrences in Georgia during the past few days.”642  In December of 
1894, the American Missionary Association, an organization that had been born out of 
the ABCFM, strongly condemned lynching and began to publish reports “bearing 
testimony against that form of lawlessness which has become alarmingly prevalent in 
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many parts of our country.”643  The Congregationalist at the beginning of January 1895, 
wrote: 
It has been said that had Mr. Jewett been permitted to 
participate in the investigation of the Armenian atrocities 
he might have been taunted by some of the Kurdish 
chieftains with the old adage, “People who live in glass 
houses should not throw stones.”  In other words, we have 
disorder and outrages enough in this country to justify the 
interference of a commission of benevolent Turkish or 








It does not appear likely that all the Powers will join England in the 
endeavor to obtain from the Porte some guarantee for the better 
government of the unfortunate Armenian population.  Germany has, 
from the outset, declared that the Armenian Question is one with which 
she is in no way concerned.  France and Russia, however, show a 
disposition to cooperate with Great Britain, and I believe it is now 
decided that the Consul of these Powers at Erzeroum will join the 
Commission. 
- Ardern George Hulme-Beaman645 
 
 
In London, at the beginning of December, Foreign Secretary Lord Kimberley and the 
Foreign Office were trying to find a solution to the thorny issue of the Sasun Commission.  
The Foreign Office had promised that an impartial investigation would take place.  At 
first, the Foreign Office was content for the Ottoman Government to send a Commission. 
However, this proved untenable when the Ottoman Government announced on November 
23 that the Commission would only “inquire into the acts of the Armenian brigands” 
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without any mention of verifying whether the massacres had taken place.  The Sultan had 
initially suggested to Ambassador Currie that an American delegate could join the 
Commission.  However, this proved untenable.   
 
On December 5, Foreign Minister Said Paşa had approached Ambassador Currie again 
and suggested that since the US was unlikely to send a representative, “either Blunt Pasha 
or Woods Pasha should be added to the Commission, or else an English officer, who 
should be named Aide-de-camp of His Imperial Majesty for the occasion.”646  On 
December 13, Lord Kimberley (AKA the Earl of Kimberley) assured Rüstem Paşa, the 
Ottoman Ambassador to London, that “looking to the strong feeling which had been 
excited in this country on the subject, it would be impossible to satisfy public opinion 
without the presence of an independent person at the Commission of Inquiry.”  Lord  
Kimberley informed Rüstem Paşa that the British government had decided to accept the 
Ottoman suggestion that a British consul accompany the Commission and make an 
independent report.  Rüstem Paşa repeated his often stated belief that the “reports of the 
atrocities were, if not entirely untrue, grossly exaggerated.”647  
 
However, the British needed to insure that the inquiry would not end up being simply the 
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word of the British delegate against that of the officials of the Ottoman State.  For the 
Foreign Office, the solution was to internationalize the Sasun Commission.  Lord 
Kimberley requested that Currie, “sound the French and Russian Representatives on the 
subject of such an inquiry, and ascertain whether their respective Consuls would be 
empowered to join in it.”648   
 
Furthermore, in a telegraphic circular sent to the British Ambassadors of France, 
Germany, Italy, Russia and Austria-Hungary, on December 6, 1894, Lord Kimberley 
wrote: 
The first step, as your Excellency will perceive, is to 
procure reliable information as regards the events that have 
occurred in the Sasson district.  You should communicate 
the substance of this telegram to the Government in which 
you are accredited, stating that the co-operation of as many 
of the Great Powers as possible will be welcomed by Her 
Majesty’s Government, but that at the present stage, from 
considerations of practical convenience and under the 
pressure of time, they have only considered it necessary to 
request those Powers who were represented by Consuls at 
Erzeroum to send those officers to join the Commission of 
Inquiry.  You should add that Her Majesty’s Government 
reserve to themselves the power of appealing, for their 
judgment, to the Signatory Powers of the Treaty of Berlin, 
when they are in possession of the authoritative information 
now being sought.649 
 
Not only was the Commission for Sasun to be an international venture, from this point on 
the British Foreign Office redoubled its efforts to “procure reliable information” about 
Sasun.  Across Europe telegraphic wires buzzed as the British ambassadors to the ‘Great 
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Powers’ of Europe attempted to gather information about Sasun, and to build support for 
an international commission to investigate Sasun.  
 
Before long, notes from Germany, France, Russia, Austria and Italy were flying into 
Kimberley’s office.  The German Government indicated that while they were not 
“immediately interested” in Sasun, they had asked their Ambassador in Istanbul to 
“advise the Sultan, in his own interests, to send a Commission which would merit the 
confidence of the Great Powers.”  The Italian government was “most anxious to take part 
in the inquiry.”  The French and the Russian governments agreed to join in a Commission 
(but not if Italy joined).650  The Austro-Hungarian government “entirely approved of the 
steps taken by her Majesty’s government, and wished to support their policy on 
humanitarian grounds” but opted not to take any other action.651   
 
Besides gathering support for an international investigation, the Kimberley Foreign 
Office also sought to gather reliable information about what had taken place in the 
mountains of Sasun.  The Austro -Hungarian Foreign Minister Count Kálnoky indicated 
to the British Ambassador in Vienna that the reports they had received from their consul 
at Trebizond were in substantial agreement with the accounts sent by Graves and 
Hallward from Erzurum.652  The accounts of the Italian consul in Trabzon,653 the Russian 
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652 FO 424/178, Sir E. Monson to the Earl of Kimberley, p. 358, December 13, 1894. 
 
653 Maurizio Russo (ed.), Documenti Diplomatici Italiani Sull’ Armenia, documents, 179, 182, 183, 184.  
This exchange of information between the British and Italian Governments went on for months.  When M. 
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consul in Erzurum,654 the French consul in Diyarbekir,655 and the Persian consul in 
Erzurum656 were also in substantial agreement with the reports of Vice-Consul Hallward 
of Van and Consul Graves of Erzurum.  The Earl of Kimberley did not stop with simply 
asking for information from other State bureaucracies.  Over the next few months, the 
Earl of Kimberly attempted to secure interviews with refugees from the Ottoman Empire 
who had crossed the frontier into the Russian Empire.657 
 
By mid-December, however, there remained substantial disagreement in Istanbul on how 
to proceed with international oversight of the Commission of Inquiry.  Aleksandr Nelidov, 
the Russian Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, was quite cautious.  In a conversation 
with Ambassador Currie, on December 9, Nelidov stressed that “any direct contact of the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Monaco, the newly appointed Italian consul to Erzurum arrived in the early part of January, the British 
Consul Graves supplied him with a “historical summary of the Sasun occurrences.”  Graves noted that, 
“since that time he has reported regularly all that he has been able to gather about the Sassoon events and 
the state of the country in general, showing considerable activity in the collection of information.  He has 
already transmitted the evidence of various eye-witnesses of the massacres whom he has been able to 
question, and so far, has always communicated anything of interest to me in the frankest possible way.”  
(FO 424/181, Sir P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley, March 18, 1895). 
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Kimberley, December 5, 1894, p. 303. According to Ambassador Currie, the Russian Chargé d’Affaires 
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for some months past made to obliterate the traces of the atrocities, and to stifle the testimony that might be 
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Consuls with the population should be avoided” and that instead of participating directly 
in the investigation, the Consuls in Erzurum should indicate to the Commissioner what 
matters were of importance and be kept abreast of the investigation.  The Russian 
Government was “averse to raising any political question.”658   
 
While Nelidov wanted to keep the Commission distant to minimize risk, Said Paşa, the 
Ottoman foreign minister, was adamant that the consul representative should be 
integrated into the preexisting Ottoman Commission of Inquiry.  Said Paşa wanted all 
consular representatives to be appointed regular members of the Commission.  Moreover, 
working jointly with the Ottoman Commissioners, they should compose and sign a joint 
report.  For the British, this level of integration was impossible.  Ambassador Currie said, 
“that it would be impossible for the Consuls to sign a joint report unless they were in 
complete agreement.”659  And, at this point, it seemed very unlikely that the British 
Consuls would come to an agreement with the Ottoman authorities on what had taken 
place at Sasun.  In Istanbul, the French and Russian ambassadors confided to 
Ambassador Currie that, “They considered that there was far more chance of ascertaining 
the truth by means of an Ottoman inquiry assisted by Europeans than by a European 
inquiry thwarted by the Ottoman authorities.”660 
 
Ardern George Hulme Beaman, the Varna-based correspondent for the Standard, 
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regarded Said Paşa’s invitation to integrate all the consuls into a single Commission of 
Inquiry as “an extremely clever move.”661 According to Beaman, a single Commission 
would allow Abdullah Paşa, presiding over the joint Commission, to focus on “the acts of 
brigandage committed at Talori” based only on the “the official correspondence” of the 
Ottoman State.662  Beaman forewarned that, “without inquiries on the spot, and the 
examination of disinterested witnesses, the investigation will be as much as a farce as that 
of Abdullah Pasha in the contrary direction.”663  This premonition would prove to be 
correct.  There would be little agreement, in the end, between the Ottoman 
Commissioners and Consular representatives over what had taken place at Sasun.  
 
On the morning of December 19, 1894, during the negotiation over the shape of the 
Commission, the Palace sent Munir Bey with a proposal: Would the dismissal of certain 
Ottoman officials and their trial by court-martial suffice?664  Ambassador Currie replied 
that as the “terms were very vague,” the proposal would not be considered until it was 
clearly spelled out.  Ambassador Currie instead advised the Ottoman Government that a 
“searching inquiry” was required.665  Later that evening, Kâmil Paşa, the former Grand 
Vizier, also attempted to persuade Currie to exchange the international commission with 
dismissal and court-martial of the accused bureaucrats.  Currie again replied that this was 
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impossible.666  The next day, Said Paşa, the Ottoman Foreign Minister called on 
Ambassador Currie requesting once more on Abdülhamid’s behalf to drop any 
involvement with European Delegates.  Ambassador Currie again stressed that “this was 
quite impossible,” and finally convinced Said Paşa to accept the internationalization of 
the Sasun Commission.667 
 
After weeks of negotiations, the Ottoman, British, French and Russian governments 
finally negotiated a middle course.668  The Ottoman Commissioners were on paper tasked 
with carrying out an “inquiry and investigation into the Sassoon incident.”  According to 
their explicit agreement with the European, French and Russian Governments, this was 
no longer simply about investigating the misdoings of “Armenian brigands.”669  
 
Also, according to this agreement, the British, French and Russian governments were to 
send delegates.  These delegates would not be part of the Commission, but would work in 
conjunction with the Commission.  The delegates would be present at all the meetings 
and be able to ask questions of the witnesses.  Finally, the delegates were charged with 
keeping a collective and daily record of the Commission, including all the incidents of 
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Even after the structure of the Commission had been agreed upon, the Ottoman State 
continued its own lobbying efforts in Europe.  In addition to spending large amounts of 
money on the European press, on December 30 Abdülhamid II reached out to Pope Leo 
XIII.  Abdülhamid II asked the Pope to help induce Austria, Germany, France and Spain 
to intervene with Great Britain and Russia.  According to a report from the British 
Ambassador to Spain, Sir H. Drummond Wolff, this was the first time that the Ottoman 






Perhaps one of the most extraordinary, not to say impressive, 
spectacles of modern journalism is the absolute silence of the whole 
Turkish Press respecting the alleged massacre of Sassoun.  During the 
months of November and December; Europe and America have 
resounded with the charges made against Turkish Pashas and their 
troops.  But all this time, the newspapers published in Turkey – Turkish, 
French, English, Armenian or Greek – have not breathed a syllable on 
the subject. In fact, the most part of the local columns of these papers 
has been filled with lists of children vaccinated, of poor relieved, or of 
mosques repaired by the order of his Imperial Majesty, and similar 
interesting matter. 
- Anonymous Correspondent for the Literary Digest672   
 
 
On December 4, the editors of the London Times wrote, “It is impossible, we fear, to 
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escape from the conclusion that there is a substantial basis of fact for the rumours on 
which we commented a fortnight ago, of atrocities perpetrated by Turkish troops on the 
Christian inhabitants of Armenia.”673  Since November 17, much of the debate in the 
British press had rested on the provenance and reliability of an anonymous letter that 
Garabed Hagopian had provided the Times.   The editors now stressed that, “We have 
reason to believe that, in due time, evidence of an entirely unimpeachable character will 
be forthcoming.”674  Where did this new evidence come from?  One possibility is that 
someone in the Foreign Office passed Hallward’s report to the London Times.  This 
seems to be supported by the fact that the editors of the London Times presented a 
narrative that was remarkably similar to a passage in Vice-Consul Hallward’s second 
dispatch.  The London Times wrote that during the massacres Ottoman soldiers: 
…recoiled from… outrages on an unarmed and helpless 
crowd of men, women and children.  According to the 
accounts that have reached us the reluctant troops were 
overawed by the presence of others who were ordered to 
fire upon them as mutineers unless they obeyed the Pasha’s 
command.  They yielded, and the whole groups of 
Christian villagers were given over to horrible outrages, 
involving a deplorable loss of life.675   
 
In his second dispatch dated November 6, Hallward wrote that the soldiers, “...hung back, 
not relishing the task, but their officers urged them on with threats, and the work of 
destruction and butchery was carried through without mercy or distinction of age or 
sex.”676  
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As discussed in the last chapter, Hallward based this second dispatch at least in part on 
the accounts that the missionaries had gathered.  So it is also possible that the London 
Times had received evidence from ABCFM sources.  Rev. George Perkins Knapp, the 
Bitlis-born ABCFM missionary wrote, that, “As a rule, however, the officers forced the 
men to acts of cruelty from which they shrank.”677  Knapp continued: 
A villager, whom I well know to be reliable, tells me that 
when the soldiers were returning from the mountains 
through Boolanek, they impressed his cart to carry three 
sick soldiers to another village.  As they were going one of 
these remarked that God would surely visit vengeance on 
the government for those things which had been recently 
done.678  
 
However, if the editors of the London Times received information from either the 
ABCFM missionaries or from the consuls of the British Foreign Office, they did not 
simply reproduce it without changing it.  The most striking divergence from Hallward 
and Knapp concerned the culpability of the central authorities.  While both Knapp and 
Hallward emphasized that the soldiers were read an Imperial Firman that legitimized the 
punishment of the mountain villagers,679 the London Times did not make any mention of 
central culpability.  Instead, the editors of the London Times wrote that, “We have no 
reason to doubt the personal humanity of the Sultan. We have no doubt that, like other 
autocrats, he has been imposed upon by the misrepresentations of subordinate 
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officers.”680   
 
This perspective was also taken up by the conservative Pall Mall Gazette, which 
concluded that Abdülhamid II was, “a humane man, anxious, there is every reason to 
believe, to rule his motley and unwieldy Empire with justice and clemency.” However, 
Abdülhamid II, “never leaves Yildiz, and is entirely dependent upon the reports of 
subordinates for his knowledge of the conditions and wants of his people in distant parts 
of the Empire.”  The ultimate culprit, concluded the Pall Mall Gazette was the “over-
centralized” structure of the Ottoman State, “threaded everywhere by telegraph wires, 
which flash reports on all things, great and small, to the Yildiz, where they are studied 
and decided upon by the Sultan in person.”681 
 
And yet the debate over what took place in Sasun, in Great Britain and in the United 
States, was far from over.  At the same time that the Times acknowledged that there was 
‘reliable’ evidence that the massacres had taken place, other newspapers continued to 
urge caution, particularly because the reports supposedly stemmed from Armenian 
sources.  Armenians, as the Aberdeen Weekly Journal put it, with the confident racism of 
the Victorian Age, “are not exactly models of veracity.”682  In a letter to the Conservative 
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Morning Post on December 11, one writer, who went by the moniker “Anglo-Turk,” 
noted that one was struck by what appears “like a repetition of the events that ushered in 
the Great War between Turkey and Russia.”683  According to this writer: 
Then, as now, it was alleged that great massacres had taken 
place, and that unwarrantable severity had been exercised 
in the restoration of order in a disturbed province by the 
employment of Imperial troops.  Before any independent 
evidence had been brought to bear in the matter, and 
without any consideration given to the circumstances that 
led to the Bulgarian revolt, the Turks were accused and 
condemned.  Later on the reports of those sent to 
investigate the matter clearly demonstrated the great 
provocation received, and the vast amount of falsehood and 
exaggeration with which the accounts given to the public of 
the rising and its suppression had been overlaid.  By the 
time however, that the truth became known it was too late, 
the mischief was done.  Eloquent speeches and picturesque 
writing had produced their effects, and driven the 
conviction so deeply home in the minds of many that the 
Turks are devouring monsters that even now there is a 
lingering belief in those horrors, which will be not fail to 
assist in obtaining credence for these false tales of rape and 
massacre of Christian women and the wholesale slaughter 
of innocent men, unless the public are cautioned to keep 
their minds free, and wait for the result of the investigation 
now about to take place.684  
 
‘Anglo-Turk’ was certain that “up to the present the only information that has reached the 
public is from Armenian Sources” and further, that “the members of various [Armenian] 
associations are perfectly unscrupulous in regards both words and deeds.”685  Both the 
belief that all the accounts stemmed from Armenian sources (which was false) and the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
protest to the Porte, that the Government has received serious reports based upon better authority than that 
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related conviction that ‘Armenian sources’ were inherently untrustworthy (a racist 
fallacy) were very widespread in the 19th century.  A member of the Young Turkey party, 
interviewed by Edward Arthur Brayley Hodgetts, put it in this way, “How,” said he, 
“could the Armenian survivors of the massacres have written the letters which have 
appeared in the press?  Those survivors are supposed to be illiterate peasants.  As a 
matter of fact, I know that the letters were written in London in the rooms of the agitators, 
they were never in Sassun!”686 
 
Unbeknownst to many was the role of the ABCFM missionaries in conveying accounts of 
violence.  
 
Throughout the next few months, both the British and American Press published 
continuous denials of the massacres from the Ottoman State.  For instance, on December 
4, the Baltimore Sun published an account from the Ottoman legation in Washington D.C. 
which concluded that accounts of the massacres were simply the fabrications of the 
“Armenian revolutionists and their friends” as the “facts show that, far from committing 
any cruelties, the regular troops succeeded in restoring peace and order.”687  
 
While accounts of what took place in Sasun were being hotly debated in the British and 
US press, there was almost complete silence among the newspapers of the Ottoman 
Empire.  Due to the high levels of centralization of narrative (censorship) only three 
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Public Opinion must be brought to bear upon this case.  It is a great 
power, and I am afraid that public opinion and the other power of 
threat of force which we are not in a condition to appeal to, are the 
only powers likely to produce any sensible improvement in the 
condition of the people of Armenia. 
- William Ewart Gladstone689 
 
 
At the same time, through a growing network of supporters, the Anglo-Armenian 
Association was able to widely disseminate its convictions to thousands of ministers from 
all denominations.  The core conviction was:  the British Government should intervene 
on the basis of the Treaty of Berlin to institute reforms in the Ottoman Empire.690  By 
withholding the publication of the British Consul reports, according to Edward Atkin, the 
honorary secretary of the Anglo-Armenian Association, the Foreign Office carried out a 
policy of “screening the Porte in its infamous oppression of the Armenian Christians.”691  
 
On December 3, Lord Kimberley, the Foreign Secretary, met with Edward Atkin for an 
hour of private conversation about Sasun.  Atkin maintained that the Ottoman 
commission appointed to investigate the atrocities was not satisfactory and that a 
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European commission should be sent to investigate.692  Two days later, a representative 
of Reuter’s asked Garabed Hagopian, chairman of the Armenian Patriotic Association 
and member of the Anglo-Armenian Association, for his opinion of the condition of the 
Eastern regions of the Ottoman Empire. In this interview Hagopian stressed that he was 
not a revolutionary.693  However, the Ottoman Government, “by suspecting Armenians to 
be rebels and revolutionists had created whatever revolutionary movements [which] 
might exist in the provinces.” By arresting teachers, priests and doctors, “even those who 
originally had no leaning toward nationalism were driven in that direction” by the 
policies of the Ottoman Government.  Hagopian did not have high hopes for the Ottoman 
Commission of Inquiry (even now making its way to Muş).  They were merely a strategy 
to “gain time and divert public attention when an unpleasant crisis arose.”  Instead 
Hagopian advocated a Joint International Commission.  The “only way of settling the 
larger issues of reform, said Hagopian, was to place it under a single governor named by 
the signatory Powers of the Treaty of Berlin, under certain guarantees.”694   
 
Atkin and Hagopian were able to broadcast their message to a much larger audience on 
December 18 at an ‘indignation’ meeting’ held at St. Martin’s Hall in London (a few 
hours before another ‘indignation’ meeting at Chickering Hall in New York City). The 
London meeting was presided by Francis Seymour Stevenson,695 the president of the 
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Anglo-Armenian Association and MP for Suffolk.  The speakers included Canon 
MacColl, Mr. Clayden, the editor of the Daily News, and several other members of the 
House of Commons.696  William Ewart Gladstone, nearing his 85th birthday, was not able 
to attend, but sent a letter to express his sympathy for the aims of the Anglo-Armenian 
Association.  His epistolary presence was enough to act as an amplifier, attracting 
considerable interest in hundreds of newspapers around the world.     
 
The audience passed a three-part resolution:697   
The first expressed regret for the fact that the signatory 
Powers had not enforced the sixty-first article of the Treaty 
of Berlin… the second declared that the punishment of the 
ringleaders in the recent massacre would not be adequate 
without the provision of regular guarantees of safety… the 
third called for the publication of the Consular Reports on 
Armenian Affairs, which have been shrouded in secrecy for 
the last five years.698   
 
Not everyone agreed on these measures, “a few persons dissented from these resolutions, 
because they said, they feared that the reports of the atrocities were due partly to Russian 
statecraft.”699  Two days later, December 20, 1894, another well-attended ‘indignation’ 
meeting was held at City Temple, London, under the leadership of the Congregationalist 
minister Joseph Parker.  Parker, a close associate of the American abolitionist Henry 
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Ward Beecher, was widely considered at the fin-de-siècle to be one of the foremost 
English pulpit orators.700  
 
Underlying almost every article, speech and dispatch was the specter of Bulgaria, 1876. 
From the beginning, almost all narratives about what had taken place in Sasun were 
rooted in an interpretation of what had taken place in Bulgaria.  For Sultan Abdülhamid II, 
the 1876 events in Bulgaria represented a seditious rebellion that was followed by a 
campaign to impugn and weaken the Ottoman State.  On December 29, 1894, after 
meeting with a deputation of the Anglo-Armenian Association,701 William Ewart 
Gladstone elaborated a very different understanding of what had taken place in Bulgaria 
and the relationship of Bulgaria with Sasun: 
What happened in Bulgaria?  The Sultan and his 
Government absolutely denied that anything wrong had 
been done.  Yes, but their denial was shattered by the force 
of facts.  The truth was exhibited to the world.  It was 
thought an extravagance at the time when I said: “It is time 
that the Turk and all his belongings should go out of 
Bulgaria, bag and baggage.”  They did go out of Bulgaria, 
and they went out of a good deal besides.  But, quite 
independently of any sentiment of right, justice, or 
humanity, common sense and common prudence ought to 
have taught them not to repeat the infernal acts which 
disgraced the year 1876, so far as Turkey was concerned.  
Now, it is certainly true that we have not arrived at the 
close of this inquiry, and I will say nothing to assume that 
the allegations will be verified.  At the same time, I cannot 
pretend to say that there is no reason to anticipate an 
unfavorable issue.  On the contrary, the intelligence which 
has reached me tends to a conclusion which I would still 
hope may not be verified, but tends strongly to a conclusion 
to the general effect that the outrages and scenes and 
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abominations of 1876 in Bulgaria have been repeated in 
1894 in Armenia.  As I said, I hope it is not so, and I will 
hope it to the last, but if it is so it is time that one general 
shout of execration directed against the deeds of 
wickedness, should rise from outraged humanity, and 
should force itself into the ears of the Sultan of Turkey and 
make him sensible, if anything can make him sensible, of 
the madness of such a course.702 
 
It is difficult to underestimate the impact of Gladstone’s birthday speech.  Even in 
retirement after a political career that had lasted decades, Gladstone was arguably one of 
the most powerful individuals in Great Britain.  Part of his power came from the fact that 
every speech he gave was reproduced very widely in the press and attended to closely by 
his Liberal followers.   
 
Gladstone’s Conservative critics, as exemplified by the Pall Mall Gazette, “heartily 
wish[ed] that he had not spoken at all.”703  At stake was more than, “a handful of misused 
Armenians only… but the question of the peace of Europe.”  The Pall Mall Gazette 
provided a different telling of what took place in Bulgaria, more in line with the narrative 
embraced by the Conservative Party that viewed the hand of Russia behind every 
misdeed.  “Mr. Gladstone,” wrote the Pall Mall Gazette,  
…still seems unaware that the Bulgarian atrocities were 
indirectly the result of foreign intrigue, as are those which 
are alleged to have taken place recently in Armenia. Did he 
never hear, or has he forgotten the story – never, so far as 
we know, contradicted – that it was on the sinister advice of 
General Ignatieff that the Porte dispatched Bashi-Bazouks 
instead of regular troops to quell the disturbances in 
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Bulgaria?  Has he never heard testimonies from men who 
now occupy prominent positions in Bulgaria as to the 
normal mildness of Turkish rule in the Bulgarian 
Peninsula?  But in any case, it can do nothing but mischief 
to re-open the old sores which still rankle in 
Constantinople.704   
 
The British Press was not a monolith.  There was no single view on the Sasun massacres, 
nor was there a single understanding of what had taken place at Batak in 1876.  However, 
the entrance of Gladstone onto the scene dramatically increased the press coverage of 
Sasun.  At the same time, his appearance greatly perturbed Abdülhamid II.  It was 
William Ewart Gladstone, after all, who had so famously denounced the Ottoman State 
after Batak.  Gladstone’s fervent opposition to the Ottoman State between 1876 and 1877 
had certainly contributed to the dramatic shift in public opinion in Great Britain.  This 
shift of public opinion had prevented the British Government from defending the 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire against Russian advancement.  The results of the 1877-
1878 war were catastrophic for the Ottoman Empire.  Abdülhamid II, from this point 
onwards, was concerned that such a crisis in 1894 could result in the overthrow of his 
rule. 
 
Although Gladstone’s speech to the Anglo-Armenian Association was not reported in the 
Istanbul Press, the Sultan’s Palace soon had a full telegraphic report.  On January 2, 
Adam Block, the chief Dragoman of the British legation in Istanbul was summoned by 
the Ottoman Government and told that Gladstone’s speech had “greatly upset the 
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Sultan.”705  In response, Lord Kimberly asked Ambassador Currie to inform the Sultan 
that: 
Her Majesty’s Government has no control over Mr. 
Gladstone’s language and are not responsible for it.  He is 
not a member of the Ministry, and does not hold office 
under the Crown.  But that, as the subject has been raised 
by His Majesty, Her Majesty’s Government cannot conceal 
from him that in this respect Mr. Gladstone represents the 
general public feeling in this country, which will not be 
satisfied with anything short of an honest and thorough 
inquiry, followed by the adequate punishment of the guilty 
parties, if the inquiry should show the existence of guilt.706  
 
Abdülhamid II was not satisfied with the answer. The next day in London, Rüstem Paşa, 
with orders from both the Porte and the Palace, demanded that the British Government 
disavow Gladstone’s speech.  At issue was not only Gladstone’s tone and language.  
Rüstem Paşa pointed out that although at the introduction of the speech Gladstone said 
that the British public should suspend their judgment until the facts about Sasun had been 
established, he went on “to speak as if the truth of the reports had already been fully 
established.”707  On January 10, 1895, Rüstem Paşa again asked that the British 
Government to apologize for Gladstone’s speech, and that not to do so might have “a 
disastrous effect” on the relations between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire.708   
 
Although the Ottoman State attempted to prevent the dissemination of illegitimate 
                                                        
705 FO 424/181, Sir P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley, January 2, 1895, p. 1.  The “consternation and fury 
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706 FO 424/181, The Earl of Kimberley to Sir P. Currie, January 8, 1895, p. 12.  
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narrative, it is clear that their efforts were not often successful.  Although Gladstone’s 
speech to the Anglo-Armenian Association was not reported to the Istanbul press, 
accounts of it quickly reached even far-flung areas.  By the middle of January, both 
George P. Knapp and Hasan Tahsin Paşa in distant Bitlis had copies of Gladstone’s 




Gladstone’s birthday speech helped to bring the Anglo-Armenian Association into the 
public limelight and interviewed by the British press.  One Armenian delegate 
emphasized that the root of the problem was “the systematic oppression of the Armenians” 
in the Ottoman Empire.  However, the “deadliest enemy” [of the Armenian Cause] was 
felt to be the British Foreign Office, which aided the Ottoman State “to evade exposure 
by consenting to the infamous imposture of the [Ottoman] Commission, when, to our 
certain knowledge, documents from consuls, which give all necessary details, are in the 
possession of Lord Kimberley.”710   
 
How did the Anglo-Armenian Association know that certain details were in the 
possession of Lord Kimberley?  In order to answer this, a review of how networks of 
information linking the ABCFM and the Foreign Office is required.  The Ottoman State’s 
conquest of its own eastern provinces, and the simultaneous Russian State’s conquest of 
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the Caucasus in the first half of the 19th century, transformed the economic, political and 
social structures of the region.  For the first time, the Ottoman State shared a border with 
the Russian State.  For the British Government, this border between Russia and the 
Ottoman domains became highly polarized, and a source of potential problems.  In the 
1830s the British Government sent James Brant, the British Government’s first 
representative to Erzurum, at least in part, to keep an eye on Russian doings across the 
border.  In 1830, the American Board of Missions sent Eli Smith (1801-1857) and 
Harrison Dwight (1803-1862) to explore what possibilities existed for the “revival and 
reformation of the Oriental churches in Armenia, Georgia, and Persia.”711  Over 
subsequent decades, the itinerant British Consuls and the Ottoman Protestant community 
developed symbiotic relations.  Quite simply, for decades the Ottoman Protestants 
provided information, in exchange for British protection.712  It is striking to note the 
extent that the British relied on the ABCFM-information network.  The ABCFM 
missionaries and their Ottoman Protestant community collected large amounts of 
information – everything from maps and population estimates to the personalities of 
various governors.  In exchange for all of this information, the British Government acted 
as the protectors of the ABCFM missionaries and the Ottoman Protestant community.    
 
In the fall of 1894, British Vice-Consul Hallward investigated the occurrences in the 
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mountains near Muş, Avzut, and Bitlis.  On October 9, Hallward sent one report from 
Muş based on unconfirmed rumors.  Although he spoke with Edhem Paşa and Celaleddin, 
the Mutassarıf of Muş, neither offered any substantial information about what happened 
in the mountains. After going through quarantine in Avzut on the Muş plain, Hallward 
travelled to Bitlis.  While in Bitlis, Hallward stayed with Rev. Royal M. Cole.  Hallward 
shared what information he had collected in Muş and Avzut with the ABCFM 
missionaries.  The ABCFM missionaries shared what narratives they had collected in 
Bitlis with him.  Based on this exchange, Hallward wrote his second dispatch and Knapp 
wrote his report.713 
 
At the end of November, the Knapp report was smuggled via Qajar Iran (almost certainly 
by Presbyterians in Urmia)714 to the United States and Europe.  The report at some point 
fell into the hands of the former missionary Frederick Davis Greene.  Frederick Davis 
Greene was the son of the Joseph K. Greene.   Joseph K. Greene was the head of the 
Bible House in Istanbul, the collection point for all ABCFM reports from across Anatolia, 
before they were sent off to Boston.  Frederick Davis Greene -- like Herbert Marsena 
Allen, George Perkins Greene, George White, and Edwin Munsell Bliss – was born in the 
Ottoman Empire.  As a second-generation member of the ABCFM/Ottoman protestant 
community of the Ottoman Empire, his own vantage point was quite different from that 
of the first-generation of Ottoman-Protestants and their parents.  In 1890 George Perkins 
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714 In the summer of 1887 Royal M. Cole escorted the Presbyterian missionaries John G. and Mrs. Wishard 




Knapp and Frederick Davis Greene returned from an education in the United States to 
their homes in eastern Anatolia.  Frederick Davis Greene, who had spent his childhood in 
the Mamara Sea basin, was assigned to the Van region.  Greene spent the next four years 
in the East.  One can imagine that what Frederick Davis Greene saw in the East 
radicalized him, perhaps parallel to how Istanbul-born Mihran Damadian (a competing 
missionary of Armenian nationalism) was radicalized after four years in Muş in the late 
1880s.  In the spring of 1894, for health reasons, Greene left Van and travelled to the 
United States for a furlough.  It was while he was in the US that he learned about what 
had happened in the Sasun Mountains.   In his first article on the subject – published 
anonymously in the Review of Reviews in January 1895 – Greene wrote: 
A lurid flash, and the echo of a smothered cry, has reached 
the civilized world, from out of the oblivion and silence in 
which Armenia has been wrapped.  A startled and confused 
effect has been produced.  Is this to be all?  The snows of a 
severe mountain winter are already sealing the country, 
effectually preventing any European Commission from 
making personal investigations on the ground before spring.  
By that time, six months will have elapsed, the signs of the 
massacre will all have been removed, the country will have 
been put in a very peaceful and orderly aspect, and public 
interest will have died out.   
Why this perilous delay?  The British Government is in 
possession of a detailed report of Vice-Consul Hallward, 
made upon the spot within a few days of the event.  
Unimpeachable written testimony has repeatedly been 
received from disinterested parties, living within a day’s 
ride of the scene, positively substantiating the horrible 
accounts that have, after three months, found their way into 
the press.  The powers have abundant evidence on which to 
proceed with the case if compelled by sufficient popular 
interest.  
In this crisis, after long silence, I feel that Christian 
manhood demands from me a statement which cannot be 
buried in the archives of the British foreign office, “for 
state reasons,” nor withheld in an authenticated form by 
mission secretaries who must be loyal to the interests of 
272  
 
great missionary enterprises.715 
 
Frederick Davis Greene was frustrated by the unwillingness of the Foreign Office to 
publish what Hallward had reported, and by the unwillingness of the ABCFM secretaries 
to publish the Knapp report.  Greene used his own network of the Anglo-Armenian 
Association to get the news out.  It is very likely that Greene was the information conduit 
between the ABCFM and the Anglo-Armenian Association (of which he was a member) 
and Garabed Hagopian’s Armenian Patriotic Association.716  It was almost undoubtedly 
because of these interwoven networks that the delegate for the Anglo-Armenian 
Association knew quite well that both the Foreign Ministry and the ABCFM knew more 
about what happened at Sasun than what they had publicly declared.   
 
The Ottoman State continued to attempt to suppress all information about Sasun that 
differed from the official reliable narrative.  On December 7, the Frankfurter Zeitung 
published a letter from Istanbul that reported that, “All travelers coming thence are 
stopped at Trebizond and sent back.  Letters from the interior to here or abroad are not 
forwarded, and all the European papers which print a word about Armenia are 
confiscated.”717 
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Greene was far from alone in these sentiments.  Greene, like many of the ABCFM missionaries and 
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716 Just like Frederick Davis Greene, Garabed Hagopian was a Protestant born in the Ottoman Empire.  
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For the Ottoman State, the increasing attention in Europe to the violence in Sasun was 
taken very seriously.  According to a report from the Birmingham Daily Post, on 
December 8, Abdülhamid II convened a special session of the Council of Ministers at the 
palace, concerned that “no charges so serious as the present accusations [had] been made 
against the Turkish authorities since the Bulgarian atrocities in 1876.”718 
 
On December 6, Edwin Pears, the Istanbul-based correspondent for the Daily News, 
wrote a lengthy article about the reports of the Sasun violence, the dangers of centralized 
rule, and the Ottoman State’s suppression of information at all levels.  Pears concluded 
that the violence at Sasun had been extensive but it was not as horrific as the Bulgarian 
atrocities of 1876.  Pears wrote: 
Every day brings confirmatory testimony to hand showing 
the grave character of the outrages which have been 
committed in Armenia.  Until evidence has been obtained 
from independent official observers, like which Mr. 
Schuyler and Mr. Baring gave in reference to Bulgaria, it 
will be impossible to speak with exactness of the numbers 
of people killed or villages burned.   The denials of the 
general story of outrages are as foolish and mutually 
contradictory as those which appeared after the Bulgarian 
outrages.  Having said this much, I must, however, express 
the opinion that from all the evidence that I have been able 
to gather, that all the outrages cannot be compared with 
those of Bulgaria.  This is a bad business, no doubt, how 
bad will only be known when the Consular reports are 
presented, but this is not a Bulgarian business.719  
 
Pears noted further that one of the “curious features” of the affair was the success the 
Ottoman State had in preventing news of Sasun from becoming more generally known.  
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This was to a large extent because in the East the infrastructure of information 
transmission – telegraphs and post offices – were exclusively in Ottoman hands.  Pears 
observed that, “No scruple is made about opening letters.”  Ottoman subjects, “are afraid 
to bring letters with them to the capital, because of the consequences which would follow 
if they were caught with letters containing matter disagreeable to the Government.”720   
 
Addressing the question about why the massacres occurred in the first place, Pears 
suggested that one aspect of a complex question was the centralization of the Ottoman 
Government.  According to Pears: 
It may be added that one of the reasons why 
misgovernment is more conspicuous in Armenian than in 
most other parts of Turkey is that the government is 
probably more centralized in the capital than it has ever 
been before.  The further away [one is] from 
Constantinople, the worse the government.  …  All the 
attention of the Porte is devoted to the capital and the 
country and towns within easy access to it.  In former times, 
the Governors were continued for a longer term in office.  
There existed, if not a system of feudal tenure, yet 
something very like it.  Under the power of a class of men 
who were known as Derebey there was a local government 
by local men and local public opinion sufficiently strong to 
keep a Governor fairly straight.  Nothing of the kind now 
exists. The Governors and other officials are appointed 
from the capital and are liable to immediate dismissal.  
They have acquired their office often by intrigue or 
payment, and their principal chance of being continued in 
office depends upon their giving satisfaction, not to the 
people governed, but to the authorities in Constantinople.  
The result of this system is that the people suffer, and that 
their grievances are unknown to the Sovereign.  When the 
Powers have to consider what steps ought to be taken for 
the better government in Armenia, the evils of centralized 
government will form one of the chief factors with which 
                                                        











Another man would not be shut up at once and pathetically pleaded, 
"Why don't you write it down, scribe? Oh, write it! For years we have 
put up with the Koords. This year when they attacked us we tried to 
defend ourselves. Then the soldiers came and killed our wives and 
children, though we offered them no resistance. I managed to escape 
and flee to a mountain, and was afterwards captured and brought here. 
What have I been brought here for?  
-- Unknown prisoner at Hampartsoum Boyadjian’s Trial722 
 
 
At the end of November, before the flurry of telegraphs were being bandied about 
between Washington D.C. London and Istanbul, the original Ottoman Commission of 
Inquiry had left Istanbul and was on its way to Muş by steamer.723  Despite the fact724 that 
the bureaucracy of the Porte had made promises to the British Government that the 
investigation would center about the broadly defined ‘events in Sasun,’ the Palace 
continued to send instructions that limited the investigation to the misdeeds of the 
Armenian “bandits.”  Writing from Trabzon, the British Consul Longworth sent a report 
of their progress on December 6, 1894.  The Commissioners were, as Consul Longworth 
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723 The Ottoman Inquiry of Commission departed from Erzurum on December 16, 1894.  (FO 424/178, Sir 
P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley, December 17, 1894, p. 300) 
 
724 FO 424/178, The Earl of Kimberley to Sir P. Currie, November 28, 1894, p. 283.  However, as Block 
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and the reports relative to the incident of Sassoon,’ these words were not in the ‘iradé’ [order] of the Sultan, 
they were after hesitation added by the Porte. … In fact, the Sultan has never consented to an impartial into 
the acts of his officials, although the Porte quite understands it will have to come, but they have not dared 




put it, "limited in their instructions in ascertaining the truth about Bitlis."725   
 
According to the accounts of the ABCFM missionaries in Bitlis, before the Commission 
of Inquiry arrived, Murad (‘nom de guerre’ of Hampartsoum Boyadjian) and his 
companions were subjected to torture.  While being transferred from Muş to Bitlis, one of 
the prisoners was beaten so badly that he died.  Once in Bitlis, “inquisitorial methods are 
being used to get these prisoners to testify that the leading Armenians here, now in prison, 
have been in league with them.”726  Once the Commission of Inquiry arrived in mid-
December 1894, the goal of the torture changed.  Now, the prison wardens wanted the 
prisoners to “testify that the Government had nothing to do with destroying villages, but 
merely stepped in to restore order between them and Kurds.”727 
 
On December 20, Murad and his five followers were brought to trial in Bitlis.  Murad 
testified that he had been born Hampartsoum Boyadjian in Haçın, had studied medicine at 
the Royal Medical School in Istanbul, and had lived for a spell in Athens and Geneva.  
He had come to preach two messages.  First, “not to sell their daughters in marriage” and 
second, “to stand up for their rights against the Kurds.”  Murad acknowledged that he had 
procured weapons for his followers so that they might protect themselves.728  According 
to Knapp: 
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His five companions were asked if Moorad had not 
promised them foreign aid, especially that of England. Four 
of them denied it; the fifth said he had not heard him 
personally, but had been told by someone else that he had 
said so, suggestive questions about England were often 
introduced by the president of the court. Whenever they 
made any reference to the massacre they were abruptly shut 
off with the order to say no more than they were asked. 
One of the prisoners, a shepherd, said that the Koords came 
and drove off his flock; that he ran to the village to give the 
alarm, and when he got there he found people lying dead in 
the streets. He was there interrupted. Another man would 
not be shut up at once and pathetically pleaded, "Why don't 
you write it down, scribe? Oh, write it! For years we have 
put up with the Koords. This year when they attacked us we 
tried to defend ourselves. Then the soldiers came and killed 
our wives and children, though we offered them no 
resistance. I managed to escape and flee to a mountain, and 
was afterwards captured and brought here. What have I 
been brought here for?729 
 
 
The trial of Hampartsoum Boyadjian and his companions lasted around one week.  At the 
end, Boyadjian and one of his followers, Hovhannes, were condemned to death.730   
 
Those scholars of Ottoman history, who employ only the point of view of the Ottoman 
State, may assume that court records are accurate and fully reflect what took place.  As 
can be seen from this description of the Bitlis trial, the court scribe refused to write down 
any account of what had befallen the people of Sasun.  Censorship began at the very 
production of the official documents.  Censorship and continual repetition of a single 
truth operated side-by-side.  Anything that wasn’t part of the official history of rebellion 
and response was ipso facto false.  It would appear that a general rule might be that there 
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is a high correlation between the degree of centralization and the need to have only 
official history (resmi tarih).   
 
Before the Commission of Inquiry appeared, the local authorities attempted to link the 
Armenian notables of Bitlis to the ‘eşkıya’ in the mountains.  After the Commission of 
Inquiry arrived, an apparent goal was to ascertain to what extent the British Government 
was involved in the ‘rebellion’ as a provocateur?   At stake was a pair of questions.  Was 
Murad’s invocation of British Government’s aid simply propagandistic?  Or did it 
suggest that the British Government was in fact involved?  Zeki Paşa’s Report suggested 
that Murad fabricated the accounts of the British involvement, while Tahsin Paşa stated 
that the British Government was directly involved.731  It seems likely that Tahsin Paşa 
attempted to undercut the legitimacy of Hallward’s reporting by attacking his legitimacy 
and accusing him directly of seditious activity.   
 
On December 21, according to a telegram published in the newspaper Tarik, Tahsin Paşa 
declared that as no deaths had occurred from cholera for fifteen days, the cholera 
quarantine cordons would be removed.732  However, three days later, Consul Graves 
reported that Tahsin Paşa sent a telegraph to the Vali of Erzurum, “stating in somewhat 
vague terms that cholera had broken out afresh at Moush, and that the surrounding 
districts had been contaminated with fugitives and requesting that quarantine cordons 
might be established upon all the roads leading to Bitlis.”  Graves suspected that this was 
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a ploy by Tahsin to hinder investigation into Tahsin’s conduct and to hinder the mobility 
of the European delegates, as he had done in the case of vice-Consul Hallward.  Graves 
observes laconically, that without waiting for the Sanitary Inspector’s approval, Tahsin 








The Commission of Inquiry emerged in a bid by the Ottoman State to dissuade the British 
from doing an investigation into the charge made against Hallward.  The original idea 
was for the Commission of Inquiry to be composed only of trustworthy people from the 
Imperial household (aide-de-camps).  The British Foreign Office signed on to this plan.  
However, on November 17, 1894, Garabed Hagopian broke the news of Sasun in the 
London Times.  After this news broke, Lord Kimberley assured the Anglo-Armenian 
Association (which included Parliamentarians) that a Commission had been formed with 
trustworthy people from the Ottoman government. 
 
However, at nearly the same time, the circulation of news in Europe about violence in 
Sasun prompted the Palace to publish a rebuttal to the accounts in Europe.  However, the 
original Commission was not intended to examine the violence in Sasun. According to 
the Communiqué published in many Ottoman newspapers by the Porte on November 23: 
Some newspapers lately published in Europe, have declared, 
contrary to the truth, that some Armenian villages in the 
township of Sassoun have been destroyed by Ottoman 
                                                        




troops, and that at this time some loss of life occurred.  
Others, exaggerating this news have said that the reason 
why this has not been known in Europe until this time is 
that travelers who have started from the region have been 
prevented from traveling.  It is perfectly manifest that His 
Majesty’s subjects residing in the township of Sassoun are 
occupied with their own work at present, as always 
heretofore, in complete quiet and comfort, and that 
travelers are going in perfect security to whatever place 
they wish.  But a number of Armenian brigands have 
yielded to the incitement of revolutionists, some time ago 
dared to engage in criminal acts of a nature to disturb the 
peace and security of the neighborhood of Tallouri, killing, 
stealing, burning and engaging in highway robbery.  Upon 
this the Government naturally took the necessary measures 
to repress the disturbance.  A sufficient number of Imperial 
troops from the Fourth Army Corps were sent, and the evil 
was not allowed to spread, and quiet having been restore, 
the Imperial troops returned to their posts.  In this matter 
there was no intervention of the Kurds, but as said above, 
as it is proven by the representations of the General 
commanding the Fourth Army Corps, and the authorities of 
the Province of Bitlis.  Hence a Commission [composed of 
Abdullah Paşa, Aide-de-Camp of his Imperial Majesty the 
Sultan, Ömer Bey, Director of the Savings Bank, Mecid 
Effendi, First Secretary of the Correspondence of the 
Interior, and Brigadier General Tevfik Paşa of his Imperial 
Majesty’s Military Household] is about to be sent this week 
to make investigations into the unlawful acts of the above-
mentioned brigands.  Since the Imperial Government is 
well known never to allow conduct like that of the recent 
publications, in respect to the various classes of subjects 
dwelling in equality under its mild and equitable rule, this 
present publication is made to set forth the truth and brand 
these publications as false.734 
 
This Communiqué was based both on the Zeki Paşa report (“representations of the 
General commanding the Fourth Amy Corps”) and on Tahsin Paşa’s dispatches 
(“ authorities of the Province of Bitlis”).  The goal of the Commission of Inquiry was 
explicit: it was “to make investigations into the unlawful acts of the [Armenian] brigands.”  
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The reports produced by Zeki Paşa and Tahsin Paşa, both connected to the Palace, was to 
be the sole legitimate narrative, and all others were to be measured against it.   
 
Because Lord Kimberley had publicly promised that the Ottoman Government would 
impartially investigate the accounts of violence, the Foreign Office was now in a serious 
bind.  For years, the Anglo-Armenian association had lambasted the Foreign Office for 
withholding information and protecting the Ottoman State.   Now it looked as if that may 
be true.  Kimberley sent a formal protest to the Ottomans “against the official notification 
which has appeared with reference to the appointment of the Bitlis Commission.”735   
 
Both the Grand Vizier Cevat Paşa, and Foreign Minister Said Paşa, declared that the 
November 23rd Communiqué was a mistake of a clerk.  Rüstem Paşa promised the Earl of 
Kimberley that the Commission would surely conduct a thorough and “impartial 
investigation into the facts connected with the occurrences in the Sassoon district.”736  
However, according to Adam Block, the First Dragoman of the British Legation, the 
Communiqué was published on the orders of the Palace.  In a report dated December 26, 
1894, Block noted that, “the Sultan has never consented to an impartial inquiry into the 
acts of his officials, although the Porte quite understands that it will come, but they have 
not dared to tell him, or have failed to convince him.”737   
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By the middle of the December, after weeks of negotiation, the British, French, Russian 
and Ottoman Governments agreed the Commission would “carry out an inquiry and 
investigation into the Sassoon incident”738 and the European Delegates would write a 
separate joint report.739  On January 13, the European Delegates left Erzurum for Muş.740  
 
Consul Robert Graves gave the British delegate, Hammond Smith Shipley, a 
memorandum to guide his investigation.  At the top of the list was to ascertain “whether 
any massacre of prisoners, unarmed men, women and children took place, and by whom 
it was committed, i.e., by regular troops, or by Kurdish irregulars.”741  Although the 
Commission of Inquiry and the Delegates appeared on paper to be united in a common 
endeavor to ascertain ‘what happened in Sasun,’ this was not at all the case.  After twelve 
weeks of daily testimonies, Shipley observed that: 
The line taken by the Commissioners throughout the 
inquiry, and which they have brought a great number of 
Kurds and others to support, appears to have been to show 
that the inhabitants of Shenik, Semal and Gheliéguzan, and 
of the Talori districts incited by Mourad, who arrived 
among them in the spring of last year began to form into 
bands on the Antok Mountain, from which they descended 
at intervals during the summer, committing acts of 
brigandage and atrocity on the Kurds, who were proceeding 
to their summer pasturages, which, in turn, led to resistance 
on the part of the latter, and armed conflicts.  It was, the 
                                                        
738 FO 424/181, Sir P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley, December 26, 1894, Inclosure in No. 537.  
 
739 FO 424/181, Sir P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley, December 26, 1894, inclosure in 538, “Les 
Délégués rédigeront, en consequence, un procès-verbal collectif et journalier des operations auxquelles ils 
assisteront.” [Delegates will prepare, therefore, a collective and daily record of the operations to which they 
will assist.] It is translated slightly differently in Parliamentary Papers Turkey 1895, no. 1, pp. 63-64.  
 
740 Parliamentary Papers Turkey 1895, no. 1, Sir P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley, January 16, 1895, p. 
44.  
 
741 Parliamentary Papers Turkey 1895, no. 1, “Memorandum of Points to be elicited by the Commission of 




Commissioners appear desirous through their witnesses of 
showing, to put a stop to these conflicts that the troops were 
sent to Gheliéguzan and Talori.  On the Armenians 
attacking the soldiers, conflicts took place both at 
Gheliéguzan and at Gheliésan, which resulted in the final 
dispersion of the Armenians, and the loss of a few lives on 
the part of the latter. 
As will be seen from the above, the Commissioners have 
adhered fairly closely to the official publication on the 
subject in the “Levant Herald” of the 23rd November last.  
Unfortunately for this version of the matter, it is not 
entirely borne out by the facts which have so far been 
brought before us.”742  
 
The Ottoman Commission of Inquiry conducted research over the course of a nearly six 
month period between 24 January and 21 July 1895. Over this period, the Commission 
met over a hundred times and recorded the testimony of 190 witnesses.  There were in 
fact two different Commissions, with two different agendas. One Commission, 
represented by the consular delegates Shipley (United Kingdom), Vilbert (France), and 
Prjevalsky (Russia), was interested in ascertaining whether or not the report of Consul 
Hallward could be verified on several different points.743  H.S. Shipley, was additionally 
tasked with verifying the British consular reports that indicated that a massacre had taken 
place.744  In the fall of 1895, H.S. Shipley wrote a memorandum on the Joint Report.  
According to Shipley, “though the fact of the inhuman slaughter is undoubted,” many of 
the accounts of violence that appeared in the Press appeared to be exaggerated.  The 
Delegates were able to determine that, “the estimates of Armenian losses published from 
                                                        
742 Parliamentary Papers, Turkey 1895, no. 1, April 27, 1895, p. 115. 
 
743 Consul Graves provided Shipley with all the information that he possessed and a seven-point guide, see 
FO 424/181, “Memorandum of Points to be elicited by Commission of Inquiry into Sassoon Occurrences,” 
January 16, 1895, pp. 44-45.  
 
744 Parliamentary Papers Turkey 1895, no. 1, “Memorandum of Points to be elicited by Commission of 
Inquiry into Sasun Occurrences,” p. 74.   
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time to time in the English and Continental Press, and which vary from 5,000 to 10,000, 
are altogether beyond the mark.”745  Shipley further believed that the “statements made 
by certain Turkish soldiers and others at Erzeroum” were exaggerated.746 
 
The Commission sent by the Ottoman State, composed of Ömer Bey, Şerif Bey, Celal 
Bey, Mecid Bey and Hafız Tevfik Paşa,747 appears to have been given a completely 
different charge, namely, to investigate how the Armenian brigands were able to gather in 
such large numbers in the mountains, and their links, if any, with foreign radicals.   
However, the Ottoman Commissioners did not simply adhere closely to Zeki Paşa’s 
report, but sought to bend all the evidence to fit their thesis.   
 
On February 8, 1895, Shipley telegraphed Ambassador Currie some of his observations 
of the inner workings of the Commission.   Over the course of twelve sittings, the 
Ottoman Commissioners had focused on hearing the testimony almost exclusively of 
Government witnesses and making ample use of official documents to prove three points.  
First and foremost, the Ottoman Commissioners sought to prove that the Armenians of 
Kavar were revolting against the Ottoman State.  Second, that in every case of violence 
the Armenians of Kavar had been the aggressors.  Third, that the Armenians of Sasun had 
“committed acts of revolting barbarity against the Mahommedans.”748  On the third sitting, 
the Ottoman Commissioners began the investigation by examining official documents 
                                                        
745 Parliamentary Papers Turkey 1895, no. 1, “Memorandum on the Joint Report of the Consular Delegates 
to the Sasun Commission of July 20, 1895,” p. 74.   
 
746 Parliamentary Papers Turkey 1895, no. 1, p. 205.  
 
747 Parliamentary Papers Turkey 1895, no. 1, p. 161; FO 424/178, pp. 280-282.   
 




produced by the local authorities.749  
As Ambassador Curie put it on 9 February, in a dispatch to Lord Kimberley: 
Up till that time the Commission had heard only one 
witness on the Armenian side.  This witness, a man by the 
name of Erco, was summoned at the suggestion of the 
Delegates.  His body still bore the marks of recent wounds, 
and he stated that he had witnessed the massacring of 
women and children by the troops and that members of his 
own family had perished.  The Commissioners evidently 
felt the damaging effect of the last witness’ evidence, as a 
few days afterward a cousin of Erco, named Serkiss, was 
summoned.  This man had been transferred, with other 
inhabitants of Shenik, to a village three hours distant from 
Moush.  He contradicted the evidence given by Erco that 
the troops massacred certain of his (Serkiss’) children; they 
had died he said, from the effects of their flight.750 
   
The European delegates observed from the beginning the witnesses were divided into two 
categories.  The survivors from the villages of Güliegüzan, Shenik, Semal and other 
villages of the Kavar Valley were considered to be “suspects” while all others were 
considered witnesses or informers.  The European delegates protested against this 
bifurcation into two classes, and pointedly wrote in their joint report that it was 
“noticeable even in the mode adopted for the examination of witnesses.”751 
 
At the end of January, the Consular Delegates demanded that Tahsin Paşa be suspended, 
                                                        
749 As the Consular Delegates observed, "According to these documents, the Ottoman authorities, hearing, 
in the second fortnight of July 1894 (o.s.), either through official reports or the secret police, of gatherings 
of armed Armenians, to the number of several hundred, in the villages of Semal, Shenik, Ghelieguzan, and 
in those of the district of Talori itself, deemed it necessary to dispatch several contingents of regular 
Imperial troops to suppress what they regarded as an armed rebellion fomented by foreign political 
agitators, and to protect Mussulman inhabitants against the acts of revolting cruelty to which they were 
exposed at the hands of these Armenian bands." (Parliamentary Papers Turkey 1895, no. 1, p. 193) 
 
750 Ibid.  
 
751 Parliamentary Papers Turkey, no. 1, “Report of the Consular Delegates attached to the Commission 




at least during the investigation.752  On January 28, 1895, Tahsin was finally removed 
from office.753  Writing from Bitlis, George Perkins Knapp recalled that Vali’s removal 
“brought quite a relief, for Tahsin Paşa was not only using the forcible measures to 
vindicate himself, but was also trying to stir fanatical elements to violence against the 
Armenians.”754  Knapp noted that, after Tahsin Paşa “stealthily” left the city, on January 
31, “those whom he had fleeced began to file Petitions against him and his henchmen to 
recover blackmail – vain hopes.”755   According to Gustave Meyrier, the French consul in 
Diyarbekir, when Tahsin Paşa arrived in that city he was greeted with a hero’s 
welcome.756   Despite this strong popular support, Tahsin Paşa travelled with a large 
armed escort to Istanbul.  When he passed through Sivas in late February, the US consul 
Jewett, noted that the reason for this escort was to protect him from the revenge of the 
Kurdish population of the mountains.  According to Consul Jewett, this escort was 
necessary because certain Kurdish tribes, were looking for opportunities to kill him in 
                                                        
752 Parliamentary Papers Turkey, no. 1, “Procès-Verbal,” January 28, 1895.   
 
753 FO 424/182, p. 86; FO 424/181, Sir P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley, January 28, 1895, p. 49.  
 
754 FO 424/182, p. 86, Knapp added, “We finally became pretty well convinced that he was even plotting 
against our lives.  I have it on very good authority that in Government Councils one leading man proposed 
that we should be imprisoned.  Tahsin said he had no right to do that, but that if he could only find 
something in the papers about the Sassoun matter over our signatures, he would then see what he could do 
to us.  We had telegraphed to our minister telling him that our mails were being interfered with…”  
 
755 FO 424/182, p. 86.  
 
756 See the volume of correspondence of Gustave Meyrier edited by Mouradian (2000), Rapport no. 2, p. 50, 
9 février 1895, “Bien qu’on assure qu’il ait été destitué, le Gouvernement local, au grand complet, et les 
troupes de la garnison sont allés à sa rencontre.  Losqu’il es descendu de cheval devant la maison qu’il doit 
occuper, il a été, en présence du Vali, applaudi par la foule des Turcs qui se trouvaient là en grand nombre. 
Cette ovation que, dans les musulmans de Diarbékir partagent les sentiments de leurs coreligionnaires du 
vilayet de Bitlis à l’égard des chrétiens et je crois que, si l’occasion se présentait, ils seraient tout disposes à 
suivre leur example.” [Although he had been deposed, the local Government in full force with the troops of 
the garrison went to meet him.  When he dismounted in front of the house he was to stay, he was in the 
presence of the Vali, applauded by the crowd of Turks who were there in large numbers.  This ovation 
among the Muslims of Diyarbekir empathize with their co-religionists in the Vilayet of Bitlis against the 
Christians and I think that, if the opportunity presented itself, they would all be willing to follow their 




revenge for what he did to the Armenians of Sasun.757  This hints at the complexity of the 
situation that does not fit easily into the anachronistic frameworks held by both Armenian 
Studies and Ottoman Studies.  It wasn’t just Kurds versus Armenians. 
 
A further example of this complexity was a Petition to the Queen of England signed by 
thirty-nine Kurdish Chiefs of the Bitlis Vilayet.  Many of these tribes had been involved 
in the Sasun violence.  Since the beginning of the Commission at the end of January, 
certain authorities within the Ottoman State had begun to place all the blame onto the 
Kurdish tribes, for the mass killings committed by the regular troops.  The Petition was 
far wider in scope than simply exculpation from being saddled for responsibility for the 
mass killings.  It was, as Consul Graves put it, the Petition was “a very clear exposition of 
recent Turkish policy in Kurdistan.”758  According to this Petition,  
Before the Ottoman Government ruled over these region, 
when we were governed by our Princes, though it was not 
known what civilization is, still our Princes were not 
accustomed to introduce enmity and strife between us and 
the various Christian sects, and its was for this reason that 
peace and safety existed among us, so that though each one 
of us owned a Christian, and every year exacted a fixed 
amount for protection afforded, yet we cared for them just 
like our own children, and if they suffered extortion from 
any direction, we would labour from them to the extent of 
sacrificing our dear life for the love of them, and this 
cannot be denied.  On the other hand, that the official sent 
to these parts introduced for their personal gain enmity 
between the two races, setting father, brother against 
brother, and in what way countless murders and various 
evils followed, is evident to your Majesty, which, to write 
in plain definiteness, could cause head-splitting pains.  
Besides this, know that we are devoid of education, they 
deceived us by painting our eyes with this seeming good 
                                                        
757 FO 424/182, Consul Longworth to Sir P. Currie, March 12, 1895, p. 1.   
 
758 FO 424/183, Consul Graves to Sir P. Currie, July 25, 1895, p. 169.  
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reason, saying, “The Christians are enemies of our religion; 
do not allow their eyes to be opened; give them no peace; 
rob them of their property; seize their wives and daughters 
by force and kidnap them.  … Witness falsely against them, 
for when they see ease they will bring our land and religion 
into inferiority – reproach.  When you subject them to such 
oppressions, should any be audacious to enough to 
complain to the Government, we will see that the necessary 
are not taken, and they are driven away. … [by] destroying 
the love and perfect confidence that has existed for 
hundreds of years between us and the Christians, and due to 
their turbulence and by means of their soldiers and 
gendarmerie, the massacres, robberies, burnings, and other 
disgusting works that have taken place in the Sassoon 
mountains and other places resulted, in which matters they 
have laid everything to Kurds, and shown themselves 
innocent…”759    
 
The Kurdish Chiefs’ Petition underlined that the purpose of this divide-et-impera policy 
of the Ottoman State was to extract resources destined for Istanbul.  This petition, and the 
real anger over Tahsin Paşa’s misrepresentations and incitement to murder, dovetails well 
with many survivor accounts that stress that it was the soldiers who did most of the 
killing.  As one petition letter from Sasun survivors emphasized, “It [was] not the Kurds 
who perpetrated all this.  On the contrary, the Kurds are, with the exception of a few 








In the spring of 1895, hundreds of newspapers across Great Britain and the United States 
began to report daily on the Sasun massacres.  The publication of Rev. Royal M. Cole’s 
                                                        
759 FO 424/183, “Petition of Kurdish Chiefs,” p. 170.  
 




letter from Bitlis in mid-November inaugurated a competition between different 
newspapers to address the Sasun events.  A number of major newspapers, including the 
London Times, the Daily Telegraph, the Daily News and the Daily Graphic sent ‘special 
correspondents’ to investigate the violence. 
 
These special correspondents included Frank Scudamore, of the Daily News, Emile 
Dillon of the Daily Telegraph, E.A. Brayley Hodgetts of the Daily Graphic, and Henry 
John Cockayne Cust, the editor of the Pall Mall Gazette.  The writings of Scudamore and 
Dillon in particular reached a very large audience.  Their interviews with survivors and 
soldiers were widely reproduced in other newspapers, and thus brought narratives of the 
Sasun massacres to a growing reading public around the world.  Dillon and Scudamore 
were two among a number of special correspondents from different newspapers who 
headed to Istanbul in the winter of 1894-1895.761 The special correspondents were 
charged with doing an investigation to verify the reports that hundreds if not thousands of 
villagers were indiscriminately killed by Ottoman troops in the Sasun mountains.  
 
Just as these special correspondents were making their way to Istanbul in mid-January 
1895, the Ottoman State forbade all journalists from coming into Anatolia.762  The editors 
                                                        
761  Correspondents from the London Times, Glasgow Herald, and Reuter’s Agency also reported long-form 
accounts from Istanbul and the Caucasus.  19th century British newspapers rarely carried the byline of the 
individual reporters, making it very difficult to decipher their identity today. Few historians have cited the 
writings of Scudamore or Dillon.  I find this to be remarkable as Gladstone credits Emile Dillon’s reporting 
in the Daily Telegraph as the primary reason why the British public cares about Sasun. See, “Mr. Gladstone 
on the Armenian Question,” in Facts about Armenia, p. 16 
 
762 Writing to the Earl of Kimberley on January 17, Ambassador Currie wrote, “All English newspaper 
correspondents desirous of travelling in Armenian provinces are being refused permission by the Turkish 




of the London Times protested this censorship in long essays composed on January 24 
and January 31, 1895.  The editors lambasted the Ottoman State for being “entirely blind 
to the importance of permitting that independent inquiry which alone can satisfy Western 
opinion.”  This was not, the editors reasoned, a clerical error or bureaucratic oversight as, 
“every one at all conversant with the management of business at Constantinople knows 
that a matter of this kind, pushed in this way, is finally decided by no lower authority 
than the Sultan himself.”763  The editors of the London Times reasoned that: 
Unless everything alleged against Turkish administration is 
true it stands to gain by every impartial examination of the 
facts; and even if everything is true it can lose nothing by a 
confession, which is at least more respectable than stubborn 
impenitence. This immovable resolution to exclude our 
Special Correspondent is, therefore, from the point of view 
of Turkish interests, a blunder of the first magnitude. It 
betrays a fear of daylight which inevitably suggests even to 
impartial critics that the deeds so carefully veiled are deeds 
of darkness.764 
 
The unnamed correspondent for the Glasgow Herald observed that a ‘raging Anglophobia’ 
had infected the Palace, but “has not in any way spread to the people of Turkey as a 
whole.”  According to this special correspondent for the Glasgow Herald: 
It is at Yildiz that the malady has its seat.  At the Imperial 
palace the antipathy to Great Britain and all things British, 
which has been slowly growing for the past nineteen years, 
has of late developed into an acute mania. … The set 
conviction of the Sultan appears to be that Great Britain is 
                                                        
763 London Times, January 24, 1895. See also London Times, February 4 and February 9, 1895.    
 
764 Ibid. Six days later the editors wrote, “The matter had been referred to the Sultan and 
his majesty evidently thinks that the danger of preventing independent inquiry is less than 
the danger of inconvenient disclosures.  As he doubtless knows much better than we do 
what really occurred in the Sasun district, he is perhaps better able to estimate the 
comparative danger of the two courses of action; but he must not be surprised if the 
section of the public which has hitherto maintained a skeptical attitude with regard about 
wholesale massacres should now be driven to believe that there is much more to conceal 




his mortal enemy, that the old personal sympathy that grew 
upon the Crimean plains between the Turks and the British 
has long since been dead, and is replaced by the feeling that 
our whole policy is now to thwart, to harass, and to oppose 
him whenever and wherever we can.  Now, it must clearly 
be understood that in Turkey, at the present time, there 
exists no power but that of the palace.765  
 
The Ottoman ban on journalists, a form of censorship, was justified by the Ottoman State 
in several ways.   One pretext was that the situation was dangerous and the Ottoman State 
did not have the means to protect the journalists in the mountains.  Another pretext was 
that the journalists would only report falsehoods.  The Grand Vizier gave variations of 
these explanations in a series of interviews that he gave to reporters in January, 1895.   
Both of these rationales were described by an unnamed special correspondent for the 
Glasgow Herald.  The journalist for the Glasgow Herald describes how, when informed 
that the journalist has come to investigate the occurrences in the vilayet of Bitlis, the 
Grand Vizier “smiled somewhat bitterly” and remarked that, “Many people are 
occupying themselves about this affair.”766  To this, the journalist replied: 
“So many,” I said, “that the public of Great Britain are determined to know the 
truth, and it is in order to have the means of telling the truth that I am here.  You 
have closed the road to some of my colleagues.  It is surely in error.  But, anyhow, 
I come to your Highness in all fairness and honesty.  I declare to you, that I have 
always loved the Turks since I shared their hardships in the war of 1877, that it is 
my desire to be absolutely impartial in this matter, and to write without any sort of 
bias on either side, and therefore ask your Highness, not indeed to facilitate my 
journey, but at least not to put in my way obstacles that cannot fail to prejudice 
your cause.” 
 
Djevad Pasha bowed.  “I thank you for your general sentiment,” he said.  “If 
everyone thought with you, things would be different, but we have now many 
enemies in England.” 
 
                                                        
765 Glasgow Herald, February 8, 1895.  
 




“All my countrymen would be glad to think well of the Turks,” I said, “but you do 
your best to rouse our doubts.”   
 
He shook his head.  “This is a difficult question,” he said, everybody is free to 
travel in Turkey, but at the present time it is inexpedient to do so.  In the first 
place, there is a great deal of snow; then the roads are bad; also, there is the 
cholera.  It is not a fitting moment.” 
 
“But you are accused of unheard-of cruelties, surely there is never a moment 
when it was less fitting and less expedient that you should seek to stifle 
independent inquiry.” 
 
All this time His Highness had stood motionless, with his hands joined on his 
breast.  He now sat down, and motioned me to a chair.  “A great deal has been 
spoken and written about this affair of the Armenians,” he said.  “We do not know 
why, but at length we have consented to appoint this Commission to which France 
and Russia have joined themselves.  The Commissioners are now on the spot in 
Mouch.  May God further their labours!  If there have been troubles, if there had 
been massacres, it will be known.  We shall regret it deeply.  There are, however, 
always disturbances in these districts.  It is a turbulent country.  I do not know 
why of late so many lies should you have written about us.” 
 
“If they are lies, Altease,” I said, “aid me to contradict them.”767  
 
Ahmet Cevat Paşa replied that it was not possible for any journalists to conduct 
investigations in the region and that all must await the results of the Commission.  Their 
conversation ended amicably, although the anonymous special correspondent for the 
Glasgow Herald vowed that he would attempt to reach Bitlis in any case.  Other 
journalists reported almost parallel conversations with Ahmet Cevat Paşa.  Frank 
Scudamore768 of the Daily News and Emile Dillon769 of the Daily Telegraph were also 
                                                        
767 Glasgow Herald, February 8, 1895.  
 
768 Frank Scudamore, A Sheaf of Memories, p. 147.  Scudamore described his conversation with the Grand 
Vizier Cevat Paşa thusly:  
“What I wished, I said, was to go up into the Sassun Mountains – scene of the alleged atrocities – there to 
glean the evidence that should once for all refute the charges made against the Sultan’s officers, and thus 
re-emblazon the escutcheon of Turkey’s tarnished humanity in the eyes of the great British public.  No 
reasonableness on my part, however, could make his Highness see eye to eye with me in the matter.  “It 
was bitterly cold,” he argued, “and there were no roads, no foods, or comforts, or accommodation for 
travelers, in all the Armenian highlands, at such a season, and he could not sanction the suffering to which I 
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explicitly informed that although would not be allowed to investigate the violence of 
Sasun in the Bitlis Vilayet they would be given ample access to the legitimate narrative 
instead.   
 
It is worth, at this point, to learn a little about the journalists Frank Scudamore and Emile 
Dillon.   
 
Frank Scudamore (1859-1939) was tasked by the Daily News with investigating, “on the 
spot the truth of the stories of dread atrocities.”770   He arrived in Istanbul on January 5, 
1895.  This was not his first trip to Istanbul.  Scudamore had first arrived twenty years 
earlier when he was a boy of sixteen.  In 1875, his father, Frank Ives Scudamore, was 
                                                                                                                                                                     
must be put, should I attempt the proposed journey.”  And when I insisted, His Highness grew irritable, and 
when I politely demurred to avail myself of the cooked-up reports of the local authorities which he kindly 
offered to place at my disposal, and insinuated that my readers would distrust them, he became angry and 
even rude.  “His Majesty the Sultan,” he said, “was determined that Sasun should not be a bazaar of 
correspondents, and he had special orders that no “special” should be permitted to the Asia Minor Coast. 
No, I should not go, and would be stopped, arrested and brought back to Constantinople if I attempted to 
proceed on my enterprise.”  There was after this nothing more to be said…” 
 
769 According to Emile Dillon (writing two decades later in The Editor & Publisher, August 3, 1918), pp. 
13-14: 
“In Constantinople, I had interesting talks with the Grand Vizier, Djevat Pasha.  I requested him to obtain 
for me an audience with the Sultan, and I presented a letter in the same sense from the Sultan’s friend, 
Professor Vambery, of Budapest.  The Grand Vizier promised to arrange the matter.  Kiamil Pasha, 
however, it would be useless because the Sultan could do nothing.  I persevered in my request.  Then Abdul 
Hamid sent me the Order of the Medjdieh.   He also offered to provide me with all requisite documents for 
the study of the Armenian question and airy apartments in which to read them.  The Medjdieh Order I 
returned with the expression of my cordial thanks, explaining that in Great Britain a special correspondent 
resembles an Ambassador in being debarred from accepting any decorations… The Grand Vizier then sent 
for me and said, “If you agree to remain here his Majesty may yet find it possible to receive you.  But you 
may not visit Armenia. There is an international commission of Russian, French and English delegates 
there about to inquire into the alleged massacres at Sassoon, so a journalist would be superfluous.  “But my 
Government has given strict instructions that you are not to be allowed in that country; nor indeed any 
journalist of any country.”  “None the less I am going, and I shall get there,” I insisted, and added, “my 
report will be read throughout Europe long before that of the Commission.”  The Grand Vizier smiled the 
smile of superior knowledge, and I left.  His spies, who had been shadowing me from the very first, never 
left me now.” 
 




hired to reorganize the Ottoman telegraph system after concluding a long career at the 
British General Post Office.  His father played a key role in the centralization of British 
State authority over the private telegraph companies in Great Britain.771   His father was 
then hired by Sultan Abdülaziz  (r. 1861-1876) to organize the telegraph system in the 
Ottoman Empire, in accordance with the international Postal Union of Berne.772   
 
Frank Scudamore spent the remainder of his adolescence in Istanbul and was a “constant, 
almost yearly visitor”773 to the Ottoman Empire thereafter.  Scudamore learned Turkish 
and became a fluent speaker of Turkish774 and Arabic.775  While still a teen, Scudamore 
covered the Ottoman-Russian war of 1877-1878 for the Daily News.776  Over the 
subsequent 17 years he worked as special correspondent or ‘war journalist.’    
 
Emile Dillon was born in 1854 to an Irish father and British mother in Dublin.  While 
quite young, he made his way to Paris, where he spent time studying with the Philologist 
                                                        
771 Charles R. Perry, “Frank Ives Scudamore and the Post Office Telegraphs,” Albion: A Quarterly Journal, 
vol. 12, no. 4 (Winter 1980), pp. 350-367d.  
 
772 The Treaty of Berne established the General Postal Union.  Signed in 1874, the Treaty of Berne was an 
agreement between 22 countries to unify their discrete postal services and thus allow international mail to 
be exchanged freely.  It is an interesting coincidence that Scudamore Sr. was hired by the Ottoman State to 
set up the very apparatus of international dissemination that his son would later make use of send his 
articles from the Ottoman Empire to London.   
 
773 Scudamore 1925, p. 18. Justin McCarthy et al. are incorrect in their assertion that Scudamore wrote 
nothing about his experiences reporting in Eastern Anatolia in his memoir, A Sheaf of Memories. In fact, 
his memoir devotes an entire chapter to his experiences covering Sasun for the Daily News. 
 
774 Scudamore 1925, p. 93; Frank Scudamore wrote the language manual Turkish for Tommy and Tar 
(1915); according also to the Daily News (March 21, 1895), “It may be well to say that our Correspondent 
speaks Turkish, and is thus able to take the depositions of Turkish soldiers.” Justin McCarthy et al. are 
incorrect in their assertion (p. 54) that Scudamore didn’t speak Turkish.   
 
775 Frank Scudamore also wrote the language manual, Arabic for our Armies (1915).   
 




Ernest Renan and worked at the Bibliothèque Nationale as a cataloger.  He subsequently 
studied Greek, Latin, Sanskrit, Arabic and Hebrew at the University of Innsbruck under 
the Orientalist Gustav Bickell.  After Innsbruck Dillon received further education at 
Leipzig, Tübingen, St. Petersburg, Louvain and Kharkov.  He received a Master of 
Oriental Languages at St. Petersburg, a doctorate of Oriental Languages at Louvain and a 
second Doctorate of Comparative Philology and Classical languages at Kharkov.777   
 
Along with this cosmopolitan education, Dillon picked up fluency in a number of 
languages (he wrote for English, French, German and Russian newspapers), and 
developed contacts across the European academic world that would later serve him in his 
chosen profession of journalism.  During his lifetime, Dillon became widely known as an 
extraordinarily talented journalist as well as an early translator of Leo Tolstoy into 
English.  When the innovative journalist W.T. Stead was asked who he considered to be 
the “most brilliant living journalist,” he replied, “A little man who hides his light under a 
bushel and shuns the public gaze as the plague, but is the honoured friend of sovereigns 
and statesmen.  I take off my hat to Dr. Dillon.”778   
 
Scudamore and Dillon each left Istanbul in late January 1895 and separately arrived in 
                                                        
777 Biographical details for Emile Dillon can be found in The New Outlook, vol. 81, p. 267; “Character 
Sketch: Dr. E. J. Dillon: Our Premier Journalist,” in Review of Reviews, vol. 24 (1901), pp. 21-26.  Before 
he became a journalist, Dillon published such articles as, “The Place Occupied by the Armenian Language 
in the Indo European Family,” “The Dualism of the Zend Avesta,” “A Translation of the History of 
Scandinavian Literature of the Middle Ages,” (all in Russian), “The Home and Age of the Avesta,” and 
“L’Alphabet de la Langue Bactrienne,” and “Die Transkription der Eranischen Sprachen.”  He contributed 
to Journal de al Société Asiatique de Paris, Oesterreichische Literaturzeitung, Revue l’Instruction 
Publique, West Oestliche Rundschan, Revue des Questions Historiques and Revue de Linguistique.   
 




Erzurum in early February.  Scudamore was assisted by Consul Longworth (an old 
friend) to bypass the strict restrictions against journalists in Trabzon and made his way in 
the dead of winter to Erzurum from the West.779   Dillon received help from the Russian 
Viceroy in Tiflis and arrived in Erzurum bedecked in the uniform of a Cossack General 
from the East.780  In his memoir, Consul Robert Graves recalled that: 
So far the Turkish Government had succeeded in 
preventing the entry into the disturbed area of any 
representative of the European Press, but at the beginning 
of February, two well-known British special 
correspondents managed to run the blockade, Dr. E.J. 
Dillon of the Daily Telegraph coming from the Caucasus 
and F.I. Scudamore from Constantinople via Trebizond for 
the Daily News.  Their arrival caused great perturbation 
and activity in secret police circles and their long and 
graphic reports on the events which until then been “wropt 
in mystery” [sic] as far as the reading public were 
concerned aroused intense interest in England.781 
 
On March 21, the Grand Vizier, Ahmet Cevat Paşa reminded Ambassador Currie that as 
“no correspondents would be allowed in Asia Minor” steps should be taken to remove 
Dillon and Scudamore from Erzurum.782  Ambassador Currie said that as he (Cevat) has 
“authority over these gentleman” the British Embassy would not “enforce the Porte’s 
prohibition.”783  The Ottoman State attempted other strategies to remove the journalists.   
                                                        
779 FO 424/181, Consul Longworth to Sir P. Currie, February 2, 1895, pp. 127-128; Scudamore, A Sheaf of 
Memories, pp. 148-155. 
 
780 The Editor & Publisher, August 3, 1918, p. 14.  
 
781 Graves 1933, pp. 145-146.  
 
782  FO 424/181, Sir P. Currie to the Earl of Kimberley, February 8, 1895 p. 98; FO 424/181, Sir P. Currie 
to the Earl of Kimberley, March 21, 1895, p. 216.  
 
783 FO 424/181, Sir P. Currie, p. 216, March 21, 1895.  Dillon recounted this with more color: “The Porte 
was alarmed.  Our Ambassador, Sir Phillip Currie, was requested by the Grand Vizier to order me out of 
the Ottoman Empire.  He answered that that was beyond his powers.  Djevad Pasha objected that the 
Russian Ambassador wielded such authority.  That may be, answered Sir Philip Currie, “but I am the 
Ambassador of Her Majesty the Queen of England.” The Editor & Publisher, August 3, 1918 [Henceforce 
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In London, the Ottoman Ambassador Rüstem Paşa threatened Lord Burnham, the 
proprietor of the Daily Telegraph, that he might be sued for “maligning the Sultan.”784  
Scudamore believed that continued official efforts to remove them from the country lent 
them some protection.785   Moreover, both Scudamore and Dillon were able to bribe 
officials, whose salaries were in arrears, into supporting their investigation.  As 
Scudamore explained: 
For the Grand Vizier made an application to Lord 
Roseberry, who was then Prime Minister, which was 
repeated some months later when Lord Salisbury took 
office, requesting that the British Government should 
require my withdrawal from Turkey.  The representations 
met, of course, with the reply that might be expected – for 
it was not for the British Government to interfere in the 
position – but the faux pas served me admirably, for having 
proclaimed the fact that moving about in the Armenian 
highlands, the good Turks were precluded from effecting 
my elimination. They therefore surrounded me with spies.  
No less than four police officials followed by footsteps at 
all hours.  This unwearyingly surveillance I found could be 
profitably turned to my advantage.  Not many days, indeed, 
had passed before I had succeeded in making an 
arrangement with the chief of these police agents (his 
salary was much in arrears) which operated for our mutual 
benefit during the whole of my stay in the country.  I found 
the watchfulness of these officers a great protection.786 
 
While in Erzurum, both Scudamore and Dillon wrote copious dispatches about the 
investigations.  For sources of information on Sasun, Scudamore and Dillon relied on 
                                                                                                                                                                     
E&P], p. 14.  
 
784 E&P, p. 14 
 
785 Scudamore 1925, p. 157.  
 




material from the British archives in Erzurum,787 the ABCFM missionaries788 and 








At the same time that journalists from Great Britain were arriving in the Ottoman Empire 
in mid-January, a long-interview with Saturnino Ximénez,790 a Spanish traveler, 
journalist and professor, was published in the pages of the Conservative organ, the 
Morning Post.791  In his widely reproduced account,792 Ximénez said that although he had 
been in the vicinity, “where the massacres and barbarities are alleged to have been 
perpetrated, he neither saw nor heard anything to warrant the sensational stories which 
have been recently published in the European press.”793’ 
                                                        
787 Scudamore was probably allowed access to the British sources through his old friendship with Graves 
(Scudamore 1925, p. 155).   
 
788 In his memoirs, Scudamore only mentions that the ABCFM missionary in Erzurum (Rev. William 
Nesbitt Chambers) was a “splendid fellow.”  Nevertheless, details from certain articles suggest an ABCFM 
source (although these same details may also have been conveyed via British consuls).  Compare 
Scudamore’s account of Damadian (April 29, 1895) with Knapp’s (FO 424/182, pp. 70-87).  Both write, for 
example that Damadian’s leg was broken “with a gunstock.”  This detail was not reported in either of 
Hallward’s reports and Damadian himself gave a different account of how his leg was broken (Chalabian, 
1994, pp. 23-49 and Selvi 2009, pp. 58-59) 
 
789 Scudamore: Daily News, “The Armenian Atrocities,” March 26, 1895; Daily News, “The Armenians,” 
March 21, 1895; Daily News, “Another Turkish Soldier’s Story,” March 29, 1895; Dillon: Sheffield & 
Rotherham Independent, March 26, 1895; Western Mail, April 2, 1895;  
 
790 I have been able to find only the faintest details on the 42 year-old Spaniard Saturnino Ximénez.   
 
791 The Morning Post, published in London between 1772 and 1937, was “regarded as the official organ of 
the most exclusive West-end and country-house circles.” Quoted from, The World’s Paper Trade Review, 
Vol. 24, p. 186.   
 
792 See for instance, The Glasgow Herald, January 10, 1895.  
 





According to Consul Graves, Saturnino Ximénez departed from Van on August 27 and 
reached Erzurum on September 8, 1894.794  Given that Ximénez had spent three days at 
Akhlat, Graves concluded that, “it would have been almost impossible for him to have 
visited Bitlis and Muş, even without halting between the above dates, but I have also 
what appears to me direct evidence that he came straight from Akhlat to Erzeroum by the 
Boulanik road.”795  It is highly likely that the ‘sufficient evidence’ that Graves referred to 
stemmed from Herbert Marsena Allen796, an Ottoman-born ABCFM missionary based in 
Van.   
 
Nearly a month later, on February 13, Rev. Allen wrote to the editors of the Chicago 
Daily Tribune: 
Ximenez, accompanied by a Turk as a bosom friend and a 
Chaldean dragoman, left Diarbekir, where he had arrived 
from the coast for Mosul.  From there he turned northward, 
skirted along Eastern Mesopotamia, made a side trip to 
Persia and returned to Turkish territory, bring up in the 
Southern Hekkiari.  He passed through the small district of 
Gawar and came directly to Van.  He spent a month here.  
Soon after his arrival he presented a note of introduction to 
me given by a friend of mine at Constantinople.  I called on 
him at once and the call was returned Aug. 3.  While here 
he made two short excursions, the longer being to Vostan, a 
distance of twenty miles from Van.  
 
                                                        
794 FO 424/181, Consul Graves to Sir P. Currie, January 18, 1895, p.86.  
 
795 Ibid.  
 
796 Herbert Marsena Allen was born in Harput in 1865 to ABCFM missionaries O.P. Allen and Caroline 
Wheeler Allen.  After an education at Williams College and Bangor Theological Seminary in 1893, he was 
ordained as a Reverend and returned “home” to the Ottoman Empire.  After the Ottoman constitutional 
revolution of 1908, and the reduced censorship on the press, he became the editor of the ABCFM-organ the 




Needless to say, he was sufficiently dined and wined, and 
this brings me to the climax of his stupendous falsehold.  
He claims to have been in the Moosh and Sassoun region 
when a slight disturbance but “no massacre occurred.”  But 
a matter of fact, on the Sultan’s accession day, Aug. 30, the 
day when the worst of the Sassoun massacre took place, 
Ximenez was being feasted at a point just two miles from 
my house in the Village of Sukhkhyar, and was said to be 
drunk.  For days later he was honored in the same way at 
another favorite resort of the Turks, four miles from here, 
and the next morning he left by boat for Akhlat on the 
northern shore of Van Lake.  He spent three days there and 
then went directly to Erzoom via Malasgerd. He spent some 
time at Erzroom and then went on to Constantinople.  
 
You will see by a study of the map that the nearest point he 
came to Moosh was Akhlat, which is two long days’ 
journey from Moosh and three from Sassoun. You will 
observe that he arrived at that point six days after the 
massacre had ceased.  
 
Let the world judge by these facts how much confidence is 
to be placed in the statements of this man who has 
challenged the cause of truth.797   
 
Rev. Allen was far from alone in his suspicion of Ximénez.  In his memoirs, Consul 
Graves recalled that “there came from Constantinople a somewhat enigmatic character in 
the person of one Ximenes, who was presented as a Spanish journalist and writer of 
distinction, but whom I quickly was able to place as a secret agent of the Imperial Palace, 
with which he was in constant communication by cipher telegram.798 
  
At the root of my investigation in Chapters four through six is how narratives of violence 
of Sasun were disseminated and censored.  The tales were gathered by ABCFM 
missionaries from survivors and soldiers in Bitlis, Muş, Harput, Erzurum, Erzingan,  and 
                                                        
797 Chicago Daily Tribune, March 24, 1895.  
 




Van and published in newspapers in Europe and the United States.  At the same time, the 
Ottoman State orchestrated the mass publication of the Zeki Paşa Report in newspapers 
in Europe and the United States.  The Ottoman State relayed the Zeki Paşa report by 
telegraph to its Ambassadors in Great Britain and United States.  Was this narrative held 
to be factually true within the Ottoman State?  Or was it understood to be mere 
propaganda to cover-up?  Certain elite members of the State probably believed it to be 
true.  Others may have had their doubts.  However, at least in print they were not 
permitted within the centralized autocracy of the Hamidian regime to voice them.  Within 
the Ottoman Empire, the Censorship apparatus tightly controlled the printed page.   
 
As early as January, investigators from Istanbul to Erzurum began to put together all the 
alternative narratives and to compare them.  The Istanbul-based correspondent of The 
Speaker wrote that the evidence of the violence from both survivors and soldiers was 
overwhelming: 
I fear that there can be no doubt about the essential fact.  
We have already the official reports of the Consuls at Van, 
Erzeroum, Sivas, and Diarbekir, which have not yet been 
published, but which we know, confirm the most horrible 
statements in the papers.  We have the reports of the 
Armenian refugees who were eye-witnesses.  We have the 
reports sent to the Armenian Patriarchy here, and the 
reports sent to the Catholic and Protestants in the vicinity of 
Sassoun.  Beyond this, and most horrible at all, we have the 
testimony of Turkish soldiers who took part in the 
massacres.  These soldiers were of the regular army and 
drawn from Erzurum, Erzingan, Van, Bitlis, Kharpoot and 
Sivas.  They have since returned to their respective posts 
after having been publicly thanked, in the name of the 
Sultan, for what they did.  And they have talked with the 
greatest freedom in public places, and to all who would 
listen boasting of their deeds.799  
                                                        





Underneath the suppression of all public information in the Ottoman State, however were 
rumors.  By the end of December 1894, fearful rumors were circulating throughout 
Anatolia about what had taken place in the Sasun mountains.  In Trabzon, Consul 
Longworth reported an increase in inter-communal tension.  Among the Muslim 
population, there was a “feeling of suspense as to the ultimate consequences of the 
Armenian troubles, aggravated by wild and loose reports of Armenian atrocities 
committed on Moslems in the interior.”800  This was buoyed by “the unscrupulous [who] 
are ready enough to work upon such emotions for their own ends.”801 
 
These rumors and stories that circulated in the aftermath of the violence had a huge 
impact on the Armenian communities of the Ottoman Empire.  The news of the violence 
radicalized many.  On January 28, Consul Robert Graves wrote a long discussion of the 
impact that that the news of Sasun had on the Armenian Protestant and Armenian 
Apostolic communities in the Ottoman East.  Before the violence, Graves describes a 
general tripartite division in the Armenian between a “Conservative and Turkophile 
party,” a “Moderate Liberal Party,” and “a small but active revolutionary party, but 
scantily represented within the Turkish Empire.”802 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
1894) quotes this same passage in his monograph on the Sasun violence.  
 
800 FO 424/178, Consul Longworth to Sir P. Currie, December 17, 1894, p. 383.  
 
801 Ibid.  
 




The Conservative faction was “composed of officials in Ottoman employ, and their 
families, of the hangers on, ‘kehayas,’ stewards and unofficial agents of various degrees 
of the leading Mussulmans, who owned their immunity from oppression to the protection 
of their patrons.”  This party consisted also of the ecclesiastics and wealthy “laymen of 
the old school” whose material wherewithal depended upon the Ottoman Government.  
For the Ottoman Government, “they were ready to lavish as much lip-service as was 
required of them and they looked with disfavour upon anything calculated to alter the old 
order of things.”803  This faction also included the Armenian Catholics, who “enjoyed 
almost entire freedom from Government interference on political and educational 
grounds.”804  The Moderate Liberal party, was made up of the “business, professional and 
scholastic classes.”  According to Graves, while they were dissatisfied with the condition 
of the Ottoman East, they “could not be called actively disloyal.”805  Their hope lay in the 
possibility of reforms which would bring jobs and opportunities to advance within the 
State.  “They were generally quite alive to the material impossibility of constituting an 
independent Armenia,” and dreaded the threat of denationalization under Russian rule.  
The ‘revolutionary party’ consisted of young Armenians who had lived abroad and 
“fallen under the influence of Socialist or Nihilist propaganda.”  Given that the views of 
this party were encapsulated in the journal Hunchak, published in Geneva and 
subsequently in Athens, Graves refers to this tiny faction as the “Hindchak group.”806   
 
                                                        
803 Ibid, p. 123. 
 
804 Ibid, p. 124.  
 
805 Ibid, p. 124.  
 
806 Ibid, p. 124. 
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In this report on public opinion, Graves concluded that, “Careful inquiry and observation 
have driven me to the conclusion that the events of the last six months, coming at the end 
of a period of ever-increasing misgovernment and persecution, have created a complete 
revolution in Armenian opinion.”807  The Hunchak group, according to Graves, in the 
aftermath of Sasun were “satisfied” with bringing the attention of Europe to the dire 
condition of the peasantries and the systematic corruption of Ottoman officials.   Many 
members of the Conservative Party has been deeply stirred by the accounts of the 
violence; “many of its members are already in secret sympathy and agreement with their 
former opponents, and many will join them if they see the changes which they formerly 
combated are inevitable and imminent, [and] bring the class which is always disposed to 
come over to the winning side.”  However, it was the ‘Moderate Liberals’ whose ideas 
had undergone the greatest transmutation.  Many had come to view the Ottoman State in 
oppositional terms, believing that there was a policy for the “weakening and ultimate 
extermination of the Armenian element in these provinces.”  While before they had 
placed their hopes in their Church and their schools, they now began to ask what was the 
use of these institutions without an Armenian population to fill them?  The solution that 
they most looked forward to was still not independence, but some form of autonomous 
governance, “resembling that of the Lebanon, under which they might enjoy security of 
life and property, and immediately from oppression, together with the equal rights of 
citizenship with their Mussulman neighbors, and a proportionate share in the 
management of local affairs.”   But after Sasun many had given up the hope that the 
                                                        
807 Ibid, p. 124.  
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Ottoman State would introduce reforms on its own.   Many now believed that some form 
of foreign interference was necessary.”808    
 
Some stories about the violence in Sasun are repeated endlessly.  It is often very difficult 
to track exactly how these stories made their way from individuals in Muş and Sasun to 
the press in Istanbul and London.  In these last two chapters, I have sought to examine 
how stories composed in Bitlis ended up in the London Times.   
 
On the one hand there is the Zeki Report.  Mehmet Zeki Paşa wrote his report on 
September 16, 1894 – six days after the cessation of violence.  Zeki Paşa based his report 
on the reports of Ibrahim Kamil Paşa, an official with a notorious representation for 
corruption, and on his own inspections based on a few days in the region.  As one of the 
most powerful military commanders in the Ottoman Empire, the head of the Hamidiye, 
and member of the Palace elite, Zeki Paşa was an incredibly powerful individual with no 
discernable ties to the local politics of the region.  The Zeki Report travelled along 
telegraph lines to the Palace.  From the Palace it was sent, in various forms to the 
Ottoman legations of Washington D.C. and London.  Mavroyeni Bey sent it to the New 
York Times and Rüstem Paşa sent it to the London Times.  Abdülhamid II ordered the 
report to be edited together with other documents into an ‘official history’ of the Sasun 
events from the perspective of the State.  Since the publication of Esat Uras’s Armenians 
in History and the Armenian Problem (Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi), composed 
in 1950, the Zeki Report has been endlessly reproduced.  The Ottoman State’s 
                                                        




representation of the truth has become the measure of truth for Ottoman Studies in 
modern republican Turkey.   
 
 On the other hand there is the Knapp Report.  George Perkins Knapp wrote many drafts 
of his report between November and February.  Knapp based his reporting on the 
investigations of C.M. Hallward, accounts of both soldiers and survivors and the stories 
circulating in Bitlis.  Unlike Zeki Paşa, Knapp had strong ties with the local community.  
He was born and bred in Bitlis.  As his sister, Grace Knapp, remembered, as “his only 
playmates and schoolmates – aside from brother and sisters – [were] Armenian lads, it 
was perhaps not to be wondered at that when he came to America at the age of fourteen, 
he resolved to return to Bitlis after completing his education.”809  Unlike Zeki Paşa, he 
had many close local ties.  The first iteration of the Knapp Report was smuggled out of 
the Ottoman Empire at the end of November.  Frederick Greene published the first draft 
of the Knapp Report in January in the Review of Reviews.  It was subsequently published 
in the London Times, the Hartford Seminary Record and finally in Greene’s Armenian 
Crisis in Turkey, the first monograph that dwelled on the violence in Sasun, in March 
1895.  When the long Knapp Report was published anonymously in the London Times 
over the course of three days, it created a huge fervor.   
 
Because the British Consuls rely on the ABCFM missionaries for information, the line 
between a missionary account and a consular account is very thin. They are often the 
same thing.  In other words, Rev. Knapp, Rev. Cole and vice-consul Hallward share 
information with each other.  The missionaries of the ABCFM and the British consuls 
                                                        
809 Grace Knapp, The Tragedy of Bitlis, p. 112.  
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from Diyarbekir, Van and Erzurum collected large numbers of rumors. They then 
attempted to evaluate the rumors comparatively, relying, of course, on their own 
affiliations to make sense of all the stories.  
 
If you put all the narratives they collected together, it’s a collection of individual 
accounts culled from witnesses (soldiers and survivors) and from the stories circulating in 
their Protestant community in Bitlis.  But a general story could be told.  This is in marked 
distinction from the reports produced by the Ottoman State that reproduced the exact 
same details every time. 
 
To emphasize one of my main points, there is a general agreement of what happened, 
although the specifics from observer to observer vary.  This is quite different from the 
single narrative that was published and widely disseminated by the Ottoman State where 
all the specific details are almost identical.  This indicates that the Ottoman State were 
very carefully utilizing just one or two sources of information and just repeating it 
endlessly in different ways.  Ottoman Sources repeatedly made mention of one Hacı, who 
was the nephew of Ömer of the Bekranlı, who was killed by the Armenian brigands in a 










Man makes his own history, but he does not make it out of the whole 
cloth; he does not make it out of conditions chosen by himself, but out 
of such as he finds close at hand.  The tradition of all past generations 
weighs like an alp upon the brain of the living.810  
 -- Karl Marx 
 
In the first chapter of my dissertation, I examined two broad narratives about the 1894 
Sasun violence.  The 'sedition' narrative, still widely held within the field of Ottoman 
Studies in Turkey, places responsibility for the violence on outside agitators who incited 
Armenian mountaineers to rebel against the State.  The 'oppression' narrative places 
responsibility for the violence on the Ottoman State, in particular the administration of 
Sultan Abdülhamid II.  These two narratives reflect two different points of view that rest 
on two different sets of sources.  The ‘sedition’ narrative rises from State sources, 
documents produced by Ottoman bureaucrats and military officers.  The ‘oppression’ 
narrative, meanwhile, presents a broad range of voices that are outside the Ottoman 
State’s bureaucracy.   
 
Scholars of the ‘sedition narrative’ tend to discuss the history of Armenians (and 
sometimes Kurds as well) from the time when the Empire began to fall apart.  At that 
point, they assert, Armenian exiles incited the local Armenian population to rebel against 
the Ottoman State, which attempted to deal with the radical nationalist challenges with 
oppression and crackdowns.   If the Ottoman State was unsuccessful in this venture, this 
line of thought continues, it was the fault of Foreign Powers that attempted to divide et 
                                                        
810 The Eighteen Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, translated by Daniel de Leon (Chicago, 1913), p. 9.  
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impera Ottoman lands.   This ‘sedition’ narrative focuses broadly on the halls of political 
power in Europe and more particularly on tiny groups of radical Armenians.  In many 
ways, this narrative’s preoccupation with seditious Armenians mirrors the anxieties of the 
Ottoman Foreign Ministry. This mirroring is not surprising, since works relying on state 
bureaucracy archives tend to reproduce state bureaucracy narratives.  In the case of the 
1894 Sasun violence, Ottoman Studies scholars relied primarily on one account, a report 
by Zeki Paşa, the commander of the Ottoman forces in the area.  
 
Scholars of the ‘oppression’ narrative draw on different materials to tell a different 
story.  Since much of this narrative is built from the memoirs and oral recordings of 
survivors of violence, it reflects a bottom-up perspective of the Ottoman State.  Scholars 
within Armenian Studies in particular have used a more diverse set of sources to tell their 
story (memoirs, foreign consul accounts, and contemporary newspapers).  Many of these 
memoirs were composed after the 1915 Genocide and present a somewhat static vision of 
the Ottoman past, one extending back only as far as memory will allow. 
 
Instead of taking a source or two as a measure of truth, the goal of this dissertation was to 
trace all the available sources of the Sasun violence to their origins in order to examine 
how they are inter-related.  It is critical to understand how accounts from distant Sasun 
passed to Istanbul, and eventually, the world.  Following the work of Jelle Verheij, my 
dissertation adopts neither the perspectives of the 'sedition' narrative nor the 'oppression' 




 The second chapter of this dissertation explored how the historical roots of the Sasun 
violence can be usefully traced back seven decades to the first third of the 19th century. 
Although such an exercise raises daunting methodological and philosophical questions, it 
also contributes critical historical context for understanding the violence that occurred in 
1894.   
 
There is, of course, a danger to this strategy as well.  Placing too much explanatory 
weight on long-term factors can result in teleological scholarship.  Methodologically, 
delving further into the past of an event makes establishing concatenation increasingly 
difficult. This problem persists even in micro-historical narrative, especially when 
attempting to discern long-term processes that lead to a known end point. This sort of 
activity risks veering into selective, retrospective, and even teleological histories. 
 
For the local inhabitants in the Eastern reaches of Ottoman Anatolia, the process of 
centralization inaugurated under Sultan Mahmud II at first resembled a conquest.  From 
the 1830s to the1850s, the Ottoman State conquered the lowland Derebey States through 
a process of military victories and strategy of divide and rule.  Over the next four decades 
(1850s-1890s), the Ottoman military made its way into the mountains, pushing the 
frontier of the State controlled areas – where taxes and conscripts were exacted – ever 
higher into the mountains.  By the time that the 19th century ended, only a few areas 
(Dersim and Sinjar), remained fully outside of the reach of the State. 
 
A similar process was occurring throughout Eurasia.  During the 19th century new 
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technologies (both the repeating rifle and the latest military drills) transformed the 
balance between the center and the peripheries.  The resulting asymmetry facilitated the 
center’s rapid conquest of vast peripheries by not only Istanbul but also its counterpart 
imperial centers in Europe –  Berlin, Rome, London, Paris.  In mountainous area, these 
conquests drove monumental transformations.  For the first time, peoples of mountains 
were governed from the lowlands. In the Ottoman case, force of arms and divide et 
impera tactics eroded the autonomy of small mountain polities.  The difficult work of 
converting the local population to think of themselves in terms of broad categories, such 
as 'Armenians,' 'Ottomans,' and 'Protestants,' was accelerated by various educational 
institutions, especially the Ottoman State, the United Society (Armenian) and the 
ABCFM schools. 
 
In the second chapter I argue that three technologies (modern firearms, steamboats and 
telegraphs) facilitated Ottoman rule across a patchwork of locally ruled spaces.  In the 
cases of Muş and Sasun, these processes dramatically transformed local power 
relations.  From many in these regions, the Tanzimat represented nothing less than a 
violent State conquest.  As these processes unseated local Emirs that traditionally ruled in 
the plains of Muş, a new system of Warlord-Bureaucrats emerged.  This new political 
system changed the use of local resources, which the State increasingly siphoned off for 
distant Istanbul.  One of the unintended consequences of these transformations was the 
creation of new forms of political identity. As Armenians from the provinces migrated to 
Istanbul for economic opportunity, they began to identify their homeland as a 




As Ottoman State monopolized the legitimate use of violence, it also increasingly sought 
to monopolize the legitimate use of narrative. Through tight control over the medium of 
print technologies, it exercised force over narratives it deemed dangerous or 
seditious.  Just as any attempt to resist the State’s forceful intrusion was ‘rebellion’ so too 
was any attempt to subvert the State’s narrative was ‘sedition.’ These trends of the State’s 
monopolization of both force and narrative emerge in the violent episode of Sasun in 
1894. This violence demonstrates how the region was one piece of this broader conquest 
the Ottoman center led over these peripheries.  
 
The third chapter of my dissertation demonstrates how the ‘Armenian issue’ arose in the 
plains of Muş and in the mountains of Sasun between 1889 and 1894.  In this chapter I 
focus on contingencies:  individual decisions, misunderstandings, and coincidences.  This 
is a story that begins with the Musa Bey’s kidnapping of Gülizar by in Muş and ends with 
the violence in Sasun. 
 
When peasants from Muş staged a protest against Musa Bey in Istanbul, this local 
struggle soon gained international attention.  Abdülhamid II reacted quickly to undercut 
the charges of corruption, ordering Musa Bey to stand trial in Istanbul.  The court 
acquitted him after a highly irregular three-day trial, students at the Istanbul Medical 
School joined together with students from abroad to form the first branch of the Hunchak 
(Bell), a radical movement for Armenian political liberation.  Meanwhile, in Muş, the 
struggle between peasants and Warlord-Bureaucrats such as Musa Bey contributed to the 
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creation of the Fedayi movement, a collection of Armenian self-defense groups espousing 
Armenian political liberation.  The combination of international attention, the formation 
of the Hunchak in Istanbul, and the growth of the Fedayi in the Eastern provinces 
terrified key sections of the Hamidian government.  Convinced that history was repeating 
itself, in the manner of the Bulgarian rebellion of 1876, Abdülhamid II and his 
administration sanctioned greater repression of any sign of dissent or political 
organization among Anatolian Armenians.  Certain officials within the Ottoman 
Government benefited financially from this oppressive shift, using the Ottoman center’s 
paranoia to enrich themselves.  These factors laid the foundations for the massacres in the 
Sasun  
 
In early August of 1894 the governor of Bitlis, Tahsin Paşa, relayed intentionally false 
reports that thousands of Armenian villagers in Sasun had rebelled against the State.  The 
Palace responded to this threat with the stern admonishment that rebels should never have 
been able to organize and an order to send in large numbers of Ottoman soldiers.  The 
orders from the Head Secretary of the Palace, Süreyya Paşa, were for the soldiers to 
“leave a legacy of terror.”  Over the course of three weeks, Ottoman soldiers carried out 
these orders, and over the course of three weeks in August and September of 1894, 
Ottoman soldiers systematically murdered one to two thousand Armenians and razed 
their villages.  Why did Tahsin Paşa send out false reports?  And why did the Ottoman 
State react with violence and terror? 
 
We cannot fully know why Tahsin Paşa sent on false reports, but part of the explanation 
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likely lies in a history of corruption.  Tahsin Paşa was known for employing the 
‘Armenian issue’ for his own ends – though this was far from unique.  The accounts of 
both British consuls and ABCFM missionaries are replete with examples of other 
Ottoman officials who did much the same thing.  To understand this broader corruption 
phenomenon, it is necessary to understand how the patronage systems linked warlords, 
bureaucrats, and their patrons in Istanbul.  Tahsin made his own decisions, but only 
within a broader system of government corruption.  To distract attention from charges of 
his own corruption, Tahsin Paşa sent reports that the villagers were rebelling in large 
numbers. 
 
A clue for why the Ottoman State reacted with such violence can be found in orders from 
the Palace.  "May God forbid," wrote Süreyya Paşa, the head secretary of the Palace, 
"that under these circumstances, an incident would happen … similar to the one before 
the war in Rumeli, with the consequent events at Otlukköy, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
might occur, and as a result of such carelessness Foreign Powers might intervene and 
give more opportunities acts of sedition to increase."811 The references to the Balkans are 
important.  Abdülhamid II’s understanding of what took place in the Balkans was that 
Christian rebels incited violence against Muslims and that this violence eventually led to 
foreign interference and to the horrific war of 1877-1878 between Russia and the 
Ottoman Empire.   This legitimist understanding of history in the Empire’s Western 
borderland influenced the Palace’s policies in the East, where it reacted to any possibility 
                                                        
811 "...maazallahi teala Rumeli'de muharebe-i zaileden evvel zuhura gelen ve neticesi malum olan Otlukköy 
ve Bosna ve Hersek vak'alari gibi hadise zuhuriyle netice-i gaflet ve bi-kaydi olarak müdahalat-i 





of rebellion with extreme violence. 
 
 I discuss the legitimist framework in the fourth chapter, where I address the Zeki Paşa 
report.  This report became the measure of ‘truth’ within the Ottoman State.  To retain a 
monopoly on legitimate narrative, the Ottoman State utilized various forms of censorship: 
banning foreign newspapers, forbidding discussion of Sasun in the Ottoman Press, 
preventing peasants from the area from travelling, and eventually denying entry to 
foreign journalists.  At the same time, news of the massacres spread through word of 
mouth, and rumors of the Sasun violence increased tensions throughout the 
Empire.  When the news finally reached London through missionary networks in mid-
November, it ignited a much larger debate about the British Government’s support for 
Sultan Abdülhamid II. 
 
In the fifth chapter, I investigated how, within a year of the violence, the telegraph 
enabled actors within the Ottoman State to censor the narratives of Sasun, and 
simultaneously, allowed others to broadcast survivor accounts around the world.  From 
this point on, the stories that flowed along telegraph lines around the world would 
provide the bases for the 'sedition' and 'oppression’ narratives.  According to the former, 
it was in Sasun where Armenian radicals with links to the Great Powers first organized a 
full-fledged rebellion against the Ottoman State.  According to the latter, it was in Sasun 





My dissertation is first and foremost about the history of the 1894 Sasun massacres.  It 
argues that to understand this history, we must understand the longue durée history of 
how the Ottoman State conquered the region and ruled it.  We must also understand how 
the State censored accounts of the Sasun violence within the Ottoman Empire, even while 
the story filled papers around the world.   More broadly, my dissertation shed light on 
how the 'Armenian' issue arose in the Ottoman Empire between 1889 and 1894.  While 
other studies emphasize either primordial sectarian conflict or the advent of nationalism, 
my dissertation examines how the interconnected processes of state centralization, 
censorship, and corruption laid the ground for violence in Muş and Sasun. 
 
The divergent understandings of what took place in Sasun contributed to a feedback 
system.  The more that international press reported news of Sasun, the more alarmed the 
Palace grew that a massive conspiracy was afoot. These factors contributed to more 
intense State violence against Armenians.  By October 1895, nearly a year after the news 
of Sasun first appeared, tensions between the Ottoman State and its Armenian populace 
had increased to a fever pitch.  The following two years brought several massacres – from 
the Sea of Marmara in the West to Lake Van in the East – that killed tens of 
thousands.  Although more research is needed to establish how this violence spread, it is 
critical to emphasize that as in Sasun, the causes for this violence were many and any 
analysis of them must take into account both the local and international factors.  My 





To make sense of the subsequent State-violence, we must make sense of how the 
violence in Sasun occurred and how it was represented.  However, until recently812, there 
was very little work on the Sasun massacres. This is remarkable given the important role 
that they are accorded by scholars within both Ottoman and Armenian studies.  For the 
former, especially those who subscribe to the 'sedition' narrative, Sasun was a key turning 
point in the armed rebellions against the State.  For others, especially those within 
Armenian Studies, the 1894 Sasun violence was the first of a long series of State-
organized massacres.  While often mentioned in passing, this episode is rarely examined 
closely, and even more rarely analyzed using all sources available. 
 
In order to understand the history of violence in the Ottoman Empire, I argue that we 
must know more about how the narratives moved from survivor to the press, from Sasun 
to a broad newspaper reading audience.  Rather than leaning on State sources – and thus 
assuming State’s perspective – I show how the ABCFM missionaries were in bearing 
witness to violence and relaying news of the violence to papers outside of the Ottoman 
Empire.  From the sectarian violence in Mount Lebanon of 1860 to the Armenian 
Genocide of 1915, ABCFM missionaries were responsible for compiling these narratives 
and conveying them to the outside world.  Their records are exceptionally detailed, 
reflecting their long and personal association with the area and its people. We must also 
                                                        
812 In 2014, Justin McCarthy, Ömer Turan and Cemalettin Taşkıran published the first English-language 
monograph of Sasun. (Sasun: The History of an 1890s Armenian Rebellion) Although McCarthy and his 
co-writers make use of a wide variety of sources -- ABCFM archival documentation, British Foreign office 
confidential reports, and Ottoman- and Armenian-language material, their work is a deeply flawed work 
that appears aimed at legitimizing and downplaying the violence.  According to McCarthy and his 
colleagues, the only reliable documentation on Sasun are the records of the Ottoman government.  All the 
accounts by the ABCFM missionaries, British consuls and journalists, according to McCarthy and his co-




understand how the Ottoman State attempted to cover up and censor any narratives of 
violence that did not coincide with their legitimist narrative.   It is only through 
examining as many sources as are available and holding simultaneously as many 
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Appendix 2: Descriptions 
 
Bitlis 
Grace Knapp, who was born in Bitlis and grew up there, described her hometown 
evocatively in The Tragedy of Bitlis.  Knapp wrote, 
Spring in a little Armenian town in the heart of Kurdistan: 
hills bleakly bare and brown the rest of the year, were 
faintly green with a sparse evanescent herbage; poplars 
lining streets and waterways were spires of pale green 
smoke bursting into beryl flame where the sun shot 
through; fruit trees behind high garden walls were masses 
of white bloom. Everywhere there was the sound and scent 
of water, for the city was a city of streams and waterfalls 
and fountains, a city high, high up among the mountains, so 
enfolded within its hills, so swallowed up in deep narrow 
ravines that the whole of it could not be seen at once from 
the top of the surrounding peaks. 
 
Many travelers, over the centuries, were also struck by the striking beauty of this trade 
city. It was, as Harry Finnis Blosse Lynch called it, the "door between highlands and 
lowlands." Nestled over 5,000 feet above sea-level, Bitlis is located about 14 miles to the 
southwest of the Lake of Van. The town is south and east of the plain of Muş, historically 
its bread-basket, and about 35 miles to the north and east of the Arabic-speaking town of 
Siirt. 
 
The town is situated in a deep valley, carved out of the rock by steady weight of the 
melting snow from the mountains to the north. One stream (the Bitlis Çay) flows from the 
north into the town where it is joined by a pair of tributaries to both west and east. 
Eventually this water would join the Bohtan Su, a tributary of the Tigris, which would 
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flow thousands of more miles before joining the waters of the Persian Gulf. 
Maximilian Streck described it, 
The town is divided by this system of rivers or ravines into 
four separate quarters, the inhabitants of which often took 
separate sides during hostilities and blockaded one another. 
The houses, usually surrounded by beautiful gardens rise 
up the steep cliffs all around; many dangerously steep and 
twining little streets, which however are always paved, 
contrary to the usual customs of the east, communicate with 
the another, numerous bridges span the river. The 
remarkably solid style of architecture of most of the 
dwelling houses makes a very pleasant impression on the 
visitor. Excellent building material is furnished by the red-
brown volcanic rocks of the district. 
 
Overlooking the juncture of waters stands a massive citadel. It was crumbling and 
abandoned by the time that Grace Knapp was born in 1870. For centuries, this citadel was 
the seat of the Bitlis Emirs, who garnered their considered power from taxing the camel-
borne trade from both north to south and east to west. In the 17th century, the French 
traveller Jean Baptiste Tavernier observed that the Emir of Bitlis, "acknowledged neither 
the Shah of Persia nor the Sultan of Turkey and was courted by both on account of the 
strategic value of his city barring the communications between Aleppo and Tabriz."  
 
It was in the late 1840s that Ottoman armies under Osman Paşa destroyed the 
independence of the Alaeddin House and banished the surviving descendants to far flung 
areas of the Empire. The fates of these exiles were myriad. At least one, Süleyman Bahri 
Paşa, the son of a younger brother of the last Emir of Bitlis, was taken to Istanbul and 
raised within the walls of the Ottoman palace. He would one day become the trusted 
mutessarıf, or governor of the Istanbul municipalities of Pera and Scutari and the 
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governor-general of Adana. Despite becoming in many respects "an Ottoman" he still 
spoke the Armenian and Kurdish languages of his youth. After the fall of the Ottoman 
State, other descendants of the Alaeddin returned. Patrick Balfour, better known by his 
title 'Lord Kinross,' described meeting the descendants of these rulers in Bitlis in the early 
1950s in his travel narrative Within the Taurus: A Journey in Asiatic Turkey, 
It was not until 1849 that the last of these Princes, Sherif 
Bey or Sherif Khan, was subdued by the Turks. He was a 
picturesque figure, gaily dressed, described by Wilbraham 
as a 'tall well-made man of about 30, with pleasing manner, 
and a handsome but melancholy cast of features.' His 
family had survived, in an unexpected capacity, into the 
new régime. The Mayor of Bitlis, a nominee of the 
Democrats, who showed us around the town, proved to be a 
man of some taste and learning, with a keen interest in the 
history of the place and especially in the tombs of the 
Sherifs. This ceased to be surprising when he told us that he 
was their descendent, and handed me his card, on which 
was inscribed, 'Adil Şerefanoğlu' - in modern terms the Son 
of Sherif Khan. With a skill which would not have 
disgraced his ancestors, he was at present manipulating a 
by-election in Bitlis, where the principal candidate, a 
powerful local Sheikh, had been induced by religious 
concessions to change sides from the People's to the 
Democratic Party. 
 
It was perhaps fitting that it was Adil Şerefanoğlu who warmly welcomed the Nobel-
prize winning author William Saroyan back to the hometown of his parents, Armenak 
and Takoohi, in 1964. Fifty years later, in 2014, it was Adil's grandson Barzan 
Şerefanoğlu who led efforts to name a street after William Saroyan. The street 
named Saroyan is now one of the few remnants of the Armenian heritage of Bitlis, or 
Paghesh as it was long known. It was in 1915 that thousands of the inhabitants of Bitlis 
were murdered by the 'Butcher Battalions' of Cevdet, the few survivors scattered around 
the world.  Thanks to the decade-long assiduous efforts of Republican bureaucrats to 
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efface, all the neighborhoods and villages of Bitlis have long been shorn of their 
Armenian names. However, in the 1950s, when Patrick Balfour passed through, echoes of 
violence and expulsion were still palpable. 
Balfour wrote, 
Its population today is a mere fifteen per cent of what it 
was before the First World War. The big, vaulted, 
Armenian bazaar is still in ruins, and the derelict houses of 
its merchants scar the hillside. The ruins of a Christian 
chapel are blackened by smoke, its crosses roughly 
defaced; a big Armenian church has been rebuilt, internally, 
to serve as a store; and a nice new prison for Turks is being 
built over the graves of an Armenian cemetery. 
 
Balfour notes that the citadel had also been converted, now serving as the administrative 
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Behind each lament lies a particular project of rule: Han 
rule under the Qing, British rule within the Empire, and 
finally, the rule of orthodox Protestant Christianity in 
Appalachia. All would style themselves, unselfconsciously, 
as bearers of order, progress, enlightenment, and 
civilization. All wished to extend the advantages of 
administrative discipline, associated with the state or 
organized religion, to areas previously ungoverned. 
 
How might we best understand the fraught dialectical 
relations between such projects of rule and their agents, on 
the one hand, and zones of relative autonomy and their 
inhabitants, on the other? 
 
- James C. Scott 
 
 
Both travelers and historians usually stick to the lowlands. This penchant has meant that 
we know far more about the lowlands than we do about the highlands. Between 1830 and 
1870, for instance, a number of travelers visited the plains of Muş. They described in 
great detail the dwelling of the people in the plains, how their houses were built, and what 
they ate. But of the mountains, an eastern spur of the great Taurus Range that runs 
along the entire South length of the Anatolian tableland, these travelers barely said a 
word. However, over the course of the 19th century, a few travelers did trek up into the 
mountains towering over the city. 
 
Some of these travelers were bureaucrat-travelers, such as British consuls who recorded 
over the years brief glimpses of the worlds of Sasun. Others were missionaries-travelers, 
carrying with them such low-lander convictions as New England Congregationalism or 
Armenian Nationalism. Almost all, however, began with a single and deeply physical fact. 
Travel in the Sasun Mountains was not easy, at least for those who had come from the 
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ease of the trade routes and the arteries of Imperial rule. 
 
Vice Consul Hampson, a British consul who trekked up into the mountains in the 
aftermath of the 1894 Sasun massacres, wrote, 
The mountainous nature of the country, consisting of 
alternate high ridges and deep valleys, many of them 
thickly wooded with walnuts, oaks, willows, mulberries, 
figs and vines, and abounding in streams, and the entire 
absence of any but the roughest footpaths, make travelling 
a matter of great difficulty. 
 
This sentiment was shared by James Brant, the first British consul in Erzurum. In the 
1830s, Brant headed up into the mountains, observing that his descent from one of the 
numerous mountain ranges into a particularly deep river valley was "the most difficult 
path that I ever went over; sometimes it led us round precipitous hollows in the hills; 
sometimes it came down in a zigzag on the face of a nearly perpendicular rock." Brant 
continued, "Our horses, though led, often slipped off the uneven and narrow path, and 
risked being precipitated into the abyss, perhaps 1200 feet in depth, and it was by great 
caution alone that a person even on foot could keep his path." 
 
Once a traveler was in the mountains, they were often surprised to find very different 
understandings of religion, politics, and economics than in the plains below. Consul 
Taylor, a British consul who travelled into Sasun in the early 1860s recalled an encounter 
with "a warlike, unruly set of Kurds called the Baliki." He observed that these 
Kurds, "swear by a church and never a mosque, or the Deity, or any of the prophets." 
They believed, that 
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...all the prophets mentioned in the Torat [that is the 
Hebrew Bible], Engeel [that is the New Testament] and 
Koran, were nothing more than one and the same person, 
who appeared at different epochs in different forms. They 
thus ascribe divinity to all, through they forbear to mention 
one name more reverently than the other. But as they 
consider that the last he assumed was that of Ali, they 
attach more sanctity to his name that to Moses or Christ, 
while Mohamed they ignore entirely.  
 
This same community fascinated the British traveler Lynch who wrote some three 
decades later,  
Strange indeed are the anomalies which are presented in 
these little-known districts of Turkish Kurdistan. On the 
southern fringe of Sasun live a tribe called the Baliki or 
Beleke, speaking a mixed language of Arabic, Kurdish and 
Armenian. Their religion cannot be classed either as 
Christian or Mohammedan nor even as 
that professed by the Kizilbashes. When they make oath it 
is in the name of a church or monastery. But they possess 
neither churches nor mosques. Marriage is a rite which they 
ignore. Their women go about in perfect freedom and 
unveiled, wearing white trousers like the Yezidi or so-
called devil-worshipers. 
 
The Baliki were only one of many groups. Travelers described how some communities in 
the mountains revered sacred groves of oak and poplar. "These groves," wrote Taylor, 
... each bear the name of some pretended Mohamedan saint, 
but their presumed sanctity is more ancient than the era of 
the Islam conquest, when the Armenians had such groves, 
and adored certain kinds of trees, one of which the Sos 
(plane-tree), was particularly the object of their veneration. 
 
Long before, the mountains of Sasun had once been a place of refuge for Paulicianism, a 
particular form of Armenian Christianity that incorporated many local practices. In the 
16th century, the Ottoman State sanctioned the use of violence against its 'dangerous 
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Others,' the Alevis. The Byzantine State similarly persecuted the mountain dwelling 
Paulicians. It is tempting perhaps even to draw a link between the two, noting 
that two of the epicenters for both Paulicianism were Sivas and Sasun. The British 
historian Edward Gibbon, perhaps unknowingly, hinted long ago of a relationship 
between the formation of group identity and State persecution.  He wrote, "The most 
furious and desperate rebels are the sectaries of a religion persecuted and at last 
provoked."  Could it, perhaps, have been equally the other way around?  Gibbon 
continued, 
They were first awakened to the massacre of a governor 
and bishop who exercised the imperial mandate of 
converting or destroying the heretics, and the deepest 
recesses of mount Argaeus protected their independence 
and revenge. 
 
It is worth stressing here that both 'Paulicianism' and the term 'Alevi' are, at least to some 
extent, umbrella terms employed by lowlanders. They describe not a single group but 
rather many localized religious practices. From the point of view of the plains, people in 
the mountains practiced a syncretism of Christianity, Islam, Mazdaisan and Pagan beliefs. 
During times of Decentralization, the mountain people ruled themselves, worshipped 
their own Gods and spoke their own languages. During times of Centralization, outsiders 
attempted to enforce discipline, extract resources, or mold the barbaric Others of the 
mountains into the 'civilized' low-lander Self. This led to a particular dialectic. With each 
advance in technologies of warmaking, mobility and communication, the abilities of the 
Self to destroy, exile or assimilate increased. But over time, as technologies were made 
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The elevated plain of Muş stretches out across some 1,200 square miles, a result of the 
lava that once poured down the slopes of nearby volcanoes. The peasantries produced 
crops of barley and rye for local consumption and to feed the important trade city of 
Bitlis. The plain was crisscrossed by a pair of tributaries of the Euphrates, known locally 
as the Aratsani (Murat Nehri) and Meghraked (Kara Su).  Since antiquity the inhabitants 
of the plain of Muş utilized the ebb and flow of waters for irrigation.    
 
Muş had once been the epicenter of the Armenian Church.  It was here, after all, that the 
practice of converting fire-temples into churches had first begun.   It was also in Muş that 
Mesrop Mashtot, a brilliant linguist-theologian, devised the Armenian alphabet in the 
early years of the fifth century.   Finally, it was in Muş, even as late as the 1880s, where 
the number of adherents to the Armenian Church likely exceeded the number of Muslims.  
Vice-Consul Clayton, who visited the plain on several occasions during his years at Van, 
wrote that, "The great plain of Mush contains a population of about 50,000, of which 
about 36,000 are Armenians, and the bulk of the remainder Kurds, with a few Turks, 
Circassians and Yezidis."   
 
During the Ottoman centuries, Muş remained for many Armenians a destination for 
pilgrimage, the location of the venerable and sacred Surp Garabed, founded as legend has 
it, by Gregory the Illuminator, the first missionary of the Armenian Church.   In the 19th 
century, it seemed to be the consensus of British scholar-travelers such as Charles Wilson 
349  
 
and Harry Finnis Blosse Lynch that the site of Surb Garabed rested on an earlier religious 
site -- in this case a Hindu Temple built by a colony of South Asian immigrants around 
150 BCE.   
 
Nowadays, based mostly on the work of the historian James Russell, most accounts of 
Surb Garabed discuss how it rests on the location of a pre-Christian temple dedicated to 
Vahagn and Astghik, two of the central deities in the Zoroastrian pantheon.  It was 
widely believed that under the monastery divs (demons) were kept, who would only be 
released by a figure called "Musho Sultan" when Jesus and Garabed returned.  Russell 
pointed out that some aspects of Zoroastrian belief, including the personal properties of 
Vahagn, like his red hair, became the attributes of John the Baptist.  According to Russell, 
this makes sense as each of these figures hold an exalted place within their respective 
religious traditions.  John the Baptist was the Forerunner to Jesus, just as Vahagn was 
second only to Aramazd in religious significance. 
 
According to a fascinating article by T.M. van Lint on the parallels between poetic 
practice among Turkish Aşıks and Armenian Ashughs,  
 
The particular character of the veneration for Surb Karabet 
includes his perceived power to grant wishes, particularly 
of the humble, the poor and the sick.  He restores their hope, 
love, and faith.  Not only Christian Armenians visited the 
site, also Muslim Kurds and Turks did.  They called the site 
Ğangli kilise Surb Karapet, Ğangli kilise, or simply Ğangli, 
"The Holy Precursor Church with bell-tower. 
 
Lint cites the folklorist Mihran Tumachan, who "states that the feast of Surb Karapet was 
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considered to be the continuation of the old Zorastrian feast of Vardavar, which is born 
out by the refrain of a song dedicated to Surp Karapet, which says:  
Uxtêd kugar Vardevêrin,  
Losed paycar, Surb Karapet! 
 
Your feast arrived, Vardavar,  
Your shining light, Holy Precursor! 
 
Gülizar, the girl kidnapped so infamously by Musa Bey in 1889, recalled in her memoir 
the complexities of religious observance in the plains.   
Mirza Bey, compared to his terrible offspring, had not 
persecuted the Armenians of the district. He spoke 
Armenian and honored the Armenian saints with ardor.  It 
was said that Mirza Bey had once visited the monastery of 
St. Aghpérig of Mush with his twelve years old son Khalil. 
After dinner, Khalil went to the stables of the monastery 
and saw a beautiful horse which he desired to ride. The 
servants of the monastery began with a warning: this horse 
was unruly, plus it belonged to the superior of the 
monastery. The Kurdish boy turned a deaf ear to the 
exhortations which were lavished on him, and jumped on 
the horse and spurred shouting "I ride the horse, the 
monastery and the abbot!" The frantic horse sped by 
mountains and valleys. Several hours had passed when the 
horse reappeared, dragging the shredded body of Khalil. 
Mirza Bey, horrified, attributed to the omnipotence of the 
monastery the tragic death of his disobedient and 
sacrilegious child.  He judged no person responsible for his 
death and left the monastery with his head down.  
 
It is clear from a number of other sources, that a large part of the "Kurdish population" 
spoke Armenian and we have accounts of how it was very common to swear by 
monasteries.  This was true even in the 17th century, when Simēon of Poland reported 
that "throughout the plain and province of Mush, the Kurds speak Armenian and swear 




For centuries the relationship between the pastoral populations and the agricultural 
populations was very likely symbiotic.  The peasantries of the lowlands exchanged their 
grain for the meat, wool and dairy of the pastoralists of the uplands.  Certain communities 
in the mountains specialized in mining ore to form the agricultural implements.  
Moreover, given the high elevation and the lengthy winters, the pastoral populations 
would literally spend half the year living with the grain-growing lowlanders.  
 
Writing in the 1860s, Consul Taylor, noted that,  
The Armenians form the principal portion of the 
industrious inhabitants in the plain and near the city, 
supplying all agricultural labour and trade, while the 
Moslems, mostly pastoral, living on the slopes of the hills 
bordering the plain occupy themselves simply with their 
flocks. 
 
However, by the end of the 19th century travelers passing through the plain often 
remarked on a striking contrast between the rich volcanic soil and the impoverishment of 
the farmers.  This had had not always been the case.  Although evidence on this point is 
rather scant, it appears that during the era of the Alaeddin Emirate, the predominantly 
Armenian peasantries of the plain constituted an important source of revenue and were 
provided with some protection by the local Emirs.  It is difficult to map the relative 
prosperity of the peasantries in plains over the years.   Part of the difficulty is that many 
travelers passed through the plain of Muş with scant observations of the welfare of the 
local population.  However, the available evidence suggests that over the course of the 
19th century, the overall living standards of the peasants decreased as centralization 
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increased.  There are innumerable variables that must be considered.  For instance, one 
astute observer, the British Consul Taylor noticed that there was a dramatic decrease in 
the welfare of the inhabitants between his visits in 1863 and 1869.  Taylor noted that,  
Six years ago, when visited the Moosh district, the fine 
plain, on one side of which the town is situated, had a 
thriving aspect. The villages seemed well peopled, and the 
crops, though damaged by locusts, in far greater variety and 
profusion than now. 
 
How are we to make sense of this decrease in prosperity?   
 
One explanation offered by Tayor, based on conversations with both Christians and 
Muslims, was that the relationship between the sedentary peasants of the plains and the 
pastoral people of the mountains had changed.  At one point, it was a symbiotic exchange 
of grain for pastoral goods, of shelter and protection.  Since the destruction of the Bitlis 
Emirate, it had become exploitative.   
 
One unbearable custom, that of the Kishlak, had done more 
than anything else to contribute to their present paucity and 
decay.  That custom, originating some years ago in the 
weakness of the Government and growing power of the 
Koords, enabled the latter to exercise the extraordinary 
right of quartering themselves and flocks during the winter 
in and about the Christian villages, entailing upon the 
inhabitants large expenses, not only for fodder for their 
animals, but also food and fuel for themselves, during at 
least four months. 
 
Over the course of the 19th century, the demography of the plains of Muş also changed.  
Taylor observed that during the 1860s, large numbers of Armenian peasants from the 
plains of Muş migrated to Russian controlled spaces.  
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Repeated complaints to the Government have done little to 
remedy this evil, and, consequently, to escape the 
intolerable burden, 750 families have, within the last six 
years, emigrated to Russia, while 500 more have this year 
sent representatives to Erivan to negotiate a similar step.   
 
At the same time, a significant numbers of Muslims from the Russian-controlled 
Caucasus settled in the environs of the Muş plains.  When the peasantries complained to 
the Ottoman authorities of unjust extractions, they risked suffering from the ire of the 
Warlords.  As Taylor put it,  
The slightest complaint to Government on the part of the 
Christians against them is followed by night attacks or open 
assaults in the day upon them.  In this manner, during the 
last year no less than ten have been killed and forty 
wounded, because they -- the Christians -- had the temerity 
to complain to the authorities of the oppression they 
suffered at the hands of the Koords.  These maunders are 
aided and abetted by a society of so-called holy men, styled 
Sheikhs, living in the Boolanik region.  
 
The rise of the Sheikhs went hand-in-hand with the arrival of other missionaries.  By the 
1860s, the Knapp family of the American Board, and the "Apostle to Kurdistan," Simon 
Tavitian, were hard at work building schools in the plains of Muş.  A decade later, the 
Istanbul-based United Society Association brought a new formulation of Armenian 
identity to the plain.  Finally, in the 1880s, the Ottoman State began opening up schools, 
spreading new conceptions of loyalty.  These competing networks of missionaries play an 
important role in the 1890s.815 
                                                        
815 This description draws from a number of sources.  The original French quotation from Armenouhie 
Kévonian's Les Noces Noires de Gulizar (Parentheses, 2005), pp.11-12 reads:  
 
Comparé à son effroyable rejeton, Mirza bek ne s’était pas mal comporté à l’égard des Arméniens du 
district. Il parlait l’arménien et honorait avec ardeur les saints arméniens. On raconte même qu’une fois, 
Mirza bek avait visité le monastère de Saint-Aghpérig de Mouch en compagnie de son fils Khalil âgé de 








Hampartsoum  Boyadjian was born in 1867 in the predominantly Armenian city of 
Hadjin in the Cilician uplands.  In 1885, at the age of 18, Boyadjian went to Istanbul to 
enroll at the prestigious Imperial Medical School (Mektep-i Tıbbiye-i Şahâne) in Istanbul.   
 
In 1889, during the fervor over the Musa Bey affair, Boyadjian played a key role in the 
founding of the Istanbul-branch of the Hunchak.  The plight of the peasantries in the East 
was no doubt one of the factors that led to the radicalization of the 22-year-old medical 
student.  The branch was founded at the home of Dr. Jelalian, Hampartsoum Boyadjian's 
closest friend at the Imperial Medical School.  Just as religious converts often undergo a 
change of names to express their new identities, many radical nationalists also acquired 
'convert' names.  Soon after the founding of the Hunchak in Istanbul, Boyadjian became 
known as 'Murad.'  Boyadjian's elder brother, Harutiun-Mardiros was also involved in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
monter pour une promenade. Les valets du monastère le mirent en garde : ce cheval était rétif, de plus il 
appartenait au supérieur du monastère. Le gamin kurde fit la sourde oreille aux exhortations qui lui furent 
prodiguées, sauta sur le cheval et l’éperonna en criant : « Je monte le cheval, le monastère et le père 
supérieur ! » Le cheval affolé fila par monts et vallées. Plusieurs heures s’étaient écoulées lorsqu’il 
réapparut, traînant le corps déchiqueté de Khalil. Mirza bek, horrifié, attribua à la toute-puissance du 
monastère la mort tragique de son enfant désobéissant et sacrilège. Il ne rendit personne responsable de sa 
mort et quitta le monastère la tête basse.  
 
Other quotations have been taken from Major E. Clayton, "The Russo-Turkish Frontier in Asia Minor, in 
Journal of the Royal United Service Institution vol. 27, 1884, p. 407; James Russell, Zorastrianism in 
Armenia (Harvard University Press, 1987); Theo Maarten van Lint, "The Gift of Poetry: Khidr and John the 
Baptist as Patron Saints of Muslim and Armenian Ašiqs - Ašuls," in Jan Ginkel, Hendrika Lena Murre van 
den Berg and Theo Maarten van Lint, Redefining Christian Identity (Peeters, 2005), p. 353; George A. 
Bournoutian, The travel accounts of Simēon of Poland (Mazda, 2007), p. 177 and the reports of Consul 




Hunchak activism in the capital and became known as 'Girayr.' It is worth noting that 
both the Istanbul-branch of the Hunchak and the Committee of Ottoman Union (İttihad-ı 
Osmanlî Cemiyeti) -- a predecessor to the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) -- 
were founded at the same institution during the same year.  None of my research revealed 
that others have investigated the relationship between these twin student-run secret 
societies, or whether the members knew each other.   
 
In July of 1890, Boyadjian, along with Mihran Damadian and other activists, helped to 
organize a demonstration against the Armenian Patriarch Ashikian at the Cathedral of 
Kam Kapı in Istanbul.  Ever since the death of Patriarch Nerses Varjabedyan in 1884, 
many within the Armenian community of Istanbul had grown frustrated with the 
relationship of the Patriarchate and the rest of the Ottoman State.  Unlike Varjabedyan, 
Ashikian had never publicly raised the issue of Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, and did 
not focus on the plight of the Armenian population in the provinces.  By 1890, one 
estimate suggested that one-half of the population of the Armenian population of Istanbul 
was composed of labor migrants from the distant regions of Muş and the Van Basin.  The 
demonstration at Kum Kapı represented the demands of the people of Muş for protection 
against warlords such as Musa Bey and his allies in the local Ottoman government.   
 
After the demonstration, Abdülhamid II ordered the sweeping arrest of all potential 
radicals in the capital.  According to one source, the Chief of Police, Hüseyin Nazım 
went to great lengths to try to capture the fugitive medical student, offering an award of 
2,000 gold pieces and distributing hundreds of photographs to his agents to secure his 
capture.  Hampartsoum managed to evade capture and escaped, along with other 
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members of the Hunchak branch of Istanbul, to the relatively safe haven of Athens.   
 
In 1891, the Boyadjian and other activists organized a demonstration in Athens on the 
one-year anniversary of the July 1890 Kum Kapı protest.  After a short stint of study in 
Geneva, in 1892 Boyadjian traveled in disguise via Iskenderun, Aleppo, Urfa, and 
Diyarbekir to the Muş village of Vartennis.  In Muş, Boyadjian reunited with Mihran 
Damadian and worked alongside Armenak Ghazarian as a missionary for Armenian 
national liberation in the mountains of Sasun and plains of Muş.   At the same time, 
Boyadjian's elder brother, Harutiun-Mardiros crisscrossed central Anatolia (from Yozgat 
to Sivas), actively organizing resistance to the rule of Abdülhamid II.   
 
After Damadian's arrest in June of 1893, Boyadjian inherited a leadership role in the 
small Arabo-Damadian band of fedayee.  According to one account by Gabriel Lazarian, 
in the spring of 1894, Boyadjian directly fought the power of the Ottoman State in the 
mountains of Sasun.   When Boyadjian was alerted that the Ottoman Government was 
attempting to repair the 'Satan' bridge to gain easier access to the isolated community of 
Tavorik, he ordered an attack on the soldiers guarding the reconstruction.  Meanwhile, in 
March of 1894, Boyadjian's brother Harutiun-Mardiros was arrested and executed.  
 
After his own capture at the beginning of September, Boyadjian was taken to Bitlis and 
tortured.  George Perkins Knapp described how the Ottoman government attempted to 
elicit a confession, especially one linking his efforts with Great Britain or the imprisoned 




They wanted to get him to testify that the notables had 
backed him, that some foreign country, especially England, 
had sent him to Sassoun to stir matters up; they wanted him 
to reveal the chemical used to develop sympathetic writing 
and also where he got the bombs that were found in his 
possession. To elicit the desired testimony and information 
he was first taken up to the police office, where for eight or 
ten hours he was pinched, and hairs, especially those of his 
moustache, were pulled out. He was then taken down to the 
dungeon and made to stand up for thirty-six hours. 
Whenever, through exhaustion or drowsiness he staggered 
or fell over, the sentinel that was placed over him would 
bring him to his senses by cruelly hitting him with his 
gunstock. During all this time he was given no food or 
water. That was only one time and one form, but tortures 
were more or less continuous for him and the others. The 
efforts to get the testimony wanted were uniformly 
unsuccessful. Then the government tried to divide the 
notables against one another by promising freedom to those 
who would tell on the others. This also failed. 
 
On January 31, 1895, Vice-Consul Hallward relayed an account from the ABCFM 
missionaries in Bitlis to Consul Graves.  According to this account,  
 
Murad Effendi and his companions were up for trial on 
Thursday [December 20, 1894].  He said he was a native of 
Hadjin, in the Adana Vilayet, had studied medicine in 
Constantinople, Athens and Geneva.  Had come to Sasun to 
teach people chiefly two things -- not to sell their daughters 
in marriage, and to resist the unjust exactions of the Kurds.  
He had given guns to the five young men, mere striplings, 
who were with him, that they might better defend 
themselves against the Kurds, since they were never able to 
get redress through the Government.  The five young men, 
his companions, substantiated what he said.  They were 
repeatedly asked if he had not promised English assistance 
against the Government.  Four denied it; the fifth said he 
had not heard him say so, but had heard others say that he 
had said so. 
 
Boyadjian was tortured and eventually sentenced to death.  Perhaps due to British 
pressure, Boyadjian's sentence was not carried out.  Boyadjian remained in prison as one 
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of the most famous political prisoners in the Ottoman Empire until 1906 when he escaped.   
Boyadjian returned to Istanbul after the Constitutional Revolution of 1908.  Soon after he 
was elected first to the Armenian National Assembly and then to the Ottoman Parliament 
to represent his homeland of Adana.  Although he was a Parliamentarian for the Ottoman 
Government, Boyadjian was among the first of Istanbul's Armenians to be arrested during 
the infamous 'Red Sunday' of April 24, 1915.  Following first an exile to Kayseri, 
Boyadjian was first tortured, given a show-trial in July and finally executed two months 
after his arrest in Ayaş.816  
 
James Bryce 
James Bryce was born in 1838 in Belfast and educated at the University of Glasgow, the 
University of Heidelberg and Trinity College Oxford.  He was elected a fellow at Oriel 
College Oxford and called to the Bar at Lincoln's Inn when he 29.   Between 1870 and 
1893, he was the Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford.  During his life, he gained a 
reputation as a legal scholar, a historian of the Holy Roman Empire and a British 
specialist of the United States of America.  In 1876, at the age of 38, he travelled through 
Russia to Mount Ararat in the Ottoman Empire.  He published a book about his 
experiences in 1877 entitled Transcaucasia and Ararat.   He soon after turned his 
                                                        
816 Much of this profile is based on the account of Chalabian 1994, especially, pp. 76-79 and Walker 1992, 
p. 433.  For details on the founding of the Hunchak in Istanbul, see Chalabian 1994, p. 104.  For his source, 
Dr. Chalabian cites a biography by E. Sirvard, Metsn Murat : Hambardzum Pōyachean: Keankʻ n u 
gortsunēutʻ iwně (Providence, 1955), pp. 16-17. For the social backdrop to the Kum Kapı protests, see an 
article by an anonymous "Armenian correspondent" in The Daily News (August 4, 1890).  Chalabian also 
paraphrases Gabriel Lazian's account of Boyadjian's destruction of the Satan bridge.  However, I have 
found no other source that so much as mentions this episode of violence.  I am thus somewhat hesitant to 
accept it on face value.  The quotation from George Perkins Knapp can be found in FO 424/182, p. 83.  
Further details about Boyadjian's treatment in the prison in Bitlis can be found in FO 424/192, pp. 381-382.  
The quotation from Hallward (almost certainly from the ABCFM missionaries in Bitlis) comes from the 
Parliamentary Papers, Turkey no. 1, 1895, p. 85.  Boyadjian also signed his name on the graphic letter sent 
to the British press discussed in the profile on Bishop Karakhanian.  
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attention to politics and gained a seat in Parliament in 1880.  He would serve as one of 
the most prominent Liberal members of Parliament for nearly three decades, leaving at 
last in 1907 to serve as the British Ambassador to the United States.  In 1885 he served as 
an under-secretary of State to Gladstone.   
 
In 1909, George Washburn, the president of Robert College in Istanbul, observed that, 
"No English statesman has followed events in the nearer East so carefully and 
sympathetically for the last thirty years as Mr. Bryce..."  In Great Britain, his reputation 
as a staunch advocate for the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire earned him the 
moniker, the "M.P. for Armenia."  Bryce continuously stressed that the British public 
should be made aware of the condition of the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire and 
strongly advocated for the publication of consular reports.   
 
On May 26, 1889, both William Ewart Gladstone and James Bryce spoke at some length 
in Parliament about the "cruelties and oppressions which have been recently committed" 
in the eastern regions of the Ottoman Empire and about the "unsatisfactory character of 
the answers which have been given by Her Majesty's Government."  Just as Gladstone 
had earlier connected violence in the Balkans with the the suppression of public 
information by the British Government, Bryce was now conntected violence in the 
Eastern regions of the Ottoman Empire with the same suppression of public information.  
Or, as Bryce put it,  
 
But although the Government has obstinately refused [to 
give] all information, everybody knows that nothing has 
been done by the Turkish Government to carry out any of 
the promised reforms. The present condition of the country 
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is quite as bad as it has ever been at any time within living 
memory. Numbers of persons have been thrown into prison, 
and some of these subjected to torture by the Turkish 
officials. 
 
Bryce now turned to the specifics.  His first example was the case of Musa Bey.  He said,  
 
One case reported is that a Kurdish chief a few weeks ago 
seized the headman of an Armenian village, against whom 
he had a grudge, bound hint on a pile of wood, poured 
petroleum over his body, and then set the faggots on fire. 
Moussa Bey, who did this, is a friend of the Turkish 
Governor of the district, and though the Turkish 
Government now pretend that they wish to arrest and 
punish him, it is notorious that the Governor made no 
attempt to interfere with his barbarities. 
 
The solution, argued Bryce, was for the consul reports of the last few years be published 
in Blue Book form.  Bryce.   Bryce contested the hoary argument of the British 
Government, namely, that complaining to the Ottoman State about the condition of 
'Eastern Christians' would ultimately only make their condition worse.  To this notion 
Bryce argued, 
 
There is not the slightest evidence that the Turks have ever 
behaved the least bit better when we have abstained from 
remonstrating, or that they have ever behaved substantially 
worse when we have remonstrated. I believe, on the 
contrary, that the best chance—it is, perhaps, a slight one—
of procuring some amelioration in the condition of the 
Christian people of Asiatic Turkey is to endeavour to 
convey to the Turkish Government the sense of shame 
which we feel when we read of the occurrences in Armenia. 
I think that if Her Majesty's Government were to insist 
upon the fulfilment by Turkey of her obligations, if they 
were to put it to the Turkish Government that any such 
sympathies for the Sultan as remain in this country—they, 
no doubt, are very slight—are being alienated, that it is 
becoming daily less and less possible to defend the Sultan's 
Government or to justify its continued existence, they 
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might have some chance of producing an effect upon the 
Sultan's mind. They might point out to the Turkish 
Government that it is repeating in Asia the self-destructive 
course of policy which it pursued long ago in Europe. It 
lost Herzegovina, Bosnia, and Bulgaria, because it refused 
to reform the administration of those regions. It created 
disaffection, justified insurrection, and made foreign 
intervention necessary. The same train of events seems 
likely to recur in Asia; and nothing but a change of policy 
can save the Sultanate from extinction. 
 
The only way to help the Ottoman State, argued Bryce was to pressure the Ottoman State 
to honor its obligations (i.e. to protect the Armenian population against Circassian and 
Kurds).  This is a striking example of the Liberal belief in the rule of public opinion.  
Bryce believed that the sentiments of the British reading public could change the mind of 
the Sultan and effect positive change in the Ottoman Empire.  The key to all this was that 
the British Government publish its consul reports so that the public might be informed of 
the plight of Eastern Christians.   
 
Local events in distant Muş were connected to Istanbul partluy through massive labor 
migration and connected to British policy partly through the technology of the telegraph.  
Over the course of the next year, the British public would learn quite a bit about Musa 
Bey and the rule of Abdülhamid II.  Although some of the articles published in the 
British press were hurriedly written and reflected no more than rumors, others were based 
on the information carefully gathered by ABCFM missionaries on the ground and 
independent investigation.  Over the next year, the Musa Bey affair would be a mainstay 
of news in Great Britain.  The whole case of Musa Bey became a symbol for the nature of 




In 1890, in the aftermath of the kidnapping of Gülizar and the furor over the trials of 
Musa Bey, James Bryce played a leading role in the founding of the Anglo-Armenian 
Association.  The foremost goal of this lobbying organization was to secure that the 
reforms promised in the Sixty-first Article of the Treaty of Berlin were carried out.  By 
1893, the Anglo-Armenian Association consisted predominantly of Liberal British 
Members of Parliament, members of the Anglican establishment, such as Canon MacColl 
and prominent members of the Armenian-British community such as Garabed Hagopian 
and Petrus Aganoor.  The membership list of the Anglo-Armenian Association also 
included one Frederick Green, who may or may not be the same person as Frederick 
Davis Greene, the Ottoman Empire-born missionary.  Although certain accusations were 
made that the Anglo-Armenian Association was a 'revolutionary' organization, James 
Bryce was adamant that the reverse was true.   Bryce wrote that, "this Association, so far 
from being revolutionary, always used all possible efforts to discourage any resort to 
force." 
 
In November 1894, after news of the violence in the Sasun Mountains reached the British 
newspaper-reading public, the Anglo-Armenian Association organized a series of mass 
meetings (November 27, January 9, February 4, and May 7) through an alliance of 
Liberal parliamentarians, clergymen and Armenian exiles from the Ottoman Empire.  
Throughout this period Frederick Davis Greene acted as conduit, linking reporting from 
the American board to the British Government.  In April, the Anglo-Armenian 
Association hosted three survivors of the Sasun massacres.  Although the Ottoman 
Government attempted to silence their voices, their accounts were published in the 
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London Times on April 25, 1895.   
 
To scholars of violence in the late Ottoman Empire, Bryce's name is most closely linked 
with the publication of a Blue Book on the Armenian Genocide.  In the midst of the First 
World War, Bryce recruited Arnold Toynbee to investigate reports that the Ottoman 
Government was systematically murdering its Armenian population.  The result of their 
labor was the Parliamentary 'Blue Book' entitled, The Treatment of Armenians in the 
Ottoman Empire, 1915-1916.  This collection of primary accounts remains, a century 
later, one of the most important primary sources for investgating the Armenian Genocide.  
Around seventy percent of the reports came from ABCFM missionaries.  




Minas Cheraz was born in 1852.  He was educated at the school of Nubar Chanazar in 
Hasköy, a predominantly Armenian community on the Golden Horn.  A gifted student of 
languages, he acquired a fluency in Greek, Turkish, English, Armenian and French by the 
time he finished high school.  Two years later, at the tender age of 18 he was appointed 
editor-in-chief of the literary journal, Ergrakount (Globe).  In the mid-1870s, his 
intellectual labor was dedicated to the idea of a single unified National Armenian 
                                                        
817 This biography draws on the profile of James Bryce from Joan George 2002, pp. 38-40.  The long 
quotation defending the Anglo-Armenian Association is from the second edition of Transcaucasia and 
Ararat (London, 1897), p. 477 f.n. 1.  The membership of the Anglo-Armenian Association can be found in 
their political pamphlet, The Case for Armenia (London, 1893) and in Haïasdan (January-April 1892).  The 
attempt of the Ottoman Government to silence voices of the refugees from Sasun can be found in FO 
424/182, p. 45.  More detail on James Bryce's relationship with the Anglo-Armenian Association might be 
found in his MSS at Oxford University.  The speech that Bryce delivered alongside Gladstone can be found 
in HC Deb 28 May 1889 vol 336 cc1309-24. 
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language, fusing the complex welter of dialects of the Armenian migrants in Istanbul into 
a single tongue.  At the same time, Cheraz founded, or directed, educational philanthropy 
efforts such as the Society of Ararat, the Cicilian Society and the United Society.  These 
institutions expended great resources toward building a hundred Armenian schools 
throughout the Empire.  Bearing a resemblance to other 'Back to the Land' movements 
elsewhere in Europe, these schools served as conduits: bringing Istanbul-born 
'missionaries' touting the conviction that there should be a unified Armenian language 
and nation to the diverse provinces.  It was thus through the United Society that the 
Istanbul-born Mihran Damadian would migrate from the capital to Muş.   
 
During the Patriarchate of Nerses Varjabedian (1874-1884), Cheraz held the post of 
General Secretary, tasked with corresponding with the various Foreign Embassies in 
Istanbul.  In 1876, he played a key role in the translation and compiling of hundreds of 
complaint letters (mazbata) into a single document to illustrate the hardships of the 
Armenian peasantries.  In 1878, Cheraz along with the former Patriarch Khrimian, was 
charged with the task of representing the Armenian Patriarchate at the Berlin Congress.  
Cheraz and Khrimian travelled across Europe advocating for reforms in the Ottoman East.  
It was at least in part due to these efforts that the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin 
included article 61 that specifically called for the protection of the life and livelihood of 
Ottoman Armenians.  In 1880, the Patriarchate gave Cheraz the task of communicating 
directly with the newly re-appointed Prime Minister Gladstone about reforms in the 
Ottoman East.  Throughout the 1880s, Cheraz continued his work as an educator and 
advocate of national education.  In 1886 he was appointed principal of the Principal of 




In 1889, the year that the Musa Bey affair radicalized an entire generation of Ottoman 
Armenians, Minas Cheraz went into exile in London, rather than risk arrest in his home 
city of Istanbul.  A Foreign Office bureaucrat Sir Fergusson, recorded his impressions of 
Minas Cheraz in 1889.  According to Fergusson,  
 
I received this intelligent and prepossessing gentleman (M. 
Minasse Tchéraz) to-day by your direction.  He said that he 
should have been glad to have had an opportunity of seeing 
your Lordship as he had been the accredited Armenian 
Delegate at the Congress of Berlin.  I said that you had 
directed me to receive him as you are too much engaged, 
and as Armenian questions are noticed in the House of 
Commons. 
 
He said that what he would state he would equally desire to 
be known to the Turkish Ambassador.  The Armenians 
could wish for nothing better than that Rustem Pasha 
should be Governor at Erzeroum.  In Lebanon he had 
established his character as a firm and impartial 
administrator.  He knew that Rustem Pasha had urged on 
the Grand Vizier the importance for the credit of Turkey 
that Moussa Bey should be punished.   
 
Though not now an accredited Representative, he knew that 
he could speak for the Armenian nation generally.  He was 
in no sense an agitator, although if he were at 
Constantinople to suggest any reform, or need of reform, he 
would be regarded with suspicion.  
 
It was a great mistake to suppose that the Armenians 
desired their country to be independent (they were too 
feeble),or that it should be taken by Russia.  They would 
regard it as a misfortune.  Russia crushes out nationality 
and alien religion.  Even the Armenian church at Kars had 
been given over to the Orthodox worship.  If the Turkish 
Government was too weak, the Russian was too strong.  
The Armenians within the Russian frontier hated their rule, 
and he had been warned by some of his fellow Armenians 
there against it.  Yet the Russians employ Armenians in the 
army and make many of them Generals, while the Turks 
will not trust them.  But the Armenians are more patriotic 
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than the Turks themselves.  His hope for the future would 
rather be if the Turks had to leave Europe, for then they 
would probably have to make their Empire in Asia a Turco-
Armenian State.  It was very unwise of the Turks not to 
utilize the real attachments of the Armenians. 
 
Soon after he arrived in London, Minas Cheraz founded the journal, L'Armenie.  The next 
year, he convinced the Orientalist Max Müller to establish the first Chair of Armenian 
Language in Great Britain.  Cheraz was immediately appointed Professor at King's 
College, elected to the Folk-Lore Society in 1891 and the Royal Asiatic Society in 1892.  
Aside from his academic duties, Cheraz was known to be an "unofficial agent of the 
Constantinople Patriarchate."  In 1893, along with Garabed Hagopian, Minas Cheraz 
joined the Anglo-Armenian Association.  After he was elected as an Honorary President 
of the Parliament of Religions in Chicago (1893) he toured United States, giving lectures 
in English and Armenian on the need for reforms in the Ottoman Empire.  News of the 
violence in Sasun led to an exhausting lecture circuit throughout scores of small towns 
throughout the British Isles, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands.  As the massacres 
continued, Cheraz grew increasingly frustrated with the contradictions of British policy 
and he moved to Paris where he assisted in the building of an Armenophilic community 
of Parisian intellectuals.  In the aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution of 1908, after 
a nearly 20-year-exile, Cheraz returned home to Istanbul.  Greeted by massive crowds 
upon his return to Istanbul, Cheraz was immediately elected President of the Armenian 
National Assembly.  However, within two years, Cheraz once again felt stifled by the 
regime of censorship.  He settled once again in Paris in 1910 where he continued his 
prodigious writing of essays, poetry, political tracts and short stories, in both Armenian 
367  
 
and French.   Cheraz died at in exile in France in 1929.818 
 
 
Royal Merriman Cole 
 
Royal Merriman Cole was born in 1839.  He was educated at Amherst College, Princeton 
Theological Seminary and Bangor Theological Seminary.  Amherst College, like many of 
the liberal arts colleges scattered along the East Coast of the United States had been 
originally founded with the education of Christian missionaries in mind (its motto 
remains 'Terras Irradient,' literally, "that they may illuminate the lands"). It is very likely 
that Royal Cole met his wife, Eliza Cobleigh, a graduate of Mt. Holyoke Seminary, 
through missionary networks.  They married shortly before setting sail for the Ottoman 
Empire in 1868.   The Coles would spend nearly the next forty years of their lives in the 
Ottoman Empire, first in Erzurum and then, between 1884 and 1907, in Bitlis.  During 
the devastating Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-1878, the Coles devoted themselves to the 
care of wounded Ottoman soldiers.   
 
The first long description of Sasun published in the British Press very likely came from 
the pen of Royal M. Cole.  There are several indications that Royal M. Cole was the 
author.  First, the author is almost certainly a Protestant missionary.  At the end of the 
letter, the author wrote, 
                                                        
818 Most of this profile is based on the profile published by Annie C. Marshall, "Minas Tcheraz: A 
biographical sketch," in Armenia Vol. IV, No. 8 (March, 1913), and published in The Oriental World, vol. 
3-7, pp. 240-5.  The long quotation from Fergusson can be found in FO 424/162, p. 133.  Additional 





"There must be a God in Heaven who will do right in all 
these matters, or some of us will lose faith.  One or more 
consuls have been ordered that way to investigate.  If 
Christians instead of Turks had reported these things in the 
city of Bitlis and the region where I have been touring, the 
case would be different, but now we are compelled to 
believe most of it.  Now the magnate is having papers 
circulated, and trying to compel Christians to sign them, 
expressing satisfaction that justice has been dealt out to 
rebels and thanking the king and the magnate himself.  
Christians here in Bitlis do not sign, though it is said that in 
the outlying districts some have signed.  It is not yet been 
offered to the Protestants, and as yet Protestants have not 
been thrust into chains or blackmailed very much, though 
lately things are beginning to look that way. 
 
The author is religious, specifies that they have just recently been 'touring,' and seems 
knowledgeable of the welfare of the Protestant community.  More evidence that the letter 
came from a missionary source can be found in an anonymous article (written by 
Frederick Davis Greene) in The Review of Reviews where an extract from the October 9 
letter is quoted.  Second, at the beginning of the letter the author uses the word 'Nero' to 
describe their magnate, that is the Vali or Governor General of Bitlis.  The author wrote,  
 
You have queried as to soldiers being at Moush, and so 
bringing cholera.  Prudence hints brevity, and an indirect 
route.  Our chief magnate seems like another Nero.  Last 
year great things were going on in the mountains south of 
Moush.  Though only a very few Nationalists seem to have 
been there, a battle took place in their self-defense, the 
magnate got his medal from Constantinople as having 
wiped out a big rebellion.  This year a few more 
Nationalists, perhaps 10 to 14, were said to be there. 
 
In Royal M. Cole's unpublished manuscript, he wrote,  
 
This will be enough to show how the door opens to what 
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follows -- our Governor General, Tahsin Pasha, whose very 
name should be a hissing & byword as much as Nero's of 
old, led off in the terrible slaughter that so  opened the 
flood gates to these bloodthirsty ones whenever a goodly 
number of Armenians were to be found in the country, in 
later massacres. 
 
Finally, in James Barton's introduction to Royal M. Cole's unpublished manuscript, he 
pointedly observes that, "The pen of Dr. Cole was the first to give the facts of the 
Sassoun slaughter of Christians to the world and he was the first to penetrate the stricken 




Someone asked the late Mr. W.T. Stead, "Whom do you 
deem the most brilliant living journalist, present company 
excepted?"  Smiling at the after-thought, he answered, "A 
little man who hides his light under a bushel and shuns the 
public gaze as the plague, but is the honoured friend of 
sovereigns and statesmen.  I take off my hat to Dr. Dillon.   
 
Emile Joseph Dillon was born to an English mother and an Irish father in Dublin in 1854.  
Dillon began his rather unusual education in Ireland, possibly studying to be a priest at a 
Jesuit Seminary.  Dillon then studied in Paris with Ernest Renan, where he immersed 
himself in the study of Semitic languages.  Briefly employed as a cataloger at the 
Bibliothèque Nationale, Dillon continued his study of Philology (with Gustav Bickell) at 
the Universität Innsbruck in the Habsburg Empire. 
 
                                                        
819 Most of this profile is based on the research of Rebecca Hennings, a librarian of Amherst College and 
her lucid article"Interior Turkey Reminiscences."  Quotations comes from The London Times (November 
17, 1894), The Review of Reviews (January 1895), p. 48 and Cole's MSS preserved in the archives Amherst 
College.  I have also used a few details from Grace Higley Knapp, The Tragedy of Bitlis (1917), p. 105.  I 
have not had time to examine the Cole Collection at the Zoryan Institute in Toronto, a repository of 9,100 
pages and nearly a thousand photographs documenting nearly forty years in the Ottoman Empire. 
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In addition to the usual concentration on Greek and Latin, Dillon devoted years to 
learning Sanskrit, Arabic, and Hebrew.  Dillon then turned his attention to the study of 
Persian over the course of two and a half years at the universities of Leipzig and 
Tübingen.  In 1876, at the age of 22, Dillon moved from the newly formed Empire of 
Germany to Kiev to work as a tutor for a German-Russian family.   He then moved to St. 
Petersburg where he supported himself as a tutor while studying Zend and ancient 
Persian at St. Petersburg University.  Upon learning that his study of Zend might lend 
itself to an academic career, he returned to France and completed a doctorate in Oriental 
Languages and Literatures at the University of Louvain. He then returned to study once 
more at the St. Petersburg, this time toward another graduate degree in Oriental 
Languages.  So far, Dillon had followed the path of an aspiring Orientalist. However, 
although he passed his oral examination at the University of St. Petersburg he soon ran 
into trouble.  According to an article lauding Emile Dillon as "Our Premier Journalist," he 
was not fated for the quiet academic life.    
 
Now just at that time the Russian professors were bringing 
out a history of universal literature.  The first two volumes 
had to do with Sanskrit and Zend.  Instead of letting them 
pass with a shrug of the shoulders, Dr. Dillon felt himself 
impelled to show up their shortcomings.  At that time the St. 
Petersburgsia Viedomosti, a paper which is now in the 
hands of Prince Uktomsky, was edited by Komaroff.  
Undaunted by the difficulty of writing in Russian, Dr. 
Dillon began his career as a Russian journalist by 
vehemently attacking the shortcomings of the professors.  It 
was a characteristic debut indeed, for this Dublin boy, to 
begin his journalistic career by writing a Russian review of 
a critical study of Zend and Sanskrit literature.  One of the 
effects of these articles was that he was requested by the 
editors of this very History of Universal Literature to write 
the history of Scandinavian Literature in the Middle  Ages, 




Whatever reputation he may have gained as an unsparing 
critic was dearly bought by the immediate destruction of 
any chance of his appointment to a professorship by the 
votes of the men whose work he had criticized.  As there 
was no second faculty of Oriental languages in all Russia, 
he had to go to another university and begin his work all 
over again.  He selected the University of Kharkoff [now 
rendered Kharkiv], and in 1883 he passed his examination 
as Master of Comparative Philology and of Classical 
Languages.  He became Docent of Khartoff University, 
being elected unanimously by the Faculty and by the 
Senate.  He then wrote and printed a dissertation on the 
place of the Armenian language in the family of Indo-
European tongues, and translated one of the most difficult 
of Armenian historians from ancient Armenian into 
Russian. 
 
At the age of 30, Dillon defended his second dissertation (this one in Comparative 
Philology) and was appointed a professor at Kharkiv University.  Soon after he began 
lecturing in 1884, Count Ivan Delyanov, the Minister of Public Education in the Russian 
Empire issued an order that deprived universities of their relative autonomy.  Dillon soon 
after left his position at the university, and spent the next two years focusing on his 
writing in Russian, French and German in a dizzyingly variety set of journals.  Aside 
from his considerable contributions to Russian- language encyclopedias, he published 
articles with titles such as "The Home and Age of the Avesta," "L'Alphabet de la Langue 
Bactrienne," and "Die Transkription der Eranischen Sprachen."   
 
In the mid-1880s, Dillon found employment in Odessa working for various Russian-
language newspapers.  Soon after, Dillon began to write as a correspondent for the The 
Daily Telegraph.  At the end of the 19th century, The Daily Telegraph was one of the 
major British newspapers, rivaled only by the conservative-organ The Morning Post and 
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the liberal-organ The Daily News.  (At this point in his career, Dillon often published 
articles under the nom-de-plume E.B. Lanin, a coy reference to 'Eblana,' an archaic 
rendering of his native city of Dublin, probably to avoid Russian censorship.)  
 
In November of 1894, after the news of Sasun had been broken to the British reading 
public, Emile Dillon was personally tasked by the proprietor of the Daily Telegraph with 
conducting an investigation of what had occurred at Sasun.  In 1918, Dillon described his 
visit to Istanbul,  
 
In Constantinople I had interesting talks with the Grand 
Vizier, Djevad Pasha.  I requested him to obtain for me an 
audience with the Sultan, and I presented a letter in the 
same sense from the Sultan's friend, Professor Vambery, of 
Budapest.  The Grand Vizier promised to arrange the 
matter.  Kiamil Pasha, however, told me it would be useless, 
because the Sultan could do nothing.  I persevered in my 
request.  Then Abdul Hamid sent me the Order of the 
Medjdieh.  He also offered to provide me with all requisite 
documents for the study of the Armenian question and airy 
apartments in which to read them.  The Medjdieh Order I 
returned with the expression of my cordial thanks, 
explaining that in Great Britain a special correspondent 
resembles an Ambassador in being debarred from accepting 
any decorations, recompense, or privileges without the 
knowledge and consent of the newspaper or proprietors 
who had sent him; and that even were it otherwise, the 
nature of the mission entrusted to be me precluded any such 
transaction.  
 
An official called on me to say that his Majesty would 
perhaps see me if he could first read some articles of mine, 
and hoped I would make a stay.  I answered my resolve to 
go to Armenia, to see things for myself. The Grand Vizier 
then sent for me and said: "If you agree to remain here his 
Majesty may yet find it possible to receive you.   But you 
may not visit Armenia.  There is an international 
commission of Russian, French and English delegates there 
about to inquire into the alleged massacres at Sassoon, so a 
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journalist would be superfluous." 
 
I replied that I had been instructed to see Armenia and talk 
to the Armenians, and arrive at my own independent 
conclusions, and that I was about to do so. 
 
"But my Government has given strict instructions that you 
are not to be allowed in that country; nor indeed any 
journalist of any country."  "None the less I am going, and I 
shall get there," I insisted, and added, "my report will be 
read throughout Europe long before that of the 
Commission."  The Grand Vizier smiled the smile of 
superior knowledge, and I left.  His spies, who had been 
shadowing me from the very first, never left me now. 
 
In his Eclipse of Russia (1918), Dillon emphasized that he had not set out with the 
foregone conclusion that the great massacres in the Sasun were true.  
 
I had gone thither to inquire into the truth of the reports 
about a massacre of Armenians which it was alleged had 
taken place in the district of Sassun.  Before I started I had 
been assured that there was not truth in the rumours.  As 
Professor Vamberg [sic, presumably Ármin Vámbéry] of 
Budapest was one of those who vouched for this reassuring 
statement I felt disposed to accept it provisionally.  Before 
starting for Armenia, however, I called on a Russian 
statesman, with whom I was on very friendly terms and 
requested him to confide to me the truth.  He said, "I will 
talk to you as a friend.  What I say is for your guidance, not 
for publication.  The massacres did take place.  I will give 
you some ghastly details, for the accuracy of which I vouch.  
We have Armenians in prison for conspiring against the 
Sultan.  They could not honestly do otherwise.  Your 
government has asked - and I may say somewhat insistently 
- for an international inquiry with a view to a collective 
intervention of the powers.  That may be a highly ethical 
step to take, but believe me it is not a wise one.  It will do 
harm to the Armenians. The French government and ours, 
being Christian and European, have agreed to participate in 
that step suggested by Queen Victoria's advisers.  That will 
give employment to the embassies and consulates of the 
interested powers.  But your ambassador in Constantinople 
fancies that we shall also join in putting pressure on the 
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Sultan.  That is an illusion.  We have no such intention.  
Indeed, we are resolved to eschew all action joint and 
isolated.  When the inquiry is over, which will establish the 
guilt of the Moslem population of Kurdistan and, I must 
add, of the Stambul cabinet, the work of Russia will be 
over together with it.  It will have no practical 
consequences, and the Sultan knows it. There, now you 
have the truth.” 
 
Dillon would explain in his memoir, in detail how he arrived in Erzurum.  In 1918, Dillon 
recalled that, 
 
I quitted Constantinople in disguise and nobody, not even 
my best friends there, knew I had gone.  I went to Tiflis, 
where the Viceroy, who was a personal friend of mine, 
gave me open letters.  Then I rode through Transcaucasia 
with a Cossack guard.  On the Turkish frontier I was 
received by the Cossack outposts.  The Commander's 
brother had, as a student, been examined by me at the 
Russian University of Kharkoff.  I was attired in Cossack 
costume, the same as generals wear.  The Turkish outposts 
who beheld me assumed that I was [a] Russian general.  
Rumor confirmed them in the belief, and when I set out for 
Armenia a day or two later, they had a guard of honor 
waiting to take the place of my Cossacks, who had to 
recross the stream dividing Turkey from Russia.  With this 
escort I entered Erzeroum, having first requested the 
Russian Consul-General by telegraph to have rooms 
prepared for me.  A day or two later, when the Russian 
Consul-General was talking to the Vali, the latter alluded to 
me as a Russian officer.  The Consul assured him I was 
neither a military man nor a Russian, but he only smiled 
and repeated significantly that he knew who I was.  
... 
"I remained in the country, seeing the refugees from the 
place of the massacres, taking down their evidence, 
drawing a map of the districts, which was used by the 
British, Russian and French Governments and supplying 
the International Commission with witnesses and evidence. 
Every obstacle that a Government could create was put in 
my way.  People were forbidden to rent a house or rooms.  
A posse of troops was stationed in front of my dwelling, 
and wherever I went it accompanied me.  Everyone seen to 
talk to me was thenceforth a marked man.  The Armenian 
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Bishop was arrested and banished to Jerusalem for that 
offence.  I was obliged to have recourse to various ruses in 
order to get about unobserved. 
 
By mid-March, Dillon wrote to his readers that he was actively involved in sending 
witnesses before the Commission.  He reported that the Ottoman Government went 
through great lengths to prevent evidence not to its favor.  Dillon wrote,  
 
The difficulties placed in the way of the witnesses coming 
here to give evidence before the Commission are almost 
insuperable. Every road leading hither is patrolled by bands 
of gendarmes, who put intending witnesses out of the way.  
I have, however, sent twelve witnesses before the 
Commission, among others, the brother of the late Kirkor, 
who was butchered, and a female relative who was 
outraged by the Kurds and escaped, after several weeks' 
detention, disguised as a man. 
 
It is clear that Robert Graves got along far better with Frank Scudamore than with the 
strange and secretive Emile Dillon.  In a personal letter dated May 11, 1895, the British 
Consul Robert Graves harshly criticized Dillon, suggesting that he bent truth to his own 
advantage and that he may have passed on information to the Russian Consul.  According 
to Graves,  
 
Personally, I am sorry he has returned, as he is a unpleasant 
sort of person, and a mischief- maker.  An Irish Catholic, of 
Jesuit Seminary education and eighteen years' residence in 
Russia, who is also a "Daily Telegraph" man, is not likely 
to shine by his candour; but he seems to me to be a liar of 
almost phenomenal capacity.  ... Though I have been civil 
and hospitable to him, I take care to be much on my guard, 
especially as I understand that he carries to my Russian 
colleague tales of what he pretends to have heard at my 
table, &c. 
 




So far the Turkish Government had succeeded in 
preventing the entry into the disturbed area of any 
representative of the European Press, but at the beginning 
of February two well-known British special correspondents 
managed to run the blockade, Dr. E.J. Dillon, of the Daily 
Telegraph coming from the Caucasus, and FI Scudamore 
from Constantinople via Trebizond for the Daily News.  
Their arrival caused great perturbation and activity in secret 
police circles, and their long and graphic reports on events 
which until then had been "wropt in mystery" [sic] as far as 
the reading public were concerned aroused intense interest 
in England. ... The inquiry [into Sasun] dragged through 
May and June into July, and as the facts of the Sassun 
Massacre become more generally known, largely through 
the reports of Dillon and Scudamore, the question of 
reforming the administration of Turkey's eastern provinces 
became the subject of lively discussion in Parliament and in 
the Press, where Abdul Hamid did not lack defenders, some 
of whom may have been honest. 
 
After his reporting from Erzurum, Graves recalled that Dillon was subsequently greeted 
enthusiastically by Armenians on the Russian side of the frontier "in recognition for his 
services in giving publicity to the sufferings of their oppressed fellows." Dillon died in 
1933 in Barcelona, Spain.820   
 
William Ewart Gladstone 
William Ewart Gladstone, a towering figure in the political life of Victorian Great Britain, 
                                                        
820 The epigraph quotation is taken from William Lately, "Dr. Emile Dillon: A great Irish Journalist," 
Everyman (Sep. 19, 1913).  The identification of Dillon's nom-de-plume 'E.B. Lanin' comes from Adrian 
Room, Dictionary of Pseudonyms (McFarland, 2010), p. 275.  The long quotation from about Dillon's 
foiled academic life in St. Petersburg comes from an article entitled "Character Sketch Dr. E.J. Dillon : Our 
Premier Journalist" in The Review of Reviews 24, p. 22.   Much of this biography is based on these two 
profiles, with additional details from The New Outlook 81, p. 267.  Many of the quotations from Dillon are 
from his recollections of the Sasun investigation published in The Editor & Publisher (August 3, 1918), pp. 
13-14, and The Eclipse of Russia (London, 1918), p. 222 and p. 223 and from his Daily Telegraph articles 
on Sasun.  Many of his articles were reproduced in other newspapers.  I quote from an article republished 
The North-Eastern Daily Gazette (March 20, 1895).  This profile also makes use of Robert W. Graves 
critical missive in FO 424/182, p. 316 and Storm Centres of the Near East : Personal Memoirs, 1879-1929 
(London, 1933), pp. 145-146, p. 148 and p. 151. No doubt, much remains to be learned from Dillon's 
voluminous archives at Stanford University (80 linear feet), Leeds University Library and the National 
Library of Scotland. 
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was born in 1809 in Liverpool.   He was educated at Oxford and entered Parliament at the 
age of 23.  He retired from politics in 1894 at the age of 84.  During the intervening years 
he served as Prime Minister four times (1868-1874, 1880-1885, February - July 1886, 
1892-1894).  In the late 1870s, Gladstone became increasingly engaged with the politics 
of the late Ottoman Empire, and simultaneously, the notion that the British Government 
was willing to sacrifice the lives of Christians in the Balkans for the sake of maintaining 
geopolitical advantage against Russia.  
 
In September 1876, Gladstone published a pamphlet entitled, Bulgarian Horrors and the 
Question of the East.  Scholars tend to remember the virulent racism of this piece of 
writing.  (For instance, Gladstone wrote the 'Turks' were "not the mild Mohametans of 
India, nor the chivalrous Saladins of Syria, nor the cultured Moors of Spain.  They were, 
upon the whole, from the black day when they first entered Europe, the one great anti-
human specimen of humanity.  Wherever they went, a broad line of blood marked the 
track behind them; and, as far as their dominion reached, civilization disappeared from 
view.  They represented everywhere government by force, as opposed to government by 
law.") 
 
However, the bulk of the vitriol in the pamphlet was directed at the Conservative 
Government under Benjamin Disraeli.  ("For we know that we have a well-manned 
Embassy at Constantinople, and a network of Consulates and Vice-Consulates, really 
discharging diplomatic duties, all of the provinces of European Turkey.  That villages 
could be burned down by the scores, and men and women, and children murdered, or 
worse than murdered, by thousands, in a Turkish province lying between the capital and 
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the scene of the scene of recent excitements, and that our Embassy and Consulates could 
know nothing of it?  The thing was impossible.  It could not be.  So silence was obtained, 
and relief; and the well-oiled machinery of our luxurious indifferent life worked smoothly 
on.  There was a pressure of inquiry, but the door was each time quickly closed upon the 
question, as the stone lid used to be shut down, in the Campo Santo of Naples, upon the 
mass of human corpses that lay festering beneath.")  
 
On May 18, 1889, less than three weeks after a large crowd of people from Muş and the 
provinces gathered in front of Armenian Patriarchate in Kum Kapı to protest the 
kidnapping of Gülizar, Gladstone strongly advocated in Parliament using the force of 
public opinion in Great Britain to pressure the Ottoman Government to enact reforms. 
Technologies such as the telegraph were critical in disseminating accounts of Sasun.   
 
Gladstone said,  
Public opinion must be brought to bear upon this case.  It is 
a great power, and I am afraid that public opinion and that 
other power of threat of force which we are not in a 
condition to appeal to, are the only powers likely to 
produce any sensible improvement to the condition of the 
people of Armenia. 
 
In the fall of 1889, Gladstone published a long and detailed letter about the kidnapping of 
Gülizar in Muş.  It is interesting to observe that the account that Gladstone published is 
nearly the same as the story that Gülizar told her daughter in France that was eventually 
published in 2004.  Gladstone died 1898 in Hawarden Wales.821 
                                                        
821 The quote from May 18, 1889 comes from the Anglo-Armenian Association published pamphlet bearing 
the name The Case for Armenia (London, 1893), p. 19.  Gladstone’s long rendition of the saga of Gülizar 




Frederick Davis Greene 
Frederick Davis Greene, was born in 1863 in the Ottoman Empire.  His father, Joseph 
Kingsbury Greene, and his mother, Elizabeth Augusta Davis, were American 
missionaries with lifetime appointments with the ABCFM.  Greene's earliest years were 
spent in Bardizag (Bahçecik) a small village near Izmit, where his father preached to the 
small Protestant Armenian congregation in Turkish.  In the late 1860s, the Greene family 
spent two years living in Minnesota.  The Greenes moved back to the Ottoman Empire in 
1870.  In 1872, when Greene was nine, his father was given the task of editing the 
Avedaper, a weekly newspaper published in Istanbul in Armenian, Armeno-Turkish and 
Greco-Turkish.   As with most of the Ottoman-born missionary children, Greene grew up 
between two worlds -- the United States of his parents, and the Ottoman Empire of his 
birth and childhood.  For high school, Greene was sent to the prestigious Phillips 
Academy.  After graduating in 1881, he attended Amherst College (class of 1885) and 
studied theology at Chicago Seminary, Yale Divinity School and Andover Seminary.  
After Greene was ordained, he left to preach the gospel in the Eastern reaches of the 
Ottoman Empire as a life-appointed ABCFM minister.  His arrival in Van in 1890 
coincided with a dramatic uptick in sectarian violence and tension in the aftermath of the 
fervor over the Musa Bey affair, violence in Erzurum and at the Kum Kapı cathedral in 
Istanbul.  In some respects, his life followed a similar trajectory to that of Mihran 
Damadian.  Both were born to prosperous families in the Marmara basin, were educated 
                                                                                                                                                                     
1889), p. 4.  It can be usefully compared with Arménouhie Kévonian’s Les Noces Noires de Gulizar 




abroad and returned to the Ottoman Empire to teach and preach in the distant provinces.  
And just as Damadian was shocked to see to the condition of the peasantries in Muş, an 
experience that likely played an important role in his conversion to Armenian nationalism, 
Greene was deeply affected by his experiences in the East.   Both Damadian and Greene 
spent four years as teacher-missionaries.   
 
While in Van, Greene observed the ruins of an earlier political order, an ancien régime 
that had been destroyed by the power of Ottoman arms.  Like many of the ABCFM 
missionaries he was convinced that the earlier feudal structures had granted more 
protection to the local populations than the rule of Istanbul.  He wrote,  
Within two days' ride southeast of Van, I found the ruins of 
four massive Kurdish castles at Shaddakh, Norduz, 
Bashkallah, and Khoshab, which must have rivaled those of 
the feudal barons on the Rhine.  The Armenian and 
Nestorian villagers were much better off as serfs of the 
powerful masters of these strongholds than as the victims 
of Kurdish plunder and of Ottoman taxation and oppression 
which they now are. 
 
In the spring of 1894, a few months before the Sasun massacres, Greene returned to the 
United States, apparently for reasons of ill health.  By this point, Greene may have 
already gotten in contact with the Anglo-Armenian Association, although the evidence is 
rather scant on this point.   In a letter that he would anonymously include in his first book, 
The Armenian crisis in Turkey: The Massacre of 1894, its Antecendents and Significance, 
published in 1895, Greene described the situation in Van when he departed,  
 
Up until May 1894, when I left Van, the whole Christian 
population of that region was simply paralyzed by fear, and 
there was no manifestation of any revolutionary thought or 
intention by the Armenians.  Certainly, if such a revolution 
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were contemplated, you would expect to find it in Van and 
Bitlis vilayets [provinces] where the provocation is the 
greatest.   
 
I do not know when Greene resigned from the ABCFM.  Based on the available evidence, 
it appears that he may have done so after he heard about what had happened in Sasun.  
Being part of the ABCFM -- like being a modern Peace Corps volunteer -- would have 
inhibited his ability to speak freely.  Greene alludes to this frustration in his first piece of 
writing on the violence in Sasun in an anonymous article published in The Review of 
Reviews in January 1895,  
In this crisis, after long silence, I feel that Christian 
manhood demands from me a statement, which cannot be 
buried in the archives of the British foreign office, "for 
state reasons," nor withheld in an authenticated form by 
mission secretaries who must be loyal to the interests of 
great missionary enterprises. The motives and spirit of the 
latter are unquestioned.  I simply discharge a duty which 
my freedom from any responsible connection with either 
diplomatics or boards renders both possible and obligatory. 
 
Between January and June, Greene moved frequently, speaking with passion about the 
plight of the impoverished peasantries in the Ottoman Empire and railing furiously 
against both the British Government's "conspiracy of silence" on the unpublished 
consular reports and the endemic corruption of many Ottoman bureaucrats and military 
officers.  Perhaps for strategic reasons, he was careful to avoid placing responsibility of 
the Sasun violence on the doorstep of the Palace.  He advocated for the "conscience of 
Europe and America" -- not just the "non-Conformist conscience" but "human 





If His Imperial Majesty, the Sultan, but knew the real facts 
of the atrocious massacre of last year, and realized the 
disgrace attaching to the Turkish name on account of the 
unspeakably brutal deeds of his Turkish and Kurdish 
soldiers, officers included, we cannot but hope that some 
punishment would be visited upon them, experience to the 
contrary.  He certainly should welcome the revelations of 
this book, and do all in his power to protect any who may 
aid him in bringing the facts to light and securing a better 
state of affairs.  God help him, and save all his subjects, 
Turk, Arab, Kurd, Christian, Jew and Pagan, from the curse 
of government not only "sick," but dead and rotting! 
 
I preach no crusade; none is needed.  But it is high time for 
the conscience of Europe and America to assert itself -- not 
simply the "non-Conformist conscience," but the 
Established, the Orthodox, the Catholic, the Agnostic, and 
the Infidel conscience, in fact the human conscience -- 
against this crime against humanity.  If this conscience is 
once aroused, I care not what parties are in power, or how 
the game stands on the diplomatic chessboard, the Eastern 
Question will be settled, instead of forever threatening the 
peace of Europe, and one more blot will be wiped out from 
the annals of the world. 
 
Elsewhere, in The Armenian Crisis, Greene stresses that although "our hearts are stirred 
by the lot of our co-religionists under the Crescent, let us not forget the Moslem 
population almost equally is cursed and impoverished by Turkish misrule, venality, and 
taxation."   
 
After the publication of The Armenian Crisis, Greene worked closely with the Anglo-
Armenian Association in Great Britain.  When three survivors of the Sasun violence 
arrived in Great Britain, it was Greene who acted as their translator.  Greene served as an 
information conduit, publishing and conveying material from the ABCFM missionaries.  
Greene certainly passed on dispatches to the Anglo-Armenian Association, and very 
likely passed on Royal M. Cole's October 9, 1895, letter to the Armenian Patriotic 
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Association.  Greene also acted directly as a sometime-journalist, describing the life and 
livelihood of peasantries in the plains of Muş and the mountaineers of Sasun for the 
Manchester Guardian.  
 
After his activism in Great Britain, Greene travelled back in the United States, this time 
roundly criticizing the reluctance of the United States to involve itself in the Ottoman 
Empire.  Greene was particularly incensed by Ambassador Terrell, whose reports, at least 
at first, reflected the point of view of the Ottoman State.  At a mass meeting in Boston, 
alluding to the abolitionist struggles that had been based in that city, Greene gave a 
speech where he confirmed that he had himself been converted.  Whereas he had once 
been a missionary to Armenia, he was now a missionary from Armenia.  
 
Dr. Greene, who was loudly applauded, said: "It is five 
years since I sailed from these shores a missionary from 
Christendom to Armenia, and I find myself now a 
missionary from Armenia to Christendom.  Christianity 
cannot be crowded out in Armenia, but it cannot be 
advanced until the conditions are changed.  I believe our 
government should take a more decided stand in this matter. 
Of course we desire to express our indignation, but the 
whole world is looking at America now and some more 
decided action should be taken.  Why is it that our consul in 
Constantinople is so backward and our admirals are 
skulking round the Mediterranean and sending back official 
reports that this thing is all a hoax?  We do not want any 
more of this cant and hypocrisy.  The United States 
influence in Constantinople has been very embarrassing in 
regard to this trouble and is embarrassing today.  The Turks 
look to America for a real expression of opinion, and a 
strong, decisive voice addressed to our government would 
have, I think, more influence on the sultan than through the 
British government, and I hope the people of America will 
not be backward in expressing their abhorrence of and 




Greene's activism in the United States, and the subsequent horrendous violence across 
Anatolia in 1895 - 1896, contributed to a sea change the United States policy towards the 
Ottoman Empire.  Within a few years, the United States government expanded the 
number of consular stations, opening consulates in Trabzon, Aleppo and Harput.  The 
United States consular officers in those cities: Oscar S. Heizer, Leslie A. Davis, and Jesse 
B. Jackson, would later act as important witnesses of the Armenian Genocide.  Greene 
died in 1962 in Andover, Massachusetts.822 
 
Garabed Hagopian 
Garabed Hagopian was born into a Protestant family in Merzifon in 1850.  He may have 
been related to Professor V. Hovhannes Hagopian, discussed at the beginning of this 
dissertation.  Garabed Hagopian was educated at Robert College in Istanbul.  In the 1880s 
he moved to London, joining a tiny Armenian community of around one hundred 
individuals.  Hagopian was employed as a instructor of Oriental languages and worked 
for a spell on an edition of Franz Thimm's Turkish Self Taught.  Hagopian was interested 
in promoting the study of the Ottoman Empire in Great Britain, and in 1891 presented a 
paper entitled "A Plan for Promoting Oriental Studies" at an academic conference. 
 
In 1886 at a conference in Paris, Hagopian help found the Armenian Patriotic Association 
(Arm: Hayots Hayrenasirakan Miut'iun) with the exiled former teacher Mekertich 
                                                        
822 This profile quotes from Greene's book (The Armenian Crisis) as well as his article, "The Armenian 
Crisis", published anonymously in The Review of Reviews, Vol. XI (January 1895).  Greene's speech in 
Boston comes from The Arena, Vol. XIII (June 24, 1895), p. xi. Biographical details have been taken from 
a number of sources, the extensive diaries of his father, Joseph K. Greene, kept at Union Theological 




Portukalian.  The main focus on this organization was to continually bring up the issue of 
the 61st article of the Treaty of Berlin.  In a letter to the London Times on December 10, 
1895, Hagopian wrote, 
 
It was formed in order to carry forward in Europe the 
policy of the great Patriarch Nersès, as the embodiment of 
our national aims and objects, by constitutional means as 
theretofore.  This policy I described in a letter which 
appeared in The Times of November 28, 1884 -- viz. 
decentralization for the Armenian provinces and a modus 
vivendi with the Ottoman Throne as the only means of 
obtaining deliverance from provincial tyranny and 
oppression.  That the Patriotic Association so created had 
no revolutionary tendencies I have shown in a letter 
published in The Times of Sept. 29, 1890.  Not only 
ourselves, but all right-minded people would sympathize 
with our Armenian breathren who took up arms in self-
defence against lawless hordes; but even this elementary 
right of mankind was made impossible by the Turkish 
Government, who armed the anarchic elements in the 
country, and disarmed the industrious and law-abiding 
element, which is almost entirely Armenian.  Nay, it has 
gone further, and, systematically vexed, harried, and 
dispersed this peaceful, wealth-producing people from the 
homes which they had occupied for centuries.   
 
By the end of the 1880s Garabed Hagopian served as the chairman of both the Committee 
of Armenian Residents in London and the Armenian Patriotic Association.  The vice-
chair of both organizations was the same individual the French-educated lawyer Miran 
Sévasly.  Given that the address of correspondence was Hagopian's personal residence in 
Fulham, it is very likely that both committees were composed of a very small number of 
members.  In November 1888, the Armenian Patriotic Association began to publish Le 
Haïasdan, a French-Armenian language-newspaper, in London.  The editor of the 
newspaper was Miran Sévasly.  Other members of the editorial staff included Jean 
Broussali, an Armenian Catholic lawyer originally from Cairo, and James Aratoon 
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Malcolm, an Oxford-educated scion of a wealthy Armenian merchant family from Persia.   
 
For nearly two decades, Garabed Hagopian wrote a near-continuous stream of letters to 
the London Times about the plight of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.  During the late 
1880s, the London Times published a letter from Garabed Hagopian roughly every two 
months.  With this rate of publication, Hagopian could almost be considered a 
correspondent for the London Times.  However, it is difficult to establish to what extent 
Garabed Hagopian's letter writing directly contributed to an increased coverage of the 
'Armenian Question' in the British Press.  Almost forty years ago, the scholar Robert F. 
Zeidner, suggested that the Hagopian's efforts, "plus those of his liberal allies in 
Parliament, coverage of the The Times of the Armenian Question rose from a mere 14 
articles throughout 1886 to 61 during the next year, and finally to 122 in 1890."  This 
assertion rests on the faulty assumption that little changed in the Ottoman Empire during 
this period.  The peasantries of Muş would no doubt have begged to differ on this point.  
 
It is clear that the Hamidian Government was greatly perturbed by the publication of Le 
Haïasdan.  In December 1888, the new Patriarch Ashikian visited the British Ambassador 
White and "alluded to the irritation produced in high quarters here in consequence of the 
publication in London of an Armenian newspaper called Le Haiasdan."  According to 
White,  
 
The Patriarch then mentioned the Armenian nation, and 
that he had every reason to believe that the Sultan was 
animated by the most benevolent intentions towards toward 
those of his subject who belong to it; but his Beatitude 
added that he was afraid that the tone adopted by his co-
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religionists domiciled in England might interfere with the 
realization of any kind intentions on the part of the Sultan. 
 
Some members of the Foreign Office were also critical of  Garabed Hagopian's  
publication of unverified accounts of violence. On at least on two occasions, the British 
Foreign Office contested his reports.  In 1889, Garabed Hagopian wrote a letter to the 
Times of London claiming that at least one of the petitioners from Muş who had 
demonstrated at the Kum Kapı at the beginning of May had been arrested and exiled on 
the orders of the Grand Vizier.  The British Ambassador White requested that this claim 
be investigated and found no evidence to support it.  Writing in April from Van, vice-
Consul Devey was even more critical about the negative impact of newspapers such as 
the Haïasdan.  He observed,   
 
"Before concluding, a word ought to be added on the harm 
done to the Armenians of Turkey by the publication of such 
papers abroad as 'l'Arménie" and the "Haïasdan" and others, 
the "prefession de foi," of the last named is "reventiquer par 
les moyens pacifiques et fermes, la prompte réalisation de 
l'autonomie admistrative et locale" on the lines of an 
Ambassadorial note addressed to the Porte in 1880, and on 
the grounds of Turkish misgovernment and Kurdish 
oppression.  The entirely sufficient reasons disposing of 
Armenian autonomy need not be recapitulated, and the 
opinion of educated Armenians of these parts of Turkey, 
honestly speaking, is that autonomy is unnecessary and 
undesirable.  Journals of the "Haiasdan" genus, however 
eagerly seize on every instance of wrong, well-
authenticated or not, hold it up to European execration, and 
aggravate what little ill-feeling there may be between 
Moslem and Christian, and Raya and Government. With 
their views they cannot, of course, allow that the Porte is 
even attempting to govern, and its policy they interpret as 
based on a plan of exterminating the Armenians by 
employing every method of oppression and injustice and by 




By 1893, Garabed Hagopian was the vice-chair of the Anglo-Armenian Association.  The 
only other members of the Anglo-Armenian Association who were of Armenian-descent 
were Miran Sévasly and Petrus Basil Aganoor, a merchant who married into a prominent 
British family.  Another member of the Committee by this point was one "Frederick 
Green."  It is very likely that this is Rev. Frederick Greene and the conduit through which 





During the reign of Tahsin Paşa (1891-1895), the Ottoman Government in Muş and Bitlis 
began to imprison priests and search monasteries.  As the former-Fedayee Rouben Der 
Minassian pointed out, this policy of "disregarding the religious sensibilities of the 
people" not only greatly agitated many observant Armenians, it also led to a 
radicalization of many clergy members, who "learned the revolutionary ideas in their 
prison cells, and became confirmed revolutionaries."  Subsequently, Der Minassian 
                                                        
823 Most of the personal details about Garabed Hagopian stem from a pair of books by Joan George, 
Merchants in Exile: The Armenians of Manchester, England, 1835-1935 (Taderon, 2002) and Merchants to 
Magnates, Intrigue and Survivor: Armenians in London, 1900-2000 (Gomidas, 2009) and an article by 
Arthur Beylerian, "La communauté arménienne de Trébizonde et le mouvement national (1878-1896)," 
Revue d'histoire arménienne contemporaine I (1995), pp. 9-30.  Although Beylerian 1995 (fn. 28) and 
Walker 1992 (p. 127), give different dates for the foundation of the Armenian Patriotic Association -- 1878 
and 1885 respectively than Nalbandian 1963 (p. 95).  It appears, at least based on Garabed Hagopian's own 
account, (see London Times, December 10, 1895) that Nalbandian is correct on the date.  Letters from 
Hagopian as the chairman of Committee of Armenian Residents in London and Committee of the 
Armenian Patriotic Association can be found in Parliamentary Papers, Turkey no. 1 (1890), pp. 1-11.  For 
mention of Hagopian's scholarly interests see, The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly, (1891), p. lxiv.  For 
more details on Le Haïasdan, see James Aratoon Malcolm, "Armenian Journalism," in Trübner's American 
and Oriental Literary Record, 1888, pp. 104-8.  For a less sympathetic perspective of Garabed Hagopian, 
see Robert F. Zeidner, "Britain and the Launching of the Armenian Question," IJMES 7/4 (1976), pp. 465-
483.  Zeidner is helpful in providing some of the many dates that Hagopian wrote to the London Times. 
The quotations of Ambassador White discussing the visit of Patriarch Ashikian comes from Parliamentary 
Papers, Turkey no. 1 (1890), pp. 42-43.  The quotation from Vice-Consul Devey can be found in FO 424-
162, p. 43. 
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stresses that it was Bishop Karakhanian who converted the former bandit Arabo to direct 
his efforts toward national liberation.  It was in the prisons that the Fedayee movement 
was born as imprisoned priests, schoolteachers and bandits compared their experiences 
and grew into a single community.   
 
Nerses Karakhanian was born in Muş in 1843.  He received his education at the 
monastery of Surb Garabed.  It is likely that he knew Mkrtich Khrimian who was 
appointed as the head of Surb Garabed in 1862.  By the early 1890s, Kharakhanian was 
probably the most powerful representative of the Armenian Patriarchate in the diocese of 
Muş.  
 
In 1892, Nerses Karakhanian described the situation in the mountains of Sasun in a letter 
to the British Consul in Erzurum.   
 
Three months ago the inhabitants of Gellighen and 
Shellivesson took refuge in the mountains leaving their 
fields untilled, and abandoning their property to the Kurds.  
The inhabitants of the great villages, Shenik, Semal, 
Gheliegozan [Gheliéguzan] and Agpikh, horrified by the 
frightful tortures inflicted upon prisoners, refused to deliver 
up their chiefs to the police and the Government, thirsting 
for revenge, awaits the opportune moment to annihilate 
these villages.  Talib Effendi, a member of the Municipal 
Council of Moush, who is the soul of the Government, has 
openly menaced the highlanders, saying, "I am determined 
to incite the Kurdish tribes against you, and make them 
annihilate your village.  
 
In another passage the report says: "It is to be feared that sanguinary conflicts are 
impending between the Armenian highlanders and the Kurdish Nomads.  The situation in 




In February 1893, two Armenians were confronted by police (zaptiye) in the village of 
Avzut on the plain of Muş.  Either through misunderstanding or fear of capture, shots 
were fired and both an Armenian and a member of the police force lay dead.  The killing 
of a zaptiye spelled disaster for the village.  The village was subsequently ransacked, 
women were systematically raped and between 17 and 20 men were imprisoned and 
tortured.  Many were still in prison two years later.  According to one account,  when 
Bishop Karakhanian complained about the violence at Avzut, he was arrested and taken 
by an armed guard to Bitlis.  Consul Robert Graves reported that the arrest may have 
been spurred by the pecuniary motives of certain members of the local Government.  In a 
report dated June 28, 1893, Graves wrote,  
 
After the affair at Avzot many of the villages around 
Moush were searched for arms, and the Armenian Bishop 
of Moush was arrested, it is believed, on a charge of being 
concerned in treasonable agitation against the government 
in the Caza of Boulanik, which he had visited for the 
purpose of buying grain for the monastery of Surp Garabet, 
of which he is also Abbot.   
 
His arrest has produced a painful impression among the 
Armenians of Moush, who are convinced of his innocence, 
and believe that the accusations against him have been 
trumped up by the police with a view to extortion and 
intimidation. It is reported that a police officer visited 
Boulanik for the purpose of collecting evidence against the 
Bishop, and succeeded in extracting no less than 580 liras 
from the villages, some of those who refused to pay being 
arrested and taken to Bitlis. 
 
Bishop Karakhanian remained in prison in Bitlis with any charge for an entire year.  
Throughout this time, Bishop Karakhanian petitioned to have his trial moved first to 
Istanbul and then to Erzurum.  His petitions were denied and in the spring of 1894, he 
391  
 
was finally tried and convicted of the "seditious incitement of the Armenian population."  
Hearing of his conviction and sentence, Graves wrote, that among the Armenian 
population of the Ottoman Empire, "his sentence will be learned with great regret, as he 
is believed to be innocent of the offenses laid to his charge, and is generally respected 
and popular.  It is said that the accusations against him were based on the treacherous 
denunciations of two Archimandrites (Vartabed) of his own monastery, who were 
actuated by personal spite and jealousy."   
 
The Patriarchate in Istanbul also convinced that the two Archimandrites who had testified 
against him had bent the truth for their own benefit.  According to a letter sent to British 
Ambassador Currie, Tahsin Paşa's enmity toward  Bishop Karakhanian was due to the 
vehement protests he had made against the depredations of the Kurds and the vexations 
of the Ottoman functionaries   It is worth mentioning here that when the Ottoman 
Commission and European delegates were at Muş in the spring of 1895, the same 
Archimandrites were brought forth to report on the events of 1894.  The Archimandrites 
(Garabet, Iasias, and Eguiche) spent the greater part of their testimony denouncing 
Bishop Karakhanian.  When asked by the President of the Commission to testify as to 
what happened in the summer of 1895, they gave a speech that could have been written 
by Zeki Paşa.  
 
This year Murad, having gathered together bands of armed 
men from Shenik, Semal, Ghelieguzan and Talori, attacked 
the Kurds with them.  Conflicts took place; the affair 
assumed greater and greater proportions; six or seven 
battalions of troops were sent and the country was filled 
with soldiers.  The Armenians fled before them to Antok-
Dagh, and the witness does not know what happened 
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afterwards.  He only knows that the troops returned, and 
absolute tranquility now prevails. 
 
While the Commission was sitting in Muş, Bishop Karakhanian remained in prison in 
Bitlis, or as he and his fellow prisoners termed it, 'Hell'.  In March 1895, Karakhanian 
and his fellow prisoners managed to smuggle to Consul Robert Graves in Erzurum and 
the British press a letter depicting the prison conditions.  In his own confidential report 
discussing the smuggled letter Graves wrote to Ambassador Currie, 
Some of the details of the Bitlis appeal would be almost too 
horrible for credence at any other time or in any other 
country, but I am free to confess that I am no longer able to 
withhold belief from such stories merely on the ground of 
their intrinsic horror.   
 
I may mention here that the keeper of the Bitlis prison, one 
Abdul Kadir, who figures so largely in my second inclosure, 
receives a salary of but £T.3 per mensem, yet he has 
recently built himself a house at the cost of £T.500, besides 
employing two or three agents to do business with the 
capital he has wrung from imprisoned Armenians." 
 
The letter begins,  
 
"In the Bitlis prison there are seven cells, each one large 
enough for ten to twelve persons.  There are between 
twenty and thirty persons crowded into each one.  There are 
no sanitary arrangements.  Offal, bus, lice, fleas, and 
human excrement are heaped together. 
 
Karakhanian then described the torture, rape of the prisoners and murder of prisoners in 
graphic terms.  This shocking letter was published in The Daily News in May 1895.  
According to the editors of the newspaper,  
 
We publish to-day another letter from Armenia, but of a 
peculiar kind.  It comes from the interior of a Turkish 
prison at Bitlis, and it describes the misery of the Armenian 
prisoners.  It has reached our Correspondent in a way he is 
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not at liberty to mention.  It is signed, in the manuscript, by 
some of the poor creatures whose anguish it narrates, but it 
bears an endorsement -- "For Heaven's sake, do not allow 
these signatures to get into "print."  In every case, however, 
the anonymous writers furnish the names of the victims.  
When they say that one man had his limbs fractured by 
blows, or that another died under torments or indescribable 
barbarities, they invariably give this clue to identity.  
Turkish apologists in this country will therefore have no 
difficulty in putting these new charges to the proof.  Will 
they think it worth their while to ascertain whether the 
persons whose names are given were, or were not, confined 
in Bitlis prison, and whether some of them did, or did not, 
pass from its gates to the grave? 
 
The next day, Reuters published a follow up article in a number of British newspapers 
that specifically brought up the plight of a huge number of prisoners in the Ottoman 
Empire, listing Bishop Karakhanian's name among their number.  Three days after this, 
on March 18, 1895, the President of the Anglo-Armenian Association, F.S. Stevenson 
(MP for Suffolk) brought up the issue of the treatment of political prisoners in the 
Ottoman Empire on the floor of the British Parliament.  Stevenson asked the Under 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, if the British government was 
aware that,  
 
"... the number of clerical and lay Armenians who have 
been thrown into prison in the various provinces for 
political reasons is estimated at between 2,500 and 3,000, 
and enumerating the principal prelates and others in prison 
or exile; and whether, in view of the large numbers who are 
undergoing punishment without trial or after mock trials, 
Her Majesty's Government will make serious 
representations on the subject to the Porte?"   
 
 
Within the next few days, back in Istanbul Ambassador Currie brought the Ottoman 
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Government's attention to the plight of the prisoners in Bitlis.  By July, according to a 
report by Consul Hampson, certain Bitlis political prisoners were released (although 
others were tortured all the more).  Eventually, Karakhanian was released from prison 
and exiled for a spell to Jerusalem.  Karakhanian died in 1913.824   
George Perkins Knapp 
George Perkins Knapp, like Frederick Davis Greene, was born in 1863 in the Ottoman 
Empire of missionary parentage.  His parents, George Cushing Knapp and Alzina 
Churchill Knapp, migrated from the farmlands of Vermont to the Ottoman Empire in 
1855.  During the first few years, the Knapps labored as missionaries in Diyarbekir as 
part of the 'Assyrian Mission'.  Illness in the swelteringly hot summers of the lowlands 
led the Knapps into the Sasun Mountains to the north of the Diyarbekir plain.  In a letter 
dated June 17, 1858, George Cushing Knapp described their first trek up the zigzag Bitlis 
river valley to the town where they would spend the rest of their lives.  
                                                        
824 This profile is partly based on Bishop Karakhanian's obituary published in Ararat vol. 1 (1913), p.  463.  
The quotation from Rouben Der Minasian can be found in James G. Mandalian (trans. and ed.), Armenian 
Freedom Fighters: The Memoirs of Rouben Der Minasian (Hairenik, 1963), p. 123.  Chalabian 1988 also 
cites Rouben (vol. 3, p. 57) in his discussion of Arabo, pp. 201-202. The report of Nerses Karkhanian was 
acquired from the Bishop of Erzurum and published by Emile Dillon of the Daily Telegraph.  As with all of 
Dillon's reporting it was widely reproduced.  This quotation can be found in The Independent (March 26, 
1895).  Accounts of the violence in Avzut can be found in FO 424/175, p. 59 and 424/175, p. 139, as well 
in Emile Dillon's article "The Condition of Armenia," published in The Contemporary Review 68 (August 
1895), p. 175-176.  A slightly different version of the affair is narrated in The New Zealand Herald (April 6, 
1895).  The account that discusses the arrest of Bishop Karakhanian is cited by Chalabian 1994, p. 203.  
Consul Graves's quotation is from FO 424/175, p. 138.  Graves reports further on Bishop Karakhanian 
imprisonment and sentencing in FO 424/175, p. 251 and 424/178, p. 130.  The letter from the Armenian 
Patriarchate can be found in FO 424/182, p. 41.  The testimony of the Archimandrites who denounced 
Bishop Karakhanian can be found in Parliamentary Papers, Turkey no. 1 (1895), pp. 208-209. A similar 
Commission testimony placing the blame for the Sasun violence squarely on the shoulders of Bishop 
Karakhanian (and Damadian and Boyadjian) was also expressed by the Priest (and informer) Parsegh, see 
FO 424/181, p. 233.  The graphic letter signed by both Boyadjian and Karakhanian can be found in FO 
424/182, pp. 347-350. The Daily News published the letter from the prisoners in Bitlis on May 14, 1895.  
The next  day, The Daily News printed Karakhanian's name in a list of political prisoners.   More 
discussion of the treatment of prisoners under the reign of Tahsin Paşa can be found in an article written 
anonymously by Tigrane Yergate, "S.M. Le Sultan et ses Prisons," La Revue des Revues, Vol. XXXIII 
(1900), also discussed by George P. Knapp in FO 424/182, p. 83. The Parliament discussion can be found 




The music of the waters; the path-way, now and then 
interspersed with trees; and the cool refreshing breeze, 
sweeping down from the snow-capped hills, through the 
narrow winding valley, all combined," he writes, "to give 
an air of romance, relieved our toil, and caused us to feel as 
if we were once more at home -- again in our Green 
Mountain State. 
 
At least at first, as elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, the most severe opposition to the 
presence of the ABCFM was not from the Ottoman State, but from the local Apostolic 
Church which worried that its adherents would 'turn' Protestant.  This conversion was a 
very serious matter.  Just a few years earlier, the Ottoman State had officially proclaimed 
that to be a Protestant was to belong to an entirely different millet from the Armenian 
millet (or religious-ethnic community).  It appears that some inhabitants of the Bitlis-Muş 
region (the 'Taron' of antiquity) chose to convert to Protestantism for reasons that deeply 
rooted pre-existing tensions within the Apostolic Armenian Church.  In the mid-1860s, 
Consul John George Taylor observed that one sect of Armenians "were known to the old 
Armenians as the Thontracites, from the village of Thontrag, the residence of their 
founder, and had their rise in A.D. 840."  According to Taylor,  
 
In spite of the most dreadful persecutions, they still 
managed to hold their own till within the last few years, 
when most of those that remained in the old faith joined the 
Presbyterian American Church.  I was informed that some 
of them who had emigrated to the Russian territory, near 
Gumri, still clung to their old faith, and that they used a 
Prayer book called the 'Panalee Jismardutyan,' or Key of 
Truth; but others said it was taken away from them by their 
Russian masters.  
 
However, unlike in towns further to the West, such as Merzifon, Maraş and Aintab, 
where the numbers of Protestants grew quickly, the numbers of converts remained tiny in 
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the Taron region.  One factor may have been the power of the local Apostolic authorities.  
George Cushing Knapp described some of the challenges that the small community of 
Protestants faced in the nearby plain of Muş in a letter dated August 23, 1869, 
 
The Armenian ecclesiastics are now wide awake to forestall 
our future efforts. We are in the habit of sending out our 
students, two by two, every Sabbath, to the near villages. 
We understand that the Vartabed [Bishop] has instructed 
the priests of these villages to use every means, even to 
personal violence, to prevent the students from being 
received. Consequently, in some of the villages, they have 
been stoned and insulted. One village, Muzrah, especially, 
has made itself notorious. The village consists of ten houses, 
and lies just at the outskirt of this city. For several 
successive Sabbaths the people used personal violence, and 
the women even came out in a body and pelted our students 
with heavy stones, so that they were obliged to flee for their 
lives. Finally, on Sabbath, the 8th instant, the villagers were 
determined to bring the affair to a crisis. 
 
Fortunately, for the Protestants, it was on this day that the Governor-General entered Muş 
and put a damper on the conflict by arresting two of the Apostolic assailants.   
 
Over the years, as is the case with most immigrants, the Knapps slowly adopted certain 
customs from their tiny community of converts.  Every summer, the family would follow 
their community from the valley of Bitlis into the mountains.  Grace Knapp, George 
Perkins younger sister, recalled that,  
 
There was a small Armenian village here, its tiny fields of 
cabbage and turnips, millet, wheat and clover, rose one 
another on terraces like a green light of stairs.  On two 
terraces above the highest of these camped the missionaries 
in tents and dugouts and here Mrs. Knapp planted a garden 
and tended it with never failing delight, reliving in memory 




The four Knapp children grew up here and in the town of Bitlis.  Grace Knapp 
remembered that their only playmates and schoolmates were Armenian children.  
Presumably most were from the tiny Protestant community.  At the age of 14, George 
Perkins Knapp was taken by his father to the Black Sea port of Trabzon, and alone 
traveled across the Atlantic to attend high school in the United States.  George Perkins 
Knapp resolved to return to his home of Bitlis after he completed his education.  George 
Knapp attended Harvard College and upon his graduation with the class of 1887 
immediately enrolled in a graduate theological program at Hartford Seminary.  After 
Knapp finished the three-year long graduate program, Knapp married his fiancée, Anna 
Jay Hunt, educated at Mt. Holyoke Seminary, and set sail for the Ottoman Empire.  In 
1890, after a dozen years away from home, George Knapp returned as a missionary for 
the American board.  According to Grace Knapp,  
 
The people of Bitlis had a pleasant way of greeting new or 
returning missionaries; they would walk two or three miles 
out of the city to meet the travellers: the schoolboys and 
schoolgirls would line up on each side of the road, sing a 
song written for the occasion and present flowers, after 
which every one would press forward for a handshake and 
word of greeting.   
 
An unusually large concourse turned out to meet "Mr. 
George" and his young wife.  Middle-aged or young men 
who had known him as a boy, young men who had been his 
childhood playmates, were won to renewed and deeper 
affection by his quick recognition of old friends in spite of 
changes wrought by the intervening years, and by his ready 
use of the language he had not allowed himself to forget.   
 
Over the next four years, George Perkins Knapp continued the labor of his parents.  This 




Throughout this period, the Knapps maintained close ties with several of the British 
Consuls of Erzurum.  Dozens of their letters are reproduced, paraphrased and cited in the 
British consular documentation (Parlimentary Papers, FO 195 and FO 424), most often 
without attribution.  These letters, in turn, often include the opinions, rumors and 
observations of the Knapp's network of the Ottoman Protestant communities of Bitlis, 
Muş and Sasun.  Through the auspices of this larger Protestant network of local 
missionaries, the Knapps (and their missionary compatriots, the Coles, Elys and 
Burbanks) provided the British Foreign office with detailed population estimates, maps 
and local histories.   
 
Alongside 'local' missionaries like Simon Tavitian of Sasun, the Knapps of Bitlis were 
key actors in the establishment of religious, educational and philanthropic institutions. 
Some of these institutions, like the Mount Holyoke Female Seminary of Kurdistan 
(established in 1870), were built on the models of their alma mater back in New England.   
 
It is perhaps obvious to state that as missionaries, the Knapps helped to organize the 
community of Protestants in areas like the plains of Muş and the mountains of Sasun.  
They were also key in helping to establish communities of Ottoman Protestants elsewhere, 
especially in facilitating the migration of Protestant Armenians to New England.  The 
kernel of the Armenian community in Worcester, MA, began with the immigration of 
Garo, a former servant of the Knapp family.  The Knapps also played an important role in 
distributing aid, both during famines and after the outbreak of violence.  In fact, the 
missionaries performed many of the aid distributing activities that we now associate with 
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NGOs.  It is thus not a coincidence that when John F. Kennedy first conceptualized the 
Peace Corps in a speech in 1951, he based his scheme on the activities of the ABCFM 
missionaries in the Middle East.  
 
 
In the summer of 1894, four years after George Perkins Knapp returned home, violence 
broke out in the Sasun Mountains to the southwest of Bitlis.  In a letter to his Harvard 
classmates, Knapp described what happened.  
In the late summer of 1894 the massacre took place in the 
district of Sassoun, some forty miles southwest of Bitlis. In 
October the English consul [Hallward] who had been sent 
to investigate was our guest for a few days at Bitlis, and 
during his stay our premises were carefully watched by 
spies. ... The winter of 1894-95 was one continuous effort 
of the government to prevent the truth from being known to  
the European commissioners who had been sent to Moosh. 
Added to the severe measures of the government against 
the Armenians was a visitation of cholera in the fall and a 
scarcity of grain during the year. The refugees from 
Sassoon kept coming into the town more and more as the 
roads opened.  
 
In late September, George Perkins Knapp composed the first ABCFM reports of the 
Sasun violence.  Basing this investigation on interviews with survivors and soldiers, 
Knapp shared information with Consul Hallward when he came to stay with the Coles 
and the Knapps in Bitlis in October.  Knapp continued to gather stories of Sasun and in 
the spring of 1895, his research on the violence and its cover-up was published 
anonymously in the Hartford Seminary Record and over the course of four days  in the 
London Times.  It is very likely that the Ottoman State was able to figure out that Knapp 




As his younger sister Grace H. Knapp, recalled,  
 
Although Mr. Knapp's name had not appeared in 
connection with the Times article, the unlooked-for-
publicity the affair had gained was ascribed to him by both 
Turks and Armenians.  The latter -- or rather some of the 
hot-headed young men among them -- jubilant over the 
coming of the commission, were rather unwise in their 
demonstrations of gratitude and thus increased the newly 
aroused hostility towards him of the government officials. 
 
This hostility became dangerous especially after October 1895 when local authorities 
sanctioned the mass murder of hundreds of Armenians in Bitlis.  Grace Knapp was a 
witness to this violence.  She wrote that the local authorities, "showed their animosity 
towards Mr. Knapp by more than once attempting to shoot him."  Grace Knapp described 
how a mob was deflected through the efforts of "the Kurdish neighbor who had been his 
father's friend and his own."  In the aftermath of the violence, the Ottoman State accused 
George Knapp of fomenting a 'rebellion' in Bitlis.  According to Grace Knapp,  
 
He was openly charged with inciting the Armenians of 
Bitlis to revolt, and although Mr. Hampson, the British 
vice-consul who had been sent to Bitlis after the massacres, 
reported that these charges were absurd, Mr. Knapp was 
summoned before criminal court.  
 
In the end, the efforts of the Ottoman Empire to permanently remove George P. Knapp 
were in vain.   Knapp insisted on remaining in the country of his birth in vain for a 'trial.'  
Ultimately, it took the Great War for the Ottoman State to dispatch this oppositional 
voice.   During the midst of the Armenian Genocide, Knapp was taken to a prison in 
Diyarbekir where, according to an official report he died of typhus.  After an 
investigation, Dr. Atkinson, a medical-missionary of the Board and an American consul 
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concluded that his death in 1915 was not due to natural causes.825 
 
 
Markar Varzhabed  
 
On July 13, 1890, a few days before the Kum Kapı demonstration in Istanbul, a shoot-out 
occurred near the village of Vartennis, leaving four Kurds and one Armenian dead.  
There were two accounts of what took place.  The 'official story,' told to Vice-Consul 
Devey, was that several Armenians from Vartennis were "smuggling out of the country a 
turbulent Armenian priest (previously expelled from Muş), disguised as a bride, when a 
few Kurds mowing grass by the road observed something was wrong and stopped them.  
The Armenians then shot down the Kurds."  The other account, repeated in a number of 
different sources, was passed on to the writer and natural historian Isabella Lucy Bird 
while she was traveling in Muş by two Protestant pastors of the Armenian church.  Rev. 
George Cushing Knapp served as their translator.  The pastors asked that the story be 
passed on to Clifford Lloyd, then the British consul in Erzurum.   
 
A bride, married a year before, was being taken from 
Mooshakir to Vartennis to visit her father's house, 
according to custom. Five men from Vartennis were taking 
her thither. About half-way, while passing through a 
Kurdish district, a number of Kurds came upon them, 
                                                        
825 This profile begins with quotations from George Cushing Knapp that can be found in first in Missionary 
Herald, vol. 54 (1858), p. 313 and then in Missionary Herald, vol. 65 (1869), p. 413; Taylor's brief 
description of the Thontracites or Thonraketzi is from his "Travels in Kurdistan, with Notices of the 
Sources of the Eastern and Western Tigris, and Ancient Ruins in their Neighbourhood," The Journal of the 
Royal Geographical Society of London, vol. 35 (1865), pp. 44-45.  It is perhaps worth mentioning that on a 
research trip to the library at Etchmiadzin, the Orientalist Frederick Cornwallis Conybeare found a copy of 
the Key of Truth, translated it and published it in 1898.  Grace H. Knapp's recollections come from The 
Tragedy of Bitlis (Fleming H. Revell, 1919).  George Knapp's letter to his classmates is from the Secretary's 
report of Harvard College, Class of 1887, issue 4, pp. 88-89. 
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asking that the bride should be given up to them. They were 
led by Hassan Mo, an ally of Moussa Bey in his crimes of 
violence. These Beys had committed crimes in Vartennis, 
in seducing girls, &c., and the villagers had complained of 
them. The men with the bride besought them to let them 
pass on, and some of the Kurds have admitted this. Hassan 
Mo replied, 'Long since have I desired to get hold of you, 
and do you think by beseeching you'll get free?' 
 
Then he seized the bridle of the bride's horse, and tried to 
drag it away. The bride, as is the custom, was adorned with 
all her coins and ornaments. The Armenians tried to hold 
the horse back. As they were straggling, one of the Kurds 
fired and killed an Armenian on the spot. When he was shot, 
another said, 'They're killing us, let us fire back'; so they 
fired, killing two Kurds, and wounding Hassan Mo in the 
knee. One of themselves was also wounded. In the skirmish 
the bride got away, and galloped her horse home. Then the 
Kurds left them, and the Armenians, afraid of the 
consequences of having defended themselves, ran away, 
and hid in the hills. When the news of the affray, and that 
the Armenians had killed some Kurds, reached Moush, 800 
soldiers, in three sections, and 4 guns, were sent against 
Vartennis, which numbers 150 houses. 
 
When the people heard that the soldiers were coming, they 
sent away as many of the women as they could. The first 
section of the soldiers came upon them at night, the two 
others were held as reserves on the road. The Vartennis 
people, to defend themselves from the Kurds, had stationed 
round the village guards, with their old-fashioned guns, of 
which, in July, they had still a few. The soldiers had for a 
guide an Armenian, who, fearing these guards would fire 
on them taking them for Kurds, cried out, 'Brothers, it's we, 
and these are soldiers,' on which the officer in command 
beat him, and said, 'Why did you give this notice?' hoping 
that they would be fired on, and thus have an excuse for 
destroying Vartennis. The soldiers then surrounded the 
village, so that none should escape. They bound all the 
adult males, despoiled the village, outraged some of the 
women, whom they robbed of their ornaments, and drove 
sixty-five bound men into Moush. As they came thither 
they met the other divisions of soldiers, and as they drew 
near the town the whole Moslem population came out to 
kill the prisoners, but the soldiers protected them, and 
lodged them safely in prison. Afterwards they sold the 
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ornaments of which they had despoiled the women in other 
villages. 
 
When they came to trial, the sixty-five prisoners pleaded 
that, except the wounded man who was with them, they had 
had no part in the affray, the others having fled to the 
mountains. The Government said that the 'bride' was a man 
in disguise, who had been stirring up the people. In reply, 
the bride's father-in-law, the reis of Mooshakir, said he 
could produce some Kurdish chiefs who were guests at his 
house when the bride was taken away, and they gave 
evidence that they were present when the woman and her 
escort left the house. This charge consequently broke down. 
After imprisoning them for some time, they let twenty-two 
of the poorer men go, and a few days ago [Nov. 12] they 
liberated twenty-six more. The remaining seventeen are 
imprisoned for fifteen years, the most severe sentence the 
Turkish law can inflict. Sixty of the best fields in Vartennis 
are unharvested at this day. Among the prisoners who are 
sentenced so severely, the wounded man is the only one 
who had any part in the affray. 
 
According to Rouben Der Minasian, it was the violence at Vartennis that began the 
conversion of an impassioned nationalist teacher into a Fedayee.  Along with other men 
from Vartennis, Markar evaded capture by taking to the mountains.  They were now 
outlaws, and the Ottoman government sought their capture.  Markar gained his own band 
of outlaws and became a 'missionary' for the revolution against the House of Musa Bey.  
As Der Miniasian elaborated,  
 
Under these harrowing conditions Markar Varzhabed 
wandered from village to village, preaching the gospel of 
freedom.  As yet he knew nothing of revolutionaries, but, 
having been educated in the teachings of Khrimian Hairig, 
the intrepid Armenian Catholicos, and of Saryan, the 
apostle of freedom, he was firmly convinced that the land 
of Taron belonged to the Armenians.  He believed that the 
Armenians had a right to be free and independent.  
 
After a period of wanderings he was forced to leave the 
region and went to the Caucasus.  In the spring of 1891 he 
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came into contact with a revolutionary organization which 
was called the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, known 
as Dashnaktzutyoun, or Dashaktzakans.  He studied the 
organization's political program and joined it.  Thus armed 
by the Federation, he took his company back to Chukhur 
and Ovasis.  It was his intention to transport a maximum of 
arms and ammunition with which to push the fight against 
the house of Musa Beg.  Having delivered his supply of 
arms at Vardenis he again returned to the Caucasus where 
this time he made the acquaintance of Arabo, another 
Armenian Ashiret leader who had come from Sassoun and 
joined the federation.  Here they charted a plan of 
revolutionary organization for the Taron Plateau.  
 
In February 1893, the shooting of Isaag Tchaush (or İshak Çavuş), an Ottoman police 
officer (or zaptiye) in the village of Azvut provided the pretext for the arrest of Markar.  
According to the special correspondent for The Daily Telegraph, Emile Dillon, after the 
shooting of Isaag,  
 
The authorities in Bitlis then sent a Colonel of the Zaptiehs 
to Avzood to see "justice" done.  And it was done very 
speedily.  The Colonel summoned the men of the village -- 
some of whom were mixed up in the matter -- and put them 
in prison.  Then the officials deflowered all the girls, and 
dishonored all the young women in Avzood, after which 
they liberated the men, except about twenty whom they 
conveyed to the goal of Bitlis.  A few of these died there 
and ten others soon afterwards dismissed.  Finally they 
decided to charge a young teacher, Markar, of the village of 
Vartenis, with the murder of Isaag Tchaush, and as there 
were no evidence against him, the other prisoners were 
ordered to testify.  Armenians have the reputation of being 
liars, but they certainly draw the line at swearing away an 
innocent man's life; and they refused in this case to commit 
the double crime of perjury and murder.  Strenuous efforts 
were made to determine them; they were stripped naked, 
burned in various parts of the body with red-hot irons, till 
they yelled in pain.  They were they prevented from 
sleeping for several nights, and tortured acutely again, till, 
writhing and quivering, they promised to swear anything, 
everything if once relieved of their agony.  A document 
declaring that Markar was in the village when Isaag 
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Tshaush arrived there, and that he had shot Isaag in their 
presence, was drawn up in their names.  To this they duly 
affixed their seals.  Meanwhile Markar himself was being 
tortured in another part of the prison.  When the trial came 
on and the incriminating document was read, the 
signatories stripped themselves in court, exhibited the ugly 
marks left by the red-hot irons, and called God to witness 
that evidence of theirs, wrung from them by maddening 
torture, was a lie.  Markar, on the other hand, declared that 
he was not in Avzood village at all on the night in question.  
But these statements were unavailing; he was hanged last 
year, and the 'witnesses' condemned to various terms in 
fortified towns.  
 
According to George Perkins Knapp, the execution of Markar took place on February 8, 
1894.  Knapp adds,  
 
Blackmail of the more barefaced kind was rampant, and on 
a large scale too, for this country.  Not only were many of 
the rich in the city bled, many of the well-to-do in the 
distant parts of the province, and several even from outside 
of it were brought here and only released after they had 
yielded what it was supposed they were able to.  .... This 
was the first public execution since the time of the Khan 
and Begs fifty years ago, and it has a very depressing effect 
upon the whole community.  Markar had been active in 
going to Constantinople and testifying against Mousa Beg, 
and had also plainly advised his villagers not to submit 
passively to the outrages of the Koords.  It was doubtless 
for this grudge that he was hung.  After his execution 
blackmail flourished all the more easily. 
 
Ruboun Der Minassian wrote that Markar's body was left hanging for three days as a 
warning for others.   Even years after his execution, Markar was revered as a martyr by 
many in the local Armenian communities of Muş.  Many decades after his execution, 
Shogher Abraham Tonoyan, a survivor of the Armenian Genocide born in Vartennis in 




Teacher Margar, God bless his soul, was a revolutionary; 
he fought with the askyars [soldiers], they took him to 
Moosh and hanged him. The Turks cut off his head. The 
Armenians bought his head with gold, took it to St. Karapet 
of Moosh and buried it under the monastery wall. It is said 
that a ray of light descended every day on his grave. 
Margar’s grave had become sacred place of pilgrimage for 
the Armenians.826 
Musa Bey  
The journalist and former military officer C.B. Norman wrote poignantly about the 
deleterious effects that the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-1878 had on the populations of 
the Ottoman East.  He wrote,  
... from all sides -- from Turk and Armenian alike -- I hear 
piteous tales of desolation that reigns throughout Kurdistan 
-- villages deserted, towns abandoned, trade at a standstill, 
harvest ready for the sickle, but none to gather it, husbands 
mourning their dishonoured wives, parents their murdered 
children; and this is not the work of a Power whose policy 
of selfish aggression no man can defend, but the ghastly 
acts of Turkey's irregular soldiery on Turkey's most 
peaceful inhabitants, acts the perpetrators of which are well 
known, and yet are allowed to go unpunished. 
 
One of these perpetrators of acts of great violence who was 'allowed to go unpunished' 
was Musa Bey.   
In the neighborhood of Moosh, one Moussa Bey, a son of 
Mirza Bey, a Kurd from near Van, has been ravaging the 
country at the head of a small body of cavalry.  The 
villages of Moolah Akjam, Hadogan, and Kharkui, having 
been pillaged, were set on fire.  At Ardouk he extracted £60, 
                                                        
826 For the quotations of the violence at Vartennis in the summer of 1890 see, Parliamentary Papers, 
Turkey no. 1 (1890-1891), see p. 72-74.  The account written down by Isabella Bird can be found in her 
article, "The Shadow of the Kurd," II, The Contemporary Review, Volume 59 (1890), pp. 822-824.  Later 
Consul Hampson recounted how the men from Vartennis were still in the Bitlis prison in the fall of 1895 in 
FO 424/182, p. 9. Discussion of Markar's execution can be found in James Mandalian, Armenian Freedom 
Fighters: The Memoirs of Rouben Der Minasian (Hairenik, 1963) and in the articles of Frank Scudamore 
(The Daily News, April 20, 1895) and Emile Dillon (The Contemporary Review 68, August 1895, pp. 175-
176). The account of George Perkins Knapp can be found in FO 424/182, p. 72 or in the Hartford Seminary 
Record 5, p. 253.  The recollection of Shogher Abraham Tonoyan can be found in Verjiné Svazlian, The 
Armenian Genocide: Testimonies of the Eyewitness Survivors (Yerevan, 2011) p. 98. 
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and at Ingrakam £40 from the head man of the village, 
under pretense of sparing them from destruction, and 
straightaway set the places on fire.  He then proceeded to a 
Mussulman village called Norashen, and hearing that an 
Armenian merchant of Bitlis was passing through, robbed 
him of all his goods, to the value of 30,000 piastres, and 
then ordered his men to murder him.  At Khartz this 
monster entered the house of an Armenian priest, who had 
lately brought his bride to his father's home.  Binding the 
old man and his son together with cords, this inhuman 
scoundrel ravished the poor girl before their eyes, and then 
gave orders for the murder of the three. 
 
How was it that certain criminals could commit such acts of violence and remain 
unaccountable?  In order to understand this, and review the violent life of Musa Bey, it is 
necessary to emphasize the broader changing relations between Istanbul and the distant 
plain of Muş in the first part of the 19th century.  After the re-conquest of the Kurdish 
and Armenian speaking regions in the 1830s, the Ottoman State made alliances with 
certain noble houses that aided them against the traditional feudal elite.  These alliances 
were not fixed and were transformed as the Ottoman State was able to build increasing 
numbers of barracks, prisons, roads, telegraphs and schools in an effort to centralize its 
rule.  By the end of the 19th century, the areas at the base of the Taurus mountains 
constituted the frontiers of state power.  Beyond this frontier, in the mountains, the 
communities continued to be organized in a great diversity of local political systems, 
coinciding with the diverse set of localized idioms and religious practices.  According to 
Garo Sasuni, the house of warlord Mirza Bey had been amongst those to side with the 
government and were awarded with bureaucratic positions and local power for their 
loyalty to Istanbul. 
 
Musa Bey, the son of Mirza Bey, was born in the village of Khevner, near the city of Muş, 
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in the mid-to-late 1850s. In 1883, Musa Bey and henchmen violently attacked George 
Cushing Knapp of Bitlis and George Raynolds of Van for a perceived slight.   When Ârif 
Paşa, the Vali of Bitlis, sent security forces (zaptiye) to apprehend Musa Bey, his father 
Mirza Bey instead pointed out four men from the rival tribe. According to a report of 
Vice-Consul Eyres, although the Armenian Christian inhabitants of Khevner testified that 
Musa Bey had attacked the two missionaries,  
 
It would naturally be impossible to expect any of my 
informants of the villagers to give evidence in court, as 
they would most certainly lose their lives, of they had the 
temerity to adopt such a course.  Therefore at first sight it 
would seem different to obtain a conviction if the arrests 
were made.  But even supposing Mousa Bey were not one 
of the actual perpetrators of the deed, it is unquestionable 
that both he and his father are responsible for all deeds of 
violence done in their districts.  It is a saying amongst the 
people that a bird cannot fly without their knowledge; and 
this Moussa Bey is a notorious murderer and robber. 
 
 
In 1885, two years after the attack on Raynolds and Knapp, Mirza Bey was killed in a 
feud with a rival tribe.  Musa Bey was now the head of the House.  By 1889, according 
the account of Consul Devey, Musa Bey ruled over an area stretching from the mountains 
of Khuyt (where "his rule is absolute over five or six large Kurdish villages") to the 
easternmost section of the Muş Plains, between Bitlis and Muş.  Devey reported at the 
end of April, about a month after Gulizar was kidnapped, that, Musa Bey "had been 
continuing a career of violence."  Devey depicted Musa Bey as a local Warlord with a 
small army of "nearly 1,000 armed men are under his orders" and that his men were 
preventing villagers from grinding their corn.   Devey continued,  
 
The villagers of the Mush Plain appealed for redress to the 
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local authorities, and finally to Constantinople, but could 
obtain no satisfaction.  Of late only their complaints were 
taken into consideration, and orders were issued from the 
capital for inquiry.  But Moussa Bey enjoys great influence 
in this town, and is a close friend of the Sheikhs Haji 
Nejmeddin Effendi, of the Idaré Council, Yusuf Agha, and 
other prominent members of the Government, and the 
orders were put aside. 
 
Moreover, Musa Bey was taking revenge on all those who reported his behavior to the 
Ottoman State. According to Devey,  
 
Moussa Bey was angered at the Mush Christians for the 
complaints they were forwarding against him, which 
possibly were not entirely true; a certain Ohan of Akhavank 
village, resident at Mush, had taken a prominent part in 
forwarding these complaints; having occasion to come to 
Bitlis about six weeks ago, Ohan carefully kept his 
intention secret, but Moussa, however, learnt his presence 
here, and placed four or five men on the road near this city, 
who captured him, though fleeing by night to escape 
observation; they took him to Gotni, a Kurdish village on 
the Mush road, and there put him to death by fire, under 
circumstances of appalling torture.  Hereupon a fresh order 
was received from Constantinople for Moussa's arrest and 
exile; the Government then attempted to carry this out, but 
Moussa Bey promptly made his escape from the Tabur 
Aghassi's house and the midst of the zaptiehs, saying that 
the local authorities were not acting honestly and openly by 
him.  He went at once to the village of Hartz, where he 
plundered the house of a certain Mouro, absent at Mush, 
abducted a young daughter of his, and slew her grandfather.  
He was then said to be threatening to pillage the post if the 
sum of £T. 700 he had given as bribes to the authorities 
were not returned.  He has just written a letter to the 
authorities expressing his willingness to return to reside at 
Bitlis under guarantee (from them), and maintaining that he 
is innocent of crime, and that, as was seen here, no one had 
any suit to bring before the Law Courts.   
 
About a week after Devey wrote this report, protests over Musa Bey would be brought to 
the Kum Kapı cathedral in Istanbul.  In turn, a couple of weeks after that, Bryce and 
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Gladstone would speak up about Musa Bey in the British Parliament.  This attention 
prompted the Foreign Office to ask Ambassador White to inquire about Musa Bey.  It 
was at this point that the Sultan ordered that Musa Bey stand trial in Istanbul.  The Musa 
Bey trial was now a trial of Empire.  The trial was reported with great interest by the 
British press and followed closely by many within Istanbul.  The fact that Musa Bey was 
never convicted of the abduction and rape of Gülizar, or of any of the crimes charged 
against him, was a source of great frustration for many Armenian-Ottomans.    
 
On July 27, 1890, another demonstration in Kum Kapı, again by migrant laborers from 
Muş, would end in violence, raising tensions still further.   The activists who were able to 
escape Ottoman prisons, such as Damadian and Boyadjian, became even more radically 
opposed to the administration of Abdülhamid II at nearly the same time that a group of 
Muslim students within the Imperial Medical School formed a secret group that 




Frank Scudamore was born in 1859.  His father Frank Ives Scudamore played a key role 
nationalizing the British system of telegraphs.  According to Michael Roth, Scudamore's 
                                                        
827 This profile is based on a wide variety of sources.  One useful source was Garo Sasuni's Kürt Ulusal 
Hareketleri ve 15. Yüzyıldan Günümüze Ermeni-Kürt İlişkileri (Istanbul, 1992).  Garo Sasuni was related to 
Armenak Ghazarian (see his profile), and no doubt heard stories of Musa Bey and Gülizar growing up in 
the mountains of Sasun.  Another important local source is that of Arménouhie Kévonian.  This text is the 
product of three women of the same family: Gülizar of Khars, her daughter Arménouhie Kévonian and her 
granddaughter, the historian Anahid Ter Minasian.  The quotation from C.B. Norman is from Armenia and 
the Campaign of 1877 (London, nd).  The quotations from Vice-Consul Eyres come from a report in FO 
195/1450, dated August 16, 1883.  This report is reproduced in FO 424/140, p. 63, Devey's long report 
from April 27, 1889 can be found in Parliamentary Papers Turkey (1889), no. 1, p. 67. 
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first assignment was covering the Russian-Ottoman war of 1877-1878 with the Daily 
News special correspondent Archibald Forbes.  While in Istanbul, Scudamore learned 
Turkish, a skill that would serve him well as a 'special' correspondent for the Daily News 
years later.  On February 7, 1895 Ambassador Currie was alerted that the Vali of 
Erzurum had informed Scudamore and Dillon that "orders had been sent from 
Constantinople to the civil and military authorities that no foreigners whatever would be 
allowed to travel in the interior."  During the First World War, Scudamore published 
language guides Turkish for Tommy and Tar and Arabic for our Armies, presumably 
intended for the use of the British military.828  
 
Hasan Tahsin  
 
Little is known about the early life of Hasan Tahsin Paşa before he reached Bitlis.  In his 
memoir, the British Consul Robert Graves described Tahsin Paşa as,  "a good-looking 
man of middle age, had been a "Young Turk" at an earlier stage of his career and a 
follower of the reformer Midhat Pasha."  Graves continued, "After a long period of 
disgrace, he was now currying favour with the Palace by a policy of severe repression of 
all Armenian aspirations, and toleration of the growing lawlessness of the Kurd tribesman 
and the new Hamidiyé organization."  
 
The American board missionaries, often serving as an information service for the British 
                                                        
828 It is worth nothing here that Justin McCarthy and his co-writers claimed in their recent book on Sasun 
that Scudamore did not speak Turkish and wrote nothing about his experiences reporting in Eastern 
Anatolia in his memoir, A Sheaf of Memories.  They are mistaken on both points.  Scudamore was a fluent 
speaker of Turkish and in his memoir devoted an entire chapter in his memoir to his experiences getting 
from Istanbul to Erzurum to investigate the Sasun violence.  This short biography builds on material from 
this memoir, and various documents from the British archives, including, 424/181, No. 139. 
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consuls, described Tahsin Paşa in very negative terms.  According to Rev. Royal M. Cole, 
Tahsin Paşa's "very name should be a hissing & byword as much as Nero's of old."  The 
sisters Charlotte and Mary Ely refer to him as "the Fiend."  The American board 
missionaries asserted that Hasan Tahsin Paşa used the Armenian issue to his own 
financial and political advantage.  During his three years of rule in Bitlis, Tahsin Paşa 
frequently imprisoned wealthy Armenians and threatened to charge them with seditious 
activity if they did not pay. 
 
For instance, the British Consul Robert Graves reported that, 
 
"Numerous telegraphic Petitions have been addressed the 
Sultan, Grand Vizier, and other Ministers at Constantinople 
by the Bitlis Armenians, almost all the signatories to which, 
including the principal men of their community, have been 
ill-used, and imprisoned by the Governor-General.  In one 
of these Petitions, they declare that they can prove that 
Tahsin Pasha, has extorted them no less a sum than 35,000 
liras."   
 
In his Contemporary Review article, "The Condition of Armenia," the special 
correspondent for The Daily Telegraph Emile Dillon documented in more detail how 
Tahsin Paşa made large sums of money by gaming the fears of the central State about the 
Armenian issue.   
"Tahsin Pasha, the late Governor-General of Bitlis, is a fair 
specimen of the high Turkish dignitary of the epoch of 
extermination.  An avaricious skinflint, he was as cruel as 
Ugolino's enemy, Ruggieri, and as cold as Captain Maleger 
in Spenser's "Faëry Queen."  He cultivated a habit of 
imprisoning scores of wealthy Armenians, without any 
imputed charge or show of pretext.  Liberty was then 
offered them in return for exorbitant sums representing the 
greater part of their substance.  Refusal to pay was 
followed by treatment compared with which the torture of 
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Jews in mediaeval England, or the agonies of the eunuchs 
of the princesses of Oude in modern India were mild and 
salutary chastisements.  Some men were kept standing up 
all day and night, forbidden to eat, drink, or move.  If they 
lose strength and consciousness cold water or hot irons 
soon brought them round, and the work of coercion 
continued.  Time and perseverance being on the side of the 
Turks, the Armenians generally ended by sacrificing 
everything that made life valuable, for the sake of 
exemption from maddening pains.  It was a case of 
sacrificing or being sacrificed, and that which seemed the 
lesser of the two evils was invariably chosen.   
 
In the Vilayet of Bitlis, several hundred Armenians who 
possessed money, cattle or crops, were arbitrarily 
imprisoned and set free on the payment of large bribes.  
Some of them, unable to produce the money at once were 
kept in the noisome dungeons until they raised the sum 
demanded, or were released by death.  About one hundred 
Armenian prisoners died in the prison of Bitlis alone.  The 
following petition signed and sent to me  -- and if I mistake 
not, also to the foreign delegates at Moush -- from a well-
known man whose name and address I publish, will help to 
convey some idea of how the Vali of Bitlis governed his 
province, and prospered the while: "We, who have served 
the Turkish Government with absolute loyalty, are 
maltreated and oppressed, more particularly of late years, 
now by the Government itself, now by Koordish brigands.  
Thus last year (1894) I was suddenly arrested at my own 
house by Turkish police and gendarmes, who escorted me 
to the prison of Bitlis, where I was insulted and subjected to 
the most horrible tortures.  Having been keep four months 
there I was released on condition of paying £450, by way of 
ransom.  No reason, no pretext has been given for this 
treatment.  On my return home, I found my house in 
disorder, my affairs ruined, my means gone. My first 
thought was to appeal the Turkish Government for redress, 
but I shrank from doing so, lest I should be condemned 
again.  Hearing that you have come to Armenia for the 
purpose of investigating the conditions of the people, I 
venture to request you, in God's name, to take notice of the 
facts of my case.  Signed Boghos Darmanian, of the village 
of Iknakhodja of the Kaza of Manazkerd. 
 
At some point, some of Tahsin's misdeeds were revealed to the Ottoman government.  
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According to The Daily News special correspondent Frank Scudamore,  
 
It was Hassan Tahsin Pacha, the late Governor of Bitlis, 
and for the past month in honourable retirement at 
Constantinople, who first inaugurated this happy system of 
milking Armenians.  He found it very successful.  He 
extorted by this means in the past two years from the 
Christians of his vilayet no less a sum then twenty-five 
thousand pounds.  Sometimes, it is true, success carried 
him away, and led him to make mistakes.  Last year, for 
instance, he imprisoned, without any shadow of cause, of 
course, for the third time in twelve months, a wealthy 
Armenian merchant, who had bought his release on the two 
previous occasions by heavy money payments.   Que 
voulez vous?  The pitcher may go once too often to the well.  
'Twas the case here.  The Armenian, no doubt, feeling at 
last that he was not being well treated, managed to bring his 
case to the notice of the foreign Embassies.  The result was 
that orders were sent from the Porte that this time the 
prisoner was to have a free pardon.  The incident did 
Tahsin Pacha not a little harm.  It shook the confidence in 
him of his powerful protectors in Constantinople who 
shared the spoils, and no doubt cost him a pretty penny to 
restore their trust in him.  Even in Armenia a man who 
takes charge of the money of the public cannot be too 
careful of his reputation. 
 
Tahsin now used fact that there were a tiny handful of Armenian radicals in the 
mountains to suppress this 'rebellion' and raise his stature in the eyes of the authorities.  
In 1893, H.F.B. Lynch travelled through Bitlis and recalled that, "the Vali of Bitlis, 
Tahsin Pasha, happened to be on bad terms with the authorities at Constantinople.  It was 
said in Bitlis that he was delighted to be afforded an opportunity of recovering favour by 
suppressing a so-called rebellion.  The result of these opposite tendencies was a little 
piece of warfare, in which Turkish troops, accompanied by the Vali in person, appeared 
before Talori."  In 1893, the inhabitants of Talori fled further into mountains. After 
conflicting reports were sent from the governor-general of Diyarbekir Sırrı Paşa, violence 
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was averted.  However in 1894, Tahsin's schemes were responsible in part for the 
massacres of Sasun.  
 
According to Cole, when Zeki Paşa, the commander of the Fourth Army at Erzingân, 
reached Sasun at the beginning of the September, he strongly berated Tahsin Paşa for 
exaggerating the threat posed by the Sasun mountaineers to the Ottoman government.  
Tahsin Paşa avoided confronting Zeki Paşa personally and through several tactics 
attempted to cover up that the violence had taken place at all.   One mystery: Why didn't 
Zeki Paşa place the blame on Tahsin Paşa?  Was Zeki Paşa afraid that he would be held 
responsible for the Vali's crimes?  As Cole put it,    
 
Zekki Pasha assailed fiercely the Bitlis Gov. Gen. Tahsin 
Pasha for calling up so many troops & instituting such a 
slaughter on so small a pretense.  "Are these few so poor, 
abject-looking Armenians I see about, such a menace to our 
government?  Absurd!"  But the Nero of a Governor had 
betaken himself off to Bitlis without confronting the 
commander.   
 
Fearing greatly the effect of the news on Europe this 
prodigy of a maladministrator even for Turkey sought in 
every way to conceal it.  As his fortunes would have it the 
troops had brought on cholera with them from Erzingan, & 
so he had an excuse for closing the roads, interrupting 
travel, searching the posts, etc.  He had poor peasants, en 
route to Constantinople to seek work, turned back & some 
10 to 15 were said to have died from hunger and hardship 
underlash of the police driving them along like cattle!  But 
a few made their escape, from the ill fated province by way 
of Russia, some others & a few reaching England even so 
that the pitiless pasha' sins found him out.   
 
Perceiving his critical predicament he set about scheming 
to save himself.  He had affirmed to the Constantinople 
authorities that his soldiers had put down a serious 
rebellion; but now the world is likely to be against him, for 
even Zekki Pasha berated him, he sets about imprisoning & 
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torturing leading Armenians in Bitlis to say that Kurds had 
committed the irregularity, and sign a paper to that effect. 
 
The first action taken by the Delegates at the Commission to investigate the Events in 
Sasun was to apply pressure on the regime of Abdülhamid II to suspend Tahsin Paşa.  At 
the end of January 1895, Tahsin was at last relieved of his office.  
 
At the beginning of February, in Diyarbekir, Tahsin Paşa was met with full honors and 
large celebratory crowds.  As Gustave Meyier noted to the French Ambassador Cambon,  
As I have the honor to telegraph Your Excellence Tashin 
Hasan Pasha, Governor General of Bitlis, just arrived in 
Diarbekir on his way to Constantinople. Although he had 
been deposed, the local Government appeared in full force, 
and the troops of the garrison went to meet him. When he 
dismounted before the house he was to occupy, in the 
presence of Vali, he was applauded by the crowd of Turcs 
who were there in large numbers. This ovation among the 
Muslims of Diyarbakir who share with their co-religionists 
of the Vilayet of Bitlis feelings against Christians, and I 
think for that, if the opportunity presented itself, they 
would all be willing to follow their example. 
 
Nevertheless, not all Muslims regarded Tahsin with admiration.  On February 22, 1895 
Tahsin Paşa passed through Sivas on his way to Istanbul.  Dr. Jewett, the US Consul in 
Sivas reported that certain Kurdish tribesmen wanted to kill Tahsin Paşa as an act of 
revenge for his role in the mass murder of 'their' Armenians.  Jewett reported that,  
 
He had an escort of about forty zaptiehs, and from quite 
reliable Turkish sources I am told it was because sixty 
Kurds, divided in fourteen companies, were distributed 
along the route watching for an opportunity to kill him 
because he had been instrumental in killing certain 
Armenians who were serfs of the Kurds. 
 
After Tahsin Paşa returned to Istanbul, there were some within the Ottoman government 
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who readily admitted that the systematic exaggeration of the Armenian issue was a severe 
problem and that Tahsin Paşa was an a good example of a much broader tendency.  In a 
'secret' and 'confidential' report dated December 21, 1895, Consul Cumberbatch reported 
to Ambassador Currie that Şakir Paşa, a former Ottoman ambassador to St. Petersburg 
and Inspector-General of the Reforms had broadly agreed with him that, "great 
culpability had been shown by several Valis in the Armenian vilayets, especially by 
Tahsin Pasha, ex-Vali of Bitlis, who like Memdouh Pasha when Vali of Sivas and 
Angora, grossly exaggerated the puerile agitation of the Armenians while hiding the fault 





In his memoir, Consul Robert Windham Graves recalled that immediately after the Sasun 
                                                        
829 This profile draws from a number of different sources.  The quotations from Robert Windham Graves 
comes from Storm Centres of the Near East : personal memories, 1879-1929 (London, 1933), p. 121 and 
from FO 424/181, pp. 8-9.  The quotation from H.F.B. Lynch comes from the second volume of Armenia, 
Travels and Studies, Volume (London, 1901), p. 158.  The quotations from Dillon come from his article in 
The Contemporary Review, no. 68 (August 1895), pp. 158-159.  The quotations from Scudamore come 
from his article published in The Daily News (April 20, 1895).   The quotations from Royal M. Cole comes 
from his unpublished memoir, Interior Turkey Reminiscences : Forty Years in Kourdistan (Armenia) that 
can be found in the Amherst Special collections.   The Ely sisters discussed Tahsin upon their return to 
United States in The Los Angeles Times (November 29, 1895).  Gustave Meyrier discussed Tahsin's 
reception in Diyarbekir in Les massacres de Diarbékir: Correspondance diplomatique du Vice-Counsul de 
France, 1894-1896, presented and annotated by Clair Mouradian and Michel Durand-Meyrier (Paris, 2000), 
p. 55.   
 
The original French is: 
 
Ainsi que j'ai l'honneur de le télégraphier à V[otre] Ex[cellence], Hasan Tashin Pacha, Gouverneur Général 
de Bitlis, vient d'arriver à Diarbekir se rendant à Constantinople.  Bien qu'on assure qu'il ait été destitué, le 
Gouvernement local, au grand complet, et les troupes de la garrison sont allés à sa rencontre.  Lorsqu'il es 
descendu de cheval devant la maison qu'il doit occuper, il a été, en présence du Vali, applaudi par la foule 
des Turc qui se trouvaient là en grand nombre.  Cette ovation que, dans les musulmans de Diarbékir 
partagent les sentiments de leurs coreligionnaires du vilayet de Bitlis à l'égard des chrétiens et je crois for 
que, si l'occasion se présentait, ils seraient tout disposés à suivre leur example.    
 
The quotation from Consul Longworth (citing the US consul Jewett), comes from FO 424/182, p. 1.  
Finally, the quotation from Cumberbatch, comes from FO 424/184, p. 514. 
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violence he encountered  "a somewhat enigmatic character in the person of one Ximénez, 
who was presented as a Spanish journalist and writer of distinction, but whom I was 
quickly able to place as a secret agent of the Imperial Palace, with which he was in 
constant communication by cypher telegram."   
On January 10, 1895 Ximénez gave an interview to a journalist from Reuter's Agency.  
This interview was prominently reproduced in a number of daily newspapers throughout 
Great Britain.  Ximénez’s account faithfully reproduced many of the basic points from 
the Zeki Paşa report, although at certain points he added a his own twist.  For instance, 
Ximénez recounts that the Ottoman troops main assault on the 'insurgents' in the Sasun 
mountains took place on August 27, and that their total numbers amount to 3000. 
However, instead of simply reporting that Boyadjian promised his followers that soldiers 
would be sent from England via balloons (as Zeki Paşa's report states, "İngiltere'den 
balonla asker celb edeceğini"), Ximénez reported it thusly,  
 
[The mountaineers] themselves averred that they had been 
deluded by an agitator named Bohazian, better known by 
his assumed name of Mourah.  This man, who was 
originally a pupil of the Armenian Methodist Missionary 
Schools, was implicated in the disturbances of Koum Kapo, 
and condemned to penal servitude, but was afterwards 
pardoned by the Sultan.  The Armenians declared that he 
had instigated the movement informing them that Great 
Britain was mobilizing troops to send to their assistance.  
On the Armenians asking how the force could be conveyed 
to their remote country, Bohazian informed them that the 
men would be brought through the air in monster red 
balloons, which were the latest invention of military 
science.   
 
Although Ximénez’s words seemed to verify the official dispatches from the Ottoman 
Government, many at the time they were printed were rather leery of Ximénez’s veracity.  
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Some of his claims seemed quite far fetched, such as that 'Mourah' was a "originally a 
pupil of the Armenian Methodist Missionary Schools" -- there were no Missionary 
Methodists in the Ottoman Empire, and the radical Hunchaks and the ABCFM 
missionaries were rivals.  It is also interesting to note although in the original report Zeki 
Paşa was careful to distinguish between Damadian and Boyadjian, Ximenes conflates the 
two in his interview.  My best guess would be that the Ottoman Government did not give 
Ximenes the original report (which he may not have been able to read) but instead a 
French-language translation like the one provided to Ambassador Currie on October 20, 
1894 by Said Paşa.  This particular document also makes the error of conflating 
Damadian and Boyadjian and also misspells 'Mourad' as 'Mourah.'   
 
Writing from Ankara, Consul Cumberbatch reported to Ambassador Currie at the end of 
the January 1895 that,  
Prominence having been given in certain English papers to 
Professor Ximenes' account of recent events in the Moush 
Sandjak, I have the honour to submit to your Excellency 
the following remarks, which may assist in judging as to 
the weight to be attached to information derived from that 
source.   
 
Shortly after the disturbances that took place in the town 
and district of Yozgat, last winter, that gentleman -- whose 
card bore the address of Rawal Pindi, British India -- 
arrived at Angora from Constantinople, and proceeded at 
once to Yozgat on his mission, the real object of which was, 
I feel certain, known to your Excellency.  
 
It was afterwards reported to me during his stay at Yozgat 
the armed soldiers and police, who had been told off in 
considerable numbers to patrol the streets, were ordered to 
lay their arms for the time being.  
 
The members of the Constantinople and local secret police, 
who accompanied him wherever he went under the guise of 
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interpreters or escort, allowed no communication between 
him and the Armenians.  He, however, called on the 
Armenian Bishop, to whom he said, "There must be a 
certain American subject here named Adam Effendi who 
seems to have suffered tortures in prison, because I read his 
reports in the papers.  Where is that gentleman?  I should 
like to see him."  The Bishop fearing the spies who were 
with his interlocutor replied, "No such person exists here" 
(viz. no one who had suffered tortures); and pointing to 
another Armenian in the room, called Adanian Hadji Agha, 
he said, "Here is Adam Effendi."  This man was thereupon 
interrogated by M. Ximenes, who though he was the real 
Adam Aivazian, of Eglendé, on account of the resemblance 
in names, and he naturally denied having been tortured or 
even imprisoned.   
 
I am not aware whether the reports of M. Ximenes from 
Yozgat were subsequently published, but if some or all 
were not brought to light, the arrival at Angora of two 
detectives from Constantinople -- who searched the weekly 
mail from the interior, which coincided with his stay at 
Yozgat, for his letters as I was creditably told -- might 
possibly have had some connection with their suppression. 
 
An anonymous special correspondent for the Glasgow Herald wrote the following about 
Ximénez in February, 
 
"News from the outer world is almost wholly sealed from 
us in this terror-ridden land, and such fitful items of interest 
as do ultimately reach us have of necessity been transmitted 
by slow and tortuous channels.  It results that by the time 
we receive information of what is doing at home, even in 
connection with the question that here absorbs all our 
thoughts, the subject matter has not merely already become 
ancient history with you, but has long since passed into the 
limbo of "things of forgot."  Thus it happens that it is only 
this week that I have read in a London daily newspaper the 
story of Senor Ximenez's interesting travels in this country.  
It is more than probable that long ere this the title to 
accuracy in these matters of this "distinguished Spaniard of 
high scientific attainments" will have been somewhat 
seriously questioned, and it may well be the British public 
has already so thoroughly taken the measure of Senor 
Ximenez as to be no longer gullible by his artistic romances.  
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In view, however, of the minutely detailed information as 
to Senor Ximenez's movements that I have at some pains 
been able to obtain, it will not be a work of mere 
supererogation to throw a little further light on his version 
of the Sassun troubles, with reference more especially to 
the opportunities said to have been enjoyed by him for 
collecting the evidence he has published to the world.   
 
At once the quickest and surest method of convincing 
British readers on these points will be, I think, to give 
Senor Ximenez's whole itinerary, with the dates of his 
arrival and departure at each of his halting places in 
Kurdistan and Turkish Armenia throughout the entire 
period covered by the "alleged atrocities," and this itinerary 
is compiled from unimpeachable evidence.  Its strict 
accuracy is vouched for by authorities whose names and 
positions (had I permission to publish them here) would 
carry instant conviction to every British mind, and its 
perusal will clearly show that Senor Ximenez simply 
picked up gossip in places far removed from the localities 
under review.  It is not, however, my present purpose to 
discuss these conflicting aspects of Mr. Xemenez's 
character.  He is a Spaniard, he is a traveller, and he is 
spoken of as "distinguished," it is but an error in terms -- he 
is certainly "notorious."  To follow the narrative with full 
appreciation it is necessary to study a good map of the 
Turkish Vilayets in Kurdistan of Van and Bitlis.  With the 
aid of this, and with the dates and distances that I am able 
to supply, it will at once be seen that Mr. Ximenez was so 
fully satisfied as to the complete gullibility of the British 
public that he did not even deem it necessary to "join his 
flats" to make his tale plausibly consistent.  It argues, 
moreover, surely a grave lack of prudence in a traveller and 
geographer of any pretentions, that he should be at pains to 
prove himself in error -- out of his own mouth -- not once 
but several times during the course of his story.   
 
Senor Ximenez was so fully satisfied as to the complete 
gullibility of the British public that he did not even deem it 
necessary to "join his flats" to make his tale plausibly 
consistent.  It argues, moreover, surely a grave lack of 
prudence in a traveller and geographer of any pretentions, 
that he should be at pains to prove himself in error -- out of 
his own mouth -- not once but several times during the 




Senor Ximenez arrived at Van from the Persian frontier on 
the 28th of July last.  He admittedly enjoyed facilities and 
privileges such are rarely accorded to European travellers 
in Turkish territory.  As an invariable rule European 
explorers of Kurdistan (and there have been many) have 
encountered innumerable difficulties and stubborn 
opposition at the hands of the enlightened officials.  There 
is not one among them who has not had to resent bitterly 
the constant police surveillance maintained over them, a 
surveillance which has constantly gone the length of rigidly 
prohibiting photography of ruins or public buildings, under 
which travellers have often been roughly ordered to move 
on when they so much as stopped to look at even the 
outsides of mosques and churches.  Many recent travellers, 
indeed Count de Cholet, Baron de Nolde, Messrs Derlet 
and Pisson, Mr. Lynch, and others were forced to make 
formal complaint to their Embassies in Constantinople on 
the subject of this persecution and espionage, and this, be it 
said, was during times of supposed peace, times when the 
country was announced (and does not Senor Ximenez 
confirm it) to be a state of complete tranquility, and when 
the Turks -- surely with tongue in cheek -- still spoke 
blandly of themselves as a civilized nation.  That any 
Europeans sojourning in Asia Minor today should be 
closely watched is natural enough.  There is so much -- as 
the Turkish Government naively admits -- that is 
undesirable he should know.  Nor do I for my own part in 
the least resent the presence of the two gentlemen who for 
the last four have kept guard in the heavy snow outside my 
door for me to finish this article."830 
                                                        
830 One of the most mysterious characters in this dissertation is certainly that of Saturnino Ximénez, the 
professor-journalist hired by Ottoman Government to reproduce Zeki's report from a 'Western' source.  For 
the brief remarks by Consul Robert W. Graves, see his memoir, Storm Centres of the Near East : personal 
memories, 1879-1929 (London, 1933), p. 144.  For reproductions of Ximenez's widely printed interview 
see The Morning Post and The Glasgow Herald (both dated January 10, 1895).  For the French-language 
Ottoman State document that was likely given to Ximenez (with identical misspelling of Boyadjian's nom-
de-guerre and conflation of Damadian with Boyadjian), see FO 424-178, p.  240.  For Consul 
Cumberbatch's missive to Currie see, FO 424-181, p. 91.  The very long quotation from the anonymous 
special correspondent from The Glasgow Herald (March 24, 1895) about Ximenez comes from the pen of 
either someone who had access to ABCFM reports or was part of the ABCFM (my guess would be the 
missionary-journalist Herbert Marsena Allen).  Although these the identity of the special correspondents is 
very difficult to ascertain, certain details elsewhere in this article are lifted directly from Knapp and the 
writer emphasizes, "we Christians," at one point.  I hope to learn more about Ximenez.  He wrote a rather 
general pamphlet entitled "Kurds and Armenians" in 1895, three decades later he published a longer 
account entitled L'Asie Mineure en ruines (1925), of which unfortunately I haven't had been find a copy of.  
Nor have I been able to locate a copy of his own biography, De La Vida Del Sabio Aventurero Mahonés 








The violence in the mountains of Sasun in the summer of 1894 is generally considered a 
turning point in the history of the late Ottoman Empire.  Both in Armenian Studies and in 
Ottoman Studies, this episode of violence figure in a much broader though different 
narrative.  It is thus somewhat surprising that the violence in Sasun has been so rarely 
studied in detail. In 2014, three historians, Justin McCarthy, Ömer Turan and Cemalettin 
Taşkıran published a detailed study of the Sasun violence under the title, Sasun : The 
History of an 1890s Armenian Revolt. I received a copy of this book after most of my 
research had been completed (January 2015).  In their book, McCarthy and his co-writers 
argue that, "Indeed, all the reports of the Sasun troubles, whether from journalists, 
missionaries, or journalists, can fairly be characterized as imaginary after close 
comparison with actual testimony recorded during the investigation.  Virtually every 
aspect of the widely circulated story of Sasun was wrong." 
 
 
Shockingly, the conclusions proffered in Sasun: The History of an 1890s Armenian 
Revolt and my dissertation are markedly different.  After careful study of the documents, 
I concluded in my dissertation that the Sasun massacres had actually taken place and that 
there was a concerted effort made both by local and central Ottoman authorities to cover 




Throughout my research, I was continually reminded of other episodes of mass 
violence.  One comparison that I found particularly apt was the March 1968 mass killing 
that had taken place in My Lai.   In both cases, soldiers had been told that they would 
face armed resistance from "insurgents."  In 1968, Colonel Oran Henderson had given 
orders to his officers to "wipe them out for good."  In 1894, Colonel Ismail had relayed 
orders to "destroy and leave a legacy of terror."  In both cases, all the villagers were 
treated as the enemy to be eliminated.  Reading accounts of the kinds of violence enacted 
by the men of Charlie Company on unarmed Vietnamese women and children echoed the 
accounts of many of the survivors from the Sasun mass killings.   
 
Even more remarkable for me were the parallel efforts of the American and Ottoman 
militaries to cover their tracks.  Colonel Henderson's efforts to cover up reminded me of 
the efforts of Müşir Zeki.  The report831 that Celaleddin, the Mutessarıf of Muş, submitted 
to the Ottoman Government recalled to me the official report of Warrant Officer Hugh 
Thompson, Jr. gave to his commanding officer.  The first US military reports claimed 
that 128 Viet Cong and 22 civilians had been killed in a "fierce fire fight."  The first 
Ottoman military report, written by Zeki Paşa, claimed that two brief battles were fought 
between bandits and Ottoman soldiers but that the women and children had been 
protected.    
 
                                                        
831 “The Late Mutessarif of Moush, before his removal from his post, addressed to the Ministry of the 
Interior a telegram defending the Sassoon Armenians against the charges brought against them.  I have 
obtained a copy of it from a secret source.  The Mutessarif in it protests against the employment of armed 
forces against the Armenians, refuses to share the responsibility of such action, and begs, if he is not 
listened to, to be relieved of his duties.”  (FO 424/178, p. 304).  
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In the case of both My Lai and Sasun, journalists played an important role in 
disseminating the story to a broader reading public.  Still, no doubt, there are who insist 
that the evidence of survivors is unreliable and that we should take our 'facts' from 
trustworthy reports by military men such as Colonel Henderson or Müşir Zeki.  These 
doubters, or deniers, might ask why the military reports, unintended as they are for public 
viewing, purposefully deceive?   
*** 
As my research has come to a very different conclusion, it is worth taking a closer look 
into the text of McCarthy and his co-writers.  To begin, what categories of analysis do 
McCarthy and his co-writers employ to make sense of Sasun?  
 
'Kurd' and 'Armenian' 
 
At the very beginning of McCarthy et al's Sasun, the authors draw attention to some of 
the complexities of the terms, "Kurd" and "Armenian."  They correctly point out that,  
Unlike other areas of the Ottoman East, few Kurds in Sasun 
seem not to have been affiliated with tribes.  Even those 
Kurds who lived in Armenian villages or away from the 
main body of Kurds identified themselves as members of 
their tribes and sub-tribes.  Kurdish loyalty resided in those 
tribes, which effectively divided each tribe from others and 
often led to intertribal conflict.  Politically, there was no 
such thing as "the Kurds." The Armenians of the region 
were also disunited, although less so than the Kurds.832 
  
McCarthy and his co-writers also are right to emphasis that journalists and diplomats 
                                                        
832 McCarthy et al, p. 9.  
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"ignored real differences" within both Armenians and Kurds in the mountains and that 
the Kurds in Sasun were "by no means homogenous or unified" 833and "the concept of 
"the Kurds" as a group acting together was an absurdity." 
 
However, very soon after this laudatory beginning, the authors quickly fall back on hoary 
ethnic categories ('Muslim' and 'Armenian') as their essentialist units of analysis.  For 
instance, the authors broadly claim that, "The Kurds, however, were a real threat to the 
peace and stability of Ottoman eastern Anatolia."834  Moreover, throughout the text, the 
authors sharply distinguish between 'Armenian' evidence and 'Muslim' or 'Kurdish' 
evidence.  It is interesting that the authors seemingly adopt stark distinctions based on the 
very sources they decry.  Furthermore, the authors rather simplistically imply that all 
Kurds in this story were Muslims -- ignoring that this area of mountains had a large 
numbers of Yezidis and Alevis.  Mark Sykes, whose 1908 study of Kurdish tribes the 
authors approvingly cite, was careful to avoid placing all the Kurds of this region under 
the category of 'Muslim.'  
 
While some effort is undoubtedly made by McCarthy and his co-writers to distinguish 
between different communities of Kurds, much less effort is made to distinguish between 
different communities of Armenians.  When discussing the travels of Isabella Bird in the 
Eastern reaches of the Ottoman Empire, the authors write,  
 
 
A British woman traveling in eastern Anatolia reported that 
                                                        
833 McCarthy et al, p. 11 and p. 12.  
834 McCarthy et al, p. 14. 
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she had heard from missionaries that Kurds ravaged 
Armenian villages in the Plain of Muş.  It should be noted, 
however that her informants were in Bitlis and Erzurum 
and were undoubtedly repeating Armenian reports. 835 
 
 
McCarthy and his co-writers use variations of the phrase 'Armenian reports' throughout 
their work.  For instance, when discussing the source of the letter published in The 
London Times on November 17, 1895 the authors argue, without evidence, that "the 
source of the letter must have been Armenian."836  Or, again without evidence, the 
authors conclude, "The first missionary reports, however, were not based on refugee 
testimony but on information from Armenians who were not from Sasun."837  It is 
difficult to see what utility this category of 'Armenian sources' has except perhaps some 
sort of implicit notion that 'Armenian reports' is inherently untrustworthy.   
 
Furthermore, by allowing no distinction to be made between those Ottoman Armenians 
who worked for the Ottoman State, or those that didn't, between those Armenians 
communities who lived in the mountains or those who lived in the plains, or between 
those in the cities and those in rural areas, or any discussion of socioeconomic conditions 
and class, the authors dramatically reduce their ability to analyze the history of the region 
in all its multifaceted complexity.   
 
Given that McCarthy and his co-writers practice a particular 'legitimist' form of 
historiography, that is one that generally adopts the point of view the Ottoman State, it is 
                                                        
835 McCarthy et al, p. 273.  
836 McCarthy et al, p. 83.  
837 McCarthy et al, p. 85.  
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somewhat surprising that the authors have also no discussion of the different 'millets' or 
juridical-legal Ottoman State categories which distinguished between Armenian 
Protestants, Armenian Catholics, and Armenian Apostolics.  These distinctions were 
upheld by many Protestant, Catholic and Apostolic missionaries, often rivals for the souls 
the inhabitants in the East.   
 
'Turks' and 'Ottomans' 
 
McCarthy and his co-writers exercise a certain level of conflation when discussing the 
actions of the government (or "Ottomans").  Rather than distinguishing between parts of 
the government or acknowledging that there were differences between the motivations 
and goals of the Bitlis-based authorities and the Istanbul-based state, the authors treat the 
Ottoman State as a monolith.      
 
The authors also, perhaps more troubling, conflate 'anti-Turkish' sentiment with any 
opposition to the Ottoman (or for European observers, 'Turkish') Government.  For 
instance, in their discussion of Mihran Damadian, the authors stress that "he organized an 
anti-Turkish demonstration in 1891."838  This demonstration, organized to commemorate 
the one-year anniversary of the Kum Kapı demonstration of July 1890, was specifically 
organized in opposition to the administration of Sultan Abdülhamid II, not in opposition 
"Turks."  It is important to maintain an analytical distinction between racist statements 
made by other (Canon McColl, for instance) and statements that opposition figures made 
about the Ottoman Government.   
                                                        




Another example of this conflation is made during the authors’ discussion of James 
Bryce, who they term, "a most active anti-Turkish campaigner."  For evidence of this 
claim, the authors cite an article Bryce published in Century Magazine entitled, "The 
Armenian Question."  Reading this article, it is very clear that James Bryce does indeed 
make deplorably essentialist arguments (a dichotomy between "robber Kurds" and 
"civilized Armenians").  However, it is also very clear that his opposition is not to 'Turks' 
per se but to the Ottoman (or as he often mislabels it 'Turkish') Government.  Even more 
clearly he attributes the 'faults' of Turkish rule to Abdülhamid II,  
 
"who leaves very little to his ministers, is jealous of any 
talent that shows itself among them, and tries to direct 
everything himself, and is, in fact, largely swayed by a 
camarilla of ignorant personal attendants and hangers-on at 
the palace.  There are some able Mohammedans in 
Constantinople who detest the present regime and see its 
perils.  Now and then a good governor is found in the 
provinces, who tries to improve the local 
administration.  But the able men are never listened to, and 
the good governor is speedily recalled.  In every 
government more depends upon them who administer than 
upon the system; but in a despotic government men are 
everything.  In Turkey, the men and the system are equally 
corrupt; and to try to reform the Turkish monarchy is like 
trying to repair a ship with rotten timbers." 839  
 
Bryce is careful to state that, in former times the Armenian population of the cities of the 
Ottoman Empire "previously suffered from misgovernment not much more than its 
Musulman neighbors, and which had lived on friendly terms with them" had suffered 
greatly since the advent of the regime of Abdülhamid II.    
 
                                                        
839 The Century, vol. 51, p. 153. 
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McCarthy et al's failure to distinguish between vitriolic anti-Turkish racism (which 
certainly existed) and a much more prevalent opposition to the Ottoman government 
obscures the role played either by Abdülhamid II himself or his government.  One 
searches in vain for a description of Ottoman State policies.   
 
For instance, McCarthy and his co-writers briefly discuss a mass meeting that took place 
at Chickering Hall, on November 21, 1895. [It is somewhat odd that the writers give this 
as their example of mass protests in the United States.  By November 21, 1895 the mass 
violence experienced at Sasun had already spread to other areas of the Ottoman Empire 
and this much larger mass protest was a response to these further attacks.  Perhaps the 
authors meant to discuss the mass meeting at Chickering Hall that took place on 
December 18, 1894?]  McCarthy et al. describe this (1895) meeting as  
a crowd that overflowed the hall heard the governor of 
Massachusetts, many clergymen, and local Armenians 
attack the Turks.  A cable from the missionary Henry 
Dwight in Istanbul was read.  Dwight blamed the sultan for 
everything and called upon the governments of Europe to 
intervene. 
 
However, when one examines the New York Times article from November 22, 1895, 
cited by McCarthy and his co-writers, one finds that the resolution specifically places the 
blame not on 'Turks' per se but squarely on the shoulders of Abdülhamid II in terms 
reminiscent of those once made against George II by the American 
revolutionaries.   ("Whereas, The Government of the Sultan of Turkey has systematically 
deprived the Armenian people of its inalienable rights, including those of life, liberty, and 
pursuit of happiness...")  While there were certainly some abhorrent and racist comments 
made about ‘Turks,’ most of the speeches were directed against Abdülhamid II, and his 
431  
 
government.840    
 
Time and Space 
 
McCarthy and his co-writers structure their book according to a very narrow temporal 
and geographic frame.  In so doing, the authors are far from alone.  Many scholars who 
have examined the violence of Sasun in 1894 have done much the same.  Geographically, 
the authors excise the history of the mountains from that of the surrounding plain 
lands.  They end their description of Sasun by noting that, "remoteness and inaccessibility 
defined the region."  (p. 10) The authors quickly trot through the 19th century in their 
second chapter, tellingly entitled, "Conflict in Sasun.”  The first dates that the authors 
mention involve "major rebellions" that "erupted" in 1806-8, 1828-29, 1834-37, 1840-
1840, 1855, and 1872-82 in Eastern Anatolia. (p. 14).  There is no explanation offered in 
any case as to why the 'rebellions' took place.  The very label of these episodes of 
violence as "rebellions" helps establish the perspective that the authors will 
take.  McCarthy et al. see both the Ottoman East and the mountainous region of Sasun 
through the lens of the central authorities in Istanbul.    
 
Clearly, to paraphrase the historian Marshall Hodgson, the geographic and temporal 
frames we employ determine what questions scholars can ask and what answers might be 
                                                        
840 Moreover, the assertion that Rev. Dwight "blamed the sultan for everything and called upon the 
governments of Europe to intervene" is simply incorrect.  According to this article, Dwight wrote in his 
cable, "Mission loss at Harput, $100,000. Raiders protected by soldiers, who fired on mission houses and 
joined in plunder. Special malice shown missionaries. Shell burst in Dr. Barnum's house. Missionaries now 
protected. Urge demand for exemplary damages and permit to rebuild at once. Troubles reported as 
beginning at Marsovan and Van Amtob (sic!) ... [and later] 250,000 souls are destitute; immediate action 




given.  By viewing the history of the mountains as divorced from the plains, the authors 
overlook entirely the critical history of local resistance to the House of Musa Bey.   The 
authors seem to believe that every act of opposition to local authorities was an act of 
'rebellion' against the Sultan.   
 
The Absence of Local Warlords 
 
McCarthy and his co-writers blithely ignore any mention of Musa Bey in the sources that 
they cite.   This is particularly strange with their discussion of the bandit-turned-
nationalist Arabo, (whose real name was 'Stepanos Mekhitharian,' not 'Arakel' as they 
have it).  Here, the authors draw from the memoir of Rouben Der Minasian.  It is worth 
taking a moment to exhibit how the authors employ their own version of a Procrustean 
bed to shape the source to their liking.  According to McCarthy et al, Arabo, "In his early 
days he was simply a bandit, although one surely opposed to the authorities." (p. 16, italic 
added).  
Rouben Der Minasian wrote,  
In the initial stages both youths were plain bandits, with 
this difference, however, that they robbed for the sake of 
fame, and not for gaining riches.  If there were Ashirets 
among the Kurds, they reasoned, why should not the 
Armenians do the same?  Having organized their bands on 
the model of the Kurdish Ashiret, they now thought they 
had a right to rob their enemies.841 
 
Der Minasian pointedly adds that, "Arabo's fame was as great as that of Musa Beg among 
the Kurds." (Mandalian, p. 121)  How did these bandits become converts to Armenian 
                                                        




nationalism?  McCarthy et al do not venture into this question.  Der Miniasian had his 
own explanation.  He wrote that,  
 
When Arabo came in contact with the people of Moush 
and saw the revolutionary fermentation, when he saw the 
big difference between the Armenians and Kurds, when 
he saw Musa Beg and the Turkish zaptiyes (gendarmes) 
persecuting the Armenians for their nationality, when he 
saw the government discriminating between Christian and 
the Moslem, he slowly underwent a radical transformation. 
 
Acknowledging that little is known about this group, McCarthy writes, "Armenian 
sources reported that the group smuggled arms from Russia from 1890 to 
1893."842  McCarthy does not mention what the purpose of these smuggled weapons 
was.   
 
According to Rouben Der Minasian, at least at first, the "intention to transport a 
maximum of arms" was "to push the fight against the house of Musa Beg."843  
By dodging the difficult question of what was behind the conversion of bandits into 
radicals, and by ignoring local actors like Musa Bey entirely, McCarthy and his co-
writers are able to maintain their black-and-white version of Ottoman History.   
In my dissertation, I showed how the fervor over Musa Bey led inhabitants of Muş to 
protest at the Armenian Patriarchate in Kum Kapı, in Istanbul.   
 
It was the added frustration with the local Ottoman bureaucrats, allied with Warlords like 
Musa Bey, that led many others to 'convert' to radical forms of Armenian nationalism.  In 
                                                        
842 McCarthy et al., p. 17. 
843 Mandalian 1963, pp. 119-120.   
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the aftermath of the Kum Kapı protests of 1890, the Ottoman State began to enforce arms 
control against the Armenian population in first the plains and then the mountains.   The 
crackdown against any sign of Armenian organization allowed corrupt officials like 
Tahsin Paşa to benefit financially by threatening Armenians with imprisonment for 
"seditious" activity. This in turn led to an escalation in conversion to Armenian 
nationalism, which led to even more repression of 'sedition' by the Ottoman State.  It was 
this violent cycle which served as the immediate backdrop of the violence in the Sasun 
Mountains, only a few hours away from the provincial town of Muş.    
 
The Commission and the Minutes 
A very significant portion of McCarthy et al.'s text dwells on the analysis of British 
Foreign Office documents produced at the Commission of Inquiry at Muş.   The main 
argument throughout is that the Report, or to give the full name, the "Report of the 
Consular Delegates attached to the Commission to inquire into the Events at Sasun" is 
not reliable.   
To support this claim, the authors compare and contrast the 28-page Report (including 
annexes) with the 171-page official minutes (procès verbaux) that described the 
testimonies given at the Commission.  The British Government published both in the 
early days of 1896.  Both the Report and the minutes were written and signed by the same 
three individuals: the British consular officer H.S. Shipley and his French and Russian 
colleagues, Vilbert and Prjevalsky.  Nevertheless, McCarthy and his co-writers believe 
that they have discovered discrepancies between the Report and the minutes, and 




For instance, when discussing the issue of the selection of witnesses, McCarthy et all 
write,  
"Even in a report that did not lack for duplicity elsewhere, 
the European delegates' statement on the selection of 
witnesses was especially false.  Writing of the Armenian 
witnesses, the delegates alleged: "The selection of these 
seventy-eight Armenians was left to the local Authorities, 
with the exception of two of them, who came of their own 
accord." No one reading the Delegates' Report could doubt 
that the Ottoman commissioners had skewed the testimony 
for the government's purposes.  But the delegates' statement 
was simply not true.  As was so often the case, this can 




McCarthy and his co-writers make three major errors concerning the minutes (which 
McCarthy et al rather misleadingly term 'actual transcripts'). (p. 123) First, they 
misunderstand the purpose of the minutes.  Second, they ignore (or are ignorant of) when 
the minutes were completed and sent. And finally, the authors disregard completely the 
setting wherein the minutes were produced.    
 
These errors lead the authors to treat the minutes as if it was a 'transcript' or recording, 
rather than a summary intended to keep the delegates from rival powers on the same 
page.  Like most summaries, it left much of what happened.  It is a certain species of 
textual fetishism to assume that truth lies within the margins of any report.   The question 
of when the minutes were composed is very significant for their argument.  For how 
could the Report be a falsification of the minutes when the minutes were composed after 
                                                        
844 McCarthy et al, p. 123.  
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the Report?  Finally, by disregarding the power that the Ottoman authorities possessed, 
and inflating the power of the Delegates, McCarthy and his co-writers diverge sharply 
from the texts that they employ.  Over and over again both in the Report and in the 
minutes, the Delegates illustrate that the Ottoman Commissioners were rigging the 
Commission to fit the Zeki Report.   
 
Why were the minutes written? 
In the winter of 1894-1895, after long discussions, the Governments of Great Britain, 
France and Russia sent out a common set of instructions to their Delegates to "assist the 
work of the Ottoman Commission."  Their duties within the Commission would be 
limited to "monitoring and surveillance."  These instructions were quoted at length by 
McCarthy and his co-writers,  
The delegates will prepare, therefore, collective minutes 
[procès verbaux] of the daily meetings they attend.  They 
will include all the incidents of the investigation and the 
difficulties that might have arisen from the exercise of their 
mission.  These minutes [procès verbaux] will be regularly 
sent to the Consuls with additional reports, as 
appropriate.  The Consuls will in turn send them to their 
embassies, along with their personal reports.  Once the 
investigation is completed, the delegates will report to the 
Consuls the results of their assessments in separate 
reports.  In addition, they will keep a comprehensive report 
of the points on which they have agreed and their common 
evaluations.  The Consuls in turn will relate the facts of the 
investigation in report to their embassies. Consular 
delegates will be present at all meetings of the Commission, 
will accompany it on its travels, and should be made aware 
of all its investigations and receive daily access to its 
minutes.  
 
There were thus two separate sets of procès verbaux or minutes.  One was to be kept by 
the Ottoman commissioners and was to be shared on a 'daily basis' with the 
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Delegates.  The other was to be kept by the three Delegates and sent 'regularly' to their 
Consuls at Erzurum.  This much is clear.  McCarthy and his co-writers conflate the two 
sets of minutes in their analysis.  This conflation occurs in their effort to prove that, "The 
report written by the European delegates bore little relation to the actual events in 
Sasun."  McCarthy and his co-writers continue, 
 
"Fortunately, minutes (called procès verbaux by the 
delegates) were taken of the testimony each 
session.  According to the terms of the agreement between 
the Ottoman Government and the European power, the 
minutes were agreed upon as accurate by both the 
commission and the European delegates.  These minutes, 
unlike the report compiled by the European delegates, 
provide an accurate picture of the testimony."845 
 
The authors cite no evidence to support their claim that the minutes "were agreed upon as 
accurate by both the commission and the European delegates."  I found no evidence of 
this in any British Confidential documents.  I also found no evidence that the Ottoman 
Commissioners ever shared their minutes with the Delegates.  In the end, H.S. Shipley, 
the British Delegate, plainly stated that the Ottoman Commissioners had not "submitted 
to us their conclusions periodically during the inquiry."846  
 
When were the minutes written?  
There is a second problem with McCarthy et al's claim that the procès verbaux represents 
"the actual events" and the Report was the product of "falsifying the evidence." (p. 131) 
Just as instructed, the delegates at first sent 'regular' copies of the procès verbaux to their 
consuls.  But they soon fell behind.  After a few weeks, the delegates stopped sending the 
                                                        
845 McCarthy et al., p. 121.  
846 FO 424/183, p. 29. 
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procès verbaux. Most of the procès verbaux were completed after the Report was 
finished.  If the Delegates really had the goal of deception, they would have altered  
the procès verbaux to fit the Report.   
 
By the first part of June, the Commission had come to a close after nearly six months of 
testimonies.  On June 11, 1895, the delegates in Muş informed the British, French and 
Russian consuls in Erzurum that they were "hard at work, drawing up their Report and 
completing the procès-verbaux."847  A week later, H.S. Shipley, the British delegate, 
wrote in a private letter to Consul Graves that, though he had intended to send a summary 
of the investigation of the Delegates, he was unable to, given "the pressure at which we 
have been working lately to get our Protocols up to date."   
 
By July 27, 1895, H.S. Shipley informed Consul Graves that he was concerned that if the 
Report were to be published (and this was by no means decided by this point), he 
expected that it would be, "violently attacked by the pro-Armenian party on account of 
our not apparently giving sufficient weight to the testimony of Armenians."  Shipley 
wrote that, "Both myself and colleagues felt, however, that we were there not to accept 
blindly all that Armenians might say, but to endeavor to arrive at the strict truth, and in 
this I am bound to say that we were not always aided by the Armenians themselves." 
Shipley continued,  
[In the Report] we have commented very strongly on the 
methods which the Commissioners have throught fit to 
adopt, and of which your Excellency has been made aware 
in my telegrams from time to time. Their mission, in fact, 
                                                        
847 This discussion will be based on material from FO 424/183, pp. 1-2, 28-29, 136, 172-173, 254, 257, 
260-261, 394, and 397.    
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would rather seem to have been to cover the whole affair 
up, and if they have failed, it was because they were too 
heavily handicapped by the instructions (public of course) 
as given to them by the Sultan. They did their best, 
however, and I could not help at times thinking that it was a 
pity that men should give themselves such infinite trouble 
to ruin their own Empire.  
 
 
The morning of August 1, 1895, Vilbert (the French delegate), left Muş with a draft of 
the Report in hand. The other two delegates were still working on "making a collation of 
the procès-verbaux copied here, of which sixty still remain unsigned."  In other words, at 
least a draft of the Report was completed before the procès-verbaux had been finished.    
 
This draft made its way first to Istanbul and then finally, by the end of August, to the 
Foreign Office.  On August 26, 1895, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Robert 
Gascoyne-Cecil (the Marquis of Salisbury), inquired in a telegraph to Ambassador Currie, 
whether he thought it wise to immediately ask the French and Russian Governments if 
they would "assent to the eventual publication of the Report."  Ambassador Currie replied 
that he had no objection, and that the Report was nearly complete.  Gascoyne-Cecil set to 
work sending out telegraphs to the British Ambassadors in Paris and St. Petersburg that 
they should make efforts to convince France and Russia to allow the Report to be 
published as, "its presentation without delay will be expected by public opinion." 
 
The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gabriel Hanotaux, was reportedly reticent to 
publish the Report immediately, since he felt that "the conclusions of the Delegates were 
necessarily vague on many points, and that, consequently, if the publication took place, 
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[it] would lead to universal discussion in the press."  This might lead to difficulties in the 
main task at hand: trying to coax Sultan Abdülhamid II to accept an array of Reforms in 
the Ottoman East.  Perhaps, Hanotaux suggested, the British Government could simply 
tell the Ottoman Government that the publication was forthcoming, and thus encourage 
them to accept the Reforms?   
 
The British government frequently employed the tactic of threatening to publish Consular 
documents to achieve a certain end.  If the British government chose not to publish 
consular reports (as they did throughout most of the 1880s), they would be lambasted by 
a certain a faction of the Liberal Party for concealing the reports from the public and 
perhaps even condoning the internal policies of the Ottoman State.  At various points, this 
small faction of Liberal voices was strengthened by large numbers of advocates 
demanding publication from press offices and pulpits. If the British government chose to 
publish the documents, not only would the British Foreign Office lose an important 
diplomatic tool, it would also, far more seriously, often draw even more public attention 
to the conditions faced by the Armenian populations of the Ottoman Empire when the 
Blue Books were published.   
 
Back in Muş, on August 10, 1895, H.S. Shipley sent to Consul Graves the final 
Report.  Still, however, he mentioned that he was unable to give his own comments, 
"owing to the great pressure of work entailed by the necessity of completing the revision 
of the Protocols [i.e. procès-verbaux] of the above-mentioned Commission."  Most of the 




Given their own State-centric approach, it is interesting that at no point in their book do 
McCarthy and his co-writers discuss the Report produced by the Ottoman 
Commissioners.  According to Kamuran Gürun's The Armenian File (a work that 
McCarthy et al included in their 'Selected Bibliography') the Ottoman Commission's 
Report can be located in the Yıldız Palace Archives.  The delegates read at least part of 
it.  In a private letter to Consul Graves, Shipley wrote that the Commissioners gave the 
Delegates the "first part of what is a "fezléké" consisting of five parts, of the inquiry, and 
asked our opinion on it."  Shipley wrote,  
  
Briefly, its conclusion is that, though Armenians, including 
Mourad, have denied sedition, other witnesses have stated 
the sedition existed, and therefore the Commissioners 
consider it proved.   The document makes no attempt to 
judge the value of different depositions, but simply ignores 
what does not suit the Turkish theory. 
 
This conclusion would also be a rather accurate description of the strategy adopted by 
McCarthy and his co-writers -- they throw out the bits they disagree with and portray as 
"logical" and "consistent" the words of the military and state officials.  For what reason 
would military officers and state officials ever lie?    
 
How were the minutes completed? 
Apart from the Report, there is quite a bit of evidence that the Commissioner was not 
attempting to find out what took place but to simply to affirm the 'truth' of the Zeki Paşa 
report.  At the end of January, at one of the very first sittings, Şefik Bey, the President of 
Commission, read out a summary of Ottoman reports on the events of Sasun.  With some 
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concern, H.S. Shipley the British Delegate, immediately contacted Consul Graves in 
Erzurum.  Shipley was worried that "the version of the Sassoun occurrences adopted by 
the Commission as the basis for its inquiries is an official account emanating from Bitlis, 
which we can hardly help regarding as coming from a tainted source." In other words, the 
starting place for the Commissioners was the 'official' history contained in the dispatches 
of Tahsin Paşa.   
 
During the 108 sittings of the Commission, all three Delegates sent independent reports 
to their respective States which noted that the Commissioners were manipulating 
evidence to conform to the 'official' report.  For instance, according to a report sent from 




The investigation is performed under administrative 
pressure from local authorities. Police ensure that people 
from the devastated villages Kawar and Talori do not 
appear in Mush, where they can submit their complaints to 
the Turkish Commission of Inquiry.  Selection of persons 
who are in the Commission as a third-party witnesses to the 
events, in part, if not entirely, made by the local 
authorities ... Often the Chairman affirmed that he called 
the Mukhtars from the known villages, who in reality are 
different people delivered by the Zaptiye.  
                                                        
848 For more details see, Rebecca Morris, "A critical examination of the Sassoun commission of Inquiry 
Report," Armenian Review vol. 47, no. 1-2 (2001), pp. 79-112.  For Shipley's concern about "the tainted 
source" see, 424/181, p. 125.  Prjevalsky or Przewalski's  report can be found as document 29 in Mkrtich 
Gegamovich Nersisi͡an's collection of documents, Genocid Armjan v osmanskoj imperii: sbornik 
dokumentov i materialov, pp. 56-57.  Nersisi͡an cites, AVPR Embassy in Constantinople d.3176 l. 103, 
again, I'd like to thank Dr. Sergey Trostyanskiy for translating this for me; Shipley's report can be found in 
FO 424/184, pp. 79-80; Cambon's report can be found in Affaires arméniennes : projets de réformes dans 
l'Empire ottoman : 1893-1897 (Paris, 1897), document no. 50;  Scudamore's article is from The Daily 
News, April 9, 1895, Dillon's article can be found in Lloyd's Weekly Newspaper, May 5, 1895; For 




Witnesses at the Commission, might be separated by the 
nature of their testimony into two categories: 1) in the first 
category the same story memorized is repeated, although 
the witness belong to different villages and are selected 
from among the Kurds and Armenians 2) in the other 
category, those Armenians belonging to Talori and Kawar 
in most cases do not respond to questions put to them, but 
instead plead complete ignorance of what happened after 
their escape from the villages. In addition, some witnesses 
gave knowingly false testimony that could not be explained 
by any personal considerations or motives.  
 
During their stay in Mush Armenian witnesses are put 
under the care of the local police, which cannot but affect 
their testimony.  For instance on a meeting on the 4/16 
March a certain Shahbaz, from the village Sema, whose 
husband, according to her, was killed in Gelieghuzan, gave 
well-defined and detailed answers, the next day, after a 
night spent in Mush, she failed to add anything to her 
previous testimony. Returning to the village, she said to her 
son: "What use is it to speak the truth, and have us killed as 
they killed your father" Kevo of Talori (meeting of 28 
February), left overnight in the care of the police 
commissioner, the next day abandoned his intention to give 
testimony concerning the events in Talori in 1894.   
 
Two witnesses - Mygro of Talori (meeting on February 28) 
and Ego of Sema (meeting of 17 February) were after their 
testimony in the Commission arrested in Mush. 
 
It is hard to imagine that all of the above is done by local 




The Commission is not impartial in their actions, which can 
be proved as just said, and the very manner of interrogation 
of witnesses. Favorable testimony for the Turks are not 
interrupted by the chairman and carefully recorded; same 
witnesses speaking against the government and troops, 
respond only to questions, and most of their interrogation 
conducted extremely confusing, with the aim to catch the 
contradictions and detail.   
 
Commission bias is also evident from the fact that it made 
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no attempt to find out important facts such as the killing of 
women and children and troops who surrendered in 
Ghelieguzan by soldiers ...  
 
III.  
The local Armenians were initially excited by the arrival of 
the Commission and foreign delegates.  Their present mood 
can be called depressed. They saw clearly that the presence 
of the delegates did not alter the normal modes of action of 
the Turkish administration.   
 
Hammond Smith Shipley, the British Delegate, concurred with his Russian colleague.  At 
the end of his own final report to the British Government dated October 12, 1895, 
Shipley observed that,  
 
In conclusion, I would beg to say with reference to the 
conduct of the inquiry by the Turkish Commissioners that I 
have grave doubts as to whether the case of many of the 
witnesses on the Government side their story had not been 
concocted beforehand.  We have commented in several of 
our Reports on the fact that many of these witnesses 
repeated the same story absolutely word for word, 
professing, at the same time, their entire ignorance of 
anything else than the story, professing, at the same time, 
and we had abundant evidence of the fact that in no case, 
where possible, was an Armenian allowed to come before 
the Commission without having first examined by the 
Mutessarif or some other of the Moush local officials.  In 
one case, viz., that of the Archimandrite Egishé, who came 
to the Commission with the intention of retracting certain 
evidence which he had previously given against the 
Armenians, we had direct proof that after an interview with 
the Commissioner he deemed it more prudent to leave 
Moush without giving effect to his purpose.  I cannot but 
feel, moreover, that the action of the Commissioners in 
establishing at the very commencement of the proceedings 
two categories for persons giving evidence, one, namely, 
being called, "witnesses," and the other "suspects," the 
latter including practically all Armenians, was not 
calculated into advance the interests of truth, for not only 
did it tend to deter Armenians from coming forward to state 
their case, but assumed as proved a revolt into the existence 
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or non-existence of which they had come to inquire.  If I 
have dwelt at some length on this last question, it is 
because I feel it is only due to myself and colleagues to 
explain more fully than was possible in our Report the 
reasons for our efforts to arrive at the truth did not meet 
with a larger share of success.   
 
 
Finally, the French Ambassador in Istanbul reported on several occasions that the French 
Delegate Vilbert had informed him that the Commission was not interested in learning 
the truth.  On May 1, 1895, Ambassador Cambon wrote to Mr. Hanotaux, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, that Vilbert found that the "inclinations of impartiality" of the 
Commission had not lasted.   
 
"[Vilbert's] reports are confirmed by a report from Mr. 
Prjevalsky given to me by [Russian Ambassador] 
Nelidov.  They agree to say, and both cite numerous 
examples where the local authorities exert continuous 
pressure on the investigation.  The witness from the 
neighboring country are placed upon their arrival in Mush, 
under the supervision of the police which is responsible for 
housing, feeding them and dictating their statements in 
front of the Commission.  Several of them have recanted 
after a night spent in the hands of the police, others who 
have maintained their statements were subsequently 
arrested; most seem to recite statements learned by heart 
and with almost identical terms which inspire 
distrust.  Many of those who demonstrate an intention to 
testify before the Commission are retained by the 
authorities, and despite assurances that the Sultan made to 
us repeatedly, freedom of survey is almost nil.  The 
Commission, on the other hand, shows an obvious 
bias.  The witness whose testimony is favorable to Turks is 
allowed to speak freely.  He who speaks in the opposite 
direction is frequently interrupted by the President who 
tries to confuse him with unexpected and off topic 
questions.   
 
Both Frank Scudamore and Emile Dillon continuously wrote about how the Commission 
worked based on evidence from their own sources.  According to an article published in 
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the Daily News on April 9, Frank Scudamore wrote,  
 
The Turkish Commissioners have one laid-down rule of 
conduct.  They are at Moush to investigate the misdeeds of 
the Sassoon Armenians against the innocent Kurds, first; 
the Pacha of Bitlis, second; and lastly against his Majesty 
the Sultan, in the persons of his troops, against lawful 
slaughter by whom them persistently protested.  That there 
is or was or could be any Armenian grievance to the 
Turkish Commissioners decline altogether to recognize, 
just as they firmly believe that there was, or could be, any 
massacre of Armenians of any kind whatsoever.   And in 
accordance with this preconceived idea of their duties, they 
approached the subject duly armed and equipped.  In the 
first place they were provided with a map of the Sassoon 
district, which purported to be the Government map, and on 
which not a single one of the villages known to have been 
destroyed had ever had any existence outside the minds of 
the willful Armenian agitators. There is, however, another 
reading of this simple document, namely, that the said map 
was compiled on the spot by a conscientious artist, at a time 
when the missing forty-seven villages of the hundred and 
nineteen that form the district of Sassoon had ceased to 
exist.   
 
Given this starting point the line taken by the Turkish 
Commissioners is easy, though irritating to follow.  They 
are still laboriously investigating every kind of side issue 
that bears on no question at all under review, but with 
special reference to the injuries suffered by the Kurds and 
their grievances against the Armenians.  In order to gain 
time (always a great point with the Turkish 
Commissioners) they place obstacles in the way of every 
witness who might have testimony to give relevant to the 
real issue.  Whenever an Armenian witness is produced by 
the Delegates, the Turks say he or she cannot be examined 
until they have communicated with Constantinople, and 
then, as this communication is necessarily a cause of much 
delay, they haul up another hired Kurdish bandit to pour 
out a string of lies that will necessitate corroboration from 
some other perjured clansman, who must be brought from 
afar.   
 




Never since the beginning of the commission of inquiry has 
more precious time been wantonly wasted than during the 
past three weeks.  I am in a position to assert that the 
evidence received six or seven weeks ago in proof of the 
perpetration of the massacre by Imperial troops was 
overwhelming and carried complete conviction.  It would, 
however, be further borne out by hundreds, -- nay, 
thousands -- of trustworthy witnesses, if the delegates 
needed further confirmation.  But they evidently feel that 
the main features of the gruesome picture are satisfactorily 
established and no longer open to doubt.  Yet, strangely 
enough, crowds of fresh witnesses are being duly 
marshalled and driven in batches before the commission 
like voters at former English elections.  These people are, 
for the most part, Kurds of various tribes, disciplined and 
schooled by the two Turkish agents whom I have already 
described, named Sali Agha and Talib Effendi. [1]  They 
tell their little story of Armenian insurrection glibly enough, 
affirming that the Kurds fought in self-defence, killing the 
bloodthirsty Armenian ringleaders and driving the 
remainder to Mounts Andok and Firuirkar.  Here their 
narrative stops short.  When the European delegates request 
them to continue they maintain that they know no 
more.  This comedy is now being daily rehearsed at Moush, 
and the monotony is relieved only by the European 
delegates demanding to hear evidence from some of the 
very few persons mentioned by these Kurdish witnesses.   
 
 
The minutes (procès verbaux) are themselves good evidence that many witnesses were 
being either intimidated or paid off to spout the story that the Commissioners wanted to 
hear.  Many of the narratives match in exact details the report produced by Zeki 
Paşa.  For instance, in the 35th sitting of the Commission, Hirshman Ağa, a local Kurdish 
notable, described how the Armenians of Kavar were willing to give up their own lives to 
protect Murad.  Hirshman Ağa said that,  
 
The Armenians replied by refusing and added, "Kill us; fire 
with your guns and cannons on our children and we will 
not yield, and beginning to fire on the troops, they killed 
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four of them and wounded eleven others. The soldiers 
replied: six Armenians were slain, ten or eleven wounded, 
and the rest, feeling themselves beaten, burnt the houses of 
Ghelieguzan, and in company with Murad rejoined the 
Armenians who had stayed on Antok-Dagh. 
 
How would Hirshman Ağa know that in this encounter ten or eleven were 
wounded?  This is precisely the same number given in Zeki Paşa's report ("on nefer 
mecruh olmuşdur".)  Or, to give another example, Hirshman Ağa reported that Boyadjian 
was captured with "eleven guns, of which five or six were military rifles."  This was the 
identical phrasing and number as in Ottoman State documents.   
 
Overall the weight of evidence reported in this dissertation is more detailed and more 
widely sourced than that presented by McCarthy et al.   Readers of both can draw their 
own conclusions.  
 
Anatomy of Information Dissemination, Or, How News Travels  
 
 
After the concomitant development of telegraphs and mass circulation newspapers in the 
mid-19th century, the issue of who should have access to information became one of the 
most hotly debated issues of day.   
 
Based on very different political-economic structures, information was dealt with in 
different ways in Great Britain and in the Ottoman Empire.  In Victorian Great Britain, 
the issue of access to government reports was tied to the structure of the multi-party 
Parliament (Liberal vs. Conservative), but also to the power of a free press.  In the 
Hamidian Ottoman Empire, a powerful regime of censorship was coupled with the 
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centralizing power of the Palace.  The differences between these two systems resulted in 
a starkly different system of information distribution.  In Victorian Great Britain, the 
question was to what extent the public should be given access to bureaucrat-produced 
information.  In the Ottoman Empire, information disseminated by Government was 
endlessly circulated but rarely questioned publicly.   
 
This contrast was apparent in a conversation between the editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, 
Henry John Cockayne Cust and Sultan Abdülhamid II on April 6, 1895.  The subject of 
the conversation was the violence in Sasun.    
 
And then our talk began.  He who Spreads the Carpet of 
Perfect Virtues was aware of my purpose.  It was to have 
free leave to go, not as his boon ally, not as a party 
politician, not as a journalist, but simply as an unbiased 
human being to see with my eyes and hear with my ears 
what had happened, was happening, was likely to happen in 
Armenia.  He had refused all others.  What now?  
 
We began in saying commonplace.  He thanked me that a 
paper with which he believed me to be connected had 
always, if outspoken, struggled to be just, and awaited 
certainty before conviction.  That said he, was all he asked.  
He could not understand the violence of England.  The two 
Royal Houses and the two Governments had ever enjoyed a 
hereditary friendship.  The Queen and her family he 
delighted to honour, the country he counted a friend to him 
as he knew himself a friend to England.  Why then this 
bedlam uproar in the Parliament and press?  "I thank you," 
said he, "for coming out yourself to see how things are.  I 
know you will be just and I ask no more.  What is it these 
people want, and do you agree with them? "  I answered 
that I didn't in the least, but that what sensible Englishmen, 
and especially the Pall Mall Gazette, both recognized and 
agreed in was this.  They recognized that in a wild and 
remote country, with a nomad and half-civilized population, 
local government could not be conducted on the same lines 
as in the demurest pars of Balham and Upper Tooting by a 
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parish council and a parish constable; that the English 
themselves in Burmah, Africa, and elsewhere have been 
forced to adapt the methods of government to the manners 
of the governed, that this was the unrecognized right of 
every Sovereign State..."  
 
"Then why not mine?" said the Sultan.  
"It is yours," I answered, "and the Pall Mall Gazette has 
never ceased to urge that right as legitimately yours, and 
laughed at the indignation, which would burn like fire in 
England if your Majesty proposed to interfere with our 
internal administration, as we seem to seek to do with 
yours."   
"Then what is the difference?" 
"The difference, stated frankly and respectfully is this.  
That whereas in England abuses are publicly recognized 
and discussed, and open endeavors are undertaken to 
redress them, the enemies of Turkey affirm that here the 
abuses are more numerous, that their existence is concealed, 
and that no visible effort is made to effect the necessary 
reforms.  The friends of Turkey, while far from accepting 
in its fulness so dark a story, desire ardently that by public 
inquiry and public reform the repetitions of such 
exaggeration and calumny should be ever discredited."  
 
The contrast that Cust drew was between a relatively 'closed' system of censorship in the 
Hamidian Ottoman Empire, and a relatively 'open' system of public debate in Victorian 
Great Britain.  However, things were not so simple.  Within the Victorian Great Britain 
there was also a relatively 'closed' system of censorship and an 'open' system of public 
debate.  
 
A decade and a half earlier, this same issue of censorship and public debate had been 
raised by the former-and-future Prime Minister William Ewart Gladstone.  Gladstone's 
popular pamphlet Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East (1876) is properly 
remembered as an example of Anti-Turkish sentiment.  Gladstone had charged that Turks 




However, one of the critical arguments that Gladstone made in that text, that has been 
mostly forgotten, concerned the dangers of censorship and the need for the dissemination 
of bureaucratic reports.  Gladstone argued that the failure of the British Government of 
Benjamin Disraeli to collect and provide information for Parliament had contributed to 
the violence in the Balkans.  Gladstone argued that British consuls needed to be tasked 
with investigating violence and that this information should be passed on first to the 
Parliament, and then the larger public.  Otherwise, Gladstone claimed, the British 
Government could be accused of aiding and abetting the violence.  Gladstone wrote,  
 
"It would not be practicable, even if it were honourable, to 
disguise the real character of what we want from the 
Government. It is a change of attitude and policy, nothing 
less. We want them to undo and efface that too just 
impression, which, while keeping their own countrymen so 
much in the dark, they have succeeded in propagating 
throughout Europe, that we are the determined supporters 
of the Turk, and that, declaring his "integrity and 
independence" essential to "British interests," we have 
winked hard, and shall wink, if such be, harder still, 
according to the exigencies of the case, alike at his crimes 
and at his impotence. We want to place ourselves in 
harmony with the general sentiment of civilized mankind, 
instead of being any longer, as we seem to be, the Evil 
Genius which dogs, and mars, and baffles it. We want to 
make the Turk understand that, in conveying this 
impression by word and act to his mind, the British 
Government have misunderstood, and, therefore, have 
misrepresented, the sense of the British people." 
 
Here Gladstone intimidated that the British Government was hiding its true aims (which 
were coldly geopolitical), which were to protect the Ottoman Empire against Russia, and 
thus willingly condoned the violence that the Ottoman Empire was committing against its 
own population.  To get around this coldhearted government, was what the former editor 
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of the Pall Mall Gazette, William Stead, called "government by public opinion."  In turn, 
in order for government by public opinion to work, Gladstone and his Liberal allies 
argued, consul reports had to be made available to the public.  This issue emerged most 
dramatically in the late 1870s after the violence in the Balkans.  The same issue of 
censorship vs. dissemination within the British Government returned to the fore after the 
kidnapping of Gulizar in 1889 and even more dramatically after the Sasun massacres in 
1894.   
 
One approach to this topic, recently embraced by McCarthy and his co-writers, has been 
to insist that the furor, first in 1889 and then more dramatically in 1894-1895, was not the 
result of events on the ground in Muş or Sasun, but rather a concoction of prejudiced 
Europeans in their quest to sell newspapers.  For McCarthy and his co-writers, the real 
story of "Sasun" was not the dead bodies, but the wide prevalence of British racism and 
the fervid imagination of opportunistic journalists.   Incidentally, this narrative closely 
models the remonstrances of the Ottoman State.   The problem with this approach is that 
it simply mimics the narrative of the Ottoman State in legitimizing the violence (“the 
Armenians were just bandits, after all!”), and naïvely believes that military officers would 
never lie about the dead bodies.   
 
There is another approach, of course:  the narrative that was adopted by James Bryce and 
his allies in the Anglo-Armenian Association, and in some ways continues in the 
countervailing historiography of Armenian Studies.  Here the focus has been the perfidy 
of the Ottomans.  Bryce suggested that the explosion of press reports on Sasun were an 
453  
 
expression of the human disaster unfolding in the Eastern disaster of the Ottoman Empire.  
The problem with this approach is that it conveniently overlooks that not every mass 
murder was reported.  In 1892, in the Sinjar mountains a couple hundred miles to the 
south of Sasun, the Ottoman military murdered large numbers of Yezidi villagers.  This 
news did not make the rounds in Parliament.  Then, and now, certain dead bodies mean 
more than others.   
 
There is something to be said for both approaches.  While ideology in Great Britain and 
patterns of the mass circulation press are important, so are the material causes of the 
violence, and the dead bodies they left behind.  My own approach in this dissertation has 
been to focus on the interplay between the violence in the Ottoman Empire and how that 
violence was reported.   
 
 
I have employed a number of different sources to elaborate both what happened (res 
gestae) and how it was told (historia rerum gestarum).  The most important have been the 
recordings of the missionaries of the ABCFM board.   I have used British Foreign Office 
confidential reports, Ottoman State reports, traveler accounts, the transcript from 
Parliamentary proceedings and mass-circulation newspapers from both Great Britain and 
the United States.  To a far lesser extent, I have studied the consular documentation of 
other States (US, France, Italy and Russia) and the material produced by Armenian-
language oral histories.  There are many sources that I have not looked into.  Perhaps the 




In much of the existing scholarship there has been more emphasis on assigning 
culpability than on studying how the information traveled from one place to another.  
Throughout this dissertation, I have attempted to track both the source of narratives of 
violence and also how they were passed from person-to-person.  A close examination of 
the narratives of Sasun violence reveals that most were passed along certain pre-existing 
information networks.  One of the most important information networks linked the far-
flung missionaries of the American Board missionaries with the British Foreign Office.   
 
The British government gave their Foreign Office consuls two mains tasks in the 
Ottoman East.  Their main objective was geopolitical: to preserve the integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire as a bulwark against an expanding Russia.  To this end, the consuls 
reported equally on rumors of Russian troop movements across the border and rumors of 
Nationalist movements (whether Kurdish or Armenian) in the major urban cities of the 
east.  The consuls’ second mission was to write reports, and to verify reports from others, 
about the economic and political conditions of the areas to which they were stationed.  
The consuls’ task of verifying reports was linked to the Press and to Parliament in Great 
Britain.  
 
This is how verification worked: first an article was published in the British Press about 
some incident in the Ottoman Empire.  Perhaps Edwin Pears, for decades the 
correspondent for the The Daily News in Istanbul, wrote about an incident that was 
rumored to have taken place in the Ottoman.  Or, perhaps an exile living in Great Britain, 
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such as Garabed Hagopian or Minas Cheraz, wrote a letter to the editor of the London 
Times reporting on an incident that they had heard about through their own contacts in 
the Ottoman Empire.   
 
Once an article had been published, a Parliamentarian (Bryce, or Stevenson or another 
member of the Anglo-Armenian Association) often brought it up in before Parliament.  
The Parliamentarian asked the Foreign Office representative whether or not there was 
some truth to the report.  The representative of the Foreign Office then would send a 
telegraph to the British Ambassador in Istanbul relaying the question and asking for an 
investigation to verify the report.  The British Ambassador would then telegraph the 
British Consul for Kurdistan, based in Erzurum (in the case of an Armenian issue in 
eastern Anatolia), and ask for verification of the newspaper article published in the press 
and brought up in Parliament.  The Erzurum consul would ask one of the vice-consuls 
stationed in Erzurum, Harput, Diyarbekir or Van to investigate.  The vice-consul would 
sometimes travel to where the incident allegedly took place.  Often, the vice-consul 
would stay with the missionaries of the ABCFM and ask them for information about 
whether or not the incident took place.  Once the vice-consul had more information, it 
would be passed along through telegraph wires to the Consulate in Erzurum, the Embassy 
in Istanbul and finally back to Parliament.  There was, however, no guarantee that the 
representative of the British Foreign Office in Parliament would provide the 
Parliamentarian-inquisitors all the information they required.  The representative of the 
Foreign Office was often terse.  All knew that all questions and responses were public 
record, and published in every major British daily. 
